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Abstract 
 
In 1866, the Hong Kong colonial government imposed stamp duty on written 
instruments. The tax was imposed for 132 years during the British rule of Hong 
Kong and was retained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after 
the 1997 transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China. Despite 
the vast number of textbooks written on the application of the contemporary 
Hong Kong stamp duty law, little is known about the driving forces that lay 
behind the first imposition of stamp duty in Hong Kong and the forces that 
shaped its development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Little is 
revealed by the successes or failures of various stamp duty laws enacted to 
fulfil these forces. In order to deal with the knowledge gaps, this study uses the 
legal historical method and the legal comparative method to reconstruct an 
interpretation of stamp duty legal history for investigation. The study reveals that 
the first imposition of the tax was driven by the primary imperative to raise 
revenue followed by a secondary demand for social equity. It also reveals that 
the provisions of the first Hong Kong stamp duty legislation were influenced by 
local political demands occasioned by events leading to the American 
Revolution in the eighteenth century. The study demonstrates that, along with 
the dominant financial impetus, other social, economic, political, sustainability 
and pragmatic forces also shaped the stamp duty system under British rule. 
Social and economic forces supplemented the financial impetus from the 1960s 
onwards as key drivers for stamp duty legislative change. The study examines 
the explicit and discerned objectives of various historical Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinances in terms of the actual outcomes. The analysis reveals many novel 
lessons in stamp duty system design. The study also demonstrates that Hong 
Kong should not abolish its stamp duty system at the present time.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Aims of the study 
The British colonial government introduced stamp duty into Hong Kong in the 
mid-nineteenth century and since then, for almost 150 years, it has been the 
major tax in the country’s fiscal system. The stamp duty was applied as a tax on 
documents, and worked in tandem with house rates in the nineteenth century 
as the means whereby the colony ensured its financial survival and 
development. The stamp duty policy was formulated as a management strategy 
to control and develop the multi-cultural colony and ensure its self-sufficiency. 
The structure of the stamp duty mechanism and the rates at which it was 
applied reflected not only the financial requirements but also the economic, 
social and political needs of the colony. Thus the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the historical development of stamp duty in Hong Kong, to 
understand the underlying imperatives that gave it shape and substance and to 
focus on its incidence and implications for Hong Kong, drawing conclusions as 
to its efficacy and its potential for the future. 
 
This study examines Hong Kong’s system of stamp duty under British rule 
during 1841–1997, with three principal aims:  
 
1. To provide a detailed explanation of how the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system achieved its modern form just before the transfer of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to the 
People's Republic of China.  
 
2. To assess the historical experience to strengthen the design of 
the system in order to raise revenue more efficiently, effectively 
and equitably whilst at the same time promoting social 
development, economic growth and other objectives as 
envisioned by the government. 
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3. To indicate the future path for stamp duty in Hong Kong, 
whether embellished, maintained or abolished, and when 
considered in light of Hong Kong’s historical background, 
present circumstances and foreseen contexts. 
1.2 Research questions 
The principal aims will be achieved by focusing on the following specific 
research questions: 
 
1. Was the Hong Kong stamp duty system intentionally and 
thoughtfully conceived in order to achieve any predetermined 
social, economic, political and other outcomes, or was it 
simply a tool of the government’s need to raise revenue with 
no regard for the subject matter of its charge? What were the 
imperatives that shaped the stamp duty system into its 
modern form and did the nature and importance of the 
imperatives change as Hong Kong progressed? 
 
2. What were the associated historical and ideological forces that 
enabled the Hong Kong stamp duty system to evolve into its 
modern form whilst accomplishing the imperatives identified 
under Research Question 1?  
 
3. How far were the personalities and qualities of individual 
Governors and other senior bureaucrats material in shaping 
the Hong Kong stamp duty system?  
 
4. How far has the historical development of Hong Kong stamp 
duty been successful in achieving the various predetermined 
policy outcomes, and what are the lessons to be learned from 
this process? 
 5. What are those features of the Hong Kong stamp duty system 
that contribute to its success or failure? 
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6. What are the undesirable provisions of the modern Hong Kong 
stamp duty system? Are such provisions the surviving 
remnants of the historical evolution of the stamp duty system 
having become ingrained yet the original historical reason for 
their existence has been surpassed and reform made difficult? 
 
1.3 Research methodologies 
In order to achieve the aims, this study adopts an eclectic approach.1 Law is the 
home discipline and the principal emphasis. Essentially, the study consists of an 
historical analysis of the law related to Hong Kong stamp duty (as it was first 
conceived in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century and developed till the 
reversion of sovereignty in 1997) and an attempt to explain why the law was as 
it was. The eclectic approach focuses on the nexus between the changes in the 
stamp duty legislation with the financial imperatives, social, economic and 
political forces that shaped the law. 
 
The eclectic approach also informs how the Hong Kong stamp duty law was 
transformed to solve a range of essentially administrative problems.2 These 
problems include the need to improve accessibility to stamp duty regulations, to 
improve collection procedures, to provide safeguards to taxpayers, to counter 
evasions and to attend to other pragmatic government administrative problems 
that were not related to stamp duty.  
 
The following research methods will be employed to complement the eclectic 
approach: 
1. Legal-historical method; 
2. Legal-comparative method. 
 
Legal-historical method 
The legal-historical method adopted for this study consists of identifying, 
evaluating, synthesising, organising and analysing a variety of textual sources.3 
                                            
1 Margaret Lam and Andrew Lymer, ‘Producing Good Taxation Research’ in Lam Margaret and 
others (eds) Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2005), 281. 
2 Ibid 283–84. 
3 See section 1.8. 
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After arranging the information into a logical and chronological format, the 
evidence will be analysed in pursuit of themes and patterns relevant to the 
stated research questions, in due course fulfilling the research aims. 
 
To illustrate, one of the objectives of the legal-historical method is to provide 
interpretational history which constructs the legal development with facts and 
historical events and, at the same time, seeks to establish and evaluate 
relationships between the law and those facts and events. In other words, the 
intention is to knit together the historical black letter law development of the 
Hong Kong stamp duty and its administration with prevailing factors such as the 
social, political, economic conditions as well as the characters and qualities of 
the Hong Kong senior officials in charge of stamp duty policies, in order to 
provide an accurate and developed account of how stamp duty law has evolved 
through the past to the present and why the present system is in force today. 
The methodology serves to establish the historical relationship between 
functional substantive law development and a number of influencing factors in 
terms of the research questions 1 to 3.  
 
Besides contributing to the understanding of how and why the Hong Kong 
stamp tax system is so shaped, the contextualisation process of the legal 
historical methodology enables the outcomes of the chosen laws and policies to 
be measured. Historical arguments can be developed to treat the success(es) 
or failure(s) of the paths adopted in Hong Kong and lessons can be drawn 
accordingly. Further, an accurate interpretation of the past legal development in 
context of the related events will facilitate appropriate future decision-making. In 
this regard, the legal historical method assists in proposing reform or 
amendment to the existing law. The methodology assists in drawing 
conclusions from the historical development posed under research questions 4 
to 6.  
 
The application of the legal-historical method requires a number of clear stages 
in the research process: 
1. Establish the date of introduction of the stamp duty legislation in Hong 
Kong and the dates of any subsequent changes. Critically review the 
legislation and survey any relevant case law of the prevailing period. 
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2. Establish the dates of repealing and re-enacting Stamp Ordinances and 
the consequent changes of any re-enacted Ordinances. Critically review 
the legislation and survey any relevant case law appropriate to each 
period. 
 
3. Examine the Hong Kong Hansard and other sources to ascertain the 
reasons why the Stamp Ordinance was introduced and the reasons for 
subsequent changes. Similarly, examine the Hong Kong Hansard and 
other sources to identify reasons why the original Ordinance or the 
subsequent legislation was re-enacted. For any re-enacted Ordinance, 
analyse the consequential changes and the reasons for the changes. 
 
4. Investigate the Hong Kong history of the period before and after the 
introduction of each Stamp Ordinance to ascertain the social, political, 
and economic background of the introduction, re-enactments and 
changes to the Ordinance. 
 
5. Analyse the resulting interpretation of history from the introduction of the 
stamp duty law to the position at the time of the 1997 reversion of 
sovereignty to discern patterns and themes and draw conclusions to 
answer the research questions. 
  
Legal-comparative method 
The Hong Kong stamp duty system was introduced by the British colonial 
power.4 The application of the legal comparative method is to understand how 
similar stamp duty doctrine was developed in Britain, and as that doctrine has 
been tested empirically, to see what impact it has had in practice. This process 
is also to ascertain how effective was the historical British stamp duty law and 
the legal system in dealing with the problems faced by Britain. This does not 
simply refer to the historical technical doctrinal problems but the related social 
and economic problems that underlie them, and to see what role other factors 
                                            
4 See section 1.5. 
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have played in deciding the historical outcomes. 5  Contrasting the British 
position with the Hong Kong stamp duty doctrine generates measures to 
determine a more effective stamp duty law in Hong Kong. Similarities and 
differences between the historical stamp duty laws in the British and Hong Kong 
jurisdictions are examined to discern any reforming measures or solutions 
which were adopted into the modern Hong Kong stamp duty system. This also 
allows an understanding of the imperfections of the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system resulting from its historical evolution. 
 
The aim of the legal-comparative method adopted in this study is to draw 
inspiration for post-1997 Hong Kong stamp duty legal reforms or amendments 
as well as to foreshadow potential pitfalls in the selection of stamp law policies 
by the juxtaposition of the historical British legal positions and problems with 
those historical stamp duty issues in Hong Kong. 
 
The application of the legal-comparative method required a number of clear 
stages in the research process: 
1. Examine the Hong Kong Hansard and other sources to ascertain the 
reasons why the related Stamp Ordinances were enacted. 
 
2. Investigate the corresponding British provisions under the British Stamp 
Acts. Critically review the legislation. 
 
3. Assess the British House of Commons Parliamentary Papers and other 
sources to ascertain the reasons why the British Stamp Acts were 
enacted as they were. 
 
4. Compare and contrast local and British stamp duty laws and their 
respective backgrounds to determine the origins of associated problems. 
 
5. Establish the reasons for the modification(s) and any departure from 
British tenets.  
 
                                            
5 Geoffrey Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
(eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 2007), 87. 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 15 
6. Analyse the intuitions and judgements from the mappings and propose 
answers to the research questions. 
1.4 Organisation and structure 
The two research methods discussed above are applied throughout Chapters 2, 
3 and 4 to deal with the research questions in order to achieve the stated 
principal research aims. 
 
Chapter 1 sets out the research aims, research methodologies employed, 
background to the study, the significance of the investigation, and the state of 
art of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 analyses the driving forces as well as the historical events that led to 
the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century.  
 
Chapter 3 identifies and analyses in depth the various primary imperatives and 
establishes their relative importance in the on-going development of the stamp 
duty after the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century 
under the British jurisdiction through till the 1997 reversion of sovereignty to 
China.  
 
Chapter 4 identifies and investigates the secondary imperatives that moulded 
the Hong Kong stamp duty law.  
 
Chapter 5 concludes the investigation by drawing together the key findings from 
the evidence presented in the body of the thesis, to deal with the principal aims 
of the study, and to look to the future of the Hong Kong stamp duty. 
1.5 Background 
The Netherlands was the first country to introduce stamp duty.6 In the early 
1620’s, the Dutch government was hard-pressed for revenue because of the 
war with Spain. It imposed a number of new taxes and exhausted all traditional 
possibilities. 7  To seek new ideas, the Dutch administration offered a large 
                                            
6 Jan M Novotny, ‘Stamp Duties’ (1955) 15(3) The Journal of Economic History, 289. 
7 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 286. 
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reward for anyone who could devise a new, non-oppressive and practical form 
of taxation. 
 
Johannes van den Brooks, a revenue collector, responded that he had invented 
a way to obtain revenue that would not be burdensome to the citizens. He kept 
his newly devised tax secret till the government promised to reward him with an 
annual salary increase of 3,000 guilders – a vast amount in the fifteenth 
century. He submitted his plan and on 13 August 1624, the world’s first ever 
revenue stamp act was adopted. The new tax was collected by embossing a 
special seal on selected legal documents. By 1635, the tax now widely known 
as stamp duty was extended to all seven provinces of the Netherlands. The 
stamp duty was adopted within a few decades by neighbouring countries, 
notably Britain, Spain, France and Austria.8 Britain first adopted stamp duty in 
1670. 9  Besides imposing stamp duties on written instruments, British 
governments have also levied stamp duties on physical objects such as quack 
medicines, 10  hair powders, 11  perfumes, 12  cards, 13  dice, 14  hats, 15  gloves, 16 
mittens17 and many other physical items.18 
 
British possession of the Hong Kong Island began when Commodore Sir 
Gordon Bremer of the Royal Navy, acting under instructions of Captain Elliot 
(the British Plenipotentiary in China and Chief Superintendent of China Trade), 
occupied the island on 26 January 1841, in the course of the First Anglo-
Chinese War (1840–1843). The Hong Kong Island formally became a British 
                                            
8 Jan M Novotny, ‘Stamp Duties’ (1955) 15(3) The Journal of Economic History, 289; Stephen 
Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, London, Frank 
Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 290. 
9 British Stamp Act 1670 (22 & 23 Car 2 c 9); Edward Hughes, ‘The English Stamp Duties, 
1664–1764’ (1941) 56(222) The English Historical Review, 234; Stephen Dowell, A History of 
Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), 
vol 3, 287. 
10 British Stamp Act 1783 (23 Geo 3 c 62); Chantal Stebbings, ‘Tax and Quacks: The Policy of 
the Eighteenth–Century Medicine Stamp Duty’ in John Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax 
Law vol 6 (North America, Hart Publishing 2013), 283. Proprietary medicines were popularly 
known as quack medicines. They refer to medicines sold by unqualified entrepreneurs. These 
medicines with secret formulas were sometimes useless and often hazardous. 
11 Duty on Hair Powder Act 1795 (26 Geo 3 c 49). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Taxation Act 1711 (10 Anne c 18); Stamp Duties on Card and Dice Act 1828 (9 Geo 4 c 18). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Duty on Hats Act 1796 (36 Geo 3 c 125). 
16 Glove Duties Act 1785 (25 Geo 3 c 55). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 284–85. 
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colony on 26 June 1843 with the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking.19 When 
Britain again defeated the Chinese Qing government in the Second Anglo-
Chinese War (1856–1860), the Qing government ceded the Kowloon 
peninsula.20 It was the southern tip of Hsin An county on the Chinese Mainland 
across the harbour from the Hong Kong Island. In 1898, the Japanese defeated 
the Qing government in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895); the British 
government took the opportunity to lease for ninety-nine years from China that 
part of Hsin An county north of Kowloon and south of the Sham Chun River 
including 235 adjacent islands. The lease for the New Territories expired on 30 
June 1997.21 Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories are 
collectively known as Hong Kong. The Chinese Communist government 
resumed sovereignty of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. 
 
The Hong Kong stamp duty system was introduced by the British colonial 
government in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century and was retained by the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government after the 1997 hand-
over. During the 150 years of British administration, numerous reforms and 
amendments were made to the legislation and related practices to ensure the 
laws were suitable for local conditions. The end result is an independent set of 
stamp duty rules with prominent characteristics. It is notable that from its 
introduction till the British left in 1997, there was no attempt by the colonial 
government to levy Hong Kong stamp duty on objects similar to Britain’s 
practice in earlier times. As such the historical discussion in this study is limited 
to the charge on written documents only.  
 
Today, most countries levy stamp duty only on documents as the practice of 
imposing stamp duties on physical objects had disappeared completely. 
Furthermore, the number of documents subject to the charge has been greatly 
reduced. The principal modern documents 22  subject to stamp duty are 
                                            
19 Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional 
Reform in Hong Kong 1945–1952 (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1988), 1. 
20 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1973), 93. 
21 Ibid 261–62; Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at 
Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong 1945–1952 (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1988), 1. 
22 Some of the chargeable documents based on information extracted from various country tax 
profile guides published by KPMG in 2013, country master tax guides published by CCH in 
2013 and the online information published by the country tax authorities accessed on 25 April 
2014 are: Hong Kong: conveyances of immovable property, leases of immovable property, 
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conveyances of immovable property, leases of immovable property, instruments 
for the sale and purchase of stock, agreements for the transfer of taxable assets 
as determined by the respective legislations of different countries. Usually, a 
physical stamp (a revenue stamp issued by the government) is attached to the 
document and endorsed to indicate that stamp duty has been paid. Another 
practice is for a stamp to be impressed onto the document by the tax authority 
with the tax officer’s endorsement. Modern versions of the tax no longer require 
an actual stamp or impressed stamp but are collected instead by electronic 
means. For example, Section 19(1E) of the current Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance23 stipulated that even if the transfer of Hong Kong stocks is effected 
by electronic means in a recognised clearing house, the transaction shall be 
deemed to be a sale and purchase of Hong Kong stock and thus subject to 
Hong Kong stamp duty. The stock exchange is deemed to be the agent 
effecting the sale and purchase and thus has the responsibility of ensuring that 
stamp duty has been paid. In practice, stamp duty on such scripless24 trading 
activities will be paid through the Hong Kong stock exchange via its computer 
trading system.25  
1.6 Significance of the study 
The fiscal history itself is important in its own right. Tax legislation profoundly 
affects a nation’s prosperity or, indeed, its decline. For example, the economic 
decline of the Netherlands in the seventeenth century was due to their tax 
system in which heavy excise duty overburdened the country’s commerce and 
trade. The British rose to become a superpower because they managed their 
                                                                                                                                
instruments for sale and purchase of stock, bearer instruments. Taiwan: cash receipts, 
contractual agreements for job and task, contracts in relation to real properties submitted to the 
government for registration, conveyances of immovable property. South Korea: instruments for 
sale and purchase of stock, agreements on transferred of taxable assets such as immovable 
property, aircraft, motor vehicle, club membership and others. Japan: conveyances of 
immovable property, agreements on transfer of taxable assets such as mining right, intangible 
property right, vessel, aircraft, profit-making business and others, contractual agreements for 
job and task, promissory notes, bill of exchanges, share certificates, subscription certificates, 
bonds, beneficiary certificates, merger agreements, incorporation documents, deposit 
certificates, bills of lading, insurance certificates, letters of credit, trust documents, receipts, 
bank books. Singapore: conveyances of immovable property, leases of immovable property, 
instruments for sale and purchase of stock. 
23 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981). 
24 Securities trading where only book entries represent the security holding and settlement, and 
no physical certificate is issued or exchanged. 
25 See further, The Hong Kong Exchange, ‘Transaction cost’ 
<www.hkex.com.hk/eng/market/sec_tradinfo/trancost.htm> accessed 25 February 2014. 
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tax system effectively in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 26  In the 
twentieth century, thriving economies like Singapore and Taiwan pursued a low 
tax strategy and used tax exemptions to stimulate economies and to attract 
foreign investments. The ideology was that people would work harder if they 
were allowed to keep the fruits of their labour.27    
 
Furthermore, tax history is not merely the history of the system but also a prism 
through which the history of a jurisdiction may be viewed from a different 
perspective. The development of the taxation system within a jurisdiction’s 
social, political, economic and ideological context facilitates the exploration of 
the historical advancement of the corresponding society, and may shed a novel 
light on the development process. 
 
Today, the Hong Kong tax system as a whole is one of the most effective 
systems in the world. The taxpayers’ administrative and compliance burdens 
are exceptionally light compared to some other jurisdictions and yet the Hong 
Kong government usually maintains a significant surplus and generates 
impressive reserves.  
 
In this regard, the Hong Kong stamp duty system contributes significantly to the 
fiscal well-being of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government collected HK$51 
Billion and HK$44 Billion stamp duty revenue in the fiscal years 2010/11 and 
2011/12 respectively, which accounted for 17.6% and 13.3% of the total Hong 
Kong government’s revenue.28 Certainly, stamp duty has aided Hong Kong’s 
fiscal surplus tremendously and its significance to Hong Kong cannot be 
understated. It is certainly an important modern tax for Hong Kong and one with 
a long history. 
 
                                            
26 Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd 
edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 268. 
27 Ibid 424. 
28 Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, ‘Hong Kong Government Revenue and 
Expenditure under the General Revenue Account (Table 192) for 2010/11 and 2011/12’ 
<www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp110.jsp?tableID=194&ID=0&productType=8> accessed 21 
April 2014. 
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Empirical stamp duty research 29  conducted by Rao, drawing data from 
Australia, Denmark, England, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Macau, 
Mainland China, Singapore and Thailand from 1994 to 2004 demonstrated 
certain results. The empirical research measured a country’s ability to collect 
stamp duty revenue by comparing the total yearly stamp duty collected to the 
nation’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as the nation’s annual 
total governmental revenue received. There were two findings. First, Hong Kong 
was only ranked after Australia and Demark in terms of the total stamp duty 
collected as a proportion of its GDP. Second, Hong Kong was ranked first in 
terms of stamp duty collected as a proportion of its total governmental 
revenue.30 The statistical research conducted by Rao, further found that factors 
dictating the stamp duty revenue collection ability of a nation are not related to 
the nation's economic fluctuations and structure, but moderately related to its 
degree of commercial development and highly related to the sophistication of its 
stamp duty law and legislation in practice. 
 
Together, these results suggest that the Hong Kong stamp duty law and 
legislation is significant for the volume of its revenue collection. Based on the 
success of the Hong Kong substantive stamp duty law compared to other 
countries, a further analysis of the historical development of the Hong Kong 
stamp duty’s legal structure and substantive law will help to gain new 
perspectives on good public policies and law. This analysis will inspire future 
debates about black letter stamp duty legislation in Hong Kong as well as in 
other countries.  
 
The local debate about Hong Kong stamp duty is topical. The Hong Kong 
British colonial government had been undemocratic. Even after World War II 
when other British colonies such as Malaysia, Singapore and India called for 
government elections, Hong Kong remained indifferent. The reasons for this 
phenomenon include: the local office bearers and Chinese leaders were 
unwilling to change the keystone of what was proving to be a winning formula 
for the Hong Kong economic miracle in the few decades after the war; the local 
Chinese (who were, and remain, the majority of the population) expected from 
                                            
29 Lixin Rao饒立新, Zhongguo Yin Hua Shui Yan Jiu中國印花稅研究 [Study on Stamp Duty of 
China] (Beijing, Zhongguo Shui Wu Chu Ban She 2009).  
30 Ibid 124. 
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the British Governor more or less what they would expect from a father (a 
traditional Chinese father was perceived to be undemocratic and ruled the 
family via traditional Confucian values). In their perception, a Hong Kong 
Governor was a fu-mu-kuan – ‘fatherly and motherly like official’ – whose good 
intentions should not be questioned. 31  The major democratic breakthrough 
came late when the first member of the Hong Kong legislative council was 
elected in 1991 (just six years before the handover of Hong Kong to China).  
 
According to Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s theory, democracy may lead to heavy 
taxation and high public spending since democratically elected politicians are 
only temporarily in office. Since they are not the owners of the resources at their 
disposal, they have a strong incentive to spend money on projects and social 
welfares that make them popular, with little regard for the future. The financial 
burden created along the way will then need to be treated by their successors 
who in turn may resort to heavy taxation and debts.32 
 
The Hong Kong government has always been undemocratic and that has been 
the case since the days of its first Governor. Because of the theory of a positive 
correlation between democracy and tax increments, the colonial government’s 
low tax policy and undemocratic nature encountered little criticism. 
 
The political situation changed with the 1997 handover. Directly elected 
Legislative Councillors began to press for universal suffrage 33  and other 
                                            
31 Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional 
Reform in Hong Kong 1945–1952 (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1988). Tsang’s book is 
a good published source of information for constitutional developments in post-war Hong Kong. 
32 For example, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy–The God That Failed: The Economics 
and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, Transaction 
Publishers 2001), 82–89. 
33 In accordance with the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the Chief Executive is nominated and 
elected by an election committee which consists of representatives from commercial, 
professional, social and political sectors. Pro-democracy activists called this a “small circle 
election” and demanded that it should be replaced by universal suffrage. Under colonial rule, 
the Queen or the King of Britain appointed the Governor. There was no democratic election. 
However, the British pushed for democratisation of Hong Kong when they were departing. As a 
result, Beijing agreed, as stated in the Basic Law, the ultimate aim would be the selection of the 
Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating 
committee. The Standing Committee of the 10th Chinese National People Congress confirmed 
that universal suffrage might be implemented in the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive election 
subject to the nomination of the candidates by the nominating committee. The pan-democratic 
camp of Hong Kong, however, objected to the screening of candidates by the nominating 
committee and continued to protest and rally. 
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rights.34 It is clear that the population (or at least the Legislative Councillors) in 
Hong Kong no longer esteemed the Chief Executive (head of government in 
Hong Kong similar to the Hong Kong British Lieutenant Governor before 1997) 
as fu-mu-kuan. In order to win over voters, some Councillors advocated more 
socialistic policies and vehemently demanded more welfare spending. 
 
In the budget of 2014, the Chief Executive C Y Leung announced that he would 
spend prodigiously and roll out a massive poverty-relief package that would see 
recurrent government spending soaring by at least HK$10 billion a year.35 Hong 
Kong’s Financial Secretary John Tsang then forewarned of the risk of the 
budgetary surplus becoming a deficit after the Chief Executive’s speech: 
Reserves will not be exhausted in the current government's term but 
that does not mean such a day is far off. It was reasonable to worry 
about the recurrent expenditure growing too fast, as that would have 
a “snowball effect” and government efforts to streamline spending 
may prove futile. Hong Kong then would need to hike taxes or borrow 
money, as fiscal reserves would be exhausted. I will try my very best 
to ensure there is a surplus in the rest of my term so as to keep 
reserves up and hence leave more time to tackle structural 
problems.36  
The consequence of a high public spending policy is the need to amass 
revenue. There are on-going debates on widening the tax base in Hong Kong 
that is traditionally labelled as narrow. 37  Many public debates have been 
                                            
34 Sin Tze Ker, ‘Struggle for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong’ The Strait Times (Singapore 15 
April 2014) < http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/news/struggle-for-universal-suffrage-in-hong-kong/> 
accessed 2 September 2016. The report stated the political leaders in Hong Kong are struggling 
to find some workable compromise between pro-democracy groups and pro-Beijing politicians 
that will allow the Hong Kong Legislative Council to pass a reform Bill on universal suffrage 
acceptable to Beijing. Without it, the increasingly frequent protests and demonstrations seen in 
the territory in recent years will only increase. The political scene in Hong Kong has been 
increasingly chaotic lately. Protest rallies and marches have become the norm. The working 
class took the opportunity to protest for basic housing needs while the middle class protest 
about rising living costs and stagnant income. Young school and college leavers march to air 
their grievances about job hunting. Protesters also cried for press freedom. And pro-democracy 
politicians have been exploiting the situation, attributing the chaos to an “unfairly elected Chief 
Executive” who does not have a mandate from voters. 
35 Mary Ma, ‘Welfare Comes of Age with Leung’ The Standard (Hong Kong 15 January 2014) 
<www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news.php?id=141517> accessed 2 September 2016. 
36 Imogene Wong ‘Beware of reckoning, Tsang Warns' The Standard (Hong Kong 20 January 
2014) <www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news.php?id=141686> accessed 2 September 2016. 
37 Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, ‘2011 KPMG Australia Report for the Advisory 
Committee on New Broad-based Taxes for the Finance Bureau of the Government of Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region’ < 
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conducted on the probable introduction of a goods and services tax. The 
government also has the option to increase income tax and stamp duty rates. 
 
With such an option to change the Stamp Ordinance to enhance revenue, the 
historical evolution of the Hong Kong stamp duty law requires investigation to 
ascertain to what extent the success of the Hong Kong system is the result of 
historical initiatives. So far, it seems that the system was successful in ensuring 
revenue to support public finance. An understanding of why and how stamp 
duty law was developed during the colonial years and the prevailing cultures 
and values of those days will certainly help the current government face 
practical problems in the coming years. An informed understanding of the 
historical debates, critical turning points, patterns and end results of the 
previous policies, constitutes a secure guide for any stamp duty reform in the 
future. In the event that government policy makers decide to amend the current 
legislation to increase revenue to defray the imminent increase in public 
spending, the result of this study will facilitate appropriate decision-making in 
creating an acceptable, sustainable and yet effective and efficient future for 
Hong Kong stamp duty policy and law. 
 
On the one hand the Hong Kong stamp duty system was an indispensable 
source of revenue. On the other hand there were complaints about the stamp 
duty system, both historically and currently, which may lead to their abolition, 
and are usually categorised in the following terms: excessively complicated; 
difficult to enforce; unfair; damaging to the economy.38  
 
In particular, with regard to the perceived unfairness of stamp duty, in an article 
examining the legitimacy of imposing the new Hong Kong Special Stamp Duty 
                                                                                                                                
www.fstb.gov.hk/tb/en/docs/btreport_annex_hktaxbasestudy.pdf> accessed 10 April 2014. In 
the July 2001 report prepared by KPMG Australia, in conjunction with KPMG Hong Kong, for the 
Advisory Committee on New Broad-based Taxes for the Finance Bureau of the Government of 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the report concluded that Hong Kong's tax base was 
narrow in composition because of its heavy reliance on a limited range of taxes, such as profits 
tax and property-related taxes. In the June 2007 final report on public consultation on tax reform 
conducted by the Finance Bureau of the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative, it 
concluded that the public generally agreed that there were deficiencies in Hong Kong’s narrow 
tax base, and was more receptive to the need to broaden our tax base. The public also broadly 
agreed that a more stable revenue base would enhance Hong Kong’s fiscal health. As at today, 
no new taxes had been introduced in Hong Kong since the dates of the stated reports. 
38 Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Debate over Taxes 
(4th edn, Cambridge Massachusetts, United States, MIT Press 2008), 3–7. 
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in 2012,39 a Hong Kong critic questioned whether the imposition of the regular 
stamp duty on immovable properties in Hong Kong was fair to begin with. First, 
it was argued, the stamp duty ‘taxes transactions whether they generate a profit 
or loss, so in that sense it is unfair.’40 Second, it was advocated that ‘stamp duty 
is just bad policy’ as it was a fractional tax which impeded the efficient allocation 
of capital and was distortional for a number of reasons. As an illustration of the 
point, the article argued that under the current Hong Kong stamp duty 
legislation, other real assets such as antiques, jewellery and art were not 
subject to stamp duty and this was unfair.41 In 1989, British critic Nicolas Gibb 
advocated the repeal en masse of the stamp duty system, as the concurrent 
imposition of stamp duty with capital gains tax or income tax on the same 
transaction might lead to unfair double taxation. 42 
 
In relation to the rhetoric that stamp duty was bad for the economy, in 1983, the 
British Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury John Wakeham (in office 1983–
1987) commented on the British stamp duty system: ‘The case is often put that 
[British stamp duty] is a bad tax which ought to be abolished, because it is a tax 
on change, and the government seeks to promote change, rather than 
discourage it.’ Interpreting his words and applying what he said to stamp duties 
imposed on immovable properties, he argued that the duties levied on houses 
would inhibit people from improving their living conditions and thus decrease 
the incentive for them to undertake activities to better themselves and the 
                                            
39 The Government of the Hong Kong SAR introduced a number of amendments to the stamp 
duty regime in Hong Kong with the intention of cooling an over-heated property market. 
Implementing legislation for Special Stamp Duty and Buyer’s Stamp Duty has been passed 
under the 2014 Stamp (Amendment) Ordinance, No 2 of 2014 which has retrospective effect 
from 27 October 2012. Essentially Special Stamp Duty was payable on any residential property 
acquired, either by an individual or a company (regardless of where it is incorporated), and 
resold within 24 months if the property was acquired between 20 November 2010 and 26 
October 2012. The Hong Kong government had extended this period to 36 months if the 
property was acquired on or after 27 October 2012. Special Stamp Duty was assessed at rates 
varying from 5% to 20% depending on the period the property was held and was payable in 
addition to the basic stamp duty. 
40 Webb-Site Reports, ‘SSD, the Basic Law, and a lesson from Singapore’ < https://webb-
site.com/articles/ssd2.asp> accessed 14 January 2016; see also Nicolas Gibb, Duty to Repeal 
(London, Adam Smith Institute 1989), 12. 
41 Webb-site Reports, ‘SSD, the Basic Law, and a lesson from Singapore’ < https://webb-
site.com/articles/ssd2.asp> accessed 14 January 2016. 
42 In 1989, Nicolas Gibb argued to abolish the British stamp duty system en masse as the 
system induced a double taxation effect. In Britain, sales of immovable properties were subject 
to British capital gains tax. Likewise, the profits on share trading would attract British corporation 
tax on top of the stamp duty charged on the sales and purchases of related shares. In that 
sense stamp duty could be considered unfair as it caused double taxation. See Nicolas Gibb, 
Duty to Repeal (London, Adam Smith Institute 1989), 9. 
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economy at large. Stamp duty on immovable properties was also an 
impediment to foreign companies/foreign talents who may contemplate setting 
up operations in/relocating to Britain which imposed stamp duties on such 
immovable assets.43 
 
Similarly, in 1989, British critic Nicolas Gibb put forward Adam Smith’s rhetoric 
to argue for the complete abolition of the British stamp duty system:44  
All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as 
they diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the 
funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all 
more or less unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the 
sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers, 
at the expence of the capital of the people, which maintains none but 
productive.45 
It could be interpreted that Gibb’s argument was that stamp duty on immovable 
properties would affect economic behaviour and thus ruin long run prosperity. 
 
To further support his motion to abolish the British stamp duty system, Gibb 
pointed out that the abolition of stamp duty in respect of share transactions and 
other financial dealings would defend London’s position as a major financial 
centre, despite threats from other major European centres such as the Frankfurt 
and Paris stock exchanges.46 Likewise, in Hong Kong recently, a critic said that 
Hong Kong should abolish its stamp duty on share trading so as to encourage 
international dealers to trade in the Hong Kong market.47 
 
The investigation of the historical development of Hong Kong’s stamp duty 
system permits an assessment of the extent to which these arguments were, 
and are today, valid in Hong Kong. 
                                            
43 Nicolas Gibb, Duty to Repeal (London, Adam Smith Institute 1989), 5–6. 
44 Nicolas Gibb, Duty to Repeal (London, Adam Smith Institute 1989), 2. 
45 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (first published 
1776, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1976), book V, c 2, para 126.  
46 Nicolas Gibb, Duty to Repeal (London, Adam Smith Institute 1989), 9–10. See generally 
Oxera, ‘Stamp Duty: Its Impact and the Benefits of its Abolition’ (2007) Oxera Research Report 
Prepared for ABI, City of London Corporation, IMA and London Stock Exchange 
47 Tom Holland, ‘Hong Kong should Scrap its Stamp Duty on Share Trading’ The South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong 18 October 2013) <www.scmp.com/business/banking-
finance/article/1333961/hong-kong-should-scrap-its-stamp-duty-share-trade> accessed 5 
September 2016. 
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1.7 Scholarship 
In the late nineteenth century, Kyshe Norton wrote about the history of Hong 
Kong legal development in his work The History of the Laws and Courts of 
Hong Kong.48 Norton traced the rise, progress, and successive changes in the 
various legal institutions and the development of the colonial law and practices 
in respect of Hong Kong in the nineteenth century. He indicated the date of the 
introduction of the first Stamp Duty Ordinance in Hong Kong and highlighted the 
vehement public opposition against the enactment. He made little reference to 
the motivation behind the introduction. Norton did not discuss the operation of 
the first Stamp Duty Ordinance in detail and omitted from his work all the 
subsequent stamp duty legislative changes that occurred in the nineteenth 
century. He appeared to have understated the revenue law in his work to give 
way to other legal developments.  
 
Ernst Eitel, a prominent Hong Kong historian in the nineteenth century, in 
addition to recording the commencement of stamp duty in Hong Kong, also 
discussed the first stamp duty amendment in his work Europe in China.49 He 
appeared to have believed that the amendment was to restore tax equity as 
proposed by the colonial government, a view that is disputed in this study. 
 
After World War II, literature on the general history of Hong Kong was 
abundant. Important works included G B Endacott, Government and People in 
Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History;50  Steve Tsang, A Modern 
History of Hong Kong;51 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong;52 
Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong.53 Although literature was prolific in this 
area, there was no attempt to explain the historical development of Hong Kong 
stamp duty. Some authors used the introduction of Hong Kong house rates in 
1845 to illustrate the social and political background when Hong Kong was just 
ceded to Britain. Authors seldom commented on Hong Kong stamp duty and its 
place in history. The introduction of stamp duty was only briefly mentioned to 
                                            
48 (first published 1898, Hong Kong, Vetch and Lee 1971). 
49 (first published 1895, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1983). 
50 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964). 
51 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2004). 
52 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2007). 
53 (London, Harper Collins 1997). 
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illustrate the robust personality of the Hong Kong Governor, who introduced 
stamp duty in Hong Kong in the mid-nineteenth century.54  
 
The leading text on Hong Kong stamp duty is P G Willoughby and A J Halkyard, 
A Guide to Hong Kong Stamp Duty.55 This was a masterly technical account of 
Hong Kong stamp duty. The work concentrated on giving guidance on modern 
stamp duty practices and providing suggestions about how to avoid modern 
stamp duty pitfalls. The authors’ core objective was to describe to readers the 
operation of the law, substantiated by a vast number of selected case laws. The 
monograph stated the year of the introduction of Hong Kong stamp duty as well 
as the years of some (but not all) subsequent re-enactments of the legislation 
but did not provide any detail. The work did not attempt an explanatory 
historical account of the evolution of Hong Kong stamp duty system from 1866 
to the present day, as it was irrelevant to the authors’ aim in preparing the book. 
 
There were other works on specific tax histories of Hong Kong. They included, 
Michael Littlewood, Taxation without Representation: The History of Hong 
Kong's Troublingly Successful Tax System;56 Kenneth Pang, History of Rates in 
Hong Kong.57  Littlewood’s work is based on the history of the Hong Kong 
income tax system when it was first introduced in 1940. The author gave a vivid 
account of the introduction of income tax in Hong Kong and discusses the 
factors dictating the development of income taxation in Hong Kong. Pang’s 
work was, as the title implies, a historical account of rates in Hong Kong from its 
first introduction in 1845 to the present day. 58  It essentially traced all the 
changes to the Hong Kong rate legislation and the related rules from 1845 to 
2005. Both works served as valuable references for the examination of the 
interrelationship between Hong Kong stamp duty, Hong Kong income tax and 
the Hong Kong rate system. However, the works mentioned did not touch on 
Hong Kong stamp duty, an area that was not relevant to their specialist aims. 
 
Other literature on Hong Kong tax was almost all directed to the professional 
needs of practising lawyers and accountants, or for students undergoing 
                                            
54 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 238. 
55 (Hong Kong, Butterworths Asia 1999). 
56 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2010). 
57 (2nd edn, Rating and Valuation Department Hong Kong 2005). 
58 See section 2.1.1. 
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professional examination. They gave up-to-date accounts of existing practices 
in all branches of taxes operating in Hong Kong. The section on Hong Kong 
stamp duty was usually small compared to that of income tax. Leading texts in 
this area were: Ayesha Lau, Hong Kong Taxation Law and Practice;59 Dora Lee 
and C M Ho, Advanced Taxation in Hong Kong;60 Peter Willoughby and Andrew 
Halkyard, Encyclopaedia of Hong Kong Taxation 4 vol;61 Patrick Ho, Hong Kong 
Taxation and Tax Planning.62  
 
An article written by Michael Littlewood on the imposition of capital gains tax in 
Hong Kong: ‘Hong Kong’s Once – And Future? – Capital Gains Tax’, 63 
discussing the imposition of capital gain tax via the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system, was the most definitive study to date on one single part of Hong Kong 
stamp duty history.64 Other academic articles65 on Hong Kong stamp duty were 
generally updates of the legislation, comments on new cases relevant to Hong 
Kong stamp duty, or about the current operation of the law. There was no 
attempt to systemically track Hong Kong stamp duty legislation advancements 
during British colonial rule and to offer an explanation of the development of the 
tax.  
 
Following the development to this point, it is clear the referenced works did not 
discuss Hong Kong stamp duty history in detail as they had different aims and 
objectives, targeting different audiences, or else were pursuing alternative 
discourses. It is thus demonstrated that the history of Hong Kong’s stamp duty 
system required investigation for a number of reasons. First, no substantial 
literature on the general history of Hong Kong stamp duty has been published. 
Second, no extensive research has been undertaken on the historical doctrinal 
evolution of the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation and policies. Third, none of 
                                            
59 (Hong Kong, Chinese University Press 2013). 
60 (8th edn, Hong Kong, Longman 2003). 
61 (Hong Kong, Butterworth Asia 2013). 
62 (14th edn, Hong Kong, Pilot Publishing Company Ltd 2015). 
63 Asia Pacific Journal of Taxation, vol 2, No 4 (January 1998), 7–14 
64 See section 3.3.9. 
65 These papers include: Winnie Chung and Michael Littlewood, ‘The Arrowtown Case: Stamp 
Duty and the Ramsay Principle’ (2002) 6(4) Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation, 90; Y Y Butt and 
Patrick Ho, ‘Stamp Duty–A Tax Easily Overlooked’ (2002) 6(4) Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation, 
2; Thomas Lee and Danny Chan, ‘Another Pong Case–A Different Subject Matter–S 45, Stamp 
Duty Ordinance’ (2001) 5(4) Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation, 2; A J Halkyard, ‘Revenue Law 
Up–to–Date Part 1: Current Controversies in Estate Duty, and Developments in Stamp Duty’ 
(1996) Law Lecturers for Practitioners, 120. 
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the existing literature has focused on the historical development of Hong Kong 
stamp duty taking into account the financial, social, economic, political, and 
other contexts of policy making and legal development. Fourth, there is no 
research attempting to juxtapose Hong Kong’s historical stamp duty legislation 
and practices with the established positions in Britain, in an attempt to explain 
the peculiarities of the historical issues faced by Hong Kong. This study will deal 
with such gaps in the scholarship and thereby provide an original contribution to 
our knowledge of the Hong Kong fiscal system. 
1.8 Sources 
The study is essentially an historical examination of Hong Kong stamp duty. As 
such, most of the sources used to prove the various assertions in the study will 
be formal Hong Kong primary legal sources and other Hong Kong original 
sources. Similar sources relating to the introduction and evolution of the British 
stamp duty were also used, reflecting Hong Kong’s status as a British colony 
when the stamp duty was first introduced and from which it evolved for more 
than a century. Various secondary sources completed the source base for this 
study.  
 
Formal Hong Kong primary legal sources 
The most important of the formal Hong Kong primary legal sources is the Hong 
Kong stamp duty legislation. This was published as the Hong Kong Government 
Gazette Legal Supplement No 1. A complete series is housed in the University 
of Hong Kong Lui Che Woo Law Library as well as in the University of Hong 
Kong Main Library special collections. Physical examination of the indexes for 
the over one hundred years under examination was necessary to extract the 
relevant Ordinances. Electronic sources were available for the stamp duty 
legislation before World War II under the University of Hong Kong digital 
initiatives of Hong Kong Government Reports Online66 as well as the Historical 
Laws of Hong Kong Online.67 Nonetheless, a search of the aforementioned 
databases might not produce desirable outcomes as compared to a physical 
examination of Hong Kong Government Gazette Legal Supplement No 1. In any 
event, the physical examination of Hong Kong Government Gazette Legal 
                                            
66 <http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkgro/index.jsp> accessed 21 June 2015. 
67 <http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/exhibits/show/oelawhk/home> accessed 21 June 2015. 
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Supplement No 1 was necessary for historical Stamp Ordinances promulgated 
after World War II as there was no digital online database available for a quick 
search for these years. The up-to-date Stamp Ordinance in operation could be 
found in the volumes of the Laws of Hong Kong which was presented in a 
loose-leaf format. The enactment history for the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
was presented as a preamble. Nevertheless, this only pinpointed the years in 
which amendments were made from the year 1981 onwards, the year in which 
the current Stamp Ordinance was enacted.  
 
Through the examination of the Hong Kong Government Gazette Legal 
Supplement No 1, other Hong Kong legislation that was not specifically enacted 
only for stamp duty, but nevertheless had a significant impact on the stamp duty 
system, was discovered.  
 
In order to analyse the differences between the actual Stamp Duty Ordinance 
passed and the corresponding Stamp Duty Bills, the Hong Kong Government 
Gazette Legal Supplement No 3, which published all the Hong Kong Bills, was 
consulted. 
 
Another branch of law that had borne upon how Hong Kong was governed 
during the colonial days, was a certain aspect of the Chinese Qing Dynasty law 
that the British Colonial government allowed to be practised in Hong Kong. This 
was the case even after the Qing Dynasty was consigned to history after 1911. 
As an illustration, before 1971, Hong Kong Chinese males were still allowed to 
have plural marriages based on the Qing Dynasty Law. Nonetheless, the 
colonial government did not allow any Qing revenue or stamp duty regulations 
to have a foothold in Hong Kong. As such, the examination of the Qing Dynasty 
revenue law68 was not necessary for this study. However, the content of some 
Hong Kong stamp duty legislation promulgated by the British colonial 
government was affected by Chinese customs. 
 
Besides legislation, the case law relating to Hong Kong stamp duty was 
examined. Hong Kong had no adequate law reports until 1905. Prior to that 
                                            
68 A comprehensive English source is Shao Kwan Chen, The System of Taxation in China in the 
Tsing Dynasty 1644–1911 (first published 1914, New York, AMS Press 1970). 
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year, the English language newspapers reported on some cases before the 
Hong Kong courts, and often a complete record of evidence, legal argument, 
and judgment was preserved in their pages. Lawyers used to cut them out and 
paste them into scrapbooks.69 But this was scarcely satisfactory; in any event, 
no such scrapbooks seem to have survived to the present day, and thus the 
knowledge of nineteenth century decisional law on Hong Kong stamp duty, if 
any, was non-existent. For the twentieth century case law on Hong Kong 
taxation, the tax cases were grouped under the specialist law report of Hong 
Kong Tax Cases published by the Hong Kong government. 
 
Formal British primary legal sources 
Relevant British stamp duty legislation was examined to illustrate the progress 
of, as well as to serve as a comparison to, the stamp duty law promulgated in 
Hong Kong. 
 
In order to locate the formal British legislative sources on stamp duty, two 
secondary sources were of great assistance. They were Stephen Dowell, A 
History of Taxation and Taxes in England vol 370 and J G Monroe and R S 
Nock, Monroe and Nock on the Law of Stamp Duties.71 These two texts served 
as a convenient starting point to identify the relevant British statutes. The former 
text indicates the years in which stamp duty legislation was enacted or 
amended in Britain before 1885. The latter contains an appendix summarising 
the major British Stamp Duty Acts enacted from 1894 to the late twentieth 
century. Once the identity of the relevant British legislation was established, 
electronic resources were used to obtain the British Statutes. The Justis United 
Kingdom Statutes & Statutory Instruments database72 was an excellent online 
database in this respect.   
 
Besides British stamp duty legislation, British stamp duty case law principles are 
also of importance as they were binding in Hong Kong reflecting Hong Kong as 
a British colony during the period under examination. Such British stamp duty 
cases decided before 1997 are still valid after the 1997 handover. In this regard, 
                                            
69 Peter Wesley Smith, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1998), 60. 
70 (first published 1884, London, Frank Cass & Co 1965). 
71 (7th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell 1989). 
72 <www.justis.com/default.aspx> accessed 22 June 2015. 
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relevant British stamp duty case law was extracted from the electronic database 
such as the Lexis Library.73  
Other Hong Kong original sources 
An important Hong Kong original source to assist in discovering how a particular 
Stamp Duty Bill had been debated in the Hong Kong Legislative Council is the 
Hong Kong Hansard.74 It is formally known as the Reports of the meetings of 
the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. As the name implies, it records the 
proceedings of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. The Hong Kong Hansard is 
available online as a free database maintained by the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council for all years since 1858 (excepting the period during the Japanese 
occupation).75 
 
Another original source is the Hong Kong Government Gazette. It first appeared 
in 1841. In the beginning, it was a supplement to the Canton Press, and was 
successively printed in newspapers such as Friends of China, Hong Kong 
Register and China Mail. In 1853, the Gazette became a separate publication.76 
It continues today as the publication of the Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, renamed as the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Gazette. Hard copies are kept at the University of 
Hong Kong Lui Che Woo Law Library. Online records were only available for 
the years before 1942 from the database Hong Kong Government Reports 
Online77  and after 1999 from the database of The Government of HKSAR 
Gazette.78 The earlier Gazette contains material of interest such as letters from 
the public bodies to the Governors of Hong Kong in the nineteenth century that 
was not published in any other sources and other relevant resources. 
 
                                            
73 <https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/auth/bridge.do?rand=0.6064698202612969> accessed 
22 June 2015. 
74 Hansard is the traditional name of the transcripts of parliamentary debates in Britain and 
many Commonwealth countries. It is named after Thomas Hansard (1776–1833), a London 
printer and publisher, who was the first official printer to the Parliament at Westminster in the 
early nineteenth century. 
75 <www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/former/lc_sitg.htm> accessed 22 June 2015. 
76 Hong Kong Public Records Office, ‘The Hong Kong Government Gazette’ 
<www.grs.gov.hk/ws/erp/en/highlights/gazette.html> accessed 11 September 2014. 
77 <http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkgro/index.jsp> accessed 21 June 2015. 
78 <www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/> accessed 22 June 2015. 
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For the yearly statistics on the amount of stamp duty revenue collected by the 
Hong Kong government, the Hong Kong Annual Report series that were 
published from 1889 to 1946 is of assistance. Physical copies are available at 
the University of Hong Kong Main Library special collections.   
 
The series of Annual Reports of the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department 
which were published during and after 1956 were useful in extracting the stamp 
duty collection statistics. The Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department only 
became responsible for the collection of stamp duty from 1 February 1956.79 
The older reports are available as electronic copies digitalised by the University 
of Hong Kong. A request for the links to the online materials can be made at the 
special collections counter at the University of Hong Kong Main Library. 
 
Other British original sources 
An important original source was The Great Britain Colonial Office Series 
related to Hong Kong held by the British Public Record Office in microfilm 
format. Certain copies are available at the University of Hong Kong Main Library 
special collections microfilm room. The various Colonial Office (CO) series that 
have been surveyed include CO129, CO131, CO349, CO381, CO403, CO489, 
CO537, CO1023, CO1025, CO1026 and CO1030. Some of the series contain 
relevant correspondence between the Colonial Office in London and the 
Governors of Hong Kong and also the Colonial Office’s internal documents 
stating the senior officials’ views on such correspondence relating to Hong 
Kong stamp duty.80 The most valuable of these, by far, were the series of files 
categorised under CO129. The research on the pre-World War II Hong Kong 
stamp duty system relied heavily on this original source. Indeed, in the 
nineteenth century, due to the brief nature of the Hong Kong Hansard reports, 
that often did not relate the subtle facts and the hidden rationales of the stamp 
duty law enacted, this source is of paramount importance to the understanding 
of the Hong Kong stamp duty system. More often than not, in the nineteenth 
                                            
79 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1956–57’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1957), 1. 
80 For an understanding of how the Colonial Office records are categorised see Mandy Banton, 
Administering the Empire, 1801–1968: A Guide to the Records of the Colonial Office in the 
National Archives of the UK (London, University of London, Institute of Historical Research 
2008), 49–106. 
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century, the Hong Kong Governors communicated freely with the Secretaries of 
State for the Colonies of the British Colonial Office through this previously 
undisclosed correspondence collected under The Great Britain Colonial Office 
Series. 
 
The study also draws upon the historical debates on British stamp duty law 
available in the British Journal of House of Commons (1688–1834) as well as 
the British House of Commons Hansard (1803–2005), which provides an 
invaluable route to understanding how the British system of stamp duty evolved 
and to what extent it was brought into Hong Kong in the late nineteenth century. 
These sources help to comprehend why the Hong Kong stamp duty system 
commenced as it did and the underlying motives and perceptions of the British 
stamp duty provisions adopted in Hong Kong, if any. The materials are 
available under the online database of British House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers maintained by ProQuest. 
 
Secondary sources 
In addition to the formal primary legal sources and other original sources, the 
study also relied on secondary sources which were mainly in the form of 
monographs, textbooks and journal articles. Some of the sources were directly 
related to taxation and stamp duty. Other non-tax-related sources were also 
used to understand how diverse factors moulded the Hong Kong stamp system 
into its modern shape. Secondary sources of eight main kinds were relied on. 
 
First, are the sources related to the history of stamp duty. These consisted of 
mainly British, American, Australian and Chinese accounts of stamp duty 
history. They are of fundamental significance to the understanding of why the 
Hong Kong stamp duty system was written in a certain way. The monographs 
on the history of stamp duty in China not only provide an understanding of how 
the Qing Dynasty officials received the western idea of stamp duty during the 
Qing Dynasty in the late nineteenth century, but also provide a platform to 
understand how the Hong Kong government avoided certain failures associated 
with the practice of stamp duty in China during the Qing dynasty and the 
succeeding Kuomintang era, as advocated by the authors. 
 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 35 
Second, are the sources related to the history of taxation. Notwithstanding that 
none of the sources under this category specifically relate to Hong Kong stamp 
duty history, these still provide accounts of the histories of the tax system which 
are useful both for general understanding and for approaches to the subject 
they indicated. Besides providing useful background, some of the monographs 
also deliver discussions on the taxation theories that emerged during the course 
of the study of the histories of the respective tax systems pertinent to the 
historical study of the Hong Kong stamp duty system. 
 
Third, are the sources of substantive stamp duty law in Hong Kong and Britain. 
These textbooks and practitioner books assisted in the understanding of the 
evolution of black-letter stamp duty law in Hong Kong and provide a foundation 
for research on the linkages of the stamp duty law with wider financial, political, 
economic and social policy concerns of the Hong Kong government. 
 
Fourth, are the sources of the general history of Hong Kong. These sources are 
vital in providing an understanding of the historical settings as to why stamp 
duty was introduced in Hong Kong as well as why stamp duty changes were 
implemented. These sources are also critically employed in the analysis of 
relationships between social policies and Hong Kong stamp duty. 
 
Fifth, are the sources of history of the courts and law in Hong Kong. This 
category provides a background for how stamp duty law was administered in 
Hong Kong. Within this category, some sources related to the court system and 
philosophy during the Qing Dynasty are selected to contrast with the Hong 
Kong British system to provide explanations of the Hong Kong Chinese’ 
attitudes towards the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong in the nineteenth 
century.  
 
Sixth, are the sources of government, politics and administration of Hong Kong. 
These sources are important in the derivation of explanations for Hong Kong 
stamp duty policies relative to the role of the Hong Kong and British 
governments, as well as other non-government actors such as pressure groups 
and public opinion.   
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Seventh, are sources of economic background. These mainly relate to 
economic efficiency with regard to the effects of taxation on the willingness to 
work, to save and to invest. Some sources relate to tax equity and tax 
incidence. Some monographs under this category discuss macroeconomic 
policy to promote economic growth. Although none of these economic 
publications deliberated on the Hong Kong stamp duty policies and their effects 
on the Hong Kong economy, they are crucial in providing approaches to the 
analysis of the economic aspects of the Hong Kong stamp duty system. 
 
Eighth, are the sources of research methods for law and taxation. These 
provide vital guidelines on the general approaches to legal and taxation 
research methods, which were adopted throughout the study. 
1.9 Referencing matters 
The Chinese mandarin pinyin system will be used for the transliteration of 
Chinese terms. Exceptions are names of Cantonese 81  origin which have 
already been widely published by local English newspapers or used extensively 
in Hong Kong government documents under the Hong Kong government’s 
Cantonese Romanisation method. This exception is prudent as any attempt to 
use the Chinese mandarin pinyin system to transliterate them may increase 
rather than alleviate confusion.  
                                            
81 Cantonese is a Chinese dialect that originated in the vicinity of Canton. Nowadays, within the 
Mainland China, it is spoken widely in Guangdong Province. Outside Mainland China, it is the 
language used by the population of Hong Kong and the Macau people in everyday life. It is also 
spoken by overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia (like Malaysia and Singapore), 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States. According to the South China 
Morning Post of 6 October 2009, Putonghua is the official language on the Mainland China, but 
if history had played out differently the vast majority could have been speaking Cantonese. In 
1912, shortly after the fall of the Qing dynasty, the founding fathers of the republic met to decide 
which language should be spoken in the new China. Mandarin – now known as Putonghua [the 
common language] – was then a northern dialect spoken by the hated Manchurian Qing court 
officials. While it had served as China's lingua franca for centuries, many perceived it as an 
'impure form' of Chinese. Many of the revolutionary leaders, including Dr Sun Yat-sen, were 
from Guangdong – which has long been China's land of new ideas. A great debate started 
between the delegates and eventually led to a formal vote. Cantonese lost out by a small 
margin to Putonghua and the rest is history. See Editorial, ‘Cantonese Almost Became the 
Official Language’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong 6 October 2009) 
<www.scmp.com/article/694592/cantonese-almost-became-official-language> accessed 2 
September 2016. 
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Chapter 2 The origins of Hong Kong stamp duty 
 
This chapter aims to identify the primary and secondary imperatives that led to 
the introduction of a stamp duty system in Hong Kong. The ensuing 
investigation specifically explores financial necessity as the primary impetus, 
and considers the roles of other non-financial demands. This evaluation will 
reflect the extent to which these imperatives may have shaped the stamp duty 
law when it was first enacted in Hong Kong. 
 
In order to discern the drivers underlying the introduction of the stamp duty to 
Hong Kong, the historical basis for Hong Kong’s first Stamp Duty Ordinance is 
investigated, as well as the implications for colonial governance in Hong Kong. 
The investigation focuses on the origins, evolution and rationale for the 
development of the British Stamp Act from its Dutch antecedents, qualified by 
Britain’s stamp duty experience during its colonial governance of North 
America, until its modified adoption as a stamp duty system in Hong Kong. The 
first Hong Kong stamp duty legislation will then be analysed in detail to show 
why certain elements of the British Stamp Act were adopted while others were 
omitted.  
 
In this context, the objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, is to identify the 
forces that gave rise to the need for and introduction of the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system. Second, is to investigate the British origins of the first Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance, and other probable antecedents. 
 
In order to attain the first objective, the financial and non-financial imperatives in 
the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong, and the various social, political, 
and ideological forces in Hong Kong potentially shaping the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system, are investigated.  
 
In order to attain the second objective, the salient features of the Britain’s 
Stamp Duty Acts before the introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
are investigated. The Acts provide a platform for analysing the introduction of 
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stamp duty in Hong Kong in respect of its charging sections, computation 
methods, jurisdictions subject to tax, collection methods, safeguards and 
noncompliance rules. The introduction of stamp duty in America in 1765 that 
subsequently led to American independence will be explored in order to 
ascertain how far the American experience affected the introduction of stamp 
duty into Hong Kong. This study will explore to what extent the factors that 
caused the American Stamp Act to be unacceptable and unsustainable 
influenced the British colonial administrative and fiscal policy during the early 
period when the British took over Hong Kong. 
2.1 The driving forces behind the introduction of Hong Kong stamp duty 
This section aims to identify and explore the imperatives that underpinned the 
introduction of the first Hong Kong stamp duty legislation – the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1866.82 
2.1.1 Early colonial Hong Kong and its revenue needs 
It seems intuitively evident that in order to ascertain the imperatives which 
occasioned the introduction of stamp duty into Hong Kong in 1866 one needs to 
examine the colony’s financial circumstances in the years immediately prior to 
the enactment of the Ordinance. 
 
Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary when Hong Kong Island was 
ceded, described it as ‘a barren island, which will never be a mart of trade’,83 
yet Hong Kong Island was in fact inhabited by local Chinese carrying out 
various commercial activities before the British took control. The population of 
Hong Kong Island in 1841 was around 5,000 to 7,000 persons.84 Hong Kong 
soon became attractive to Chinese of all walks of life from Guangdong as well 
as European merchants. By the year 1845, according the census conducted by 
the government, Hong Kong’s population was 23,817.85 
 
Being a multiracial community, the first task for the Hong Kong government was 
to set up a police force to maintain law and order. This required financial 
                                            
82 No 12 of 1866. 
83 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 1. 
84 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 19. 
85 Hong Kong Census (1844), CO129/12, 304–10. 
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resources. John Davis, the second Governor (in office 1844–1848), raised 
revenue to support the police force by levying rates on properties.86 The tax 
was based on a percentage of the value of each parcel of ground, house or 
building, and was payable by the owner or occupier. The Governor, with the 
advice of the Executive Council, determined the percentage. The sum was 
calculated to not exceed the expenses of the police establishment.87 The British 
merchants immediately protested and presented a petition to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. Nevertheless, Davis enjoyed the support of the 
Secretary and the first Rating Ordinance, Ordinance No 2 of 1845 was 
enacted.88  
 
From 1845 to 1865, Hong Kong’s public expenditure was financed by rates – 
the only form of taxation in the colony till the introduction of stamp duty in 1866 
– sales of land, opium licences and spirit licences with no other plausible 
avenue to boost public revenue.89 A vast portion of public money was used to 
combat burglary and piracy, and to improve the general sanitary conditions of 
the colony in its formative years. This increased the Governor’s difficulties in 
balancing the budgets as well as the provision of other public goods. The 
deficiency in revenue caused the colony to be constantly in financial straits. 
 
On 25 July 1866, Sir Richard MacDonnell, the sixth Governor of Hong Kong (in 
office 1866–1872), informed the Hong Kong Legislative Council that the 
government had been running a deficit for three years and he expected that 
there would be a deficit in 1867 as well.90 It was in this context that MacDonnell 
tabled a bill entitled ‘Establishing of a Stamp Office, and Imposing and 
Regulating Stamp Duties in the Colony’ for debate in the Legislative Council on 
                                            
86 Alvin Rabushka, Value for Money: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process (Hoover Institution 
Press 1976), 12. 
87 Kenneth Pang, History of Rates in Hong Kong (2nd edn, Rating and Valuation Department 
Hong Kong 2005), 1–2. It is interesting to note that the Cantonese term for rates is still in use 
today – Chai Heung, which literally means policemen’s salary. 
88 Steve Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional 
Reform in Hong Kong 1945–1952 (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1988), 2. 
89 Information available from the Revenue and Expenditure Reports of the Colony of Hong Kong 
1845 to 1865 published in the Hong Kong Blue Book. See Hong Kong Government, ‘Blue Book’ 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government Printer, 1845–1865). 
90 Meeting of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (July 25 1866), CO129/115, 46. 
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14 August 1866.91 The Governor highlighted his intention to introduce stamp 
duty in order to reduce the estimated 1867 budget deficit of HK$120,000.92 
 
To be precise, when MacDonnell presented the stamp duty bill in 1866, he 
showed the Legislative Council the various deficits to emphasise the importance 
and necessity for a new tax. The deficits were as follows:93 
1. Maintenance of gun-boats    HK$26,000 
2. Reservoir at Pok Fu Lam   HK$50,000 
3. Sanatorium at Kowloon   HK$11,000 
4. Carriage road to Gap    HK$23,000 
5. Roads in Kowloon     HK$4,000 
  HK$114,000 
 
The foregoing deficits were selected to make a forceful point in the Legislative 
Council. The investigation shows that MacDonnell promoted the stamp duty law 
and pre-empted opposition by not highlighting in the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, the annual military contribution of HK$94,000 94  demanded by the 
British government. Such military contribution was the centre of discussion with 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies as it was the major cause of the Hong 
Kong budget deficit.95 In the Legislative Council, he concentrated on the need 
for public money to improve sanitary conditions, combat pirates and build roads 
as well as to develop the Kowloon Peninsula, which the British had acquired 
from the Qing government a few years previously. This evidence indicates that 
the introduction of stamp duty in 1866 was in response to the dire financial need 
of the colony at that time. 
 
MacDonnell advised that the first Hong Kong stamp duty bill presented to the 
Legislative Council replicated that of another British colony, the Singapore 
Stamp Ordinance, with seventy-one heads of charge incorporating various 
                                            
91 Hong Kong Hansard 14 August 1866. 
92 Hong Kong Hansard 5 September 1866. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Hong 
Kong’ (Hong Kong Government 8 September 1866); The 1867 Hong Kong Appropriation Bill, 
No 10 of 1866.  
95 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115, 33. 
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chargeable instruments for stamp duty.96 By adopting the Singapore legislation, 
MacDonnell intended to enhance the acceptability and sustainability of the 
Hong Kong stamp law. This was based on the ideology which he articulated in 
the Legislative Council: ‘As Singapore, having a similar background as Hong 
Kong, enacted the stamp law with no disappointment, stamp duty should be the 
best policy for Hong Kong permitted by the circumstances at that time’.97 He 
further promoted his observation of Singapore’s development and conjectured 
the future of Hong Kong stamp duty in the Legislative Council that the 
imposition of a stamp duty in Singapore ‘had not produced in (sic) a less 
wealthy colony than Hong Kong’.98 
 
The evidence reveals that although MacDonnell showed political wisdom in 
using Singapore as a model to promote his stamp duty policy and refrained 
from accentuating the sensitive issue of military contribution, he nevertheless 
honestly admitted in the Legislative Council that his objective in implementing 
stamp duty was incontestably to raise revenue. By examining the 
correspondence between MacDonnell and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies,99 it becomes clear that there is no evidence to suggest MacDonnell 
had another dominant objective in mind that was contrary to the revenue-raising 
aim when he advocated the implementation of a stamp duty system. 
 
The introduction of the new duty was vigorously opposed, suggesting the 
recognition by the Legislative Council that the stamp duty legislation was an 
unambiguous measure to raise revenue. Subsequent to the Governor’s 
announcement of his intention, all three unofficial members100 of the Legislative 
Council, James Whittall, John Dent and H B Gibb,101 submitted a written protest 
on 29 August 1866, together with a long list of signatories from the Hong Kong 
                                            
96 Establishing a Stamp Office, and Imposing and Regulating Stamp Duties in the Colony Bill 
(1866), sch. 
97 Meeting of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (25 July 1866), CO129/115, 45. 
98 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115, 35. 
99 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115. 
100 Individuals who are appointed by the Governor to be a member of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council but who are not a civil servant. See also section 2.4.2. Throughout this thesis, the term 
‘unofficial member’ is employed, instead of another commonly used term ‘non-official member’. 
101 British heads of business of prominent trading firms Jardine, Matheson & Co, Dent & Co and 
Gibb, Livingston & Co respectively. 
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British community, objecting to the enactment of the proposed Stamp Duties 
Ordinance.102 The unofficial members presented five grounds for objection.    
 
First, the unofficial members requested the deferral of some of the public 
works.103 Second, they petitioned for a tax increment to the existing house rates 
as it was apprehended that if stamp duty was sanctioned, the new legislative 
powers may be exploited in the future to raise revenue by adding new heads of 
charge and/or increasing tax rates: 
It is this expansive property that is the evil at the bottom of the whole 
proposition, as passing a stamp tax, avowedly as the future proper 
mode of meeting any public exigencies that may arise, amounts to a 
declaration that, if money is needed for expenditure in the colony, 
trade must be taxed by new or altered stamp imposts to supply the 
amount.104 
Third, the unofficial members advocated for government to raise public debt 
funds as they viewed expenditures on roads, reservoir and sanatorium as non-
recurring, and as such a new permanent tax should not be introduced. Fourth, 
stamp duty was unfair as they predicted only the European and the American 
communities would bear the tax. It was believed that the Chinese community 
would be able to evade the tax without being detected since tax collectors did 
not understand Chinese documents. Fifth, Hong Kong’s commerce would be 
badly affected, as traders would send their orders elsewhere to avoid the tax on 
commercial documents.105 
 
In his address to the Legislative Council on 5 September 1866, MacDonnell 
reiterated the worsening budget deficit. The Hong Kong government needed a 
permanent source of funds and temporary measures did not help. He would not 
forsake the legislation of stamp duty unless: ‘our last road and our last drain 
and our final repairs to public buildings, if in fact everything, that mark the 
                                            
102 Hong Kong Hansard 5 September 1866, 1–2. 
103 Memorial and Protest against the Stamp Ordinance 1866 (29 August 1866), CO129/115, 52–
53. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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progress in a community, not yet smitten by decay, could all be completed by 
the end of 1867’.106  
 
MacDonnell perceived that borrowing would create a heavy interest burden for 
the government. The government would then need to impose an equivalent tax 
on the public or discontinue public improvements.107 Examination of secondary 
sources revealed there was another reason MacDonnell refrained from 
borrowing – it was the Colonial Office’s cautious view on financing a colony by 
loan. By looking at the colonial fiscal methodologies commonly adopted by 
British colonies in the nineteenth century, the Colonial Office generally believed 
that borrowing for the purpose of meeting current expenses would be the ‘most 
ruinous practice’.108 The Colonial Office would only concede borrowing if the 
work undertaken offered a large return and with a fair loan interest rate. 
Compared to promulgating stamp duty legislation, borrowing was an easy way 
out, but the Governor could not resort to loan funds due to the constraints 
imposed by the Colonial Office. Furthermore, public borrowing with an attractive 
interest rate was only possible if Hong Kong could guarantee the repayment of 
debts by a viable tax system that could generate stable revenue. To illustrate 
this, the British government financed many wars by borrowing in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. This was possible because Britain had a tax system 
that could guarantee non-default repayments.109 In 1866, a comprehensive tax 
system was not in place in Hong Kong and house rates were the only form of 
Hong Kong taxation at that time. This made borrowing difficult with what 
MacDonnell perceived as high rate of interest of 8% per annum.110   
 
To deal with the unofficial members’ apprehension that, if stamp duty was 
sanctioned, the system might be systematically exploited to raise money 
thereafter, MacDonnell inserted a limitation clause in the Hong Kong Stamp 
                                            
106 Speech of His Excellency Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell CB in reply to a Memorial and a 
Protest against a Proposed Ordinance to Impose Stamp Duties (5 September 1866), 
CO129/115, 48. 
107 Speech of His Excellency Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell CB in reply to a Memorial and a 
Protest against a Proposed Ordinance to Impose Stamp Duties (5 September 1866), 
CO129/115, 49. 
108 Paul S Reinsch, Colonial Administration (London, MacMillan 1912), 147. 
109 Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd 
edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 270. 
110 Speech of His Excellency Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell CB in reply to a Memorial and a 
Protest against a Proposed Ordinance to Impose Stamp Duties (5 September 1866), 
CO129/115, 48–49. 
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Ordinance 1866 to enhance its acceptability. Section 25 of the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1866111 stipulated that the Governor might exempt or lower 
rates of stamp duty by an order published in the Government Gazette. No 
equivalent power was granted to the Governor to increase the stamp duty rates. 
This implied that the Governor would not be able to raise the rate without going 
through the Legislative Council again.  
 
To deal with the apprehension of unlimited expansion of the scope of stamp 
duty in the future and the negative effect on commerce, MacDonnell reduced 
the number of dutiable items, simplifying the original proposal of seventy-one 
heads of charge (same as those in operation in Singapore) to twenty-one heads 
of charge. 112  By comparing the first Stamp Duty Bill and the 1866 Stamp 
Ordinance, the items sifted out were: affidavits, arbitrations, awards, drafts, 
cheques, comprador orders, bills of sale, cognovits, compositions between a 
debtor and his creditor, co-partnership instruments, writings to attest a true 
copy, covenants, declarations, deeds of gift, guarantees, life insurance policies, 
shipping insurance policies, letters of credit, letters of license from a creditor to 
his debtor, trust deeds for the benefit of a creditor, releases to a debtor by his 
creditor, releases to an executor or trustee from his trust, settlements, marriage 
settlements, and warranties of attorney to confess judgment. The 1866 Stamp 
Ordinance reduced the charging heads by simplifying the application to the 
following categories: agreements, bonds, conveyances, mortgages, bills of 
exchange and promissory notes. 
 
MacDonnell informed the Legislative Council that he had performed a ‘careful 
sifting’ of the Singapore stamp legislation to reduce seventy-one heads to 
twenty-one.113 The selection criteria by which the ‘careful sifting’ was effected, 
was not outlined in either the Governor’s Legislative Council address or in his 
correspondences with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. A possible 
reason for this was that MacDonnell omitted some items such as drafts, 
                                            
111 No 12 of 1866. 
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cheques, comprador orders,114 shipping insurance policies and letters of credit 
that were used frequently in Hong Kong trading115 activities during that era. This 
might have been done to win acceptance from the unofficial members, who 
were all heads of prominent British trading firms. The reductive and simplifying 
measures adopted would also mitigate the protestors’ perceived detrimental 
effects of tarnishing trade, as according to them, orders would be driven out of 
Hong Kong due to the introduction of stamp duty. These gestures also 
contributed to the sustainability of the stamp duty by minimising the possibility of 
strikes and riots by the local community and future petitions to the Colonial 
Office by the British traders.  
 
In soliciting the sanction of Legislative Council unofficial members for his tax 
measure, MacDonnell referred to the experience of Singapore in introducing 
stamp duty before Hong Kong. As with Hong Kong, Singapore was mainly 
inhabited by great numbers of Chinese and established as a British commercial 
depot to promote free trade. 116  The commerce of the two colonies was 
essentially transit trades with neighbouring countries. As Hong Kong and 
Singapore functioned within similar parameters, it would be reasonable to 
foresee that ‘if a heavy and complicated stamp duty worked satisfactorily and 
without impediment to business in Singapore, a simple and light stamp duty 
would work even more satisfactorily in Hong Kong’.117 MacDonnell remarked 
that: ‘There were no depressing effects being reported relating to the 
implementation of stamp duty in Singapore.’118 The Hong Kong stamp duty was 
modelled after the successful taxes and tariffs of Singapore. MacDonnell 
believed that stamp duty would engender positive results for Hong Kong in its 
revised form.119  
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In response to the protestors’ remarks that the duty was unfair as the Chinese 
community would be able to evade the tax without being detected since the tax 
collectors did not understand Chinese documents, MacDonnell said, according 
to the experience in the Straits Settlements of Singapore, the Chinese would 
probably not evade tax as they regarded stamp duty as a validation of their 
trades. 120  Hence, he considered the concern for potential evasion by the 
Chinese community as groundless.  
 
In reality, the Chinese community (Chinese merchants) submitted a written 
protest to the Governor regarding the proposed stamp duty on 5 September 
1866 (the same day on which MacDonnell addressed the Legislative Council 
after the unofficial members’ protest).121 It was noteworthy that the Chinese 
protest was not sent to the Colonial Office for consideration. This supported the 
observation that the ethos of the Hong Kong governing class at that time had 
little interest in the local Chinese beyond maintaining stability and good order 
conducive to trade.122 This was apparent from the 1866 composition of the 
Legislative Council, which had no Chinese representative to offer any insight on 
MacDonnell’s perception of Chinese customs. The Hong Kong Chinese 
merchants protested unequivocally that the levying of stamp duty would be 
obstructive and inconvenient. Similar to the British community, they advocated 
an increase in the house rates.123  
 
Clearly, despite the Governor’s efforts to promote the legitimacy of the 
proposed stamp duty law, the evidence presented above shows the Governor 
faced vehement public opposition on the basis that the Bill was an unequivocal 
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revenue-enhancing measure. It was not recorded whether unofficial members 
openly accepted the strategies adopted by MacDonnell but endorsed stamp 
duty with grace. After further debate, subsequent legislative amendments were 
made by MacDonnell. His final address in the Legislative Council on the 
enactment of the Hong Kong stamp duty with the dominant aim to raise 
revenue, plus the final draft of the legislation together with the written protests 
by the unofficial members and the Governor’s representation, were sent to the 
Colonial Office for approval. On 15 December 1866, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Lord Henry Herbert sent his consent to the colony after 
considering the opposition’s views and the Governor’s opinions.124 Accordingly, 
the Stamp Ordinance No 12 of 1866 (Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866) was 
enacted.  
 
The appraisal of Hong Kong’s financial exigency together with MacDonnell’s 
speeches in the Legislative Council, wherein he expressed his revenue 
objective for the new stamp duty legislation, the intense political opposition 
seeking to annul the stamp duty proposal, as well as an examination of the 
correspondence between the Governor and the Colonial Office, allows the 
conclusion that the most important driver for introducing the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1866125 was undoubtedly the need for revenue enhancement.  
 
There is other quantitative evidence to support this conclusion. MacDonnell 
appointed Mr F W Mitchell as Hong Kong’s first Collector of Stamp Revenue.126 
The first Hong Kong Stamp Office employed five staff in its initial operation.127 
With a salary increase of 20%,128 MacDonnell expanded the role of the Post 
Master General, Mr F W Mitchell, to include those duties of Collector of Stamp 
Duty. Together with the five staff, the total annual remuneration outlay for the 
department was HK$5,190.129 The expenditure incurred on the fitting of the new 
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Stamp Office was HK$1,200.130 Nonetheless, the revenue raised before the 
official implementation of the 1866 Stamp Duty Ordinance had already 
exceeded HK$12,000 with ‘the banks and principal firms having supplied 
themselves with a number of stamps before the day fixed for the Ordinance 
coming into operation’.131 The total revenue collected for the first year was 
around HK$100,000.132 The evidence demonstrates the operation of the Stamp 
Office was financially effective and efficient even before it was officially in 
operation. The analysis also shows that the Stamp Office was already 
generating an operating surplus with low administrative expenditures in its first 
year of operation. This background confirms that the introduction of stamp duty 
had a very positive outcome, reflecting the probability of a financial objective.  
2.1.2 Non-revenue demands for the introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 
The arguments discussed for imposing the new stamp duty in 1866 were largely 
about raising funds to cover the budget deficit. Undoubtedly, that was the case 
as MacDonnell was looking for a fresh sustainable source of revenue. However, 
it is possible there were secondary non-financial motives reflective of a 
response to social and environmental circumstanced. This section evaluates the 
extent to which such circumstances accounted for the genesis of Hong Kong 
stamp duty, and further examines whether stamp duty successfully fulfilled the 
consequent requirements.  
 
The British and Chinese protestors suggested that instead of levying stamp 
duty, the Governor should consider imposing a water rate or reservoir rate and 
increasing the police rate to build the reservoir and to maintain the gunboats 
that were emphasised by MacDonnell when presenting the Stamp Duty Bill in 
1866.133 To that point the sole form of taxation in the colony had been house 
rates, a combination of the police, lighting and water rates. MacDonnell rejected 
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the notion of increasing house rates as a solution for all revenue needs, and 
insisted on the introduction of the 1866 Stamp Ordinance.134  
 
Examining the reason for MacDonnell’s persistence, his address to the 
Legislative Council was particularly revealing:  
When Legislation first commenced here rates were unknown.135 As 
money is wanted houses were subsequently taxed. At first lightly, 
and subsequently more heavily till now the rates amount to 12% on 
the rental. Householders should now pay more because they already 
pay so much. Thus if previous legislation had gone on piling every 
burthen on that one species of property till rates amount to fifty per 
cent we should, according to the Memorialists, have all the stronger 
argument for raising them still higher.136  
The evidence shows that the unfairness of continuing to impose the 
government’s financial burdens on householders was his subsidiary driving 
motivation for introducing stamp duty.  
 
To fully comprehend MacDonnell’s statement, an understanding of the historical 
background of Hong Kong’s house rate collections till the year 1866 is 
necessary. Besides the police rate, which was introduced by Governor John 
Davis in 1845, a lighting rate137 was introduced in 1856 and a water rate138 was 
added in 1860. The lighting rate was levied when the government decided to 
introduce a system of public lighting for the City of Victoria in 1856. The water 
rate was enacted in 1860 with the objective of supplying water for the City of 
Victoria. The City of Victoria referred merely to the Central District on the Hong 
Kong Island today 139  and not the entire Hong Kong Island and Kowloon 
Peninsula under British governance in 1866. As noted by MacDonnell, the 
aggregate of the house rates comprising the three components mentioned 
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above, amounted to 12% of the value of each parcel of ground, house or 
building. All households in Hong Kong had to pay all three rates. Yet, the 
lighting rate and the water rate were for the improvement of the City of Victoria 
and would not benefit households situated beyond the city. MacDonnell in his 
pre-legislation speech on stamp duty in the Legislative Council told members 
that he rejected an increase in the water rate to facilitate the building of a 
reservoir as the levy was paid by a vast number of households not receiving 
supply from the reservoir and it would be unjust to ask for additional payment.140 
With the same reasoning, MacDonnell considered the gunboat expenditures 
were related only to surveillance over neighbouring waters and the prevention 
of piracy. 141  These costs should fairly be paid by general government 
consolidated revenue rather than by householders. By applying the matching 
principle to revenues and expenditures, the Governor found it unjustifiable to 
increase any component of the house rates. It was thus crucial for Hong Kong 
to widen the tax base by introducing a new form of taxation and not rely on a 
single class of taxpayers – that is, householders, including lower income 
labourers.  
 
Nonetheless, it was perplexing that both the British and Chinese communities 
protested against stamp duty but favoured an augmented house rates policy. In 
both cases, additional taxes were to be collected. Investigating further, 
MacDonnell’s written reply to the Chinese merchant protestors was particularly 
illuminating:  
You asked, however, to pay an increased house rate instead of a 
stamp duty. Is it just that houses, which now pay more than 
HK$200,000 per annum, should bear all burdens? The general 
business of the place has never yet contributed anything directly to 
its expenses now, under the Stamp Ordinance, those who have no 
chance of making profit by business will pay nothing. The poor who 
have only their labour, would under your plan, be soon made to 
bear your legitimate burden because, if rates were increased, you 
would charge more for rent. The new Ordinance therefore is more 
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just for you. It also reaches in its operation many, who, though not 
residing in Hong Kong, use Hong Kong as their chief mart of 
business, whereas your plan would throw on those, who reside 
here, all the cost of maintaining the quays, roads, police and 
harbour, which consequently facilitate the business of the 
absentees just as much as of residents.142  
In this light, it is submitted that the protestors’ background provides a clue as to 
why they opposed stamp duty. They were merchants and were protecting their 
mercantile interests. By increasing the house rates, they were able to pass on 
to the tenants the additional rate whereas the imposition of stamp duty would 
impact their businesses directly.  
 
As a whole, the evidence demonstrates that MacDonnell conceived the duty of 
the government was to devise some new scheme for raising the necessary 
public revenue instead of unfairly laying the entire burden on householders 
alone. He found the practice of not taxing Hong Kong businesses was irrational. 
His chosen regulation, the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866, 143  would 
broaden the tax base to a variety of commercial activities in Hong Kong. 
Accordingly, the previous tax immunity bestowed upon businesses in Hong 
Kong was removed. Stamp duty widened the tax base and levied taxes on the 
previously untaxed commercial areas. The lower income householders would 
not be impacted by a probable sharp increase in the house rates whenever 
there was a public revenue demand.  
 
In this way, MacDonnell demonstrated a keen sense of social responsibility in 
taking care of the poorer people in the community through his insistence on the 
implementation of stamp duty despite fierce opposition. The consequent dual 
taxation system of house rates and stamp duty implemented in Hong Kong was 
more equitable than before. Both the businessmen and householders 
shouldered some of the revenue burden.  
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The historical evidence reveals that the total rates levied on a household in 
1866 were 12% and by 1900 had risen to 13%.144 While it is not valid to claim 
that the policy of employing stamp duty was successful in widening the tax base 
and protecting householders from escalating tax burdens, it is a reasonable 
speculation that the rates in 1900 would have been much higher than 13% if 
stamp duty legislation had been rejected in 1866. Thus, the historical evidence 
of household rates implies that stamp duty was effectual in widening the tax 
base and ensured the tax burden was more equitably applied.  
 
Besides the need to widen the tax base, the extent to which easing Hong 
Kong’s overcrowded living conditions, could constitute another secondary 
impellent underlying the first imposition of stamp duty in Hong Kong.  
 
In his letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, MacDonnell wrote: ‘I 
would not prefer to a stamp duty, an increase of house rate, or any taxation 
rendering building more costly where there was far too much overcrowding in 
Hong Kong.’145 In his address to the Legislative Council members during the 
pre-legislative discussion on stamp duty legislation, MacDonnell articulated his 
concern over the agony of the members for the poor people, who, in looking for 
healthy residences were dissuaded by the high level of rates charged.146 It 
would seem, therefore, that the introduction of stamp duty was a means of 
accruing public revenue so that the government could freeze house rates and 
stabilise accommodation rentals. The ultimate aim was to control Hong Kong’s 
overcrowded living conditions and reduce the health hazards in the colony.  
 
Other historical sources confirm that overcrowding contributed to the poor 
sanitary conditions prevailing in Hong Kong at that time and caused epidemics. 
In a written report, Dr William Dick, Chairman of the Special Commission 
appointed by MacDonnell to investigate the existence of certain endemic 
diseases in April 1866, stated that the fatal febrile disease usually attacked the 
poor but somehow the richer community was immune. The medical team 
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doubted the fever was Yellow Fever as suggested by some practitioners, and 
was unable to identify the disease conclusively. The report directed 
MacDonnell’s attention to a Chinese district called Taipingshan where:  
Houses, into which the rays of the sun can never penetrate, were 
huddled together, back to back. In many cases, pigs, poultry, dogs, 
men, women and children live together in the same damp, small, 
dark, unventilated rooms in separate misery, and in filth, and it is 
not surprising that such a disease as we have been instructed to 
investigate should have been traced to a district of this city.147  
Those words portrayed the living conditions of the Chinese poor in 1866. This 
historical evidence supports MacDonnell’s concern that the overcrowding of 
certain Hong Kong quarters was well founded in 1866. It shows that he did not 
contrive the housing problem so as to deceive the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies or the Legislative Councillors, in pursuing stamp duty implementation.  
 
Prima facie, the evidence demonstrates that one of MacDonnell’s subsidiary 
motives in pursuing the enactment of the stamp duty legislation was to improve 
the living environment by relieving the overcrowded living conditions, 
particularly those in the poor Chinese areas. This tentative conclusion further 
begs the question whether the introduction of stamp duty had the desired effect 
of improving living conditions in the colony. Examining the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1866 reveals that it expressly stipulated that documents relating to 
property transactions such as leases, mortgages and conveyances would be 
charged stamp duty and no exemptions were given to low value properties.148 
MacDonnell’s proposal, therefore, appeared to be ungenerous as additional tax 
would accumulate for householders in the form of the newly devised stamp duty 
even if house rates were not increased. There would not be any immediate 
relief for the cost of housing. Unlike the implementation of stamp duty on a 
broader base requiring businesses to share the colony’s taxation burden by 
virtue of the multi-faceted incidence of stamp duty through a number of different 
instruments, there was no simultaneous quantifiable effect. The introduction of 
stamp duty might not, therefore, relieve Hong Kong’s overcrowded conditions. 
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In contrast, when advocating stamp duty to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, MacDonnell argued that the tax charged on properties by stamp duty 
would be mild compared to a persistent increase in house rates and in the long 
run overcrowding would be controlled and relieved. MacDonnell estimated that 
if stamp duty was rejected, the house rate would eventually be doubled.149  
 
Approximately a decade later, during the tenure of Governor John Pope 
Hennessy (in office 1877–1883), the sanitary conditions of the poorer Chinese 
residential districts in Hong Kong continued to deteriorate as housing prices 
escalated. Dr Phineas Ayres, the Colonial Surgeon, reported that sanitary 
conditions in 1880 were deteriorating because the one- and two-storey houses 
he had seen in 1874 had been demolished and rebuilt into three- and four-
storey houses, resulting in more severe overcrowding.150 He commented that if 
the underprivileged Chinese desired a healthy environment with ‘pure air, pure 
water, purity from damp, pure light and equable temperature’, the best way for 
them was to go to the gaol.151 This demonstrates that MacDonnell’s objective, 
to reduce overcrowding through implementation of the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1866,152 was not fulfilled after more than a decade. The house rates 
did not increase with the imposition of stamp duties, but house prices did not 
freeze153 as forecasted by MacDonnell.  
 
Analysis of MacDonnell’s tax policy and why it encountered difficulty in freezing 
housing prices, thus reducing overcrowding in Hong Kong, yields some possible 
explanations. It could be that the failure was caused by the great influx of 
Chinese immigrants. From 1866 to 1881, the number of Chinese residents 
increased by 39,208 (or 32.2% increase over the previous population of 
Chinese).154 It is possible that Hennessy’s 1877 policy allowing the Chinese to 
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buy land in certain areas previously reserved for European communities155 
started a vast speculation in land by the Chinese, further increasing house 
prices. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the most viable explanation is that 
immovable property transactions in Hong Kong took place in the asset market 
(in which items are purchased for their investment potential) rather than in the 
consumer goods market (in which items are purchased for consumption).156 The 
evidence demonstrates that a tax freeze on asset goods did not necessarily 
lead to a price freeze of those goods. This result can be contrasted with the 
expectation that a tax freeze (eg customs duties) on consumption goods would 
lead to a price freeze of such goods.  
2.2 Other circumstances influencing stamp duty law  
In addition to the influences identified so far as being responsible for the 
introduction of the stamp duty to Hong Kong, namely enhancing revenue, 
restoring tax system equity and improving living conditions for the poor, the 
question arises whether other circumstances contributed to the introduction of 
this new tax into the Hong Kong fiscal system. These can be identified by 
appraising the associated economic, social, political and human factors.  
2.2.1 Stamp duty was the only viable choice 
When it was determined that a second form of tax was required, many British 
officials charged with decision-making regarding the form of the Hong Kong 
fiscal system favoured stamp duty, and that was the tax adopted. As Governor 
Sir Hercules Robinson (in office 1859–1865) advocated in his 1864 letter to the 
Colonial Office on the Hong Kong fiscal system: ‘If additional taxation should be 
determined on, the only source which remained available without interfering 
with the freedom of the trade was a stamp duty similar to that imposed 
throughout India and the Straits Settlements’.157 MacDonnell shared a similar 
view as he pointed out in his 1866 letter to the Colonial Office: ‘If increasing the 
revenue in Hong Kong ever became necessary, a stamp duty was the 
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preferable mode of effecting that object.’ 158  Other than the view that the 
imposition of stamp duty would not be injurious to trade, the Governor’s written 
explanations did not illuminate convincingly why stamp duty was the preferred 
option. The answer lies in the fiscal, political, social and cultural history of Hong 
Kong as well as in Britain during the nineteenth century.   
 
In order to raise revenue to fund their operations, British colonies in the 
nineteenth century imposed a variety of taxes apart from stamp duty, namely 
customs duties, excise duty and income tax.159 Hong Kong adopted house rates 
as its first form of taxation to finance a police force.160 A house rate mechanism 
was favoured because it did not require a declaration of income or benefit 
derived from immovable properties, nor did it require an inquisitorial process. 
Despite bitter opposition from the local population to the imposition of taxes, the 
Colonial Office approved the imposition of house rates in Hong Kong.161 
 
Between 1845 and 1865 despite the colony being in a state of continuous 
financial exigency, no new branch of taxation was introduced.162 Investigating 
the reason, it was found that the Governors of Hong Kong faced certain 
constraints when formulating taxation policies during the early years of the 
colony. Customs duties, which were the most important taxation method being 
used in other British colonies at that time,163 were rejected in Hong Kong. When 
Governor John Davis (in office 1844–1848) tried to raise public revenue by 
levying customs duties on imported wines and spirits in 1846, the proposition 
was met with severe opposition from the public. The public viewed such a 
measure as premature as the colony was not yet ready to be self-sufficient 
financially. More importantly, the Legislative Council (made up entirely of official 
members164 at that time) disapproved of the proposed customs duties, pointing 
out that the collection of customs duties would be contrary to the proclamation 
of Hong Kong as a free port in 1841 by Sir Charles Elliot, the Chief 
Superintendent of British Trade in China and Administrator of Hong Kong when 
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Hong Kong had just been ceded to Britain. Davis sent the proposed Ordinance 
together with the opposing views of the Legislative Councillors to the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies for comments and approval. The secretary William 
Gladstone (in office 1845–1846) agreed with the Legislative Councillors and 
customs duties on wine and spirit were rejected.165  
 
It was not just customs duties which were precluded from adoption in Hong 
Kong. Excise duties were not a viable revenue source for Hong Kong as Hong 
Kong was a place of trade only and had no natural resources, such as tin ore 
and rubber as in the Straits Settlements166 or ivory as in Africa, that could be 
subject to tax upon export. Excise duties were imposed on home produced 
goods sold in the domestic market. Likewise, income tax was not a viable 
source of revenue. It was not feasible during the early colonial years as it 
necessitated the declaration of income and associated inquisitorial 
proceedings.167 The Chinese community at that time was not accustomed to 
this kind of tax as the Chinese Qing government did not levy income taxation.168 
Moreover, the Chinese accounting records169 would cause difficulties in the 
collection process. In addition, the Colonial Office’s nineteenth century colonial 
financial policy discouraged the use of income taxation in primitive economies 
such as Hong Kong. In the nineteenth century, income taxation had given rise 
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comment was made 60 years after the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong which 
supported the estimation that in 1866, Hong Kong was not ready for income tax. 
168 Shao Kwan Chen, The System of Taxation in China in the Tsing Dynasty 1644–1911 (first 
published 1914, New York, AMS Press 1970); Yan Xu, ‘Tax History in China’ (Tax Law History 
Conference, Centre for Tax Law, Faculty of Law of the University of Cambridge, United 
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 58 
to much debate and many objections even in the most advanced western 
nations.170  
 
Apart from the lack of other viable options, another reason for favouring stamp 
duty in Hong Kong was the prevalent use of this form of tax in Britain during the 
nineteenth century. The reasons for the widespread use of stamp duty in Britain 
were threefold.  
 
First, the expansion of trade and commence begun in Britain in the seventeenth 
century171 provided many important tax bases for levying stamp duty. By the 
early nineteenth century, the British Stamp Act 1804 levied stamp duties on 
commercial documents such as agreements, bills of exchange, promissory 
notes, receipts and so on.172 Stamp duty would not have been as widespread if 
trade and commerce had been underdeveloped at that time. Correspondingly, 
the efficacy of stamp duty as a revenue-raising device would have been in 
doubt if an agrarian society had prevailed.   
 
Second, through an examination of the British fiscal history, historians 
advocated that the significant use of indirect taxes, such as stamp duty, in 
Britain in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, was the result of an 
administrative revolution. The revolution refers to the establishment of a highly 
centralised bureaucracy staffed by salaried officers to competently implement 
and administer an accurate and reliable system of indirect taxation. 173  In 
contrast, the collection of land taxes174 in Britain in the eighteenth century by 
unpaid provincial landowners with no formal legal knowledge led to the 
widespread understatement of tax liabilities, and the prevalence of evasion and 
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malpractice.175 Furthermore these local gentry land-tax collectors often illicitly 
retained a portion of the taxes collected for private their gain.176 
 
Third, the ease of taxing by stamp duty mechanisms was a key reason why 
Britain adopted it and continued its use. When stamp duty was first being 
considered in Britain in 1664, a British official had stated that the duty would be 
‘insensible, un-burdensome and bring in a vast treasure’.177 In the 1797 British 
Budget speech, Prime Minister William Pitt described stamp duty as a tax 
‘easily raised, widely diffused pressing little on any particular class, especially 
the lower orders of society, and producing a revenue safely and expeditiously 
collected at a small expense.’178 Likewise, tax historians observed that stamp 
duty was the simplest of all imposts in Britain in the nineteenth century, since 
the taxpayers would go to the Stamp Offices to have their written documents 
impressed with a stamp.179 The officials in the Stamp Offices simply needed to 
ensure they collected the appropriate stamp duties based on the document 
presented. In addition, this form of indirect tax could be collected with minimum 
friction and expense.180 Unlike income tax, stamp duty did not require any 
intrusive inquisitorial proceedings. People paid this innocuous tax without even 
noticing. The government plucked ‘the most feathers with the least 
squawking’.181 Evidence to substantiate this view can be found in an article 
published by the Liverpool Financial Reform Association in the mid-nineteenth 
century which stated that the objective of the article was to expose the 
‘insidious and deceptive nature’ of stamp duty which facilitated the stamps 
occupying about ‘the third place in public revenue’ in 1850.182 Furthermore, the 
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article observes: ‘This branch of revenue [stamp duty], although now [1850] 
very productive, may, by consolidating the present provision and introducing 
some few amendments, be rendered still more productive, and, at the same 
time, less vexatious and burdensome to the public.’183 Besides the evidence 
just cited, indirect taxes such as stamp duty were favoured, as direct taxes 
occupied a large portion of the tax department officials’ time and attention, often 
to the exclusion of other administrative duties.184  
 
Applying the foregoing rationale as to why stamp duty was prevalent in 
nineteenth century Britain, it is clear why Governors Sir Hercules Robinson and 
Sir Richard MacDonnell singled out stamp duty as the most viable second form 
of tax for the colony. Essentially, Hong Kong was a trading and shipping depot 
of the British Empire in the Far East, which guaranteed an abundance of 
commercial and trading documents for the imposition of stamp duties. At that 
time, Hong Kong lacked resources to set up a large tax department to 
administer taxes. Thus, it was prudent for the colony to opt for stamp duty due 
to its ease of application and collection without the need to incur extensive 
administrative resources to manage the system. 
2.2.2 Why stamp duty was not introduced earlier into Hong Kong 
Britain adopted the stamp duty as early as 1670.185 By the time Britain took over 
Hong Kong in 1842, the British stamp duty system was already well developed 
and tested and ready to be adopted by its colonies as required. Further, it is 
clear that Hong Kong was financially unstable from 1842 to 1865186 and stamp 
duty was considered the most feasible revenue source for Hong Kong in its 
early colonial days. 187  The colony’s initial financial difficulties and the 
demonstrated appropriateness of stamp duty as a revenue source in the mid-
nineteenth century implies that the Hong Kong government could have 
introduced a stamp duty system at an earlier time to ease the colony’s financial 
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pressures. Clearly some forces delayed the introduction of stamp duty in Hong 
Kong for about two decades after house rates were first implemented as Hong 
Kong’s initial form of taxation. 
 
The first such force lay in the politics of personal preferment. Unlike his 
predecessors, MacDonnell came to Hong Kong towards the end of his long and 
already successful career in the British Colonial Service. He had been the 
Governor of Gambia, Lucia, St Vincent and South Australia.188 He came to 
Hong Kong in 1866 at the age of fifty-one and with twenty years’ experience as 
colonial Governor. He had been knighted (CB)189 in 1852.190  
 
The award of a knighthood was of paramount importance to civil servants in the 
British Colonial Office during that era. Alexander Johnston, the first 
Administrator (acting in the capacity of the Governor) of Hong Kong (in office 
1841–1845) wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies soliciting 
recognition for his service in Hong Kong. His request was not granted due to his 
perceived mediocre performance.191 Hercules Robinson, the fifth Governor of 
Hong Kong (in office 1859–1865) wrote to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies complaining that he had been overlooked in the 1862 honours list 
despite his good service rendered in Hong Kong.192   
 
MacDonnell already had such an honour bestowed upon him before taking up 
the post of Hong Kong Governor and probably Hong Kong would be his last 
posting before retirement. He had his reward and had nothing to lose. Together 
with his strong and near authoritarian personality,193 he pushed through the 
introduction of a new tax in the form of stamp duty, an unpopular policy that he 
believed was beneficial for the colony.   
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This action could be compared to some of his predecessors. George Bonham 
was appointed the third Governor of Hong Kong (in office 1848–1854) when he 
was aged forty-four. Though Hong Kong was insolvent at that time,194 Bonham 
refrained from implementing additional taxes,195 and chose to cut expenditures 
in all possible ways to balance the budget. From his prior employment with the 
British East India Company administering the Straits Settlements, he knew 
Hong Kong people were taxed much more lightly than the Straits Settlements. 
However he refused to risk his popularity by introducing new taxes in Hong 
Kong.196 As a result, public works such as drainage constructions were delayed 
and the police force was reduced.197 Nevertheless, the Hong Kong community 
loved Bonham, as he was approachable and easy going, and more importantly, 
he did not pursue any vigorous unpopular tax policy. Because of his good 
service in Hong Kong, he was knighted in 1850.198 
 
Introducing taxes in Hong Kong during the early years of the colony would 
affect a Governor’s reputation and career advancement. An overt example was 
John Davis, the second Governor of Hong Kong (in office 1844–1848). He was 
given the task of setting up the Hong Kong government and putting an end to 
the administrative chaos. Davis was also given the unpopular task of increasing 
colonial revenue so that Hong Kong would be self-sufficient.199 He accordingly 
tried to implement various taxes including rates and duties on wines and spirits. 
This made him unpopular with British merchants200 and the community was 
against him. He resigned after bitter disagreement with British merchants in 
Hong Kong on taxes and other issues. Davis returned to Britain and continued 
with his studies at the age of fifty-three with no further colonial postings.201 
 
Thus the evidence shows that the introduction of any new tax in Hong Kong 
during the early colonial days, including the stamp duty in 1866, depended to 
some extent on the Governors’ career situation and the honours they had 
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already obtained, or the prospect of such honours, when they were appointed 
as Governor of Hong Kong.  
 
There exists a second plausible, and political, reason for the delay in the 
adoption of stamp duty. Governor John Davis’ proposal for Hong Kong customs 
duties to be imposed on wines and spirits in 1846 was met with unanimous 
opposition from the official members202 of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.203 
The official members did not always rubber stamp the Governor’s proposals. 
Occasionally, they joined the unofficial members to go against a proposal. The 
Colonial Office rejected the tax partly due to the office-bearer’s view that it was 
impossible to go against the unanimous wish of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council.204    
 
When the Hong Kong Legislative Council examined the possibility of enacting 
stamp duty in 1866, none of the Legislative Council official members joined with 
the three unofficial members to oppose it. This might have been due to the 
personal charm and leadership of MacDonnell, the Governor in office. It might 
also have been due to a genuine and unanimous belief of the Legislative 
Council members that the 1866 Stamp Ordinance was well drafted and would 
benefit Hong Kong enormously. 
 
There was another reason behind the delay in the introduction of stamp duty. In 
1864, the Hong Kong Colonial Treasurer joined the unofficial members in voting 
against the military contribution demanded by Britain. Further, he seconded the 
unofficial members’ motion to delete the military contribution from the 1865 
budget. The Secretary of State for the Colonies Edward Cardwell (in office 
1864–1866) was furious and reprimanded the Colonial Treasurer. When 
MacDonnell took office as Governor in 1866, the official members asked him if 
official and unofficial members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council had 
different privileges. More directly, they were seeking the Governor’s opinion on 
whether they could vote against the Governor’s proposal in the Legislative 
Council similar to the unofficial members who could cast dissenting votes. 
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MacDonnell astutely answered that all members could speak and vote freely. 
An official member should explain his reasons when he directly opposed the 
policy of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.205 
 
Reading the letter from MacDonnell reporting the incident, Cardwell was not 
pleased with the Governor’s position. He issued a ruling, which then became a 
governing principle for the official members of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council. Cardwell decreed in his letter to MacDonnell dated 31 May 1866: 
Her Majesty’s government have the right to consider opposition by 
the official members of the Legislative Council to its settled policy as 
incompatible with retention of office, and I am equally of opinion that 
they are bound if required to do so, to support by their votes and not 
to oppose by any public act, a policy which may originate with the 
Governor.206   
 
The message was a clear warning to the official members of the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council that they were civil servants of the British Colonial Service. If 
they voted against the Governor in the Legislative Council or publicly 
disapproved a policy advocated by the Governor, they had to resign. This 
implied that the official members could only privately voice their opposition to 
the Governor. The convention of official members voting as a block to support 
policies advocated by the colonial administration was formed.  
 
The ruling by Cardwell in May 1866 certainly assisted MacDonnell in his 
introduction of the 1866 Stamp Ordnance two months later. Before the ruling, 
Governors had to clear three hurdles to implement the taxes proposed: 
Legislative Council concurrence, public support, and the approval of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. After the ruling, obtaining Legislative 
Council concurrence was no longer a serious problem. This also prevented the 
proposed taxes being rejected by the Secretary of State for the Colonies due to 
the unanimous Legislative Council disagreement, such as the customs duties 
on wines and spirits proposed by Governor John Davis in 1846. Without the 
ruling, stamp duty might not have been smoothly introduced in 1866. If the 
                                            
205 Ibid 85. 
206 Letter from Edward Cardwell to Richard MacDonnell (31 May 1866), CO129/112, 90. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 65 
ruling had been in force earlier, Governor John Davis, or some of MacDonnell’s 
predecessors might have already successfully implemented stamp duty in the 
colony before 1866. 
2.2.3 Early colonial social structure influencing stamp duty law 
The political bargaining powers of the different strata of the Hong Kong 
population shaped the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance.207 There were three 
social strata in Hong Kong in 1866. Senior British expatriates, who were 
businessmen of the upper echelon, formed the upper class. British expatriates 
with supervisory roles in British firms and Chinese merchants formed the middle 
class. Chinese labourers constituted the lower class.208 
 
In the 1866 Legislative Council, all unofficial members were heads of British 
trading firms who could influence the government’s decisions. Because of their 
background, they were not interested in measures that were unsupportive of 
trade and opposed to all taxes that might affect businesses negatively. 
MacDonnell frankly pointed out during the stamp duty pre-legislation debates 
that these unofficial members ‘do not represent all the colony nor even those 
residents who now pay more than half the revenue of the colony, for the Asiatic 
residents, pay 4/7th of the existing ordinary revenue.’209 They lacked interest in 
public works and social welfare, and objected to the 1866 Stamp Duty 
Ordinance. They considered the project of building a reservoir as ‘not of such a 
character as to necessitate being carried out, until the ordinary revenue of the 
colony will admit such expenditure.’210 The Governor pointed out that building a 
reservoir was urgent and important for community sanitary reasons and that 
stamp duty must be levied in 1866 to finance the work. He urged the unofficial 
members to care for their own lives by building a reservoir rapidly so as to 
supply water to clean up the filthy part of the colony:  
One main reason for increasing water supply is to ensure means of 
cleansing the Chinese portion of the town. Yellow fever and cholera 
produced in the Chinese quarter may spread to the European quarter 
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and we endeavour therefore for our own safety to purify the abodes 
of our neighbours.211  
 
British expatriates with supervisory roles in British firms had no direct 
representation in the Legislative Council. This middle class joined the unofficial 
members in signing the written protest against the 1866 stamp duty proposal. 
MacDonnell dismissed the written protest, as he believed the upper class 
expatriate employers heavily swayed the middle class British employees: ‘The 
influence of a few leading houses here commands so many signatures of the 
parties immediately dependent on them.’ 212  MacDonnell received several 
representations from the poorer Britons who considered the action of the upper 
class Britons blocking stamp duty to be selfish as this would shift the tax burden 
to the householders through raising house rates.213  
 
Chinese merchants had the same interest as upper class Britons. They 
protected their business interests by objecting to stamp duty, a tax that attached 
handles to their economic activities directly. In 1866, this Chinese middle class 
was not represented in the Legislative Council. So, they wrote directly to the 
Governor and suggested MacDonnell drop his stamp duty plan.214   
 
The lower class of Chinese labourers was not represented in the Legislative 
Council either. A majority of them stayed in Hong Kong temporarily for the sake 
of economic gain. They were not educated and had very limited opportunity to 
voice their opinions. They relied on their fu-mu-kuan – ‘fatherly and motherly 
like official’ – to care about their welfare. They regarded the Governor of Hong 
Kong as the British version of a traditional well-respected Qing dynasty fu-mu-
kuan. In the 1866 stamp duty implementation episode, MacDonnell himself 
voiced the rights of this lower class in the Legislative Council. He displayed the 
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paternalism of a British Governor who cared about the welfare of the people 
under his charge.215 Such an action was important in maintaining stability in 
Hong Kong.216 
 
This social and political structure suggests reasons why the scope of the 1866 
stamp duty heads of charge was less extensive and stamp duty rates were 
lower, as compared to the corresponding legislation of Singapore and Britain.217 
The political bargaining power in Hong Kong in 1866 was obviously skewed 
towards the upper class British merchants due to the prevailing Hong Kong 
social structure. If the Britons who were heads of companies advocated stamp 
duty instead of house rates in 1866, their British middle class employees would 
support stamp duty. Chinese merchants joined the upper class British 
merchants when it came to taxation matters. As Hong Kong was a British 
trading post, mercantile interests were of high priority. The Governor had to be 
mindful of the British merchants’ interests. 218  To avoid opposition from the 
merchant upper class, the Governor would not propose an extensive stamp 
duty but resort to one with fewer heads of charge and lower rates. 
 
The interests of the lower class Chinese labourers could easily be ignored. 
First, it was believed that they were uneducated and did not understand 
taxation issues. Second, the Governor was the only person who represented 
them in the Legislative Council. Third, most significantly, they did not demand 
any public works such as roads, reservoirs, hospitals or schools, as most of 
them were itinerants with no permanent emotional attachments to Hong Kong. 
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The body of evidence demonstrates that in the mid-nineteenth century taxes in 
Hong Kong were kept as low as possible as there was no social pressure on 
the government to provide welfare to the poor and to re-distribute wealth. 
Instead, merchants pressed government to implement restrained tax policies so 
that they could keep as much as possible the profit they earned. This ethos 
remained through the next hundred and thirty years of British colonial rule. The 
ideology of the 1866 Stamp Duty Ordinance219 was one of the cornerstones of 
Hong Kong being a low tax rate jurisdiction during the hundred and fifty years of 
British rule. 
 
2.3 The British origin220 
The British colonisation of a large part of the world began in 1578 when Queen 
Elizabeth I granted a patent to Sir Humphrey Gilbert for discovery and overseas 
exploration.221 The British colonists took with them elements of the British tax 
system and implemented them in their colonies.222 Besides Hong Kong, stamp 
duty was imposed in North America,223 Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, 
India, Fiji, the New Hebrides, Singapore, Australia and Malaysia.224 
 
The initial stamp duty system introduced to Hong Kong in 1866225 was based on 
the prevailing Singapore system,226 Singapore being a British colony at that 
time. It was also probable that the initial Hong Kong stamp duty regime had its 
origins in the British system. In order to ascertain the validity of this assertion, 
this section compares the key provisions of the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance227 with the British stamp duty provisions in the nineteenth century. 
Specifically, the juxtaposition aims to ascertain the nature of the key British 
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stamp duty provisions adopted in Hong Kong in 1866 and the extent to which 
they were implemented, as well as to establish which key British stamp duty 
provisions were omitted and the reasons for those exclusions. 
 
In the process of determining whether the initial Hong Kong stamp duty system 
was influenced by British stamp duty tenets, and based on the preliminary 
assumption that Hong Kong did implement related British stamp duty principles 
in 1866, this section also examines the origins of the British stamp duty law. 
The research into the British origins of the colony’s stamp duty system is 
expected to reveal not only the British precursor, but also the influences that 
originally moulded the law in Britain in the centuries before Hong Kong’s 1866 
adoption. The reason for investigating the British origins is that the rationale for 
certain modern Hong Kong stamp duty practices may not be adequately 
explained by solely examining the evolution of Hong Kong stamp duty from 
1866 till the present time. It is postulated that an examination of the British 
origins of the Hong Kong stamp duty law may be able to ascertain how Hong 
Kong taxable instruments were selected; whether there were reasons for 
choosing such taxable instruments other than revenue grounds; why the 
modern Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 228  did not include a general anti-
avoidance rule; and why the stamp duty liabilities were calculated by methods 
prescribed under the current Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance.229 
 
The background to the origins identified in this section will be instrumental in 
informing discussion in subsequent chapters.  
2.3.1 The introduction of stamp duty into Britain 
In tracing the lineage of Hong Kong’s stamp duty through the British stamp duty 
system, the antecedents of the British system must first be established. It has 
been seen that stamp duty was invented by the Dutch230 and was adopted by 
the British government in the late seventeenth century, first imposing it in 
1670. 231  The initial British stamp duty was levied upon law proceedings, 
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enrolled deeds, and Crown and other grants for a period of ten years. Office 
bearers at law courts collected the duties and paid them over to the Crown.232 
Such duties were more in the nature of fees as there was no requirement for 
any stamp to be applied onto the deeds or the other taxable documents. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the first imposition of stamp duty in Britain was 
for any other purpose than to raise revenue. The analysis of the event also 
shows the collection method had two shortcomings. First, it was inadequate in 
ensuring that duties were paid by the taxpayers on the relevant documents. 
Second, even if it had been paid, it was difficult to ensure the funds received 
were channelled in full to the Crown.233   
 
In 1694, England introduced its first general stamp duty legislation to raise 
money for the war against France.234 A board was formed and Commissioners 
of Stamps were appointed to oversee the operation of stamp duty collection. 
The British Stamp Act 1694 laid down thirty-five instruments to which the stamp 
duty would apply.235 Taxable instruments included agreements, employment 
documents, admission documents as a fellow of the college of physicians, 
university degree certificates, probates of will, leases, conveyances on sale, 
passports, insurance policies and many more.236 It was specifically stated that 
bills of exchange and promissory notes were exempted from stamp duty.237 
Compared to the 1670 British stamp duty initiative, there was a significant 
increase in the number of taxable documents in the British Stamp Act 1694.238 
Prescribed duties for different instruments were denominated as 40s, 5s, 2s 6d, 
1s, 6d and 1d.239 The appointed commissioners had six different metal dies to 
indicate the six different categories of payment. The six metal dies were used to 
emboss stamps onto documents to show that tax had been paid. Stamps were 
                                            
232 British Stamp Act 1670 (22 & 23 Car 2 c 9); Edward Hughes, ‘The English Stamp Duties, 
1664-1764’ (1941) 56(222) The English Historical Review, 234; Stephen Dowell, A History of 
Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), 
vol 3, 286–87. 
233 D Graham Hill, Stamp Duty Rewrite: New South Wales: The Stamp Duties Bill 1997 with 
Commentary (North Ryde, NSW, LBC Information Services 1997), 19. 
234 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21), s 1. 
235 Ibid s 3. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid s 6. 
238 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21. 
239 Old British money, £ is pounds, s is shillings and d is pennies. There were twenty shillings 
per pound. The shillings were subdivided into twelve pennies. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 71 
to be embossed on every piece of chargeable paper or parchment. 240  The 
taxpayers were required to bring the taxable instruments to the Stamp Offices 
for the appointed officers to impress stamps onto the instruments. 241  The 
legislation did not go into detail as to how it was possible to emboss a stamp on 
a thick seventeenth century parchment, but the usual practice was to emboss 
the stamp on a piece of paper and then attach it to the parchment using glue 
and a metal strip.242 Compared to the 1670 British stamp duty, the British Stamp 
Act 1694 had a much improved collection method. By requiring the paper or 
parchment to bear a stamp as clear evidence that the tax had been paid, the 
shortcoming of not being able to ensure duties were paid was overcome.243  
 
Assessing the first Hong Kong stamp duty legislation,244 it is seen that the 
cornerstone concept of requiring stamps denoting different payment values – to 
be impressed by Stamp Officers on taxable instruments presented by taxpayers 
to signify tax payments, as introduced in the British Stamp Act 1694,245 – was 
adopted fully by Hong Kong in 1866.246  
2.3.2 Structure of the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
It was earlier noted that the British Stamp Act 1694 imposed stamp duty on 
thirty-five written instruments.247 Examination of the 1694 British Act found that 
it was extremely difficult to identify the documents subject to tax or to pinpoint 
the applicable tax levied on different instruments, as the dutiable instruments 
and the specified rates were densely grouped under one large and dense single 
paragraph in section 3 of the 1694 Act.248  
 
In contrast, the 1866 Hong Kong stamp legislation presented the instruments in 
a separate schedule with a column denoting the taxable instruments and 
                                            
240 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21), s 12. 
241 Ibid s 9. 
242 John Barefoot, Great Britain Revenue (York, J Barefoot Ltd 2002), 3. John Barefoot is a 
stamp dealer and J Barefoot Ltd is his stamp dealing company. 
243 D Graham Hill, Stamp Duty Rewrite: New South Wales: The Stamp Duties Bill 1997 with 
Commentary (North Ryde, NSW, LBC Information Services 1997), 19. 
244 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866. 
245 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21. 
246 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, s 8. 
247 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21), s 3; see section 2.3.1. 
248 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21, s 3. 
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another column denoting the applicable tax payables. 249  In terms of 
comprehensibility, this was a marked improvement compared to the first British 
comprehensive Stamp Duty Act.250 This comparison leads to the query as to 
whether Hong Kong adopted certain British tenets that were buried in history. If 
the latter is true, another query to arise is: what caused the British government 
to rewrite the law to improve its comprehensibility.  
 
Hong Kong learned and benefitted from Britain’s experience. During the 
eighteenth century, when the British government needed to add new dutiable 
instruments, it added new stamp duty legislation instead of revising the existing 
Act. Besides the formidable length of new taxable instruments, British taxpayers 
also found the laws confusing due to the perplexing language used by the 
draftsmen who tried to make the related laws as specific as possible so as to 
minimise tax avoidance and reliance on judicial opinions.  
 
In response, the British government tried to overcome the obscurity of the 
statutes with the Stamp Act 1804.251 Section 1 of the 1804 Act acknowledged 
that the existing stamp duty legislation was complex and prodigious, and cited 
reasons to support the commissioning of the new Act:  
Whereas the several rates and duties upon stamped vellum, 
parchment, and paper, and upon other articles and things under care 
of the commissioners for managing the said duties, are very 
numerous, intricate and complicated, and it will tend to give facility to 
business, and contribute materially to the public benefit to 
consolidate and simplify the same.252  
 
Essentially, the British Stamp Act 1804253 consolidated all previous stamp duty 
legislation and presented all taxable instruments and objects under a schedule 
                                            
249 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, sch. The Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 
of 1866 had thirty-two sections and one schedule. The schedule stipulated the twenty-one kinds 
of documents that were chargeable with stamp duty and the applicable rates. The 1866 
schedule used a clear labelling system and had clarifications for earmarked instruments. The 
respective tax rates for these instruments were presented clearly. Section 6 of the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866 specified that the instruments denoted in the attached 
schedule were subjected to Hong Kong stamp duty. 
250 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21). 
251 44 Geo 3 c 98. 
252 Ibid s 1. 
253 44 Geo 3 c 98. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 73 
annexed to the main statute. The schedule arranged all taxable items under 
separate headings with their respective applicable rates. 
 
When the time came to draft the stamp duty legislation in Hong Kong in 1866, 
the British practice of including a schedule of chargeable items was followed. 
Governor MacDonnell actually adopted the drafting method from Britain.  
 
The present day Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance schedule only contains four 
heads of charge.254 The present schedule also often refers the reader to the 
main body of stamp duty legislation for clarification.255 It can be argued that 
clarity may be improved if the information is grouped in one place within the 
main body of the legislation. Nonetheless, the historical evidence collected 
shows why the present Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance256 maintained a separate 
schedule to denote heads of charge even though the substance of the schedule 
was reduced drastically.257 For historical reasons a separate schedule denoting 
heads of charge was necessitated in Britain around two centuries ago. Such 
practice was the surviving remnant of an historical evolution of the stamp duty 
system that had become ingrained, yet the original reason for its existence has 
been long surpassed in its Hong Kong manifestation.  
2.3.3 Chargeable instruments of the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
The first Hong Kong stamp duty legislation had twenty-one heads of charge 
constituting various taxable instruments. 258  These heads of charge were 
incorporated into the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation in 1866 with no debate 
in the Hong Kong Legislative Council regarding their suitability. MacDonnell 
provided no detail as to why the twenty-one heads were selected when he 
introduced the Bill. It was not discussed in the Governor’s letters 259 to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Even the written protests260 submitted by 
                                            
254 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981), sch 1; see Appendices I to V 
for the development of taxable instruments from the twenty-one heads in 1866 to the four heads 
in the present day Ordinance. The present day four heads of charge are immovable property 
situated in Hong Kong, Hong Kong stock, Hong Kong bearer instruments, duplicates or 
counterparts. 
255 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981), sch 1. 
256 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981). 
257 See Appendices I to V. 
258 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866; see Appendix I. 
259 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115, 32–41. 
260 Memorial and Protest against the Stamp Ordinance 1866 (29 August 1866), CO129/115, 52–
55; Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Deputation from the Chinese Residents of Victoria waited 
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the unofficial members and Chinese merchants were not directed to any of the 
twenty-one categories earmarked for tax. Further, the historical reasons for 
introducing such heads of charge are not known.    
 
In order to identify the rationale for including these heads of charge into the first 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance and to facilitate a clearer understanding of the 
law, this subsection assesses whether the reasons were embedded in the 
history of British stamp duty. Specifically, the subsection has two aims. The first 
is to examine whether the Hong Kong heads of charge, constituting various 
taxable written instruments, had British roots. In other words, were the Hong 
Kong heads of charge extracted from British Acts or did MacDonnell devise 
them in response to Hong Kong’s particular circumstances as a British trading 
depot in the Far East? On the presumption that these Hong Kong taxable 
instruments did have British roots, the second aim is to investigate the reasons 
for introducing them in Britain; how and why were they chosen? This is 
important for enhancing the understanding of Hong Kong law as such motives 
were often inherited without significant deliberation, as noted in the previous 
paragraph.  
 
The heads of charge prescribed for the first 1866 Hong Kong stamp duty 
legislation were as follows:261    
 
Head of charge Rate 
Head 1: Agreements262     Fixed duty263 
Head 2: Bank notes       Ad valorem duty264 
                                                                                                                                
on His Excellency Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, CB and Commander-in-Chief at government 
house to receive a reply to an address [to annul the Stamp Duty Ordinance] which they had 
presented on 5 ultimo [5 September 1866], Government Notification No 145’ (Hong Kong 
Government 6 October 1866). 
261 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, sch. 
262 Taxable agreements were written agreements, minutes, memoranda or any forms of 
evidence of an obligation between parties. It was manifestly stated in the schedule that 
documents for sealing an agreement should be subject to stamp duty. Exemptions were given 
to: agreements for fire or marine insurance, agreements for sales of goods, agreements for sale 
of shares in public companies, and salary agreements between the master and the mariners of 
any ship. 
263 A fixed duty of HK50¢ was imposed on each chargeable document. 
264 Bank notes issued by a bank in Hong Kong for circulation in Hong Kong were taxable at ½% 
per HK$100 of the average value264 of such notes in circulation. The stamp duty was paid to the 
Stamp Office every six months. The average value of the bank notes (AV) in circulation in each 
six month period was the sum of bank note values on the last Saturday of each month within the 
six month period divided by six. 
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Head 3: Bills of exchange      Fixed duty265 
Head 4: Bills of lading      Fixed duty266 
Head 5: Bonds267       Ad valorem duty268 
Head 6: Charter parties269      Fixed duty270 
Head 7: Transfers of shares in any public company  Ad valorem duty271 
Head 8: Powers of attorney     Fixed duty272 
Head 9: Notes of protest by commander of vessels273  Fixed duty274 
Head 10: Notarial acts      Fixed duty275 
Head 11: Receipts276      Fixed duty277 
Head 12: Probates and letters of administration   Ad valorem duty278 
                                            
265 Bills of exchange and promissory notes were charged at HK$1 if drawn singly, or HK50¢ on 
each part of the set if drawn in a set. In the nineteenth century, bills of exchange drawn in sets 
indicated they were to be drawn either in sets, or as duplicates, lest the first should be lost or 
miscarry. When bills were drawn in sets, each had to contain a condition that it should be 
payable only while the other remained unpaid. Thus, the first was payable only when the 
second and the third remained unpaid. The second was payable only when the first and the 
third remained unpaid. The third was payable only when the first and the second remained 
unpaid. See John Ramsay McCulloch, A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical of 
Commerce and Commercial Navigation ( Philadelphia, T Wardle 1840) , 659. 
266 Bills of lading were charged at HK10¢ per document. 
267 This referred to ‘bonds or other obligations concerning bottomry and respondentia’. Bottomry 
bonds were loans obtained by shipmasters by pledging the ship as the collateral. If the principle 
and interest were not paid at the appointed time after the ship’s safe return, the creditors would 
forfeit the ship. Such a loan was required when a ship needed emergency funding for repair 
during its voyage and the shipmaster could not contact the ship’s owner to arrange funding. The 
shipmaster could arrange a loan by pledging the ship and executing a bottomry bond. 
Respondentia bonds referred to the shipmaster obtaining loans by pledging the goods on the 
ship under similar situations. Although there were corporate bonds in 1866 Hong Kong [see G B 
Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong (Singapore, Eastern Universities 
Press 1962), 34], the 1866 Stamp Ordinance did not tax corporate bonds. Stamp duty payable 
was based on the sum ‘secured’. The word ‘secured’ implied some collateral was necessary for 
the borrowing that was not akin to the requirement of a normal corporate bond. Government 
bonds would be exempted by the general exemption clause at the end of the schedule annexed 
to the 1866 Hong Kong legislation as they were classified as instruments ‘made or executed by 
or on behalf of Her Majesty or any department of Her Majesty’s Service’. See Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance, No, 12 of 1866, sch. 
268 The stamp duty payable would be HK$10 if the sum secured did not exceed HK$10,000. If 
the sum secured was equal to HK$10,000 or more than HK$10,000, the stamp duty payable 
would be HK$20. 
269 Agreements for hiring a ship. 
270 Charter parties would be subject to a fixed stamp duty of HK$5 per document. 
271 The applicable rates were: instrument values up to HK$1,000, HK25¢ for every HK$100 or 
part thereof of the consideration; after the first HK$1000, HK$2 for every HK$1,000 or part 
thereof. 
272 Powers of attorney would be taxed at a fixed rate of HK$2 per document. 
273 These documents were made before a notary public by a shipmaster to declare 
circumstances beyond his control during a course of a voyage such as bad weather or other 
extraordinary events that caused damage to the ship or cargo. The documents were to be used 
against the insurance underwriters. 
274 Notes of protest were subject to a fixed stamp duty of HK25¢ per document. 
275 Notarial acts were charged at a fixed rate of HK$1 per document. 
276 Exemption was given to receipts for duly stamped documents. 
277 Receipts of more than HK$10 would be subject to a fixed duty of HK3¢. Exemption was 
given to receipts for duly stamped documents. 
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Head 13: Conveyances property     Ad valorem duty279 
Head 14: Mortgages      Ad valorem duty280 
Head 15: Re- assignments of mortgaged property Ad valorem duty281 
Head 16: Letters of hypothecation282    Ad valorem duty283 
Head 17: Duplicates or counterparts    Ad valorem duty284 
Head 18: Leases for premium     Ad valorem duty285 
Head 19: Leases for rent       Ad valorem duty286 
                                                                                                                                
278 The applicable rates were: instrument values up to HK$1,000, HK25¢ for every HK$100 or 
part thereof of the consideration; after the first HK$1000, HK$2 for every HK$1,000 or part 
thereof. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Written instrument, which authorises a bank or lender to repossess and sell the pledged item 
in case of a default. In international trade, a letter of hypothecation enables an accepting bank 
to sell the shipment in case of the non-acceptance or non-payment of the associated bill of 
exchange by the buyer. 
283 The applicable rates were: instrument values up to HK$1,000, HK25¢ for every HK$100 or 
part thereof of the consideration; after the first HK$1000, HK$2 for every HK$1,000 or part 
thereof. 
284 Duplicates and counterparts of any chargeable document would be subject to the same duty 
paid on the original document when such duty did not exceed HK50¢. If the duty chargeable on 
the original document exceeded HK50¢ but did not exceed HK$10, the applicable duty would be 
HK$1. If the duty chargeable on the original document exceeded HK$10 but did not exceed 
HK$20, the applicable duty would be HK$2. If the duty on the original document exceeded 
HK$20, the applicable duty would be HK$3. 
285 The applicable rates were: instrument values up to HK$1,000, HK25¢ for every HK$100 or 
part thereof of the consideration; after the first HK$1000, HK$2 for every HK$1,000 or part 
thereof. 
286 The applicable 1866 Hong Kong stamp duty for rental on a lease was: 
Yearly rent When the 
lease is for a 
period not 
exceeding a 
year  
When the 
lease is for a 
period 
exceeding a 
year 
HK$ HK$ HK$ 
Below 100 0.50 1.00 
  
 
100>250 1.00 2.00 
  
 
250>500 2.00 4.00 
  
 
500>1,000 4.00 8.00 
  
 
1,000>2,500 10.00 20.00 
  
 
2,500>5,000 20.00 40.00 
  
 
Any 
additional 
1,000 or any 
part thereof 5.00 10.00 
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Head 20: Leases for premium and rent    Ad valorem duty287 
Head 21: Instruments under seal     Fixed duty288 
 
The investigation of the British origins of the Hong Kong heads of charge 
demonstrates that taxable items, such as bonds, charter parties, mortgages, 
probates, conveyances of properties, leases, powers of attorney, notes of 
protest, notarial acts, duplicates and counterparts, instruments under seal 
presented in the 1866 Stamp Ordinance, were embedded in the British Stamp 
Act 1694.289  
 
According to the 1694 British House of Commons’ records, a committee was 
appointed by the House to formulate a bill on stamp duty to finance the war with 
France.290 However, the committee’s selection criteria for the instruments were 
not recorded. The committee might have resolved to select items that would not 
be challenged widely for their suitability.291 However, the Commons did spend 
much time clarifying the instruments that were included.292 An example of the 
detail of such discussions is the duty payable on university degrees. In relation 
to the phrase: ‘every skin, or piece of vellum or parchment, or piece of paper, 
upon which any register, entry, testimonial, or certificate, taken in either of the 
two universities, shall be ingrossed or written’ is charged with a duty of 40s, a 
question had been raised as to whether the two universities had to pay 40s for 
each degree on their registers. If that was the case, each university had to pay 
a large sum of over £200 yearly. The Commons clarified that 40s was to be paid 
on every sheet or skin of the universities’ registers and not based on every 
degree awarded.293 The rates of stamp duty were also discussed in the House 
of Commons. It had been doubted if degrees perceived as of ‘no advantage to 
the graduates’, such as ‘Master of Arts which was thought unnecessary by 
many persons’, should be subject to the same duty of 40s as other degrees.294 
                                                                                                                                
 
287 The stamp duty payable would be the aggregate of the taxes calculated under head 18 and 
head 19. 
288 This referred to instruments under seal that were not otherwise charged under the schedule.  
The applicable duty was fixed at HK$10. 
289 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21, s 3. 
290 11 Journals of the House of Commons 1688-1834 8 January 1694, 199. 
291 Ibid, 5 April 1694, 151–52. 
292 Ibid, 23 February 1694, 243–46. 
293 Ibid 246. 
294 Ibid. 
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The Commons also deliberated issues related to specific exemption, such as 
whether exemption should be given to Bachelor of Arts degree certificates, as 
the related graduates were ‘not generally able to pay 40s’.  
 
During the enactment of the first general stamp duty law in Britain in 1694, 
therefore, there were deliberations regarding the drafting of tax rates and 
exemptions. However, there was no discussion on the merits and deficiencies 
of individual taxable instruments denoted under various heads of charge. It can 
be deduced that the instruments in the British Stamp Act 1694 were selected 
purely for raising revenue in a period of acute need with no regard for the 
subject matters of charge.  
 
The levying of stamp duty on conveyances and the transfers of company shares 
under the 1866 Hong Kong legislation had its origins in the British Stamp Act 
1713 where such duties were imposed for the first time. 295  The House of 
Commons gave no reason for the imposition of stamp duty on conveyances.296 
The imposition of the stamp duty on share transfers, on the other hand, was 
attributable to the disposing of shares by the British joint stock public-private 
partnership, the South Sea Company,297 to procure cash to reduce the national 
debt.298 It may be concluded that stamp duty levied on the conveyances as well 
as the transfer of shares would be an additional income to the government with 
no other detectable auxiliary policy concerns or reservations.   
 
Bills of exchange and promissory notes that were taxable according to the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866299 first appeared under the British stamp duty 
                                            
295 British Stamp Act 1713 (13 Anne c 18), s 21. 
296 17 Journals of the House of Commons 1688–1834 22 April 1712, 246. 
297 The South Sea Company (officially known as The Governor and Company of the Merchants 
of Great Britain, trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for the 
encouragement of fishing) was a British joint-stock company founded in 1711, created as a 
public–private partnership to consolidate and reduce the cost of national debt. The company 
was granted a monopoly to trade with South America, hence its name. There was no realistic 
prospect that trade would take place and the company never realised any significant profit from 
its monopoly. Company stock rose greatly in value as it expanded its operations dealing in 
government debt, peaking in 1720 before collapsing to little above its original flotation price; this 
became known as the South Sea Bubble. For a detailed historical explanation of joint-stock 
company see Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in 
the Western World (New York, Simon & Schuster 1986), 268–69. 
298 17 Journals of the House of Commons 1688–1834 13 May 1712, 221. 
299 No 12 of 1866. 
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system as a specific exemption in the British Act 1694, 300  as they were 
important mercantile instruments in 1694.301 They became taxable in the British 
Stamp Act 1782.302 An examination of the reason behind the change found that 
again it lay in the need for revenue. In 1782, the North American colonists 
rebelled against Britain in the American Revolutionary War (fought during 
1775–1783). The British government needed money for the war. Further, the 
British government faced urgent and enormous pecuniary imperatives from the 
early 1770s as Britain had been at war for most of the eighteenth century, 
exhausting Britain’s finances. A huge sum of national debts, principal and 
interest repayments, had made matters worse.303 In the 1782 budget speech, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Frederick North (in office 1767–1782), 
estimated that the new duty imposed on bills of exchange and promissory notes 
would bring in much additional revenue. Meanwhile, he solicited acceptance by 
correcting the belief that this category of instrument, which promised a payment 
at a certain date, was used frequently by the poorer people304 at that time.305 
The law was passed with no opposition.    
 
Lord John Cavendish took over as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1783. He 
opened his 1783 budget speech by highlighting his task of proposing new taxes 
to service loan interest. Cavendish informed the House of Commons that the 
stamp duty imposed on bills of exchange and promissory notes introduced in 
1782 had been very productive and bought in annual revenue of £56,000. 
Cavendish perceived the tax was far from being burdensome to society and 
proposed doubling the tax rate in 1783.306 The evidence affirms the deduction 
that the selection of bills of exchange and promissory notes for stamping was 
again solely for revenue raising with no other obvious motive. 
 
                                            
300 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21, s 5. 
301 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 288. 
302 22 Geo 3 c 33, s 2. 
303 Chantal Stebbings, ‘Tax and Quacks: The Policy of the Eighteenth–Century Medicine Stamp 
Duty’ in John Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law vol 6 (North America, Hart Publishing 
2013), 290. 
304 This was an additional reason for Dowell’s comment on why this class of instruments was 
specifically exempted in the 1694 British Act. 
305 15 Parliamentary Register 1780–1796 11 March 1782, vol 6, 422–23. 
306 15 Parliamentary Register 1780–1796 26 May 1783, vol 10, 67–68. 
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In addition, in 1783, Cavendish advocated a stamp duty on receipts, a head of 
charge that would be adopted in Hong Kong in 1866. Cavendish remarked that 
as an ‘immense number of receipts that were (sic) given in England in a year’, a 
massive sum of revenue could be anticipated.307 In order to take care of the 
poor, he proposed an exemption on receipts of less than 40s as the poor 
seldom had large sum receipts. 308  The non-revenue reason for introducing 
stamp duty on receipts was ‘to make people more regular in their payments and 
be of infinite use to trade in general’.309 Cavendish did not explain why the new 
tax would make people settle their bills more regularly. An educated conjecture 
would be that the prescribed progressive tax rates were based on the amount of 
the receipt.310 This would encourage businesses to settle the bills regularly 
rather than accumulating a large sum. The stamp duty on receipts was 
introduced under the British Stamp Act 1783 with no opposition in the 
Parliament.311 Nonetheless, it proved to be very unpopular with shopkeepers. 
Apparently, the public did not agree that the stamp duty on receipts would 
enhance regular settlements of bills. The public perceived the tax was 
detrimental to trade.312 The evidence demonstrates that revenue-raising was 
the key impellent behind the introduction of receipts as a chargeable 
instrument. Cavendish attempted to give a non-financial reason for the duty on 
receipts but this was proved fallacious.  
 
The investigation of the British origins of bank notes313 that were included as 
chargeable in the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866314 found that they first 
appeared in the British Stamp Act 1799.315 The reason why bank notes were 
included in the British stamp duty system lies in the connection between the 
                                            
307 Ibid 68. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid 68–69. 
311 British Stamp Act 1783 (23 Geo 3 c 49). 
312 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 292. 
313 Paper currency was first developed in Tang Dynasty China during the seventh century, 
although true paper money did not appear until the eleventh century, during the Song Dynasty 
in China. The usage of paper currency later spread throughout the Mongol Empire. European 
explorers such as Marco Polo introduced the concept in Europe during the thirteenth century. 
See Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, a Venetian, in the Thirteenth Century: Being a 
Description, by that Early Traveller, of Remarkable Places and Things, in the Eastern Parts of 
the World (William Marsden tr, Cox and Baylis 1818), 353. 
314 No 12 of 1866. 
315 39 Geo 3 c 107. 
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history of bank notes and the history of stamp duty. The Bank of England was 
established in 1694 to raise money for King William III’s war against France. In 
1696, coins for £1 and above were made of gold. The Bank of England started 
to issue notes which could be redeemed for gold or coinage. The notes were 
not widely circulated due to their large denomination.316 In 1797, there were 
bank runs on the Bank of England caused by the uncertainty of the war. This 
drained its bullion reserve and the bank was forced to stop paying out gold for 
its notes. Instead, it issued small denomination £1 and £2 notes for 
circulation.317 These bank notes were negotiable instruments in the form of bills 
of exchange and promissory notes. Stamp duty had been levied on commercial 
promissory notes since 1782. With the widespread use of bank notes, British 
Prime Minister William Pitt (in office 1783–1801) decided to subject them to tax. 
The British Stamp Act 1799 stipulated that stamp duty should be paid on bills of 
exchange and promissory notes for small sums of money as indicated on the 
instruments issued.318 Banks collected the stamp duty and remitted it to the 
government periodically.319 It is clear that the only reason bank notes attracted 
stamp duty was that they could potentially bring in vast revenue. No regulatory 
motive is apparent. 
 
The discussion indicates that the lack of political resistance allowed the British 
government to select chargeable instruments freely without the need to conduct 
in-depth parliamentary examination on the merit and deficiency of each 
selected instrument. Further research into the reasons for the general lack of 
parliamentary debate on this aspect discovered that British Stamp Acts 
charging written instruments were usually passed for three reasons. First, there 
                                            
316 At around 1696, it was decided not to issue any notes for sums of less than £50. The notes 
were not widespread as the smallest domination of £50 was a large amount at that time. By 
1745 notes were being printed in large denominations ranging from £20 to £1,000 which made 
the notes still uncommon. In 1759, gold shortages caused by the French and Indian Wars 
forced the Bank of England to issue a £10 note for the first time. The first £5 notes followed in 
1793 at the start of the war against France. 
317 For a history of bank notes and the related banking practices see Bank of England, ‘A Brief 
History of Banknotes’ <www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/pages/about/history.aspx> 
accessed 7 May 2014; Davies Glyn, A History of Money from Ancient Times to the Present Day 
(Cardiff, University of Wales Press 2002); R D Richards, Early History of Banking in England 
(New York, Routledge 2012). 
318 British Stamp Act 1799 (39 Geo 3 c 107), s 1. 
319 Ibid s 3. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 82 
was a genuine need for revenue for wars and to service the national debt.320 
Treasury officials and politicians stressed the importance of steady repayment 
of the national debt so that loans would be forthcoming in times of 
emergency.321 Second, stamp duty was of least importance as compared to 
customs duties and excise at that time.322 As clear evidence, there were no 
debates when North and Cavendish introduced stamp duty on bills of exchange 
and receipts in their budget speeches in 1782 and 1783, respectively.323 The 
members of the British Parliament instead concentrated on additional custom 
duties that were proposed concurrently on various goods. Third, nothing was 
perceived as wrong in using taxation for purely financial purposes during that 
period, in contrast to modern taxes where the government would try to link it to 
some non-financial imperatives.324 
 
The body of evidence shows that all Hong Kong heads of charge constituting 
various taxable instruments introduced in 1866 were extracted from the British 
Acts. The evidence also points to the forces behind the selection of taxable 
instruments for British stamp duty that were eventually adopted by Hong Kong. 
For stamp duty to be effective and efficient, British politicians would select 
instruments that were most often used in order to generate vast tax revenue. 
There was no hidden agenda detected and no doubt the need to raise revenue 
was the key driver for the selection of the instruments. However, to a certain 
extent, the politicians also evaluated whether the selected instruments would 
affect the poor and whether they would cause public inconvenience. Other than 
that, there was no distinct policy in selecting specific written instruments to be 
included for stamp duty in Britain from 1694 to 1799. The indications are 
suggestive that Hong Kong inherited these values.   
                                            
320 See Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 
(Cambridge University Press 2001), 47. The debts rose from £2 million in 1688 or about 5% of 
the GNP to £834million in 1815 or over twice the size of GNP. 
321 Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 
(Cambridge University Press 2001), 375. 
322 Chantal Stebbings, ‘Tax and Quacks: The Policy of the Eighteenth–Century Medicine Stamp 
Duty’ in John Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law vol 6 (North America, Hart Publishing 
2013), 301. 
323 See 15 Parliamentary Register 1780–1796 11 March 1782, vol 6; 15 Parliamentary Register 
1780–1796 26 May 1783, vol 10. 
324 In fact in the twentieth century some tax philosophers held that taxation should not be used 
for non-financial aims as ‘to mix up with one very important objective another different and 
perhaps incompatible one is to run the risk of failing in both.’ See Harley L Lutz, Public Finance 
(New York, D Appleton and Co 1929), 313; C F Bastable, Public Finance (London, Macmillan 
and Co 1927), 336. 
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2.3.4 The initial regulations relating to jurisdictions subject to tax 
In this subsection, the historical British treatment of instruments with foreign 
elements will be examined. The aim is to analyse the historical development of 
the British principles regulating the imposition of stamp duty on such 
instruments before the 1866 Hong Kong introduction of stamp duty. The British 
tenets will be compared with the initial Hong Kong law to assess the extent to 
which Hong Kong had adopted these tenets. Besides achieving the foregoing, 
the investigation of the British origin and the juxtaposition of the British and 
Hong Kong positions in 1866 provides an important platform for the analysis of 
the Hong Kong development in this area in the next 130 years. It is also the aim 
of this investigation to exemplify the effectiveness of the initial Hong Kong 
provisions in regulating the taxing of instruments with a foreign element.  
 
In modern tax law, for instruments tinged with foreign elements to be subject to 
a country’s stamp duty law, there must be some minimum connection 325 
between the jurisdiction imposing the duty and the taxpayer or the instruments 
concerned. Contemporary principles devised for income taxation purposes – the 
source principle, residence principle and citizenship principle 326  – are also 
applicable for stamp duty analysis. 
 
The source principle refers to a country taxing all (external) activities having an 
economic nexus with the country. The residence principle refers to a country 
taxing all activities of a person who resides within that country regardless the 
location of the activities. The citizenship principle refers to a country taxing their 
citizens on their worldwide activities regardless of their place of residence.327 
 
The examination of historical British stamp duty legislation and parliamentary 
records indicates that in Britain, the tradition of levying stamp duty on written 
instruments with foreign elements commenced in 1783.328 To raise revenue for 
the British Treasury, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord John Cavendish (in 
office 1783), imposed stamp duty on foreign bills of exchange329 in addition to 
                                            
325 Christiana Panayi, Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty-Shopping and the European 
Community (Netherlands, Kluwer Law International 2007), 1. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid 2–5. 
328 British Stamp Act 1783 (23 Geo 3 c 49), s 2. 
329 A foreign bill of exchange was drawn in one country and made payable in another. 
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stamp duty on bills of exchange 330  which had been introduced in 1782. 331 
Cavendish remarked in his 1783 budget speech that ‘British legislation had a 
right to lay tax on all bills drawn here to be sent abroad’332 but ‘had no right to 
levy impositions on bills drawn abroad.’333 It is clear from Cavendish’s speech 
that his intention was to tax such instruments based on the source principle. 
Taxpayer’s residence and citizenship were irrelevant. 
  
Investigating subsequent British development it is found that there was no 
material promulgation of stamp duty legislation in respect of jurisdictions subject 
to tax from 1783 to 1866. The only connected legislation was the British Stamp 
Act 1821 which provided that deeds executed in England relating to property in 
Ireland are to be stamped.334  Other than that, the 1821 Act did not really 
enhance the understanding of how to determine the jurisdictions subject to tax 
for taxable instruments. Further investigation of English court cases decided 
before 1866, found for example, in Ximenes v Jaques, 335  that when an 
agreement was not made within Britain, it would not be subject to stamp duty. In 
Winbled v Malmberg,336 it was held that:  
The articles of a foreign ship, made abroad, regulating the wages of 
the sailors, even where the sailors have been hired in London, and 
which articles are lodged with the consul in London, may be given in 
evidence of the agreement for the hiring and wages to the sailor, 
without being stamped. 
During 1783 to 1866, only sporadic court cases added to the knowledge of the 
subject matter relating to agreements. Further, it can be observed from these 
cases that the Stamp Act did not affect those agreements made outside Britain. 
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 337  made foreign bills of exchange 
subject to stamp duty. Two types were rendered liable, namely bills drawn 
within but payable out of the colony; and bills drawn out of the colony which 
                                            
330 An inland bill of exchange was one that was both drawn and made payable in the same 
country. 
331 British Stamp Act 1782 (22 Geo 3 c 33), s 1. See also section 2.3.3. 
332 15 Parliamentary Register 1780–1796 26 May 1783, vol, 1068. 
333 Ibid. 
334 1 & 2 Geo 4 c 55. 
335 (1795) 170 1 Esp 311.  
336 (1796) 170 1 Esp 454. 
337 No 12 of 1866. 
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shall be accepted, endorsed, transferred, paid or otherwise negotiated within 
the colony. 
 
Analysing the provisions shows that Hong Kong’s first stamp duty legislation 
inherited the British ideology promulgated in 1783 which favoured the use of the 
source principle. A material difference detected was that the jurisdiction subject 
to tax was significantly wider under the Hong Kong stamp duty law in 1866 than 
under British law in 1783, which latter only imposed stamp duty on foreign bills 
of exchange drawn in Britain and sent out of Britain. MacDonnell did not give an 
explanation for the departure from the existing British principle. It can be 
surmised that he simply wanted to raise extra revenue. 
 
The 1866 Ordinance 338  did not specifically clarify the tax treatment of the 
remaining chargeable instruments with probable foreign elements. Some 
hypothetical examples, which the law did not clearly focus on, were transfers of 
Hong Kong company shares completed overseas; conveyances, mortgages, 
leases executed in Hong Kong in respect to overseas properties; and 
instruments under seal executed overseas for obligations related to Hong Kong.  
The incomplete law might have given rise to noncompliance.339 Nonetheless, it 
was unfair to blame MacDonnell for a legislative oversight in formulating the first 
Hong Kong stamp duty legislation as clearly the parent legislation lacked the 
relevant provisions. The analysis of the British and Hong Kong stamp duty laws 
highlighted the deficiency in this area.340  
2.3.5 Duty computation methods 
Evaluating the first 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance with regard to stamp 
duty computation methods, it can be seen that when MacDonnell introduced the 
first stamp duty legislation in Hong Kong, he embraced both the fixed rates 
regardless of transaction values and the ad valorem rates. 341  Since the 
substance of the stamp duty law was adopted from Britain, it was likely that the 
calculation methods would also be imported wholesale to Hong Kong. In order 
                                            
338 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866. 
339 Not only was revenue on these instruments lost, the compliance confusion, if it had led to a 
culture of disobedience among taxpayers, would have potentially affected the sustainability of 
the Hong Kong stamp duty system in the long run. 
340 This issue is examined in Chapter 4 relating to the Hong Kong stamp duty development in 
the quest for stamp duty system sustainability. See section 4.2.3. 
341 See section 2.3.2. 
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to assess this surmise and to understand these methods, it is necessary to see 
how stamp duty computation methods evolved in the British parent legislation. 
 
The 1694 British Act342 to a certain extent was a tax on the quantity of paper 
forming the chargeable document. It was stipulated clearly in the Act that every 
piece of paper should be stamped or marked with payment applicable to the 
instrument.343 Specifically, the charging sections usually commenced with the 
instruction: ‘For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, sheet or piece of 
paper upon which …’ brought to the realm of British stamp duty ‘shall be 
ingrossed or written, the sum of’ certain fixed tax rates, regardless of transaction 
value.344 The initial 1694 governing principle for stamp duty rates was that there 
should be one fixed rate prescribed for one class of instrument. The fixed rate 
was to be levied on each and every page of that instrument to arrive at the total 
tax payable.345  
 
Consequently, stamp duty rates were increased based on the length of the 
instrument and not on the value of the transaction denoted by the instrument.346 
Records of the British House of Commons offered no explanation why the 
British stamp duty rates were originally based on the quantity of paper used. A 
conjecture could be that taxes should be paid in proportion to the attestation 
service rendered by the stamp duty officer as he embossed stamps onto each 
page of the chargeable document. Another possible reason is that it was just for 
administrative ease; that is, the government perceived that it was simpler to 
count sheets of paper rather than to quantify transactional values from the 
documents in order to levy taxes.  
 
However, when stamp duty rates were based on the number of sheets of paper 
used, total stamp duty liabilities would depend on fonts, styles, formats and 
languages used for the documents. In short, the law introduced a degree of 
inequity into the stamp duty system. Thus, it was also unavoidable that 
taxpayers would seek to reduce tax liabilities by curtailing the length of the 
                                            
342 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21. 
343 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21), s 7. 
344 Ibid s 3. 
345 Ibid. 
346 Not all chargeable documents would have intrinsic values. For example, it was not possible 
to attach values to marriage certificates and degree certificates.  
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documents. In order to control such tax avoidance activities, the British Stamp 
Act 1694 specified that documents should be ‘written in such manner as they 
have been usually accustomed to be written.’ 347  In certain instances, the 
governments of British colonies adopting such a charging basis had to state in 
great detail the size of paper permitted and the maximum number of words on 
each sheet of paper to counter noncompliance. As clear evidence, the 1760 
Jamaican Stamp Act, a related law in the then British colony of Jamaica, stated 
the following:  
The sheet to be deemed a sheet and to contain forty lines of writing 
in each sheet and each line to be allowed as if continued from one 
edge of the paper to the contrary edge and to contain twenty eight 
words in each line and no more on paper commonly called or known 
by the names of post paper pro patria; and foolscap paper or any 
paper vellum or parchment of the same size one side of the sheet to 
be deemed a sheet and to contain twenty four lines in each sheet 
and each line to be allowed as continued from one edge of the paper 
to the contrary edge and to contain twenty words in each line and no 
more.348 
 
These rules to counter noncompliance, necessitated by rates based on 
document length, caused considerable inconvenience to the taxpayer when 
drafting chargeable documents and weakened voluntary tax compliance. 
Indeed, intricate stamp duty rules to counter noncompliance in this context, 
encouraged stamp duty noncompliance due to the difficulties in adhering to the 
stamp duty guidelines. Further, the collection cost incurred to ensure 
compliance was large as additional manpower was needed to audit the formats 
as well as the styles of the documents to ensure their conformity with the 
specified regulations.   
 
Despite the shortcomings involved in adopting fixed rates based on the number 
of sheets of paper as identified above, this practice existed in Britain for one 
hundred and ten years from 1694 to 1804 due to public revenue exigencies. 
This prompts a consideration of the impetus that drove the British stamp duty 
                                            
347 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21), ss 11 & 15.  
348 Lynne Oats and others, ‘Taxing Jamaica: The Stamp Act of 1760 & Tacky’s Rebellion’ 2014 
12(1) eJournal of Tax Research, 175. 
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development to phase out the practice completely in 1804 and the 
circumstances that facilitated its abolition  
 
The British Stamp Act 1713349 was central to the philosophy of stamp duty tax 
rates. The Act stipulated that, for some heads, stamp duties could only be 
collected if certain pre-set transactional values were exceeded. For example, it 
provided that: 
For every skin or piece of vellum or parchment, or sheet or 
piece of paper, upon which any grant of office or employment in 
Great Britain, which shall be above the value of fifty pounds 
sterling per annum shall be engrossed or written, the sum of 
forty shillings sterling.350    
This could be the official commencement of charging stamp duty based on 
transaction value instead of the length of the document. However, it could be 
argued that this was only a specific exemption so as not to affect the poor.   
 
The undisputed emergence of levying stamp duty on the basis of transaction 
values occurred in the late eighteenth century when British legislators initiated 
some measures to take into account transaction values when formulating stamp 
duty tax rates for certain heads of charge. As clear evidence, it was specified in 
the British Stamp Act 1782351 with regard to stamp duty on bills of exchange 
that: 
For every piece of vellum or parchment, or piece of paper, upon 
which any inland bills of exchange, promissory note, or other 
note payable otherwise than upon demand, shall be ingrossed, 
written, or printed, where the sum expressed therein, or made 
payable thereby, shall not amount to the sum of fifty pounds, 
there be charged a stamp duty of three pence. 
 
…, shall amount to the sum of fifty pounds or upwards, there be 
charged a stamp duty of six pence.352 
                                            
349 13 Anne c 18. 
350 British Stamp Act 1713 (13 Anne c 18), s 21. 
351 22 Geo 3 c 33. 
352 British Stamp Act (22 Geo 3 c 33), s 1. 
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This was the inception of ad valorem rates for stamp duty. Stamp duty rates 
were based on transaction values denoted by the chargeable instruments. 
 
It is seen that at this point there were two principles governing stamp duty rates 
in Britain: the length of the instruments with fixed rates, or the length of the 
instruments combined with ad valorem rates on transaction values denoted by 
the instruments. The practice of levying stamp duty based on the length of 
documents remained in force. 
 
Advancing further in the direction of ad valorem stamp duty charges, Prime 
Minister William Pitt (in office 1783–1801) obtained approval from the British 
Parliament to apply a full ad valorem scale for bonds in 1797. He introduced a 
table of charge ranging from 10s for bonds not exceeding £100 to £5 for bonds 
exceeding £100. This was more detailed than the two-tiered charge previously 
used for some heads of charge. Another major reform put forward by Pitt was 
abandoning the concept of charging stamp duty on the length of deeds. Pitt 
obtained parliamentary consent to levy stamp duty on the deed itself regardless 
of the length of the deed.353 This was the first time in the history of British tax 
that the charge to stamp duty was based on the document as a whole and not 
on the pieces of vellum, parchment or paper that made up the document. 
 
Pitt did not explain his landmark 1797 changes to the duty computation 
method.354 Investigating further, the acceptance of the ad valorem duty concept 
in late eighteenth century Britain was probably due to the influence of Adam 
Smith’s principle of proportionality in taxation,355 as Pitt’s fiscal view generally 
followed Adam Smith’s taxation principles.356 In particular, the notion of an ad 
valorem duty conformed to Adam Smith’s first maxim of taxation that taxes 
should be equal or equitable, which suggested that the ability to pay and the 
benefits received were keystones in determining how the British government 
should ensure that people made their tax contributions. The establishment of ad 
                                            
353 British Stamp Act 1797 (37 Geo 3 c 90); Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in 
England 4 vols (first published 1884, London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 293–94. 
354 18 Parliamentary Register 1796-1802, 26 April 1797, vol 2, 375–78. 
355 Harold M Groves, Tax Philosophers: Two Hundred years of Thought in Great Britain and the 
United States (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press 1974), 15. 
356 Chantal Stebbings, ‘Tax and Quacks: The Policy of the Eighteenth–Century Medicine Stamp 
Duty’ in John Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law vol 6 (North America, Hart Publishing 
2013), 292. 
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valorem rates facilitated the abolishment of rates based on document length in 
Britain. 
 
By virtue of the British Stamp Act 1804,357 Prime Minister Henry Addington (in 
office 1801–1804) put a complete stop to the British practice of levying stamp 
duty based on the length of the document. The conventional words, ‘for every 
piece of’, that appeared in all British stamp duty charging sections were 
deleted.358 The schedule annexed to the British Stamp Act 1804 specified the 
fixed rates and ad valorem rates chargeable to the whole document. 
Investigating the reason for the complete departure from the concept of levying 
stamp duty based on document length and shifting the focus to the use of the 
ad valorem basis, Addington’s remarks in the British Parliament were 
particularly revealing.359 Addington stated that there were three objectives to his 
Act of 1804: ‘First, an augmentation of the duties; next, a classification of those 
duties; and thirdly the necessity of subjecting the persons liable to pay those 
duties to a tax ad valorem.’360 Addington further commented that the members 
of the Parliament should turn their ‘attention to the ad valorem duty, which he 
was satisfied would be productive of much benefit to the revenue.’361 Addington 
did not disclose the proof that he was relying upon to justify his postulation that 
ad valorem duty would raise more revenue than imposing duties based on 
document length. It could be conjectured that the statistical analysis presumably 
made available to him on the effect of imposing ad valorem stamp duty from 
1797 to 1804, facilitated his decision. 
 
The evolution of British stamp duty calculation methods during the eighteenth 
century to the early nineteenth century relied upon two key drivers. The first 
driver was the demand for taxpayer equity in imposing stamp duty based on the 
principle of ability to pay. The second driver for the legislative changes was the 
need to enhance revenue. Perhaps, the second driver became more significant 
than the first after the British government realised that imposing stamp duty on 
an ad valorem basis could substantially enhance revenue. 
 
                                            
357 44 Geo 3 c 98. 
358 British Stamp Act 1804 (44 Geo 3 c 98), s 2. 
359 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 2 July 1804, series 1, vol 2, col 921–22. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
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The body of evidence shows that the stamp duty computation methods 
implemented under the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance362 were derived from 
the experience gained during the 173 year evolution of British stamp duty (1694 
to 1866). Most of the anomalies were filtered out before the Hong Kong 
adoption. The study of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866363 indicates that 
from the outset, duties were not imposed based on the length of documents. 
The evaluation of the Ordinance also reveals that more duties were based on 
an ad valorem basis than a fixed rate basis. Undoubtedly, MacDonnell tried to 
impose ad valorem rates whenever feasible and where taxpayer convenience 
would not be impaired. The evidence verifies that this was significantly 
influenced by the British history of stamp duty computation methods which had 
revealed that ad valorem duties effectively enhanced equity as well as revenue. 
 
In this context it is necessary to conduct a survey of modern classifications of 
ad valorem stamp duty rates in order to classify and identify the precise nature 
of the ad valorem rates initially used in Hong Kong, because in modern times, 
the term ad valorem stamp duty can have many different meanings with a 
variety of structures.  
 
An analysis of contemporary stamp duty tax rates prescribed in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Australia and Britain reveals at least six categories of ad 
valorem stamp duty rates: ad valorem (standard rate basis), 364  ad valorem 
(static percentage basis),365 ad valorem (cumulative standard rate basis),366 ad 
valorem (standard rate with static percentage basis),367 ad valorem (progressive 
                                            
362 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866. 
363 No 12 of 1866. 
364 Example: 
Transactional values Duty Payable 
$1 – $1,000 $5 
$1,001 – $2,000 $10 
$2,001 – $3,000 $20 
$ 3,001 – $4,000 $25 
 
365 Example: 
2% on transaction value. 
366 Example: 
$2 for every $100 or part thereof of the consideration up to $1,000 and $20 for every $1,000 
or part thereof after the first $1,000. 
367 Example: 
$50 plus 3% on transaction value. 
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percentage basis)368 and ad valorem (standard rate with static percentage and 
progressive percentage basis).369   
 
Applying this classification, it is seen that in the first Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance, ad valorem (standard rate basis) was applied to bonds, probates, 
conveyances, mortgages and letters of hypothecation and leases. The ad 
valorem (static percentage basis) was applied to bank notes only. These were 
the least complicated types of ad valorem duty.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that in Hong Kong, MacDonnell made the 
calculation of tax payable easy for taxpayers by keeping the calculation 
methods simple in the first stamp legislation. This enhanced the sustainability of 
stamp duty by minimising the potential for noncompliance.370 
2.3.6 Methods of collection 
Effective collection methods strengthened a tax system while drawbacks in the 
law hindered collection efficiency and effectiveness. Given the foundation of 
Hong Kong stamp duty was the British stamp duty law, it was also probable that 
British collection methods would have been imported into the colony. It must be 
ascertained to what extent the British collection principles were adopted by the 
first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, identifying any variations, and examining the 
reasons for those variations in order to ascertain the impulses that triggered 
them.  
 
                                            
368 Example: 
Transactional values Applicable tax rates  
$1 – $1,000 2% 
$1,001 – $2,000 3% 
$2,001 – $3,000 3.5% 
$ 3,001 – $4,000 4% 
 
369 Example: 
Transactional values Applicable tax rates 
$1 – $2,000,000 $100 
$2,000,001 – $2,351,760 $100 + 10% of excess over $2,000,000 
$2,351,761 – $3,000,000 1.5% 
$3,000,001 – $3,290,320 $45,000 + 10% of excess over $3,000,000 
$3,290,321 + 2.25% 
 
370 Nevertheless, in the next 130 years, the Hong Kong system adopted the ad valorem 
(standard rate with static percentage basis) and the highly complicated ad valorem (standard 
rate with static percentage and progressive percentage basis). The reason to the changes will 
be discussed in Chapter 3. See section 3.4.5. 
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It has been seen that when stamp duty was first enacted in Britain in 1694, the 
Stamp Act provided that the taxpayers were required to bring the chargeable 
documents to government Stamp Offices for the stamp duty officers to emboss 
stamp the documents to signify tax payments.371 The British Stamp Office also 
distributed stamped papers, namely a piece of paper bearing a pre-printed 
revenue stamp,372 to the public and collected the duty in that way. The stamped 
papers could be used for documents requiring stamping, such as leases, 
agreements and receipts. Taxpayers could purchase the stamped papers when 
needed or stock them for future use. Furthermore, it is found that the British 
government also distributed stamped papers prepared in London for American 
colonies during the 1765 implementation of the American Stamp Act.373   
 
The examination of British Stamp Acts and the related parliamentary records 
distinguishes a striking evolution in the stamp duty collection methods in Britain. 
This was the adoption of Sir Rowland Hill’s penny postage principle into the 
revenue stamp system in 1853 by William Gladstone when he was Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. 
 
Before January 1840, it was the usual practice for the recipient to pay postage 
upon delivery of a letter. Postage was charged according to the number of 
sheets and the distance travelled. The delivery cost could not be recovered if 
the recipient was unable or unwilling to pay. Hill proposed using a small-sized 
paper covered with glue at the back to indicate pre-payment of postage by the 
sender. The use of an adhesive stamp was a revolutionary idea. For 
convenience, it was resolved that a standard rate of one penny would be 
charged to mail a half-ounce letter between any Post Offices in Britain. The very 
first adhesive stamp with the face value of one penny, the Penny Black,374 was 
issued in Britain on 1 May 1840.375  
 
                                            
371 British Stamp Act 1694 (5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21), s 9. 
372 Mackay James, Philatelic Terms Illustrated (4th edn, London, Stanley Gibbons 2003), 147. 
373 Hermann Ivester, ‘The Stamp Act of 1765 - A Serendipitous Find’ (2009) XX(3) The Revenue 
Journal, 87. 
374 As the name implied it was a black-coloured stamp which featured a profile of Queen 
Victoria with a value of one penny. 
375 John Powell, Great Events from History: The 19th Century 4 vols (New York, Salem Press 
2006), vol 2, 643, <http://salempress.com/store/pdfs/great_events_from_history_19th.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2014; See generally Roland Hill, The Life of Sir Rowland Hill and the History 
of Penny Postage (London, Thos De La Rue Co 1880). 
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Thirteen years later, Gladstone announced a landmark alteration to Britain’s 
stamp duty collection method, articulating his reasons for change in the 1853 
budget speech.376 A few stamp duty collection principles could be inferred from 
Gladstone’s budget speech. Essentially, he listed factors that intensified stamp 
duty noncompliance relating to written instruments such as immense burdens, 
annoyances and payment inconvenience. He believed convenient processes 
would enhance stamp duty compliance.  
 
Borrowing from Hill’s postage reform, Gladstone created the penny tax system 
to improve the convenience of tax payment, which would in turn enhance 
compliance. The penny tax system had two important features.  
 
First, instead of bringing the receipts to designated Stamp Offices to be 
stamped, or producing receipts on stamped papers with the designated rates, 
the penny tax system allowed taxpayers to pay tax by applying adhesive 
revenue stamps onto the receipts. To avoid the same stamp being used in 
future transactions, taxpayers were required to sign on the adhesive stamps to 
signify usage. Taxpayers’ signatures on the stamps indicated tax had been 
properly paid and the documents were legally binding.  
 
Second, the penny tax system replaced the complicated progressive rates 
system previously in used. Instead of charging 3d for receipts between £5 and 
£10 and escalated upwards by a scale of eight steps to a maximum of 10s for 
receipts for more than £1,000,377 the penny tax system charged a fixed rate of 
1d for receipts of £2 or more.378   
 
Gladstone believed that by providing a convenient tax collection environment 
through levying a low fixed rate penny tax on daily transactions, tax compliance 
would be encouraged. Though tax rates had been reduced, due to economies 
                                            
376 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 18 April 1853, series 3, vol 125, col 1406. 
377 The eight steps of duty rate were 6d, 1s, 1s 6d, 2s 6d, 4s, 5s, 7s 6d and 10s. See House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers 6 April 1853, ‘A Return of the Number of Stamps for Receipts, 
at each Rate, issued to the Public by the Office of Inland Revenue and its Distributors 
throughout the United Kingdom, for Three Years ended the 5 January 1853’ series Accounts 
and Papers, vol LVII581, paper 300. 
378 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 300. 
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of scale, total tax revenue would increase in the long run. Gladstone was 
prepared to accept an initial loss of revenue for a longer-term positive outcome.  
 
By selecting receipts as the first trial instrument, Gladstone believed that the 
penny tax system was suitable for numerous everyday transactions. For 
instruments that were not used as frequently as receipts, such as conveyances 
on sale of immovable properties and leases, changing to the penny tax system 
was not necessary. These instruments usually involved significantly higher 
transaction values with higher tax rates. Reducing the progressive stamp duty 
rates to the fixed rate penny tax system would lead to less tax revenue. 
Gladstone would not be able to make up the loss he forecasted with receipts. 
Also, in relation to instruments such as immovable property conveyance 
agreements, taxpayers were willing to pay stamp duty to gain the notarial 
protection of these documents. On the other hand, taxpayers did not need this 
kind of notarial protection for receipts related to small purchases of 
merchandise or services.  
 
Gladstone expected no objection from the House of Commons and the public 
as the fixed rate for receipts was low and the adhesive stamp collection method 
was simple and convenient. Based on postage stamp revenue regaining its pre-
reform level in seven years after Hill’s reform in 1840,379 Gladstone estimated 
that the initial negative effect of £155,000 due to the new penny tax system 
would be recovered in the long run.  
 
It turned out that Gladstone’s financial estimation was far too conservative. No 
loss of revenue was recorded in the twelve months after the reform compared to 
the three yearly incomes before the reform. The revenue received after the 
reforms considerably exceeded previous records. The total revenue from stamp 
duty on receipts before the reform for the period of January 1852 to December 
1852 was £194,088.380 After the reform, revenue received on penny stamps for 
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receipts for the period October 1853 to September 1854 was £259,670.381 This 
showed that the penny tax reform was a huge financial success. 
 
Summing up the penny tax reform in his speech to the House of Commons, 
Gladstone observed that before the reform, ‘disobedience had become the rule 
and obedience the exception’. With the introduction of the new penny tax 
system, ‘obedience is the rule, and disobedience is the exception’.382 
 
When Governor MacDonnell introduced the stamp duty into Hong Kong, he 
chose impressing stamps, undertaken by officers in the Stamp Office, and 
adhesive stamps, as the two methods for stamp duty collection.383 He did not 
adopt stamped papers in Hong Kong but gave no explanation. To this extent, 
therefore, some, but not all, features of the British stamp duty collection method 
were endorsed in the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866.384 One reason could 
be that Hong Kong was a small colony in 1866 (consisting only of Hong Kong 
Island) with a much smaller and concentrated population as compared to 
Britain. It could be conjectured that it would not cause great inconvenience for 
Hong Kong taxpayers to bring their documents to the Stamp Office for stamping 
when the need arose. It was not necessary for the taxpayers to stock stamped 
papers. Another reason was Hong Kong lacked the resources to check the 
authenticity of stamped paper which would be used for important revenue-
generating levies such as bills of exchange, leases or conveyances on sales 
and the like. The Hong Kong Stamp Office commenced operation in 1866 with a 
staff of five,385 and if stamped papers had been permitted, the policy might have 
invited unscrupulous taxpayers to counterfeit the stamped papers which, 
unchecked, might have weakened system sustainability. 
 
The first Hong Kong stamp duty law stated the essence of the tax collection 
method but did not decree the actual implementation procedures. Nonetheless, 
the legislation gave the Hong Kong Governor a free hand in devising 
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procedures to collect stamp duty in Hong Kong. 386  It has been discovered 
through research of colonial records that before the implementation of the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866, 387  MacDonnell wrote to the Colonial Office 
seeking general advice on practical collection procedures from experienced 
British stamp duty officers.388  
 
The Commissioners of the British Inland Revenue reviewed the 1866 Stamp 
Ordinance and replied with a report (5 December 1866 Stamp Duty Report) 
stating their views on the practical operation of the Hong Kong stamp duty 
implementation. The first piece of advice was that an office be set up in a 
convenient location for the public to send in their written instruments to be 
stamped and to distribute adhesive stamps.389 MacDonnell took this advice and 
decided the Stamp Office should be conveniently positioned within the Hong 
Kong Post Office building which was located at the heart of the City of 
Victoria.390  
 
Second, since the Hong Kong Ordinance was based on the British Stamp Acts, 
the practical British regulations devised by the British Inland Revenue could be 
used for the implementation of the Hong Kong Ordinance in Hong Kong.391 The 
British Inland Revenue supplied the Governor with forms used by the British 
Stamp Office and the office’s internal control regulations for adoption in Hong 
Kong. There was no evidence to suggest that MacDonnell deviated from the 
British regulations and internal control practices.  
 
The third, and most significant, recommendation related to the use of adhesive 
stamps. 392  The Commissioners of the British Inland Revenue advised 
MacDonnell that in Britain, adhesive stamps were allowed to be used only on 
agreements, bills of exchange (foreign), charter parties, drafts and receipts. The 
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Commissioners objected strongly to the application of adhesive stamps to 
instruments generally, due to the insecurity of the revenue, a phrase now 
accepted to mean tax evasion. Accordingly, their use was confined to 
instruments of the nature described above and a few others that were liable to 
small rates of duty. 393  In other words, the Commissioners explained what 
William Gladstone did not point out in his penny tax reform speech. Adhesive 
stamps should not be used on non-daily transactions with larger amounts of tax 
payable, as they would induce noncompliance. For example, if adhesive stamps 
could be used on leases that commanded higher tax payable, taxpayers might 
not attach the stamps on the leases in the first instance, as the related taxes 
were high. If there was no dispute till the end of the lease, the likelihood was 
that no stamp duty was discharged. In the case of dispute, the taxpayer could 
attach a stamp immediately and no penalty was involved.  
 
A high-ranking official394 of the Colonial Office endorsed the 5 December 1866 
Stamp Duty Report with one additional comment. He advised MacDonnell not to 
impose any unnecessary restriction that caused inconvenience to the Hong 
Kong public at the commencement of a new and unpopular system of tax.395 
The British officials stressed the importance of striking a balance between the 
dichotomy of ‘insecurity of revenue’ and ‘taxpayer’s inconvenience’.  
 
MacDonnell permitted the following instruments to be taxed according to the 
British penny tax principle: bills of exchange when drawn out of Hong Kong, 
powers of attorney, notes of protest, receipts, duplicates and counterparts of 
deeds, and instruments in writing under seal not otherwise charged with duty 
under the 1866 Stamp Ordinance drawn out of Hong Kong.396 Besides receipts 
and bills of exchange drawn out of Hong Kong, the rest of the instruments 
earmarked by MacDonnell for the penny stamp system in Hong Kong were not 
permitted in Britain. For these instruments, only impressed stamps applied at 
British Stamp Offices could be used. When queried by the British 
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Commissioners of Inland Revenue on the policy departing from the British 
government’s practices,397 MacDonnell just said it was a matter of necessity 
without explaining. 398  Analysing the evidence collected, it is possible that 
MacDonnell deviated from the British practice because he wished to secure 
more revenue through offering greater convenience to the public. It could also 
be the case that MacDonnell adhered to the advice of the aforementioned high-
ranking Colonial Office official. Another possible explanation was that 
MacDonnell envisioned the new but understaffed Hong Kong Stamp Office 
might not be able to cope with the workload of impressing stamps on a large 
number of chargeable instruments. 399 
 
Nonetheless, two years later, MacDonnell acceded to the Commissioner’s 
request to adhere to the British principle on instruments to which adhesive 
stamps were permitted to be affixed by issuing an executive order, thus 
forestalling the British Treasury from further pursuing the matter.400   
 
The evidence affirms that the first Hong Kong stamp duty legislation had 
adopted all British stamp duty collection methods and principles prevailing in the 
nineteenth century (except for the use of stamp paper).  
2.3.7 The prosecution protection mechanism and assessment appeal process 
safeguards deficiency 
In a stamp duty system, it is essential to have prosecution protection 
mechanism as well as the assessment appeal process safeguards, to prevent 
the tax authority from abusing its power. This would prevent taxpayer 
discontent, which might have threatened the social order or led to widespread 
tax evasion. Moreover, governments would benefit from well-developed 
mechanisms and safeguards as tax compliance was best achieved by providing 
taxpayers with a tax system that ensured they were taxed precisely and 
                                            
397 Letter from Commissioner of Inland Revenue of Britain to British Treasury (28 February 
1868), CO129/135, 327–28. 
398 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Richard Grenville (14 May 1868), CO129/130, 346–47.  
399 Extract from the Minutes of the Executive Council of Hong Kong (28 September 1867), 
CO129/125, 37. See also section 2.3.6. 
400 Letter from Commissioner of Inland Revenue of Britain to British Treasury (27 August 1868), 
CO129/135, 418. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 100 
according to the law.401 To put it simply, prosecution protection mechanisms 
refer to the system in place to prevent unjust prosecution as well as to offer the 
right to appeal against conviction. Stamp duty assessment appeal process 
safeguards refer to the granting of rights to aggrieved taxpayers to appeal to the 
regular courts,402 or to an adjudicating body within the tax process itself,403 
against the assessments issued by the tax authority. 
 
This subsection investigates the British stamp duty prosecution protection 
mechanisms as well as appeal process safeguards that were already in 
operation when Hong Kong introduced stamp duty to ascertain whether Hong 
Kong adopted the established British processes in 1866. The extent to which 
the 1866 Hong Kong Ordinance embraced and implemented the British 
processes, their effectiveness and adequacy, forms the basis of this subsection.    
 
British protection mechanisms for unjust prosecution 
The first general British Stamp Act promulgated in 1694404 reveals that the 
legislators had already stipulated elementary protection mechanisms to ensure 
stamp duty payers were not unjustly prosecuted in the seventeenth century. 
The 1694 Act provided that no person should be arrested for stamp duty 
offences ‘without any writ or legal process to justify the same’.405   
 
Evaluating the legislative advancement before 1866,406 it is discovered that the 
next major enactment, which specified a judicial appeal channel against 
convictions, was promulgated in 1765. The Stamp Act 1765 407  stated that 
taxpayers aggrieved by the judgments or convictions issued by a Justice, or 
Justices, of the Peace408 might appeal to the Quarter Sessions.409 In the event 
that the taxpayers found the judgments of the Quarter Sessions improper, they 
might appeal to the Barons of the Court of Exchequer.410    
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British appeal process safeguards against Stamp Office’s assessment 
Adjudication by government officers in charge of tax administration was an 
integral part of the administration of certain forms of taxation such as the excise, 
in nineteenth century Britain.411 The British government introduced bureaucratic 
adjudication of stamp duty for written instruments via the British Stamp Act 
1850.412 The British government recognised that there were frequent doubts by 
the taxpayers as to whether stamp duties were chargeable on such written 
documents and it was expedient that such doubts should be removed. It was 
stipulated that the taxpayers would pay a fee of 10s to obtain the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue’s adjudication.413  
 
The merit of such adjudication was the high quality of judgments made by 
officers who were technically competent in assessing tax liabilities. On the other 
hand, the perceived weakness of bureaucratic adjudication was the clear 
conflict of interest between taxpayers and adjudicators. 414  The adjudicators, 
being executive members of the tax departments, were in effect judging their 
own causes. 
 
Examination of the British Stamp Acts reveals that it was not until the year 
1870, that the stamp duty lawmakers specified clearly in the Stamp Act 1870, 
that taxpayers who were dissatisfied with the assessments of the 
Commissioners might appeal against such assessments to the Court of 
Exchequer.415 Such law was not apparent before 1870. As such, it was unlikely 
that taxpayers had the right to appeal against the Stamp Office’s assessments 
to regular courts before 1870. Further evidence to justify the rhetoric is found 
via examining the stamp duty case law before the mid-eighteenth century. A 
survey of the English stamp duty cases in a British stamp duty textbook written 
for tax practitioners in 1841 demonstrates that all cited cases, which shaped 
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and exemplified the British stamp duty system, were civil cases between parties 
to certain instruments.416  
 
Hong Kong’s position in 1866 
In the Hong Kong context, the Stamp Ordinance 1866 provided that offences 
pertaining to stamp duty would be summarily tried by the Police Magistrate.417 
In Hong Kong, the post of Chief Magistrate was created in 1841 and the only 
appointee was also the Chief of Police and the Goal. 418  In 1843, a Chief 
Magistrate and an Assistant Magistrate were appointed.419 In 1862 (four years 
before the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong), a revised structure was 
established with two Police Magistrates of equal grade.420 Until the late 1870s, 
the Magistrates under the Magistracy system had no formal legal training. They 
were British421 and usually military men who were advocates of flogging and 
prided themselves more on their expertise in handling the Chinese than on their 
legal knowledge.422 Furthermore, the Magistrates often ignored the presumption 
of innocence and placed the burden of proof on the accused.423 One Hong Kong 
Magistrate, Charles Hillier, remarked in 1856: ‘my duty is to take down positive 
and relevant evidence in support of the charge’ and he thought it was not 
necessary to take evidence in favour of the accused.424  
 
The Hong Kong Magistracy in the nineteenth century was not part of the Hong 
Kong judicial system, but a department of the government to administer law and 
order and to hear offences arising from Ordinances passed by the Hong Kong 
                                            
416 J Chitty and John Walter Hulmes, A Practical Treatise on the Stamp Laws with an Appendix 
of the Statutes, and Notes thereon (London, Saunders and Benning Law Booksellers 1841). 
417 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, s 30. 
418 Kyshe Norton, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong (first published 1898, Hong 
Kong, Vetch and Lee 1971), vol 1, 6. 
419 Ibid 24. 
420 Gillian Bickley, A Magistrate's Court in 19th Century Hong Kong: Court in Time (Hong Kong, 
Proverse Hong Kong 2005), 35. 
421 Christopher Munn, ‘The Rule of Law and Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century’ in Steve 
Tsang (ed), Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2001).   
422 With this attitude, the sentences for the same crime were clearly divided into Chinese and 
non-Chinese with the Chinese’s sentences more severe. Equality of race across ethnic lines 
was not always upheld in the Hong Kong Police Magistracy in the nineteenth century. 
423 Christopher Munn, ‘The Rule of Law and Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century’ in Steve 
Tsang (ed), Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2001), 30. 
424 Kyshe Norton, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong (first published 1898, Hong 
Kong, Vetch and Lee 1971), vol 1, 378. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 103 
Legislative Council.425 The Police Magistrates were accordingly officers of the 
Hong Kong government and under the authority of the colonial government.426 
Under such a system, the officers of the executive in effect were judging their 
own cause. Further, the Hong Kong Magistracy system did not assist in 
ensuring the taxpayers were taxed accurately and according to the stamp duty 
legislation. It was not a system which promoted any constructive dialogue 
between collectors and taxpayers who felt they were being wrongly taxed. 
Instead, it was used to punish those who were perceived to have evaded tax.  
 
However, the 1866 Stamp Ordinance included a legal protection to shield 
taxpayers from being prosecuted unfairly by the Magistracy. It stipulated that 
prosecution for any offence under the 1866 Stamp Ordinance should only be 
processed with the prior consent of the Hong Kong Attorney General.427 Unlike 
the Police Magistrates, the Hong Kong Attorneys General in the nineteenth 
century were professional lawyers who had distinguished legal careers before 
being appointed. A few of them became the Chief Justice of Hong Kong. 428 
They were more competent than a Hong Kong Magistrate to gauge whether a 
taxpayer had complied with the stamp duty legislation. This stamp duty law was 
unusual as the Attorney General’s prior approval was not required for summary 
proceedings brought to the Magistracy in other spheres. For example, there 
was no similar provision to initiate summary proceedings of a Chinese for not 
carrying a lantern or lighted lamp and going about the City of Victoria429 after 
dark under the law passed during the same era as the 1866 Stamp Duty 
Ordinance. The person who violated the law would be sent directly to the Police 
Magistrate by the police officer for trial without the Attorney General’s prior 
consent to prosecution.430 This protection mechanism was, therefore, particular 
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to the stamp duty law and was incorporated into the legislation because passing 
judgment on revenue law matters required more than mere common sense and 
local knowledge. The legislator considered that the legal expertise of the 
Attorney General was necessary. 
 
By way of contrast, the Hong Kong legislation introduced the British stamp duty 
mechanism of subjecting stamp duty offenders to summary trials. Following the 
British tradition, Hong Kong also introduced protection mechanisms to prevent 
unfair prosecutions in the first instance. Nonetheless, the juxtaposition of the 
parent with the host systems identified two marked differences. First, in Britain, 
the trials were conducted by an independent431 Justice of the Peace, whereas in 
Hong Kong they were heard by non-independent Police Magistrates. Second, 
unlike the British legislation, the Hong Kong law did not specify any further 
appeal mechanism if the taxpayers were aggrieved by the judgments of the 
Police Magistrates. The evidence shows that protection against unjust 
prosecutions provided in Hong Kong under its 1866 stamp legislation were 
inadequate. Thus, the essential protection implemented in Britain at the same 
time that the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance was introduced, was not 
adopted comprehensively in Hong Kong.  
 
As revealed above, before 1866, the British stamp legislation did not specify 
any rule that general taxpayers could follow to appeal against assessments 
issued by the Stamp Commissioners, either to a Justice of the Peace or other 
British Courts. Essentially, the British appeal system was only appropriate for 
those taxpayers who were accused by the stamp duty authorities of having 
committed stamp duty offences under the Stamp Acts. The next fundamental 
question is whether, in 1866, the Hong Kong taxpayers were in a similar 
position. Examining the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance,432 it is suggested 
that Hong Kong taxpayers could not appeal to Police Magistrates if they had 
disputes with the Stamp Office as the law lacked the relevant provisions. In any 
instance, it was unlikely that the taxpayers could appeal to the Police 
                                            
431 Chantal Stebbings, The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law: A Study in Constitutional Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press 2009), 23. 
432 No 12 of 1866. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 105 
Magistrates since the Magistracy was set up to hear offences committed and 
impose punishments, but not to hear civil disputes.433 
 
Investigating further, it was discovered that, unlike the legislation for Hong Kong 
house rates, which specified that taxpayers could petition the Hong Kong 
Supreme Court for a refund of house rates,434 the 1866 Stamp Ordinance did 
not specify any such appeal path for stamp duty. Although the 1866 Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance did not expressly prohibit taxpayers from appealing to the 
Supreme Court, there is no evidence that any such appeals were made within 
ten years following the introduction of stamp duty assessment.435 It is suggested 
that the reason for this was that it was not always practical for the taxpayers to 
appeal to the Supreme Court on stamp duty matters. First, the cost of appeal436 
could far exceed the duty payable since the maximum stated duty chargeable 
under the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 was HK$25.437 Second, it was not 
certain that the Supreme Court would accept stamp duty cases initiated by 
taxpayers due to the small amount of tax in dispute. Drawing parallels with the 
Hong Kong Rating Ordinance in the 1860s supports this assumption. The 
Rating Ordinance in 1867 stipulated that the Judge of the Court would not 
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entertain any claims from taxpayers for over-assessed house rates that were 
below HK$500.438 With the threshold of HK$500 stated in the only other form of 
revenue law at that time, it could be inferred that an appeal to the Supreme 
Court for stamp duty disputes by taxpayers was not feasible.    
 
Regulations for appeals from the decisions of the Supreme Court to the British 
Privy Council in London were published in Hong Kong on 5 May 1846. 439 
Appealing to the Privy Council was unthinkable as it was expressly provided 
that the Privy Council would only entertain appeals that involved a claim that 
was more than HK$5,000.440 It was unlikely that stamp duty disputes would 
exceed that sum in the 1860s.  
 
The evidence demonstrates that in 1866, the Hong Kong position on the right to 
appeal to any court against a stamp duty assessment was similar to the 
prevailing practice in Britain. It was not possible or feasible to appeal at all in 
Hong Kong. 
 
The British tradition of adjudication by the executive was adopted in Hong Kong 
by the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866.441 It specified that any person who 
was in doubt as to the proper amount of stamp duty payable on an instrument 
could apply to the Collector of Stamp Revenue for adjudication for a fee of 
HK$10. 
 
It is submitted that the Hong Kong stamp duty adjudication system in its initial 
form was not effective for three reasons. First, the technical merits of the 
determinations issued were untenable. The first Hong Kong Collector of Stamp 
Duty, Mr F W Mitchell had another major full-time employment as the Post 
Master General of Hong Kong and could not devote all his time to the Stamp 
Office. Furthermore, there was no evidence he had expertise in the British-
based stamp duty law to make quality decisions on stamp duty legal matters. 
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The Governor of Hong Kong Sir Richard MacDonnell remarked: ‘I have after 
much consideration appointed Mr Mitchell to be the Stamp Collector 
provisionally, as he has more facilities for discharging duties as such than any 
other head of a department more remote from the new office’.442 Mr Mitchell 
was appointed because the Stamp Office was situated within the Hong Kong 
Post Office building and he was in close proximity to oversee the operation. The 
other two key officers were the First Clerk and Second Clerk of the Hong Kong 
Stamp Office. MacDonnell commented that the First Clerk, Mr S Rodrigues, was 
appointed ‘due solely to his familiarity with legal documents and instruments’.443 
The reason for hiring the Second Clerk, Mr F Biden, was because ‘he was a 
respectable person here and had some slight previous acquaintance with 
doctrine of the Stamp Office duties in London’. 444  With the composition of 
novice staff, the quality of adjudication was unconvincing. Second, the cost of 
seeking adjudication was HK$10, which was significant as compared to the 
stamp duty, which ranged from HK3¢ to a maximum of HK$25, payable on each 
taxable transaction in the 1860s. Taxpayers were better off paying the stamp 
duties than paying a substantial sum to access the safeguard. Third, the 
inherent conflict of interest in tax collectors acting as adjudicators further 
undermined the acceptability of the early Hong Kong stamp duty adjudication 
system. 
 
Apart from the prosecution protection mechanism and appeal process 
safeguards that Hong Kong had adopted partially from its British parent, there 
were two other types of safeguards in place to ensure the Chinese community 
was taxed according to the law. They were the Chinese Hong Kong 
Government Gazette and the Hong Kong Tung Wah Hospital. 
 
The tradition of the London Gazette was established in 1665.445 The Hong Kong 
government ensured all stamp duty legislation was published in the Hong Kong 
Government Gazette. This helped the taxpayers to understand their exact 
stamp duty obligations in their interaction with the Hong Kong Stamp Office. To 
ensure the majority Chinese population was informed of government policies, 
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Governor Sir Hercules Robinson (the predecessor of Governor Sir Richard 
MacDonnell) decreed that more Chinese editions of the Gazettes 446  be 
produced.447 The Chinese Gazettes enhanced local understanding of the British 
colonial law and policies.448 
 
Though the stamp duty law was published, it was technical and complex for 
many taxpayers to understand their precise obligations and to safeguard their 
rights. There was a demand for independent advice and assistance on stamp 
duty issues. Surveying the available options available in the 1860s, it is seen 
that they were very limited. Wealthier taxpayers could obtain legal opinions from 
the twenty or so British solicitors449 practising in Hong Kong in the 1860s if they 
deemed it necessary. For the majority of the Chinese community, there was an 
alternative advisory channel in the form of Hong Kong Chinese organisations, 
which acted as the de facto government for the Chinese and were sanctioned 
by the British colonial government. The earliest such organisation was Man Mo 
Temple,450 founded by some Chinese community leaders in 1847. Although its 
ostensible purpose was to worship the literature god and the martial god, the 
temple evolved to serve as the local de facto governing board among the 
Chinese. The temple attended to social affairs of the Chinese community and 
acted as commercial arbitrators for the Chinese.451 The establishment of the 
Hong Kong Tung Wah Hospital by the Hong Kong government in 1872 largely 
replaced the role of Man Mo Temple. Prominent Chinese residents were elected 
by the government on an annual basis to become directors of the hospital 
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board, as a form of government recognition of notable and distinguished 
Chinese residents. These hospital directors were highly regarded by the Hong 
Kong Chinese,452 and the hospital also functioned as an informal governing 
body for the Chinese. To avoid unfamiliar British law and the complexities of the 
English language, many Chinese preferred to resolve their civil arguments 
through the prestigious board. Judgments passed by directors of the Tung Wah 
Hospital were morally binding among the Chinese. The hospital also provided 
an advisory service on ways to comply with Ordinances passed by the British 
colonial government.453 
 
The inadequacy of the Hong Kong stamp duty prosecution protection 
mechanism and appeal process safeguards in 1866 
Based on the available evidence, there were no satisfactory protection 
mechanisms against unfair prosecutions or appeal process safeguards for 
stamp duty taxpayers under the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866. 454 
MacDonnell might have felt it was not necessary as stamp duty was viewed as 
the simplest form of tax in operation in Britain.455 Taxpayers purchased stamps 
needed for their document or had documents impressed with a stamp at the 
Stamp Office and such operation was not complicated. Further, MacDonnell 
might have perceived that the dutiable documents in Hong Kong were not 
extensive and tax rates were low as compared to other British colonies and 
Britain. As such, no significant dispute would be anticipated. Accordingly, he 
might have regarded the demand for an elaborate protection as well as 
safeguard system was not strong, which led to the absence of such regulations 
in Hong Kong’s first Stamp Duty Ordinance.456 
 
Apparently, there was also no clamour against the lack of prosecution 
protection mechanisms or appeal process safeguards for taxpayers in the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866. Examination of the historical social and political 
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circumstances points to two reasons behind the absence of demand in Hong 
Kong.  
 
The first reason related to the Chinese population’s lack of knowledge of the 
British legal system as well as its intrinsic moral principles. Governor Sir 
Hercules Robinson (in office 1859–1865) estimated that out of the 120,000 
Chinese living in Hong Kong in the 1860s, fewer than five hundred were familiar 
with British laws and legal institutions.457 The majority of the Chinese people 
were living according to the values of the Qing Dynasty legal system and were 
not aware of the British legal system, of which judicial independence was the 
keystone. Besides hearing civil disputes and criminal cases, a Qing Magistrate 
was also an originator of law, an administrator of law, a prosecutor, a police 
chief and a coroner.458 From a tax perspective, the Qing Magistrate concurrently 
held the appointments of the Governor of Hong Kong, the Collector of Stamp 
Duty, the Chief Justice of the Hong Kong Supreme Court and the Hong Kong 
Government Prosecutor. There was an aggregation of powers rather than 
separation of powers. The perceived benefit of such a system was the ability to 
lower the number of officers in the government and thus lower taxes. 
Nevertheless, under such a system, it was quite pointless for taxpayers to 
launch appeals against tax assessments issued by the government or to 
dispute prosecutions initiated by the Qing Magistrate. The Qing legal and 
governing system was part of life for the Chinese in the nineteenth century. 
Furthermore, the nineteenth century Chinese legal system was shaped by 
Chinese Confucian ideologies. The Chinese believed that litigation and court 
disputes were engaged in by contentious and immoral people and that morally 
superior people would not litigate. In other words, the act of engaging in a 
lawsuit indicated moral failure. 459  Qing scholar and prominent Mandarin 
Yuqian 460  remarked that people living according to high moral principles 
emphasised humaneness, righteousness, politeness, wisdom and sincerity. 
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People who liked to litigate were mean-spirited, lacked balance, were 
contentious out of anger, and were therefore not humane, righteous, polite, wise 
or sincere.461 As a Chinese gentleman, one had to avoid lawsuits at all cost. 
With such traditional Chinese values, and ignorant of British legal concepts of 
judicial independence, the Hong Kong Chinese did not censure the lack of 
safeguards under the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866.462  
 
The second reason was related to the first. Without support from the majority 
Chinese community, it was impossible for the minority Hong Kong British 
population to stage a formidable revolt against the lack of comprehensive 
protections and safeguards similar to the American stamp duty revolt in 1765.463  
 
As Hong Kong progressed, it can be surmised that the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system in its primitive form could not defend the rights of the taxpayers. The 
1866 Hong Kong stamp duty system could not deal with the growing demand by 
taxpayers for mechanisms to ensure that they were being taxed strictly in 
accordance with the law, and this would be compounded in future by the effects 
of economic growth and the introduction of higher tax rates.464  
2.3.8 Introduction of rules to counter stamp duty noncompliance 
In the pre-legislative debate on the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance,465 the 
Legislative Council unofficial members envisioned noncompliance would be a 
problem, as the stamp duty collectors would not comprehend Chinese 
documents, thus enabling the Chinese community easily to escape paying 
tax. 466  In his communication with the Colonial Office regarding the 
implementation of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866, 467  MacDonnell 
mentioned that his government would ‘nevertheless require much vigilance to 
prevent some of its provisions being evaded.’468 The Commissioners of Inland 
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Revenue reviewing the 1866 Hong Kong stamp legislation remarked that 
MacDonnell might have lost sight of the possible loss of revenue due to 
noncompliance with the extensive use of adhesive stamps on a wide variety of 
instruments. The evidence demonstrates that the parties to the institution of 
Hong Kong stamp duty envisioned noncompliance would be a key 
implementation issue that could not be neglected in the initial years following 
the introduction of stamp duty. 
 
In this study, noncompliance encompasses the act of not paying stamp duty 
when dutiable instruments were executed, evading stamp duty as well as 
avoiding stamp duty. For the purposes of this study, stamp duty evasion is 
defined as the illegal circumvention of duties by deliberately misrepresenting the 
true state of the dutiable transactions to the Collector of Stamp Duty or else 
escaping the payment of duties by other illegal means. Meanwhile, stamp duty 
avoidance is defined as the legal use of the stamp duty law to reduce the tax 
burden.  
 
It has been seen that a number of measures were imported into the Hong Kong 
stamp duty from the British parent tax, such as techniques to compute, methods 
to collect, prosecution protection mechanisms and the assessment appeal 
process safeguards. It will now be seen to what extent measures taken to 
combat stamp duty noncompliance during the formative years of the Hong Kong 
stamp duty law had British origins.  
 
Initial provisions to ensure voluntary and full payment 
It was stipulated in the British Stamp Act 1694 that when a taxable written 
instrument was unstamped or insufficiently stamped, the document would not 
be admitted in court and would remain useless in this sense till a penalty of £5 
had been paid.469 This shows, first, that the tax was notarial in nature as the 
application of a government seal added credibility and validity to the 
documents. So, for example, physicians or attorneys would ensure their 
professional admission documents were properly stamped when showing their 
qualifications to the public.470 The public might view certificates without proper 
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stamp marks as counterfeits. This notary function was a practical deterrence 
against not paying the tax. Second, since unstamped documents were 
inadmissible for court rulings, it would be in the parties’ best interests to ensure 
the documents were stamped to guarantee validity. Third, the penalty of £5 for 
noncompliance was a large sum when compared to the usual duties payable, 
thus encouraging self-compliance rather than being charged a much larger 
penalty later. In other words, the stamp duty law was designed to levy heavy 
penalties on relatively small amounts of stamp duties payable so as to 
encourage voluntary compliance by taxpayers. These same fundamental 
principles were maintained in subsequent stamp Acts, notably the British Stamp 
Act 1815,471 which Stephen Dowell termed a ‘final consolidation’ for the period 
1694 to 1815.472 
 
The 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance473 was drafted in such a way as to 
combat stamp duty noncompliance in two ways. The first was accomplished by 
not recognising unstamped documents. This was achieved by rendering 
unstamped documents inadmissible in courts474 or by ordering public officers 
not to act upon unstamped documents.475 The second was accomplished by 
imposing heavy penalties for noncompliance. Penalties for non-stamping would 
be double the original amounts of stamp duty payable if the unstamped 
documents were brought to be stamped within six weeks of execution. 476 
Penalties would be tripled if the unstamped documents were brought to be 
stamped after six weeks of execution.477 The penalty would be increased to 
twenty times the original stamp duty if the unstamped or insufficiently stamped 
documents were brought to the Stamp Office four months or more after 
execution.478 The evidence demonstrates that Hong Kong adhered completely 
to the British traditions begun in 1694 with no material alteration. 
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In addition to adopting British tenets in ensuring voluntary and full payment, 
MacDonnell included a mechanism that was not apparent in the British Stamp 
Acts for written instruments to detect noncompliance with the aim of improving 
voluntary stamp duty payment. The 1866 Hong Kong stamp legislation 
stipulated that the Stamp Office would award the whole or part of the fine 
gained by the Hong Kong government to informers of incidences of documents 
being executed but not stamped.479 This was an extra detection channel made 
available to identify taxable written instruments that had been executed but not 
duly stamped besides relying on courts or public officers. MacDonnell gave no 
explanation for conceiving the law, in either the Legislative Council addresses 
or in his correspondence with the Colonial Office. As an educated conjecture, 
the rule might have its origin in British Stamp Acts for objects. As clear 
evidence, it was the first method of enforcement for the medicine stamp duty in 
the late eighteenth century in Britain.480    
 
Taking the initial Hong Kong law on inducing voluntary compliance at face 
value, it is submitted that the British principles adopted might be cost effective 
as well as effectual in achieving the pre-determined objective. Nevertheless, 
analysing the peculiar Hong Kong circumstances in the late nineteenth century, 
there might be doubt whether the Chinese population would comply as they 
might not rely upon the protection of the Hong Kong British judges in 
commercial disputes.481 This might have dampened their desire to comply. As 
evidence in support of this, a Hong Kong historian observed that with the 
exception of receipts given to foreigners, Chinese tradesmen and merchants 
disregarded the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation in 1867.482    
 
In addition, evaluating the effectiveness of the initial provisions in encouraging 
the voluntary payment of stamp duty, gives rise to two observations regarding 
the drafting of the initial Hong Kong law that might have impinged on voluntary 
compliance. First, it was stipulated that all instruments had to be stamped 
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before execution. 483  The strict requirement for stamping documents before 
execution caused significant inconvenience to taxpayers, and in consequence 
led to a degree of disobedience. Second, the provisions which levied heavy 
penalties were complicated by a section which used HK$50 dollars as a 
reference point to prescribe the applicable penalties. Basically, it provided that 
penalties should not exceed HK$50, or a sum equal to ten times the value of 
the stamp omitted if the sum so calculated exceeded HK$50.484  
 
Illustration 1 
Consider the stamp duty omitted is HK$5 485  and the omission 
period is more than four months. The applicable penalty would be 
HK$5 x 20 = HK$100. In this case, since the penalty exceeded 
HK$50, the penalty would be decreased to HK$5 x 10 = HK$50.  
 
Illustration 2 
Consider the stamp duty omitted is HK$25 486  and the omission 
period is more than six weeks but less than four months. The 
applicable penalty would be HK$25 x 3 = HK$75. Since the penalty 
exceeded HK$50, the applicable penalty would be increased to 
HK$25 x 10 = HK$250. 
 
The above illustrations show that the penalty sections of the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1866 487  lacked simplicity and rendered inconsistent results. The 
drafting of the penalty sections was not crystal clear and caused confusion as to 
the penalties applicable to taxpayers, and this undermined the effectiveness of 
the system established to combat noncompliance.  
 
Initial provisions to counteract stamp duty evasion 
The British Stamp Act 1694 stipulated that any person who forged a stamp 
should receive the death penalty.488 Other than this provision, there was no 
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other regulation stated in the Act489 to counteract stamp duty evasion. By 1815, 
however, numerous specific anti-evasion regulations had been introduced. For 
example, the British Stamp Act 1815 490 stated that if any person, on applying 
for probate, had estimated the estate to be of a lesser value than the same 
should have afterwards proved to be, should be liable to a penalty.491 
 
Looking at the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, it is perplexing to find that 
the Ordinance did not promulgate any provision to curb the forging of stamps.492 
This resulted in an absurd outcome of only penalising late payments but not the 
serious offence of counterfeiting stamps. MacDonnell did not clarify why the 
British law was not followed. It might have been a legislative oversight. Another 
possible explanation was that the Governor believed it would be much more 
expensive to forge a stamp than to pay stamp duty in the formative years of the 
tax. 
 
In adopting British legislative values, the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance493 
provided that taxpayers were liable to a penalty not exceeding HK$250 if found 
wilfully inserting amounts lower than the true consideration in respect of 
instruments subject to ad valorem duty. Nonetheless, the law in 1866 provided 
no prescribed procedure or standard that the Stamp Office could follow to 
determine the open market valuations (for example, for conveyance of 
properties and disposal of shares). The lack of well-defined law in the area 
caused the anti-evasion provision to be ineffectual. 
 
Initial provisions to counteract stamp duty avoidance 
Surveying the statute law in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, it is 
found that the British government did not enact general anti-avoidance 
regulations494 to combat stamp duty noncompliance. The reason was that in the 
eighteenth century and beyond, tax avoidance was not a crime as explained by 
Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England and Adam Smith in his 
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Wealth of Nations.495 Indeed it was sometimes regarded more as a sport.496 In 
reality, even half a century after the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong, a 
British judge said: ‘No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral 
or otherwise, so to arrange his legal relationships to his business or his property 
as to enable Inland Revenue to put the largest shovel into his stores’.497 It was 
contrary to this ethos to legislate in general terms against tax avoidance. 
Another reason was that the general anti-avoidance concept was too advanced 
for the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In fact, in Britain, common law 
general anti-avoidance doctrine was not propounded until the decision of the 
House of Lords in W T Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners498 in 
1982.499  
 
Nonetheless, it can be recalled that specific anti-avoidance rules had already 
been prescribed under the British Stamp Act 1694.500 It has been said that 
stamp duty was charged on every sheet of the written instrument in 1694.501 
With the aim of counteracting tax avoidance by reducing the length of the 
documents, the 1694 British Act required documents to be written in a manner 
and style acceptable to the British Stamp Office.502  
 
Inheriting the British values, Hong Kong did not legislate in general terms 
against tax avoidance in 1866. After all, there was no real need for such general 
legislation in 1866 in Hong Kong as the amount involved was too small to 
warrant such legal complexity. Even if such law was in place, the Hong Kong 
Stamp Office would have had a problem in arriving at a common understanding 
of what constituted tax avoidance as the concept was too sophisticated for 
Hong Kong at that time.  
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Similar to British stamp duty law, only specific anti-avoidance rules were 
propounded in Hong Kong in 1866. Inspecting the initial Hong Kong stamp duty 
legislation,503 in order to prevent avoidance by executing gifts, exchanges or 
settlements with no money consideration or only nominal consideration, the 
schedule annexed to the 1866 Ordinance enabled the government to collect a 
large fixed stamp duty of HK$25 instead of the ad valorem duty in respect of 
such instruments.504 Besides this, there was no other specific anti-avoidance 
provision drafted.505  
2.4 The American Stamp Act 1765 
Hong Kong was colonised by Britain in 1841.506 Before 1841, it was part of the 
imperial Qing Empire which ruled its provinces through highly institutionalised 
administrative apparatus consisting of the Six Boards 507  and the Grand 
Council508 in Peking.509 Of the Six Boards, the Revenue Board was charged 
with the duty of tax collection. The central Imperial Qing government would ask 
the Chinese Provincial Governors to comment on whether tax policy changes 
suggested by the central government would work under the specific situations 
in each province. After receiving responses from the Provincial Governors, the 
Qing Emperor would direct Revenue Board ministers and the Grand Council 
members to conduct further debates before making a final decision. 510 The 
fiscal policies were the personal decision of the Qing Emperor with advice from 
his ministers and Provincial Governors. It can be deduced that the taxpayers 
were never a party to the tax policy decision-making processes. Since Hong 
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Kong was part of the Imperial Qing Empire before colonisation and accustomed 
to such governing mandate, it would be appropriate for the British government 
to unobtrusively follow suit and simply direct the Hong Kong Governors from 
London to impose stamp duty to ease the colonial budget deficit. Nevertheless 
it has been revealed from an examination of the political resistance which 
Governor John Davis needed to surmount in his plan to impose rates in Hong 
Kong in 1845,511 that from the beginning of the colony, it was never the intention 
of the British government to impose tax from London, but rather to allow 
taxpayer involvement in the formulation of Hong Kong tax policy.512 In other 
words, the Governor had to obtain local political sanction for the imposition of 
stamp duty.  
 
The foregoing observations drove the research to investigate why the British 
government chose to adopt an onerous path in promulgating colonial taxes in 
Hong Kong, and to determine whether there was a strong case to suggest that 
the political approach adopted to implement stamp duty in Hong Kong was a 
consequence of the stamp duty history.   
 
An examination of the introduction of stamp duty in America in 1765 is 
revealing. On the one hand, the examination shows how the imposition of 
stamp duty by Britain significantly influenced the independence movement in 
America. On the other hand, it shows the profound impact of the American 
stamp duty event on Hong Kong’s fiscal policy in its early years, notwithstanding 
that the Imperial Chinese Qing government ceded Hong Kong to Britain sixty 
years after the British introduced stamp duty in America. The extent to which 
the American experience affected the introduction of stamp duty into Hong 
Kong and the colony’s finances and government, will be explored to see how far 
the factors that caused the American Stamp Act to be unacceptable and 
unsustainable, influenced the British colonial administrative and fiscal policy 
during the early period following the cession of Hong Kong to Britain.    
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2.4.1 The introduction of American Stamp Act 1765 
The introduction of stamp duty into America in 1765513 was mainly due to the 
French and Indian War514 during 1754 to 1763. The war was fought primarily 
between the colonies of Britain and France in North America. Both sides were 
supported by military units from their parent countries. The British Americans 
won the war but at the same time the British government began to question 
what it had gained from all the blood and money sacrificed. The colonies in 
North America benefited much more than the British government which paid for 
the war as well as providing military support. The British government advocated 
that these North American colonies should contribute more to the on-going 
British military support.515    
 
In 1765 the British Parliament under the leadership of the Prime Minister 
George Grenville (in office 1763–1765), passed the American Stamp Act as the 
first direct tax on American colonies with no vote against it in the Commons and 
no debate in the House of Lords.516 The American Stamp Act 1765 ignited 
enormous colonial opposition and outrage, leading to the first combined 
resolute effort by the colonists to resist the authority of the British Parliament. 
Even though the American Stamp Act was repealed in 1766, the events 
surrounding the tax protests led the American colonists to challenge other 
aspects of British control leading to eventual and successful revolution against 
the British, thus gaining their independence in 1783.517  
 
There were various reasons why the American Stamp Act failed the test of 
sustainability and caused widespread antipathy. These related to the institution 
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of tax assessment and collection; the ‘handles’ on the different forms of income 
and economic activities; and the political process of the tax revision.518  
 
On the question of tax assessment and collection, the American Stamp Act 
itself was designed to have tax collected by institutions administered by local 
residents in the colonies and not by officials sent from Britain. All the money 
raised by the Act would stay in the colonies and would not be remitted to 
Britain.519  These gestures were positive to the sustainability of the system. 
However, the colonists resented one of the prescribed taxpayer’s safeguards to 
the effect that cases on the American Stamp Act were to be heard by Vice-
Admiralty Courts,520  with no jury. The colonists’ opinion was that the Vice-
Admiralty Courts’ jurisdiction, based on tradition, should be confined to marine 
matters only and tax laws should not be administered by the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts. The colonists felt that their right to common law trial was undermined 
and thus clamoured against the American Stamp Act.521 
 
To make the American Stamp Act more sustainable and acceptable, the 
‘handles’ attached to different forms of income were lower than the 
corresponding rates of the British Act at that time. The reduced rates were 
incorporated to meet the different conditions in the colonies. 522  This was 
another positive step to ensure acceptability and sustainability.  
 
Nevertheless, the number of objects and documents to be taxed was still 
enormous to the colonists. These included advertisements, newspapers, 
pamphlets, legal documents of all kind, court judgments, court decrees, court 
sentences, insurance policies, playing cards, calendars, dice, testimonial, 
certificates of any degree taken in any university or academy or college, 
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(Cambridge University Press 2001), 22. Daunton proposed a few variables that are used for 
taxation history analysis that are used here. 
519 P D G Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American 
Revolution 1763-1767 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1975), 99. 
520 These courts were located in British colonies that were usually granted jurisdiction over local 
legal matters related to maritime activities, such as disputes between merchants and seamen.  
521 Edmund S Morgan and Helen M Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 
(New York, Collier Books 1963), 98. 
522 P D G Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American 
Revolution 1763-1767 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1975), 99. 
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seminary of learning, bonds and deeds, and so forth.523 This list caused intense 
resentment. The colonists also argued that such measures would weaken their 
commercial strength. To understand the enormous number of dutiable 
documents and the tax rates in the America Stamp Act, the following quotation 
on Britain’s stamp duty law is illuminating: 
Every species of written or printed document necessary for carrying on 
a business of mankind, had now been drawn within the grasp of the 
stamp laws. The scales of duty were arbitrary and jumping. Many 
transactions were subjected to excessive rates of duty; and every single 
head of duty had been raised to the highest possible rate.524 
 
The most contentious issue was the political process involved. The motion to 
levy stamp duty in the American colonies was passed directly by the British 
Parliament in London. This long-distance approach to taxation led to the 
unsustainability of the stamp duty proposed, as British politicians in London 
were out of touch with the real conditions in America. The colonists raised the 
issue of taxation without representation. They had no direct representation in the 
British Parliament, having only agents to lobby and advise the British political 
figures on American matters. They could not tolerate being taxed with no direct 
representation, 525  as this was tantamount to denying their rights as British 
subjects.526  
2.4.2 The American Stamp Act’s impact on Hong Kong’s constitutional development 
and fiscal policy 
Existing literature does not explain how the American Stamp Act influenced 
British colonial policy after the American War of Independence and the political 
process of introducing stamp duty in Hong Kong, nor does it explain the 
substance of Hong Kong stamp duty law. Yet, by analysing the political and 
                                            
523 Duties in American Colonies Act 1765 (5 Geo 3 c 12), ss 1–6. 
524 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 296. 
525 The tradition of taxation with representation began in the Britain when King John was 
compelled to sign the Magna Carta. The key provision was ‘No scutage or aid, save the 
customary feudal ones, shall be levied except by the common consent of the realm.’ Essentially, 
it meant that taxation could only be collected with consent. When King John needed extra 
revenue, he could not arbitrarily increase taxation, he needed to call his councils of taxpayer 
representatives and present a case for more taxation. See, Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: 
The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 
1999), 157–58. 
526 US History from Pre-Columbian to the New Millennium, ‘The Stamp Act Controversy’ 
<www.ushistory.org/us/9b.asp> accessed 5 March 2014. 
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philosophical factors related to the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong, it 
can be hypothesised that some of the factors which caused the American 
Stamp Act to be unacceptable and unsustainable in America, influenced the 
British colonial administration and its fiscal policy during the early years of 
British colonisation of Hong Kong.  
 
The Colonial Office in London had central control of Hong Kong after the 
cession of Hong Kong to Britain in 1841.527 The history of the Colonial Office in 
London is relevant. The Colonial Office can be dated to the establishment of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1768, formed to tackle the situation in 
America after the introduction of the American Stamp Act. Following Britain’s 
subsequent defeat in the American War of Independence and the formation of 
the United States of America, 528  the position of Secretary of State for the 
Colonies was abolished and a new official post called the Secretary of State for 
War and the Colonies was established in 1801. In 1854, military reforms led to 
the separation of the colonial and military responsibilities of the secretary. The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies was then appointed to head the Colonial 
Office, one objective being to exercise control over Hong Kong.529 
 
In general terms the financial philosophy of nineteenth century Britain with 
regard to its colonies was that after defraying the cost of acquiring the colony, 
the colonial establishments should be self-sufficient. The colonies should 
neither rely upon Britain for on-going support nor be subjected to levies of 
tribute or taxation to support Britain’s imperial policies.530 Britain’s defeat in 
America shaped its subsequent fiscal policy to a certain extent to guard against 
a repeat of the unpleasant experience in America by controlling expenditure on 
                                            
527 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 21. 
528 The American Stamp Act ignited the Americans’ resistance to the British government and 
ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and Britain’s defeat in the war. See Archiving Early 
America, ‘Paris Peace Treaty of 1783’ <www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/paris/> 
accessed 11 March 2014. 
529 Wm Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
1999), 15–16; Mandy Banton, Administering the Empire, 1801-1968: A Guide to the Records of 
the Colonial Office in the National Archives of the UK (London, University of London, Institute of 
Historical Research 2008), 25–26; History of Government curated by The National Archives, 
‘Administrators of the British Empire’ <https://history.blog.gov.uk/2014/12/08/administrators-of-
the-british-empire/> accessed 8 April 2014; The British Empire, ‘Secretaries of State with 
Responsibility for the Colonies’ <www.britishempire.co.uk/biography/secretariesofstate.htm> 
accessed 10 May 2016. 
530 Paul S Reinsch, Colonial Administration (London, MacMillan 1912), 83. 
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British colonies and ensuring the colonies achieved financial independence. 
There would be no arm’s length taxes imposed directly by the British 
Parliament.  
 
This nineteenth century colonial fiscal policy was apparent from the Hong Kong 
Charter (now known as Letters Patent) dated 5 April 1843. The Rules and 
Regulations for her Majesty's Colonial Service (Colonial Regulations) issued 
from London in 1843 served as guidelines and directives to Hong Kong 
Governors on administrative and financial matters. 
 
The Letters Patent stipulated that the Hong Kong Governor, who was appointed 
by the British monarch on the advice of the British Foreign Secretary, was to 
constitute and preside over a Legislative Council and an Executive Council by 
nominating three officials to each of the councils. These Hong Kong Governors 
were usually British civil servants531 selected from the British Colonial Service 
and who had served in other colonies532 before taking up the post in Hong 
Kong.533 In the councils, there were official and unofficial members. The official 
members 534  were persons holding governmental appointments in the Hong 
Kong government. Initially there was no unofficial member, either British or 
Chinese, appointed to the councils. The first two British Legislative Council 
unofficial members were introduced in 1850.535 The first Legislative Council 
Chinese unofficial member was introduced in 1880.536 The Executive Council 
was set up to advise and assist the Governor. It was akin to the cabinet in 
                                            
531 P K Li, Hong Kong from Britain to China Political Cleavages, Electoral Dynamics and 
Institutional Changes (England, Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2000), 21. 
532 See, G B Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong (Singapore, Eastern 
Universities Press 1962), 4–51, for the careers paths of the early Hong Kong Governors in the 
British Colonial Service. The chapters gave vivid accounts of the Governors’ personal qualities, 
their previous experiences in the field before becoming the Hong Kong Governors or even their 
personal friendships with the Foreign Secretary which formed the basis for their selections to be 
the Governors of Hong Kong.  
533 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 4. 
534 The official members could be the Major General in Command, the Chief Justice, the 
Colonial Secretary, Attorney General, Chief Magistrate as selected by the Governor. See, G B 
Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 40. 
535 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 43. 
536 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press 2004), 27. 
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Britain.537 The Governor with the advice of the Legislative Council was given full 
authority to make laws for the colony of Hong Kong subject to three limitations. 
First, the law proposed in the Hong Kong Legislative Council was subject to the 
instructions and approvals given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies who 
headed the Colonial Office in London; second, the law proposed by the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council was subject to the power of disallowance by the 
Crown; and third, the British Parliament retained the power to enact legislation 
over Hong Kong.538 
 
Regarding the last two limitations, the British government hardly ever exercised 
its right to intervene in the internal affairs of Hong Kong. The British Parliament 
had the right to promulgate laws that were binding in Hong Kong, but by 
convention, this was only exercised when it was necessary for the 
standardisation of the law to be achieved throughout Britain and its colonial 
territories.539 As such, in most circumstances, the Secretary of State in the 
Colonial Office would comment and make the final decision pertaining to the 
laws originating from the Hong Kong Legislative Council based on the reports 
from the Hong Kong Governors, and occasionally, the petitions from the Hong 
Kong inhabitants.540 
 
According to the 1843 Colonial Regulations, Governors needed to prepare a 
schedule of expenditure to be charged against the coming year’s estimated 
colonial revenues before the end of June each year. The document was 
required to be vetted in the Legislative Council and upon majority concurrence, 
would be passed as an Ordinance and sent to London for the joint approval of 
the Colonial Office and the British Treasury. It was manifestly stated in the 1843 
Colonial Regulations that any proposed taxation measures to be effected in 
                                            
537 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (5th edn, Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1975), 75. 
538 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 22. 
539 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (5th edn, Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1975), 61. 
540 See for example, Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), 
CO129/115, 32–41; Memorial and Protest against the Stamp Ordinance 1866 (29 August 1866), 
CO129/115, 52–53. 
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Hong Kong, as with expenditure, required the joint approval of the British 
Treasury and the Colonial Office.541 
 
In retrospect, mindful of the factors leading to the repeal of the American Stamp 
Act, certain policies pursued by the British Colonial Office in the nineteenth 
century could be seen as evidence that lessons had been drawn from the ill-
fated introduction of the American Stamp Act. These policies affected how Hong 
Kong was governed and financed in the nineteenth century. First, the general 
approach specified by the Colonial Office in the nineteenth century was not to 
spend extravagantly on Hong Kong, encouraging the colony to achieve financial 
independence as soon as possible. This helped to curtail the previous tendency 
of the British Parliament to impose taxes on colonies at arm’s length to support 
Britain’s own financial needs, and had been the cause of its dire troubles in 
America. Second, the Governor of Hong Kong initiated tax-related legislation, 
contrasting with the American Stamp Act which originated, and was drafted, in 
London. The functions of the Colonial Office and Treasury in London were to 
examine the Hong Kong Governor’s report on the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council debates and local inhabitants’ reactions to any proposed tax, and to 
offer the final approval or disapproval of the proposed tax legislation. Since 
local debates occurred in the Hong Kong Legislative Council, the problem of 
taxation without representation raised during the American Stamp Act episode 
was avoided. Third, the Governor of Hong Kong would initiate the tax 
legislation. He would be au fait with the Hong Kong environment, and thus 
better placed than London-based officials to propose any tax measure, and who 
might not be familiar with Hong Kong or lack a clear understanding of the latest 
social, economic and political conditions in the colony. With the lessons learned 
from the American Stamp Duty episode, measures and governing principles 
which aimed to ensure the sustainability and acceptability of the tax legislation 
had evolved and were applied to the colony of Hong Kong. The introduction of 
stamp duty in Hong Kong was subject to such tenets. 
 
These lessons continued to have an impact even after the 1997 ceding of 
British sovereignty. The Hong Kong Basic Law542 replaced the British Letters 
                                            
541 Rules and Regulations for Her Majesty’s Colonial Service (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office 1843), 87–88. 
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Patent and the Royal Instructions for Hong Kong after the British ceding of 
Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997. The Basic Law 
serves as the constitutional document for the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR) of the PRC. Article 106 of the Basic Law provides that: 
1. The HKSAR shall have independent finances.  
2. The HKSAR shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own 
purposes, and they shall not be handed over to the Central 
People's government of China.  
3. The Central People's government of PRC shall not levy taxes in the 
HKSAR.  
 
The notions under Article 106 are very similar to the historic British governing 
principles for its colonies. The drafting of Article 106 took into account the 
successful experience of Hong Kong under British rule. The political and 
ideological forces which originated from stamp duty events still have significant 
influence on Hong Kong’s governance after the departure of the British. Such 
methods were adopted to ensure Hong Kong’s social stability after the 1997 
cession.  
2.5 Conclusion  
The evidence gathered shows that the primary reason for the 1866 
implementation of stamp duty in Hong Kong was to raise money. The evidence 
also confirms stamp duty as an effective tool in raising revenue in Hong Kong, 
even in its formative year.    
Although revenue-raising was the dominant aim for the introduction of the Hong 
Kong stamp duty regime, there were other non-financial reasons behind the 
implementation of stamp duty in Hong Kong. Close examination of the 
communications between Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell (in office 1866–
                                                                                                                                
542 The Hong Kong Basic Law, serves as the constitutional document of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was adopted on 4 
April 1990 by the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China, 
and went into effect on 1 July 1997 (replacing the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions) 
when Hong Kong being former colony of the British Empire was handed over to the PRC. 
The Basic Law was drafted in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the 
Question of Hong Kong (The Joint Declaration), signed between the Chinese and British 
governments on 19 December 1984. The Basic Law stipulates the basic policies of the PRC 
towards the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for a period of fifty years after 1997 
cession. See Hong Kong Government, ‘The Basic Law of Hong Kong’ 
<www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/index.html> accessed 12 September 2014. 
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1872) and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as well as other extra-
statutory sources, demonstrates the imposition of stamp duty in Hong Kong had 
the secondary purpose of widening the tax base as well as to improve the living 
conditions of the poorer class. The evaluation of evidence gathered 
demonstrates that the Governor’s perceptions with regard to stamp duty being 
an effective medium by which to widen the tax base, was impeccable. However, 
the historical evidence shows that the imposition of stamp duty was not 
instrumental in improving living conditions in Hong Kong during the decade 
following implementation.  
Besides the primary financial, as well as the secondary social, objectives, it has 
also been established that stamp duty was chosen for certain practical reasons. 
The first and foremost of these was that there were simply no better options 
available. The evidence evaluated in the chapter demonstrates convincingly 
why the other alternatives commonly adopted by colonial governments in the 
nineteenth century, were ruled out of consideration for Hong Kong. Customs 
duties and export duties were not possible due to the economic structure of 
Hong Kong as a trading centre with no natural resources. It has also been 
established that income tax was ruled out, as it required the declaration of 
income and inquisitorial proceedings that the Hong Kong community, especially 
the Chinese, were judged not ready to embrace. 
The investigation also deduced the requirement that political sanction be 
obtained, playing a role in the selection of stamp duty as the second form of 
taxation in Hong Kong. It has been ascertained in the analysis that stamp duty 
was a widely accepted tax in nineteenth century Britain because it was 
convenient for tax administrators, and largely unnoticed by the taxpaying public. 
This led to the conclusion that MacDonnell anticipated ease of approval by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies as well as the British Inland Revenue 
Authority in London for the implementation of stamp duty, as compared to other 
possible revenue-raising measures.  
The evidence presented and analysed in this chapter shows that two historical 
events in the history of stamp duty, namely its adoption by the British 
government in 1694 and the Stamp Act crisis in America in 1765, are pivotal in 
understanding the development of Hong Kong Stamp Duty. The British Stamp 
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Act 1694,543 which was itself based on the stamp duty policy of the Dutch, was 
the genesis of the first 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance.544 The American 
Stamp Act crisis was an important influence in the development of the Hong 
Kong stamp duty legislation.  
Turning to how the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance545 achieved its initial 
legislative form, an assessment of the British origins of the provisions reveals 
three key influences.    
First, the analysis of the development of the British stamp legislation from 1694 
to 1866 concluded that the chargeable instruments that appeared in the 1866 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance546 were originally chosen for revenue objectives 
when they were first introduced under various British Stamp Acts. The evidence 
overtly shows that there were no plausible non-financial objectives considered 
by the British Parliament for selecting these instruments. 
Second, the investigation reveals the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance547 
inherited many British stamp duty ingredients that were valuable in soliciting 
initial acceptance as well as maintaining the stamp duty system sustainability. 
As clear evidence, it has been seen that Hong Kong had inherited the stamp 
duty legislation drafting method of grouping taxable instruments under a 
separate distinct schedule to ensure better comprehension of the stamp 
legislation. The older confusing British method of prescribing stamp duty 
legislation, which was in use before 1804, was omitted. It was also found that 
MacDonnell had adopted the principles of the penny tax system. The penny tax 
system was then, a revolutionary stamp duty collection system invented in 
Britain in 1853. The central concept was to improve compliance by creating a 
convenient stamp duty payment environment together with a low fixed rate. 
Indeed, the study concludes that Hong Kong was given a head start by 
adopting many concepts that took the British government over a hundred years 
to polish from ineffectual, inefficient and flawed origins. The evidence affirms 
that these British ingredients were time-tested and many unaccommodating 
features were filtered out before being incorporated into the Hong Kong Stamp 
                                            
543 5 & 6 Wm & Mar c 21. 
544 No 12 of 1866. 
545 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866. 
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid. 
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Ordinance in 1866. 
Third, it may be concluded from the evidence, that during the formative years of 
the stamp duty law, the Hong Kong government was inherently resource limited 
in implementing the full scope of the elements of the British stamp duty system. 
In certain instances, the Hong Kong government only had the capability to 
adopt a partial selection of those elements. One such example relates to the 
Hong Kong Magistrates system. The Magistrates were not legally qualified for 
the task as the magistracy in Hong Kong during that era was effected to levy 
punishments for violations of stamp duty legislation rather than to hear 
taxpayer’s disputes with the Stamp Office and make equitable decisions. 
Another piece of evidence to justify this conclusion is based on the analysis of 
the adjudication function in its formative years. Unlike in the Britain, where the 
adjudicators were experts in the stamp duty field, novice staff in the 1867 Hong 
Kong Stamp Office provided the adjudication services.  
The evidence demonstrates that the American revolt instigated by the 1765 
imposition of stamp duty in North America by the British Parliament, directly and 
without local discussion, had lasting implications for Britain’s colonial policies. 
The British government took the lessons learned from the 1765 American revolt 
seriously and prevented the same mistakes from recurring when implementing 
stamp duty in Hong Kong. The evidence indicates that the Colonial Office 
implemented a system to ensure stamp duty was enacted in Hong Kong with 
local discussion and with only slight intervention from London to ensure initial 
acceptability as well as longer term sustainability.   
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Chapter 3 Primary imperatives driving the development of 
Hong Kong stamp duty  
3.1 Introduction 
Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell (in office 1866–1872) described the 
introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong in 1866 as a ‘critical moment in the 
history of the colony.’548 Chapter 2 identified the salient features and analysed 
the historical background to the implementation of the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system in 1866. Chapter 3 goes beyond that emphasis and focuses on the 
imperatives that drove the subsequent development of the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system during British rule of the colony. 
 
Fundamentally, this chapter identifies the sometimes obscure primary forces 
which notionally drove the development of the Hong Kong stamp duty system 
from its introduction until the end of British rule in Hong Kong in 1997. The 
chapter examines the relative importance of these identified drivers and how 
their nature and primacy changed over time. Historically, these demands were 
often not publicly articulated due to the Hong Kong government’s apparent lack 
of transparency in relation to the objectives underpinning their stamp duty 
policies. For example, whilst the Hong Kong government might have 
announced that its stamp duty policy was to restore stamp duty equity, its 
associated actions amidst other evidence may have indicated a revenue 
enhancement motive. 
 
In order to discern these primary drivers and their comparative significance, the 
chapter analyses the effects of the relevant stamp duty law in its historical 
context, relying in part on previously undisclosed correspondence between the 
Hong Kong Governors and the British Colonial Office. This chapter outlines the 
primary imperatives and prioritises them in order of their relative importance to 
the Hong Kong economy. In order to discern the comparative significance of the 
primary imperatives identified in this chapter, three factors have been used in 
their determination:  
                                            
548 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115, 33. 
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1. The frequency of enacting stamp duty law in response to the identified 
imperative. 
2. The significance of the resulting stamp duty law made in response to the 
identified imperative. 
3. The sustainability of the resulting stamp duty law made in response to 
the identified imperative.  
 
A secondary aim of Chapter 3 is to identify the conditions that led to successful 
design and implementation of changes in the Hong Kong stamp duty regime to 
respond to these imperatives. At the outset, it is necessary to define the 
meaning of ‘success’ in this context. Three main criteria have been adopted in 
this study: 
1. The extent to which the changes achieved their stated aims as 
articulated by the Hong Kong government. The changes were successful 
if the stated aims were attained. 
2. The extent to which the stamp duty changes had desirable by-products. 
The changes were successful if such desirable by-products were 
propagated. 
3. The sustainability of the changes. If the changes became redundant in 
the short- to medium-term, they were deemed unsuccessful.549   
 
By studying the successful features, useful and informed lessons could be 
learned to ensure the sustainability of the Hong Kong stamp duty system, and 
to strengthen its design. Some of these lessons would also be valuable in 
improving the effectiveness of governance of the present day stamp duty 
system. In the process of identifying successful changes, the unsuccessful 
features are also highlighted. Such unsuccessful features are important markers 
to be heeded in formulating future changes in the stamp duty system. 
                                            
549 These criteria for what constitutes successful tax reforms or changes was adopted from, 
Cedric Sandford, Successful Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform in Six 
Countries (Bath, Fiscal Publications 1993), 5, which was originally not intended for Hong Kong 
stamp duty. 
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3.2 The classification of stamp duty changes550 
The phrase ‘stamp duty changes’ can have different meanings in different 
contexts. Thus it is important to define the terminology used in this study. To 
make fruitful deductions from stamp duty changes requires a clear framework of 
terms.  
 
A stamp duty system consists of two major elements. The first element is the 
stamp duty structure which refers to the tax rates and tax bases. The second 
element is the stamp duty mechanism which refers to the regulations governing 
stamp duty administration and stamp duty compliance.551 
 
Stamp duty changes can be classified either as a reform or an amendment. In 
this study in particular, the term stamp duty reform is used to describe the 
events modifying both the stamp duty structure and the mechanism. On the 
other hand, the term stamp duty amendment refers to either modifying the 
stamp duty structure or the mechanism. The reform or amendment can either 
be comprehensive or partial depending on the scope of change.552 
 
The objectives of the reform or amendment can be grouped into three 
categories, enabling meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the analysis: 
1. Vertical equity enhancing or horizontal equity enhancing.553 
2. Revenue expansion, revenue neutral, or revenue contractionary.554  
3. Economically neutral or interventionist.555 
                                            
550 Certain ideas were adopted from Malcolm Gills, ‘Towards a Taxonomy for Tax Reform’ in 
Malcolm Gills (ed), Tax Reforms in Developing Countries (Durham, Duke University Press 
1989), 1–26 which were originally not intended for application in the stamp duty environment.  
551 For example, assessment processes, collection mechanisms, safeguard procedures, anti-
avoidance measures, counter-evasion doctrines, incentive policies and exemption rules. 
552 Reform or amendment can be comprehensive – encompassing most elements of the stamp 
duty system – or partial – confined to only a few components of the system. 
553 Vertical stamp duty equity means that instruments with higher values have higher tax rates. 
This is in line with Adam Smith’s notion that taxpayers who entered into instruments with 
unequal values should be taxed unequally. This reflects the principle that taxpayers involved 
with instruments having higher values are financially better off and therefore should pay more 
tax. Horizontal equity in stamp duty means that all taxpayers, regardless of their wealth or social 
status, pay the same amount of tax for the same instrument with the same value involved. For 
example, in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century, British soldiers who used bills of exchange to 
remit money to London would pay the same amount of stamp duty as British merchants who 
remitted the same amount of money to London. It would be termed a horizontal inequity if 
British soldiers were taxed a lesser amount. 
554 Stamp duty reform or amendment may be designed to increase revenue. Revenue neutral 
modifications merely seek to replace one source of revenue with another. In rare cases, tax 
reform or amendment may be designed to reduce tax revenue. 
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3.3 Financial imperatives 
The overall aim of section 3.3 is to identify and analyse what were the most 
powerful imperatives that drove the changes in stamp duty law during the 
period 1866 to 1997 and to evaluate the effectiveness of the approaches 
adopted to meet the imperatives.  
 
This section attempts to identify the financial imperatives and discover to what 
extent those financial demands were influential in the drafting of Hong Kong 
stamp duty law. At its simplest, the financial impetus comprised the pecuniary 
necessities which drove the Hong Kong government to utilise its stamp duty 
system to pursue revenue-raising objectives. However, besides this intrinsic 
impetus, this section also seeks to identify other wider fiscal drivers which 
encompassed combinations of other administrative demands, such as ease of 
operation, countering evasion and fraud and the like, as well as equity 
restoration which steered the development of stamp duty regulation, ultimately 
leading to revenue raising. To further clarify the terms used in this study, 
‘financial imperative’ relates to the pure demand for monetary receipts whereas 
‘fiscal imperative’ relates to the need for government policies to influence the 
development of the stamp duty system which may or may not be for the sole 
purpose of raising revenue. It is appropriate to regard financial imperatives as a 
subset of fiscal imperatives. 
3.3.1 Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell’s duplicity 
MacDonnell tabled a bill in the Hong Kong Legislative Council to amend the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 on 5 May 1868,556 just eight months after 
the implementation of the Ordinance. MacDonnell publicly announced that his 
objective for the Ordinance amendment was equity restoration, though his 
perceived actions pointed to the possibility that revenue enhancement might 
have been the real objective. Section 3.3.1 investigates the Governor’s motives 
in introducing the Bill, and determines whether he ultimately achieved his aim.  
 
                                                                                                                                
555 Economically neutral stamp duty changes are those that do not affect economic activities. 
Government may use the stamp duty tax system to encourage or discourage certain economic 
activities. Such reform or amendment is described as interventionist. 
556 Hong Kong Hansard 23 May 1868. 
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Before tabling the Stamp Duty Bill, MacDonnell appointed a Commission of 
Inquiry (the Commission) consisting of the Hong Kong Acting Colonial 
Treasurer, W Alexander, the Collector of Stamp Revenue, F W Mitchell, as well 
as a Hong Kong Legislative Council unofficial member, Phineas Ryrie.557 The 
Commission’s brief was to prepare a report on the subject of Hong Kong stamp 
duty. To obtain input from the business community, the Commission held 
consultation meetings with the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (the 
Chamber of Commerce). Ryrie declared at the inaugural consultation meeting 
with the members of the Chamber of Commerce that MacDonnell ‘was 
convinced of the inequities that had been found to exist in the 1866 Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance’ and ‘the Governor intended to have the legislation thoroughly 
revised to sift its imperfections and to restore equities’.558  
 
In essence, the Commission recommended that:559 
1. Bills of exchange and promissory notes to be given an ad valorem scale 
together with the exemption for bills under HK$100. A table ranging from 
HK10¢ for bills of exchange between the values of HK$100 to HK$1,000 
to HK$1 for bills of exchange over HK$10,000 was recommended. The 
concept of applying different rates for bills drawn singly or in sets was to 
be abolished. This proposal was to replace the original fixed rate.560 
 
2. Bonds concerning bottomry and respondentia, 561  charter parties, 562 
mortgages, 563  re-assignments of mortgaged property, 564  letters of 
                                            
557 A prominent British businessman who was a Senior Partner of Turner & Co (an opium 
trading firm), Director of Hong Kong Diary Farm Company and Founder of the Hong Kong High 
Level Tramway Company. 
558 The Hong Kong General Chamber Of Commerce General Meeting, In Re: The Stamp Act 
(20 March 1868), CO129/131, 58. 
559 Report of Commission on Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 (27 March 1868), CO129/131, 
56–57. 
560 The rate was HK$1 for all bills of exchange if drawn singly and HK50¢ on each part of the 
set if drawn in sets under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 (Ordinance No 12 of 1866). See 
section 2.3.2. 
561 The rates were HK$10 for sums secured not exceeding HK$10,000 and HK$20 for sums 
equal to or exceeding HK$10,000 under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 (Ordinance No 12 
of 1866). See section 2.3.2. A reduced ad valorem duty of HK50¢ for every HK$1,000 or part 
thereof was proposed. Bottomry bonds were loans obtained by shipmasters by pledging the 
ships as the collateral. If the principal and interest were not paid at the appointed time after the 
ships’ safe returns, the creditors would forfeit the ships. The use of such loan was when ships 
needed emergency funding for repair during their voyages and the shipmasters could not 
contact the ship owners to arrange funding. The shipmasters could arrange a loan by pledging 
the ships and executing a bottomry bond. Respondentia bonds referred to the shipmasters 
obtaining loans by pledging the goods on the ships under similar situations. 
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hypothecation 565  and leases at a rent, 566  were to attract reduced ad 
valorem duties or revised rates to restore vertical equities. 
 
3. Transfer of shares in any public company to attract a reduced ad valorem 
rate of ⅛% of the share prices to replace the previous ad valorem rate.567 
 
4. New heads of charge were recommended to make up the potential loss 
of revenue. The new heads were: shipping insurance policies at a fixed 
rate of HK10¢ each, articles of clerkship to facilitate future admission as 
a solicitor at fixed rates of HK$50, warrants of attorney 568 at the ad 
valorem rate of HK10¢ per HK$100, cognovit569 and arbitration awards at 
an ad valorem rate of HK10¢ per HK$100.  
 
                                                                                                                                
562 The rate was HK$5 for all charter parties under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 
(Ordinance No 12 of 1866). See section 2.3.2. An ad valorem scale was proposed with a table 
ranging from HK$1 for vessels not exceeding 200 tons to HK$5 for vessels exceeding 1,000 
tons plus HK50¢ for every 100 tons thereafter. Charter parties were contracts between the 
owners of vessels and the charterers for the use of vessels. 
563 The applicable ad valorem rate under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 (Ordinance No 12 
of 1866) was HK25¢ for every HK$100 or part thereof of the consideration for transaction values 
up to HK$1,000. After the first HK$1,000, HK$2 for every additional HK$1,000 or part thereof. 
See section 2.3.2. A reduced ad valorem scale of HK$1 on the first HK$1,000 and HK50¢ on 
each subsequent HK$1,000 or part thereof was proposed. 
564 The applicable ad valorem rate under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 (Ordinance No 12 
of 1866) was HK25¢ for every HK$100 or part thereof of the consideration for transaction values 
up to HK$1,000. After the first HK$1,000, HK$2 for every additional HK$1,000 or part thereof. 
See section 2.3.2. A reduced ad valorem rate of HK10¢ per HK$1,000 or part thereof was 
proposed. 
565 The applicable ad valorem rate under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 (Ordinance No 12 
of 1866) was HK25¢ for every HK$100 or part thereof of the consideration for transaction values 
up to HK$1,000. After the first HK$1,000, HK$2 for every additional HK$1,000 or part thereof. 
See section 2.3.2. A fixed rate of HK$1 was proposed. Letters of hypothecation were 
documents which authorised banks or lenders to reprocess and sell the pledged items in the 
event of a default.  
566 A completely revised ad valorem scale together with the exemption for all rentals of yearly 
rent under HK$100 was proposed. 
567 The applicable ad valorem rate under the original Stamp Ordinance 1866 (Ordinance No 12 
of 1866) was HK25¢ for every HK$100 or part thereof of the consideration for transaction values 
up to HK$1,000. After the first HK$1,000, HK$2 for every HK$1,000 or part thereof. See section 
2.3.2. 
568 Warrants of attorney were documents that enabled attorneys named in them to appear in 
courts on behalf of the persons giving the warrants and to confess judgements entered against 
them. 
569 Creditors might ask the borrowers to sign a cognovits note when credits were extended. If 
the debtors fell into arrears, the creditors could obtain judgements against the debtors without 
notification to the debtors. 
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By comparing the recommendations of the Commission with the 1868 bill to 
amend the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866,570 it was clear that MacDonnell 
adopted recommendation 2 and only partially adopted recommendations 1, 3 
and 4. 
 
Recommendation 1 concerned bills of exchange. While the Governor agreed to 
the application of an ad valorem scale, he disagreed with the rates suggested 
by the Commission. The following table compares the original rates under the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 with the new rates under the Hong Kong 
Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1868: 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of stamp duty rates for bills of exchange, 1866–1868  
Bills of exchange 
values 
Drawn singly 
(Before the 
amendment) 
Drawn 
singly 
(After the 
amendment) 
Drawn in sets 
(Before the 
amendment) 
Drawn in sets 
(After the 
amendment) 
 
(HK$) (HK$) (HK$) (HK$) 
     
Below HK$100 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.15 
  
   
HK$100 > 
HK$3,000 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
     
Above HK$3,000 1.00 1.50 0.50 0.75 
 
For the category value above HK$3,000, the new rates for bills of exchange 
drawn either singly or in sets increased by 50%. For the category value below 
HK$100, the tax rates for bills of exchange drawn either singly or in sets 
decreased by 70%. The principle of applying a low rate on voluminous 
transactions of small value bills of exchange to encourage taxpayers’ 
compliance, led to an overall revenue increase, as was earlier demonstrated by 
Gladstone’s penny tax reform in 1853.571 
 
Recommendation 3 dealt with the transfer of shares. MacDonnell rejected the 
rate of ⅛% of share prices as proposed by the Commission and advocated a 
rate of HK50¢ for every HK$500 or fraction thereof. Under MacDonnell’s 
                                            
570 Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘1868 Stamp Duty Bill Read First Time’ (Hong Kong 
Government 9 May 1868). 
571 See section 2.3.6. 
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suggested rates, the government had a greater potential for collecting more 
stamp duties. 
 
As to recommendation 4, MacDonnell accepted all the new heads of charge as 
proposed. However, he did away with the low ad valorem duty for warrants of 
attorney, and for cognovit and arbitration awards, and replaced them with fixed 
rates of HK$5 and HK$1 respectively. In addition to the Commission’s 
recommendation on additional heads of charge, MacDonnell added a head of 
charge on co-partnership deeds, which attracted a fixed duty of HK$5 per deed.  
 
By comparing the Commission’s recommendation and MacDonnell’s final 
decision, as well as critically reviewing the associated circumstance, it is 
submitted that his real intention was financial for three principal reasons. 
 
First, MacDonnell agreed to most of the Commission’s suggestions granting ad 
valorem rates on certain instruments in order to ensure vertical equity under 
recommendation 2; however, the decrease in tax revenue was insignificant as 
the stamp duties charged on these instruments were minimal.572 Further he did 
not endorse some of the Commission’s suggestions to reduce the rates greatly 
for some instruments. It was clear that after the amendments, the decrease in 
stamp duty revenue would be small and would certainly not require seven new 
chargeable instruments573 to ensure revenue neutrality. 
 
Second, since stamp duty from bills of exchange accounted for 42% of the total 
stamp revenue,574 the analysis of changes made to the bills of exchange tax 
                                            
572 The related instruments were bonds, chartered parties, mortgages, re-assignment of 
mortgages, leases for rent. The percentages of the instruments’ contribution to the overall 
stamp revenue can be extracted from the data provided in a tabular statement prepared by the 
Hong Kong Collector of Stamp Duty, F W Mitchell, circulated during the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce General Meeting on: The Stamp Act, Return shewing the Revenue 
derived from Stamps, impressed under each article of the Schedule to the Stamp Ordinance, 
1866, and under 20th Section thereof, during the period from the opening of the Stamp Office, 
to 29 February 1868, to which is added the revenue for Adhesive Stamps sold during the same 
period (12 March 1868), CO129/131, 60. 
573 These were broker notes, bank cheques, shipping insurance policies, articles of clerkship, 
warrants of attorney, cognovit and arbitration awards and co-partnership agreements. 
574 See data provided by a tabular statement prepared by the Hong Kong Collector of Stamp 
Duty, F W Mitchell circulated during the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce General 
Meeting on: The Stamp Act, Return shewing the Revenue derived from Stamps, impressed 
under each article of the Schedule to the Stamp Ordinance, 1866, and under 20th Section 
thereof, during the period from the opening of the Stamp Office, to 29 February 1868, to which 
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rates strongly suggests that revenue enhancement was the real objective for 
the exercise as a whole, rather than equity restoration. 
 
Third, in hindsight, chargeable instruments added in the amendment were 
exactly those MacDonnell had carefully sifted from the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1866575 in order to obtain the approval of the Legislative Council.576 
After only six months,577 he could not openly announce his wish to add back 
those chargeable instruments for revenue purposes. Instead, he directed a 
Commission to review the system on equity grounds as a façade to pave the 
way for introducing new chargeable instruments into the system to gain 
revenue.  
  
There is other evidence to show that MacDonnell’s objective in introducing the 
stamp duty amendment was revenue enhancement.  
 
The Commission announced to the Chamber of Commerce that the Governor’s 
initiation of the 1868 stamp duty amendment was intended to restore equity to 
the stamp duty system and was revenue neutral. Hence, any reduction in taxes 
due to the amendment had to be made-up by the introduction of new heads of 
charge. It is perplexing why the Governor initiated an amendment exercise on 
equity grounds, as the public was not calling for any such reform of the stamp 
duty system. This was confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce. For example, 
when debating the stamp duty treatment of bills of exchange, a Chamber of 
Commerce member, Mr Bostman pointed out that ‘he had never heard of 
                                                                                                                                
is added the revenue for Adhesive Stamps sold during the same period (12 March 1868), 
CO129/131, 60. 
575 No 12 of 1866. 
576 Speech of His Excellency Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell CB in reply to a Memorial and a 
Protest against a Proposed Ordinance to Impose Stamp Duties (5 September 1866), 
CO129/115, 48. 
577 The actual implementation of the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance was on 10 October 
1867; see data provided by a tabular statement prepared by the Hong Kong Collector of Stamp 
Duty, F W Mitchell circulated during the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce General 
Meeting on: The Stamp Act, Return shewing the Revenue derived from Stamps, impressed 
under each article of the Schedule to the Stamp Ordinance, 1866, and under 20th Section 
thereof, during the period from the opening of the Stamp Office, to 29 February 1868, to which 
is added the revenue for Adhesive Stamps sold during the same period (12 March 1868), 
CO129/131, 61. The proposal to amend the stamp duty legislation was announced to the 
members of the Hong Kong Chambers of Commerce on 17 March 1868, see The Hong Kong 
General Chamber Of Commerce General Meeting, In Re: The Stamp Act (20 March 1868), 
CO129/131, 58. 
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hardship of the present schedule on drawers of bills of exchange.’578 Another 
member, Mr Delbanco reported that he ‘had not heard of any great complaints 
as to the rate on bills of exchange.’579  These examples are indicative that 
MacDonnell’s real intention was to boost revenue, as there was no evidence of 
public demand for stamp duty incidence to be made more equitable.  
 
In MacDonnell’s correspondence to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
seeking London’s approval for the 1868 Ordinance, he stressed he was under 
pressure to raise at least HK$110,000 annually from stamp duty. 580  The 
revenue raised during the eight months following the incorporation of the law 
was HK$65,595,581 around 10.5% below his forecast. 
 
MacDonnell also informed the Secretary of State that he had discarded the 
Chamber of Commerce’s suggested schemes as ‘the speakers who advocated 
the most extensive abolition of stamp duties commanded the greatest 
applause.’ 582  As such he was not able to ‘safely accept many of the 
Commission’s suggestions.’ He expressed the need to add new heads of 
charge to the existing stamp duty legislation as well as to adjust the tax rates to 
ensure stamp revenue could be raised.583 If his stamp duty amendment failed to 
produce the targeted revenue, he would implement another non-stamp duty 
fiscal Ordinance to raise revenue.584  
 
The evidence confirms that MacDonnell hid his real intentions from the 
Legislative Councillors and the Hong Kong public so that his revenue-driven 
policy could withstand public scrutiny and pass through the Hong Kong public 
and Legislation Council with minimal resistance. With MacDonnell’s strategic 
ploy enhancing acceptability, the bill to amend The Stamp Ordinance, 1866 was 
passed successfully on 30 May 1868 with no protest. Accordingly, the 1868 
Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance was enacted.585 
                                            
578 The Hong Kong General Chamber Of Commerce General Meeting, In Re: The Stamp Act 
(20 March 1868), CO129/131, 59. 
579 Ibid 58. 
580 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Richard Grenville (10 June 1868), CO129/131, 48. 
581 Ibid 50. 
582 Ibid 48. 
583 Ibid 50. 
584 Ibid. 
585 No 5 of 1868.  
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This conclusion is contrary to the view expressed by Ernst Eitel, a prominent 
Hong Kong historian in the late nineteenth century. 586  Eitel suggested that 
MacDonnell’s intention was to improve the working of the Hong Kong stamp 
duty legislation rather than revenue-raising. 587  As Eitel’s book 588  was first 
published in 1895, colonial records and other sources may not have been 
readily available at that time to allow the perspectives that are possible in this 
study.  
 
At this point in the investigation, it was established that the main driving force 
for the 1868 amendment was financial and not equity restoration as publicly 
declared. A further issue in assessing whether the driving force in the 
amendment was financial, is to ascertain whether the stamp duty changes 
instigated by the Governor were effective in meeting the identified financial 
objective.  
 
Since the changes were structural and there was no change of mechanism, the 
1868 Ordinance can be classified as a stamp duty amendment. Although the 
evidence shows that the amendments were principally for revenue 
enhancement, vertical equity was enhanced as a by-product since reduced ad 
valorem rates with expanded scale steps were incorporated for some 
instruments. The changes made were extensive and the amendments were 
comprehensive. The short-term result of the amendments was a stamp revenue 
increase of 5.5% compared to using the old system.589 The increase in revenue 
fell short of MacDonnell’s expectation. The shortfall can be explained by 
comparing the ideologies behind the British 1853 penny tax reform 590 
implemented by William Gladstone and the Hong Kong 1868 stamp duty 
amendment directed by MacDonnell. Both changes were effected for revenue 
enhancement. The penny tax reform can be considered a reform as Gladstone 
                                            
586 G B Endacott stated that students of the history of Hong Kong can hardly avoid familiarity 
with E J Eitel’s Europe in China: The History of Hong Kong from the Beginning to the Year 
1882. See further G B Endacott, A Hong Kong History: Europe in China / by E J Eitel – the Man 
and the Book (Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong Press 1961). 
587 E J Eitel, Europe in China (first published 1895, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1983), 
429. 
588 E J Eitel, Europe in China (first published 1895, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1983). 
589 Hong Kong Hansard 3 October 1868. Figures were based on three months comparative 
results prepared by the Collector of Stamp Duty. 
590 See Section 2.3.6. 
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materially altered both the stamp duty structure and stamp duty mechanism to 
achieve significant financial success.591 In the 1868 Hong Kong amendment, 
MacDonnell focused on stamp duty structure and did not consider modifying the 
stamp duty mechanism. If there had been improvements in collection 
procedures, counter-evasion measures or the education of Chinese taxpayers, 
there might have been a better outcome. For example, MacDonnell ignored the 
Chamber of Commerce’s suggestion that the public should be granted a grace 
period of fourteen days to have documents stamped without imposition of a 
fine, and insisted that documents had to be stamped before the documents 
were effective. In hindsight, implementing this recommendation would have 
greatly decreased the inconvenience of payment and possibly led to improved 
taxpayer compliance. Gladstone investigated taxpayers’ behaviour to detect 
non-compliance and responded to it, whereas MacDonnell did not. The 
comparative analysis suggests that in order to achieve revenue enhancement 
through stamp duty changes, a programme targeting both the stamp duty 
structure as well as the mechanism was needed. Concentrating on the stamp 
duty structure alone yielded a sub-optimal result.  
 
The total annual stamp duty revenue raised in 1868 was HK$101,894 and the 
cost of collection only HK$4,286.592  Furthermore, even though the revenue 
collected fell short of his expectation, MacDonnell stated in his 1869 budget 
speech that the colony’s revenue was permanently raised due to the Stamp 
Ordinance, and the Hong Kong financial position ‘began to right itself slowly’.593 
This confirms his financial motive. 
3.3.2 Governor John Pope Hennessy’s arrangements to increase stamp revenue 
Ernst Eitel observed that shortly after the first imposition of stamp duties in 
Hong Kong in 1867, ‘with the exception of receipts to be given to foreigners, 
Chinese tradesmen and merchants disregarded the Ordinance and stamped 
commercial documents only in cases in which they apprehended the possibility 
of litigation’.594 Governor John Pope Hennessy (in office 1877–1883) was the 
                                            
591 Ibid. William Gladstone decreased the tax rate substantially and introduced a new innovative 
collection mechanism. 
592 Hong Kong Government, ‘Hong Kong Blue Book 1868’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1869), 23. 
593 Hong Kong Hansard 17 September 1869. 
594 E J Eitel, Europe in China (first published 1895, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 1983), 
427.  
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first Governor to deal with the Chinese stamp duty evasion problem.595 Driven 
by the desire to increase the yield of the stamp duty, he discovered few, if any, 
stamp-duty-related prosecutions in the years before he was appointed 
Governor. He instructed the Hong Kong Magistrates in 1877 to increase 
prosecutions against the Chinese who had violated the Stamp Duty 
Ordinance.596 Hennessy investigated the reasons for the Chinese taxpayers’ 
non-compliance with the law and responded by prescribing appropriate 
remedies. The prosecutions he filed against the Chinese traders led to a 
positive educational outcome; the Chinese community wrote to Hennessy to 
inform him that they understood the government’s determination to enforce the 
Stamp Duty Ordinance and would comply. However, they asked the Governor 
to exercise his discretion in not prosecuting any cases involving documents 
prepared before 1878, to which Hennessy, pragmatically, acceded.597 
 
Further, to complement his policy to enhance stamp revenue, Hennessy 
sanctioned a Chinese Stamp Agency to facilitate the sales of stamps to the 
Chinese. The agency was not under the direct management of the Hong Kong 
government. Instead, it was operated as a private business by an ethnic 
Chinese598 selected by the Collector of Stamp Revenue. The agent was allowed 
to purchase any quantity of adhesive stamps and bring any number of 
documents to the Stamp Office to be stamped. In the first instance, the agent 
paid stamp duty as would any other taxpayer;599 however, at the end of every 
three-month period, the total purchases were reported to the government and a 
discount of 10% was granted to the agent by the Hong Kong Treasury.600 The 
use of stamp distributors resulted in a devaluation of stamps in China during the 
early Republic of China era.601 Hennessy did not implement any measures to 
prevent the Chinese Stamp Agency from selling adhesive stamps at below-face 
value. Furthermore, no control measures were in place to prevent purchases of 
                                            
595 Speech of His Excellency John Pope Hennessy CMG on Colonial Finances (15 October 
1878), CO129/184, 10. 
596 Ibid. 
597 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (1 March 1878), CO129/181, 198. 
598 In 1879, the appointed Chinese stamp agent was Un Man Tsoi, a former Chinese clerk 
working for the Hong Kong government. See Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Michael Hicks 
Beach (20 May 1879), CO129/184, 421. 
599 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Michael Hicks Beach (20 May 1879), CO129/184, 421. 
600 Ibid 422. 
601 Lixin Rao饒立新, Zhongguo Yin Hua Shui Yan Jiu中國印花稅研究 [Study on Stamp Duty of 
China] (Beijing, Zhongguo Shui Wu Chu Ban She 2009), 97; See section 4.2.8. 
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adhesive stamps from the agency by European businesses, which contradicted 
the ethos of the establishment of the agency. Compared to China, the main 
difference was that Hennessy only appointed one agent, which allowed focused 
supervision and prevented the devaluation of stamps caused by market 
competition between agencies. 
 
Despite the shortcomings of the Chinese Stamp Agency, in 1877, through the 
establishment of the Agency as well as the prosecutions filed against the 
Chinese evading the Stamp Duty Ordinance, stamp duty revenue increased 
from HK$103,846 in 1876 to HK$118,539 in 1877, 602  representing a 14% 
increase. This was clear evidence in itself that Hennessy had a financial 
agenda when he conceived his 1877 stamp duty policies. 
 
Other evidence exemplified Hennessy’s primary motive as revenue 
enhancement. During Hennessy’s tenure, and with a growing economy, there 
was no pressing need for him to intensify the enforcement of the stamp duty to 
yield more revenue. Yet his stamp duty actions point to revenue enhancement 
as his intention. This directs attention to the reasons why Hennessy instigated 
such a policy which could upset the Chinese. Investigation into the reasons 
behind his conceived financial imperative reveals that his motives were 
personal, and concerned his desire for preferment. Hennessy had not been 
knighted after serving as Governor for various British colonies before he took up 
his governorship in Hong Kong.  
 
Investigating the possible reasons for Hennessy’s lack of a knighthood prior to 
his Hong Kong posting, reveals that the Colonial Office felt he lacked common 
sense and was administratively inefficient. Indeed, the officials recorded that 
Hennessy left correspondence from the Colonial Office unattended and 
mismanaged the finances of all of the colonies that he had governed, and that 
they must ‘watch his proceedings narrowly’.603 
 
In order to remove any impediment to the bestowment of a knighthood, 
Hennessy was thus eager to demonstrate his management ability, in particular, 
                                            
602 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (1 March 1878), CO129/181, 197. 
603 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 170–71. 
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in the area of financial administration. He sent a handful of letters to the 
Colonial Office stating his achievements in improving stamp duty revenues.604 
On 15 October 1878, Hennessy announced in the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council his plan to reduce taxation for the first time in the history of the colony. 
In his opinion, this was attributable to his favourable financial policies, in 
particular the stamp duty policies. 605  His announcement was unknown 
beforehand to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.606 The Secretary of State 
rejected the announced policy and sent a telegram instructing Hennessy to 
make no tax reductions.607 
 
Investigation of Hennessy’s objectives in 1878 found that equity restoration was 
important. Hennessy was a firm believer in the principle of equal treatment for 
all people;608 the Europeans should not be accorded preferential treatment and 
the Chinese should be dealt with likewise. The horizontal tax equity between 
European and Chinese taxpayers had to be restored. It was unfair to the 
European taxpayers that they were required to pay a stamp duty for certain 
instruments whereas their Chinese counterparts ignored the statutory 
requirements with no consequences. If stamp duty horizontal equity was not 
restored, in the long run the European taxpayers would show contempt by 
evading the duties which would potentially lead to a severe revenue drain. In 
this context, the discussion indicates that the perceived horizontal equity 
restoration imperative that drove Hennessy’s stamp duty policy was ultimately 
financial in nature with a view to sustaining stamp duty revenue.  
 
Hennessy’s reinforcement of the receipt stamp mechanism in furtherance of his 
financial imperative was again in evidence some eighty years later, during the 
fiscal years 1956/57 and 1957/58. The Stamp Office had stepped up its 
prosecution of stamp receipt defaulters, and a total of 29,155 instances were 
                                            
604 For example see Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (9 October 1877), 
CO129/179, 208; Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (4 December 1877), 
CO129/179, 434; Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (1 March 1878), 
CO129/181, 198. 
605 Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Speech of His Excellency The Governor on Colonial 
Finances Extracted from the Daily Press, Proceeding of Council on 15 October 1878’ (Hong 
Kong Government 19 October 1878). 
606 Minutes on the Comparative Return of Stamp Revenue for 1877 and 1878 (17 February 
1879), CO129/184, 3. 
607 Telegram from Michael Hicks Beach to John Pope Hennessy (28 February 1879), 
CO129/184, 15. 
608 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 170. 
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detected and penalties collected. This was achieved by causing inspectors to 
carry out frequent investigations to ensure that receipts were properly stamped. 
Such activities in this regard produced the desired result and made the public 
more aware of their responsibilities. The result was overwhelming as the sales 
of receipt stamps were increased by $188,437 in 1956/57 and by a further of 
$106,726 in 1957/58. The total increase of HK$295,163 is considerable, 
bearing in mind that stamps cost only HK15¢ each at that time.609  
 
After demonstrating the financial nature of Hennessy’s actions, this section 
continues the analysis of lessons to be learned about substantive stamp duty 
initiatives that could be used to quench financial exigencies.  
 
As discussed in section 3.3.1, altering the stamp duty structure alone might not 
yield a constructive result, raising the all-important question of how to enhance 
stamp duty revenue when the financial need arises. 
 
The first administrative official to experiment with stand-alone policy to reinforce 
the stamp duty mechanism to increase stamp duty revenue was Hennessy.610 
The evidence demonstrates that Hennessy’s policies to educate, punish, and at 
the same time offer convenience to the Chinese taxpayers in the form of the 
Chinese Stamp Agency were successful in fulfilling his financial objective, 
showing how much could be achieved by applying coherent policies to reinforce 
the stamp duty mechanism. Contrasting this with MacDonnell’s 1868 
amendments 611  demonstrates that stand-alone changes to stamp duty 
structures are unlikely to succeed; successful changes require that stamp duty 
mechanisms be the central focus. What Hennessy had done also demonstrated 
that it was possible to achieve successful reform focusing only on stamp duty 
mechanisms.    
 
Following the development to this point, it can be said that historical 
investigation of the Hong Kong stamp duty system confirms that it was not 
                                            
609 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1957–58’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1958), 19. 
610 Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–1919: Years of Discretion (Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong University Press 1975), 40. 
611 See section 3.3.1. 
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essential to increase duties or add in novel heads of charge at all times to 
achieve desired revenue increments. Revenue enhancement could be achieved 
by enforcing and/or strengthening the existing mechanisms unaided by other 
measures. 
3.3.3 Hong Kong’s first revenue-driven comprehensive stamp duty reform 
Governor Sir George Bowen (in office 1883–1885) informed the 1884 
Legislative Council during his opening speech that he would ‘consolidate and 
amend the law relating to stamp duties’. 612  Although the kind of statutory 
consolidation envisaged would have been extremely useful and was an 
appropriate object in itself, Bowen did not explicitly state the objective of the 
exercise. Attorney General Edward O'Malley (in office 1879–1889) specified the 
need to readjust the incidence of certain duties that were inequitably distributed 
as another reason for the proposal.613 There was no mention of any revenue 
objective during the legislative process for the proposed Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1884.614 Nevertheless, analysis of the historical evidence reveals 
Bowen did indeed have a dominant revenue objective in mind when he planned 
the 1884 stamp legislation, driven by the need to improve the infrastructure of 
Hong Kong. 
 
When Bowen took over, Hong Kong was a fine city in terms of its infrastructure. 
There were gaslights on streets, reservoirs, schools, botanic gardens, theatres, 
museums and public libraries.615 Hong Kong was then the British Empire’s third 
most important seaport after London and Liverpool. 616  Nonetheless, Bowen 
faced a dire problem of Hong Kong’s unsanitary conditions. The Colonial Office 
appointed Osbert Chadwick in 1881 to conduct a full enquiry into the sanitary 
condition of Hong Kong. Chadwick submitted his report with numerous 
suggestions in 1882.617 The adoption of these recommendations, in which the 
Colonial Office expected no delay, was left to Bowen. Chadwick’s 
                                            
612 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1884. 
613 Letter from George Bowen to Edward Stanley (16 May 1884), CO129/216, 115. 
614 No 15 of 1884. 
615 Gwenneth Stokes, Hong Kong in History (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government Printer 
1965), 65. 
616 George Bowen, Thirty Years of Colonial : A Selection from the Dispatches and Letters of Sir 
George Ferguson Bowen (Stanley Lane-Poole ed, London, Longmans 1889), vol 2, 393; J P 
Floru, Heavens on Earth: How to Create Mass Prosperity (London, Biteback Publishing Ltd 
2013), ch 4, 4. 
617 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 187–88. 
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recommendations dealing with drainage, water supply and similar large public 
works were to be carried out at great expense.618 
 
The evidence shows that Bowen’s real objectives in introducing the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1884619 were threefold: 
 
First, the timing of the 1884 legislation indicated strongly that it was indeed a 
direct response to the financial demands highlighted in the Chadwick report. 
 
Second, evidence arises from Bowen’s disclosure that the colony was in need 
of money during the first session of the 1884 Legislative Council meeting. He 
stressed the need to obtain a loan620 ‘not much exceeding the revenue of a 
single year’ to finance those ‘strong and complete measures of sanitation’ 
foreshadowed by the Chadwick report as so necessary ‘for the immediate 
benefit of the public health’ as well as to carry out several other urgent public 
works.621 
 
Third, Bowen summed up his view on the role of stamp duty in his Legislative 
Council closing speech delivered in 1886. 622  He pronounced that the best 
means for Hong Kong to raise extra revenue to defray loan interest was by an 
increase of stamp duty.  
 
Given Bowen’s three objectives, the 1884 stamp duty changes instigated as a 
consequence of the Chadwick report on Hong Kong’s sanitary conditions 
reflected a financial imperative. It can be convincingly inferred that the 1884 
stamp duty changes were revenue driven despite the Hong Kong government 
not disclosing this revenue objective during the entire legislative process. 
 
                                            
618 Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Colonial Office Despatches on Sanitation and Education, 
Government Notification No 74’ (Hong Kong Government 3 March 1883); G B Endacott, A 
History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 202. 
619 No 15 of 1884. 
620 Eventually, the Secretary of States for the Colonies gave approval and allowed the colony to 
borrow up to one million dollars. See Hong Kong Sessional Papers 2 February 1886, ‘Despatch 
Respecting the Proposed Loan’ paper 13, 83; 1886 Loan Ordinance, No 11 of 1886. 
621 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1884, 2. 
622 Hong Kong Hansard 21 May 1886, 75. 
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The Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1884 was in force from 1 April 1885.623 The 
following Hong Kong stamp duty revenue figures were extracted from historical 
publications: 
 
Table 3.2: Stamp revenues, 1884–1888 
Year (Calendar year)  Annual stamp duty collected 
(HK$) 
1884 151,495a 
  
1885 145,582b 
  
1886 176,001c 
  
1887 184,991d 
  
1888 205,041e 
a Hong Kong Government Gazette, 10 January 1885. 
b Hong Kong Government Gazette, 9 January 1886. 
c Hong Kong Government Gazette, 8 January 1887. 
d Hong Kong Government Gazette, 7 January 1888. 
e Hong Kong Government Gazette, 12 January 1889. 
 
Despite evidence showing the clear financial imperative, ie to raise money, the 
stamp revenue initially dropped slightly in the year 1885, before increasing in 
subsequent years. A likely explanation for the revenue decline was that the 
Sino-French war broke out in August 1884 and detrimentally influenced trade 
and commerce in Hong Kong, and consequently the stamp duty revenue, which 
had most of its lucrative heads of charge associated with business transactions. 
When the war ceased in the latter part of 1885, the revenue effect of the 1884 
reform was subsequently observed during 1886–1888 when stamp duty 
revenue rose steadily without any other revenue-driven amendment being 
enacted. The revenue rose by 35% over the five year period. From the data it 
can be concluded that the implementation of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
1884 was successful in generating more revenue. In a way, the data also 
serves as further evidence that the 1884 Hong Kong stamp duty reform had a 
principal financial agenda.  
                                            
623 The 1884 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance repealed the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance as 
well as the 1868 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, together with the related 
Governors’ Orders that had been promulgated. 
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After discerning the key financial aim behind the 1884 Stamp Ordinance, this 
section moves on to examine the measures initiated by the Hong Kong 
government to effectively attain the revenue objective.  
 
The investigation reveals valuable lessons relating to the stamp duty revenue 
enhancement procedures. At the outset, the Hong Kong government presented 
the 1884 changes to the stamp duty system as an exercise to meet two distinct 
administrative imperatives: simplification, convenience and equity restoration 
through reinstatement of stamp duty vertical equity. In the following paragraphs, 
these imperatives are individually discussed in the context of the 1884 stamp 
duty law.  
 
1. Simplification  
In general, simplification means to decrease complexity. The complexity of a 
stamp duty system is illustrated by the sum of stamp duty compliance costs. 
Such costs consist of those incurred by taxpayers as well as by government. 
Taxpayers’ costs include expenditures of time and money to comprehend the 
stamp duty law, to consult experts and to respond to the Stamp Office’s 
investigations. The government’s costs are the stamp duty administrative 
expenditures. The more complex the stamp duty system, the higher the 
compliance costs associated with it.624 By reducing the compliance costs of 
taxpayers, a higher level of voluntary compliance could be anticipated. From the 
perspective of the Stamp Duty Office, simplifying the stamp duty law enhanced 
its surplus from stamp duty collection. 
 
The 1884 simplification of the stamp duty tax mechanism was accomplished by 
three techniques. First, certain sections in the legislation deemed unnecessary, 
such as the definition of the term ‘Governor’, were deleted.  
 
Second, various dispersed sections were grouped into one place for clarity. For 
example, sections 7, 10, 12, 14 and 27 of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
                                            
624 William G Gale and Janet Holzblatt, ‘The Role of Administrative Issues in Tax Reform: 
Simplicity, Compliance and Administration’ (Tax Reform for the Millennium at James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, November 1998), 3. The conference paper provides 
an excellent summary and analysis of issues relating to tax avoidance, evasion and 
administration. 
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1866,625 which referred to the administration of penalties, were grouped under 
sections 6 and 7 of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1884.626 
 
Third, the language was simplified. For instance, the lines used to describe the 
calculation of stamp duty penalties were reduced from thirty-eight in 1866 to 
twenty-four in 1884. This was mainly achieved by doing away with the 
complicated section using HK$50 as a reference point to calculate the 
applicable penalties.627 
 
As regards the stamp duty structure it can be concluded that the 1884 
simplification was achieved by reducing the steps in the ad valorem rate scale 
and by promoting the uniformity of tax rates across chargeable instruments. 
This usually took the form of superseding the previous multi-step ad valorem 
rate scale by introducing single step ad valorem rates (cumulative standard rate 
basis)628 to the main chargeable instruments.629 However, by analysing the new 
rates in the context of the old rates, it is clear that simplification did not 
necessarily involve a reduction in the duties collected. 
 
The 1884 reform also simplified the stamp duty structure by arranging the 
heads of charge in alphabetical order. This was intended to improve the 
comprehensibility of the schedule and make it easier for Hong Kong taxpayers 
who understood English, to check whether certain instruments were taxable. By 
appraising the stamp duty law in Britain, it can be concluded that the stamp duty 
simplification ideologies adopted in Hong Kong in 1884 had their roots in the 
                                            
625 No 12 of 1866. 
626 No 15 of 1884. 
627 See section 2.3.8. 
628 See section 2.3.3; Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, sch; Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, sch. 
629 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, sch. For charter parties, there was a revision 
of the previous ad valorem rate augmented based on the ships’ tonnages to simply, HK10¢ for 
every HK$100 or part thereof. In other words, the previous six-step ad valorem (cumulative 
standard rate basis) rate was replaced by a single step ad valorem (cumulative standard rate 
basis) rate. For probates and letters of administration, conveyances and leases at a premium 
the ad valorem rate was adjusted to HK10¢ for every HK$100 or part thereof. In other words, 
the previous multi-steps ad valorem (cumulative standard rate basis) rate was replaced by a 
single step ad valorem (cumulative standard rate basis) rate. There was also considerable 
revision made to the ad valorem rate for leases at a rent. The previous seven-step ad valorem 
(standard rate basis) rate was replaced by a single step ad valorem (cumulative standard rate 
basis) rate. For mortgages, the previous multi-steps ad valorem (cumulative standard rate 
basis) rate was replaced by a single step ad valorem (cumulative standard rate basis) rate. 
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British Stamp Act 1870.630 Dowell remarked: ‘Before the simplification effected 
in 1870, the law on this subject (British stamp duty) was complicated and 
confusing. It is now well-arranged, easy to find and within the comprehension of 
the most moderate intellect.’ 631  In support of this conclusion, the British 
legislature arranged the heads of charge in alphabetical order for the first time 
in 1870. The Hong Kong government imitated this practice in 1884.  
 
2. Convenience 
Besides effecting simplification, the evidence demonstrates that the 1884 Hong 
Kong stamp duty reform aimed to offer taxpayers greater convenience,632 both 
locational and procedural.  
 
The new power granted to the Governor to set up subsidiary Stamp Offices633 
offered taxpayers locational convenience in purchasing adhesive stamps as 
well as presenting the documents for stamping. In the 1880s, Hong Kong 
consisted of the Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, which 
constituted a total area of only 32.5 square miles. 634  Moreover, the large 
mountainous area was uninhabited. Setting up even a few subsidiary Stamp 
Offices would be enough to offer great convenience to the public. With this new 
law, the role of the privately run stamp distributor could be phased out.  
 
The new measure to allow agreements by letters and documents executed 
externally to Hong Kong to be stamped after execution, 635  also offered 
taxpayers more procedural convenience in complying with the law. It was more 
sensible for taxpayers to sign the documents after stamping to prevent the 
ensuing difficulties of seeking refunds for spoiled stamps in cases where 
agreements needed to be re-drafted before execution. This was the first time 
the Hong Kong law allowed instruments to be stamped after their execution. 
 
3. Equity restoration 
                                            
630 33 & 34 Vict c 97. 
631 Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England 4 vols (first published 1884, 
London, Frank Cass & Co 1965), vol 3, 306. 
632 See also section 2.3.6. 
633 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, s 2. 
634 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 4. 
635 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 15 of 1884, s 10(1). 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 153 
Bowen specifically remarked in his report to the Colonial Office that the tax 
rates on bills of exchange were inequitably distributed. Accordingly, the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 1884 had instigated a complete rearrangement of the 
related tax structures. For this reason, it was also deemed necessary to 
introduce more chargeable instruments to compensate for the loss of revenue 
and restore revenue neutrality.636 The new chargeable instruments introduced 
were attested copies, average statements, 637  declarations of trust, 638  lease 
duplicates, servant security bonds,639 settlements,640 policies for life insurance, 
policies for fire insurance, general letters of hypothecation and notes of protest 
for bills of exchange.641 642 As with MacDonnell’s strategic ploy in 1867,643 this 
use of an equity restoration ideology was perhaps peculiar to the stamp duty 
regime. 
 
The 1884 Stamp Ordinance restored vertical equity to bills of exchange by 
replacing the previous three-step rate scale with a more complicated ten-step 
configuration.644 Comparing the new rates with the old rates, it is apparent that 
the restoration of stamp duty equity did not necessarily involve a reduction of 
the overall duties collected from bills of exchange. 
 
This also demonstrates that the attempts to make stamp duty fairer conflicted 
with the notion of making stamp duty simpler. No doubt, the stamp duty system 
should be simple and fair but the entailing policies to achieve the two outcomes 
were headed in opposite directions. In this case, the Hong Kong government 
permitted complexity in order to achieve equity. 
 
                                            
636 Letter from George Bowen to Edward Stanley (16 May 1884), CO129/216, 115.  
637 Average statements were documents that stated the amount owed by the owners of a ship 
or the goods the ship carried and the amount owed by an insurance company when they shared 
the cost of any damages or losses. 
638 Declarations of trust were statements made by the holders of a piece of property that the 
property was being held for the benefits of other persons. 
639 See section 3.4.1. 
640 Settlements were documents on the resolutions between disputing parties about a legal case 
reached before or after court actions. 
641 Bills of exchange were documents that the drawers made obligations that the drawees 
should pay the payees a specified sum of money. Protests of bill of exchange were documents 
prepared for the non-receipt of the bills of exchange or refusal to pay them.  
642 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, sch. 
643 See section 3.3.1. 
644 Ibid. Bills of exchange were given a new ad valorem (standard rate basis) with ten-steps. A 
table of charge ranging from HK2¢ for transaction values over HK$10, to HK$3 for over 
HK$10,000, was introduced to replace the previous three-step scale. 
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The 1884 stamp duty reform also restored equity by creating a new category of 
bills of exchange on demand and charged at a very low fixed rate.645 George 
Phillippo, the previous Attorney General (in office 1869–1879), had opposed 
such a scheme in 1877. Based on his experience, Chinese taxpayers would 
inevitably classify bills as payable on demand even though they were only 
payable after a period of time, in order to be taxed at a lower rate.646 This new 
distinction, however, generated an opportunity to avoid tax. If the government 
wished to consider the control of resultant tax avoidance, the creation of 
complex legislation was inevitable. To a certain degree, the government 
restored tax equity so as to limit the propensity for tax evasion.647 Taxpayers 
were more likely to evade tax when they felt that the tax system was inequitable 
and perceived that others were reaping greater benefit than they were. The 
analysis attests that it was ineffectual to introduce any tax law designed for 
equity restoration if it would also give rise to tax evasion. Another pitfall 
identified from the discussion was that it would be ineffectual to restore equity 
by introducing excessively complicated legislation. Complexity itself invited 
evasion.   
 
It is submitted that stamp duty law designed to satisfy any of these 
administrative and equity imperatives individually might not enhance revenue. 
In fact, as discussed above, only the stamp duty simplification exercise had a 
slight linkage to revenue enhancement. Offering vertical equity might even have 
a revenue-contraction effect. Further, while examining the Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1895,648 it is demonstrable that the extension of convenience to 
stamp duty payers would not necessarily enhance revenue.649 It can be said 
that law, designed to meet any of these fiscal imperatives in isolation, would 
only satisfy the stamp duty system sustainability imperative but not the demand 
for revenue.650  
 
                                            
645 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 15 of 1884, sch. Bills of exchange on demand taxed at a 
low fixed rate at HK2¢ regardless of the transaction values instead of the ad valorem rate.  
646 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (21 August 1877), CO129/178, 586. 
647 Erich Kirchler, The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour (New York, Cambridge 
University Press 2007), 82. 
648 No 26 of 1895. 
649 See section 4.2.1; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 26 of 1895.  
650 See section 4.2.1. 
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Yet the 1884 Hong Kong stamp duty reform was considered a great financial 
success. As such, the evidence confirms the principle that serving the 
administrative needs of simplification and offering convenience to taxpayers, as 
well as simultaneously satisfying the requirements of vertical equity, would 
result in a positive financial outcome.   
 
In comparing the Stamp Ordinance 1884 with the previous version that 
displayed an unproductive revenue yield, it is clear that the 1884 version was a 
comprehensive reform with extensive changes made to both the stamp duty 
structure as well as the mechanism. The main theme of the reform was 
simplification through consolidation. The auxiliary themes were the offering of 
convenience and equity restoration. These three themes worked synergistically 
to deliver an overall package that was effective in increasing stamp duty 
revenue.  
 
The Hong Kong government chose to implement the aforementioned 
administrative and equity imperatives concurrently, under the one piece of 
legislation. With hindsight, this provides further evidence that the main reason 
for the introduction of the 1884 Hong Kong stamp duty reform was 
unequivocally for the principal financial imperative, rather than the secondary 
demand to enhance system sustainability. 
3.3.4 Meeting revenue exigency caused by cessation of opium by dealing with both 
stamp duty structure and mechanism 
The stamp duty amendment of 1909651 demonstrates that the need for revenue 
continued to be an important imperative in shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty 
law in the first decade of the twentieth century. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, the British home government discouraged opium trading in its colonies. 
Nonetheless, the taxes and related charges imposed on opium-related activities 
were hitherto, a significant source of revenue to the Hong Kong government.652 
Unquestionably, the Hong Kong government experienced financial exigency in 
1909 due to the change in the British government’s policy attitude towards 
opium.  
 
                                            
651 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 19 of 1909. 
652 See section 3.4.2. 
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The examination of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1909653 finds 
that it was enacted for the sole purpose of enhancing revenue by the imposition 
of higher duties on receipts and probates to counter the potential loss of 
revenue from the cessation of the opium trade. The legislation came into force 
on 1 January 1910. It was an immediate financial success as the aim of 
Governor Sir Frederick Lugard (in office 1907–1912), to increase the level of 
stamp revenue, was achieved. Stamp revenue collections increased from 
HK$626,023654 in the year 1909 to HK$753,836655 in the year 1910. 
 
An analysis of the fundamentals that enabled Lugard’s stamp duty amendment 
to be financially successful, found that before the 1909 amendments, receipts 
for less than HK$25 did not require a stamp, but after the amendments receipts 
for HK$10 and upwards would bear a five cent stamp. The stamp duty rates on 
probate were also doubled and in Lugard’s opinion, this was still ‘small in 
comparison with like duties charged in other countries’.656  
 
The colonial government also enhanced the tax mechanism to strengthen the 
collection of probate stamp duties by imposing penalties for delayed probate 
applications. 657  No doubt, the purpose was to induce early application for 
probate to prevent evasion of duties and more importantly, to inform the 
Chinese that probate was compulsory and not voluntary. Generally, stamp 
duties on probate would be charged at three times the original rates if the 
probates were not delivered to the Stamp Office within one year from the death 
of the deceased.658  
 
To sum up, the success of the measure was attributable to the fact that stamp 
duties on receipts and probates were essentially made compulsory rather than 
voluntary, although whether the Hong Kong stamp duty system as a whole was 
compulsory or voluntary, was still ambiguous in 1909. 
 
                                            
653 No 19 of 1909. 
654 Hong Kong Government, ‘Hong Kong Blue Book 1909’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1910), c2. 
655 Hong Kong Government, ‘Hong Kong Blue Book 1910’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1911), c2. 
656 Hong Kong Hansard 1 July 1909, 64. 
657 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 44 of 1909, s 2. 
658 Ibid. 
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The evidence reinforces the finding that financial imperatives were likely to be 
reinforced by stamp duty legal changes driving both the stamp duty 
mechanisms as well as the structures, simultaneously.  
3.3.5 Meeting revenue demand in Hong Kong’s most disastrous year by dealing 
with the stamp duty structure 
The Hong Kong stamp duty amendments of 1894 reflected the colony’s severe 
exigencies at that time, giving rise to the predominant need to significantly 
increase revenue.  
 
Governor Sir William Robinson (in office 1891–1898), described the year 1894 
as the ‘saddest and the most disastrous in the records of history of Hong 
Kong’.659 The dismay that marked the year sprang from a number of factors all 
severely damaging the Hong Kong economy. A bubonic plague attacked the 
colony, the calamity accounting for more than 2,500 victims and causing an 
unprecedented exodus of more than 50,000 Chinese, affecting all businesses in 
Hong Kong. A rapid fall in silver prices caused the depreciation of the silver-
based Hong Kong currency. The large devaluation of the Hong Kong currency 
was not only detrimental to businesses but also resulted in a heavy financial 
burden on the government in meeting the demand for a 20–35% increase in 
salaries.660 The First Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95 affected the economic life 
of Hong Kong adversely.661  Numerous typhoons occurred in Hong Kong in 
1894, causing severe damage.662 
 
The combined effect of these unanticipated circumstances increased the 
government’s expenditures and decreased the government’s revenues, 
triggering financial stress in 1894. In his 1894 speech giving the financial 
estimates for 1895, Robinson forecasted a deficit of HK$67,231.663 The need 
for revenue predisposed the Governor to increase taxation. Robinson’s first 
alternative was to increase stamp duty with an expected yield of HK$40,000, 
partially defraying the 1895 estimated deficit.664 The remaining deficit would be 
                                            
659 Hong Kong Hansard 28 November 1894, 2. 
660 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 117. 
661 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 253. 
662 Hong Kong Hansard 28 November 1894, 2. 
663 Ibid. 
664 Ibid. 
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covered by an increase in pawnbroker licence fees and spirit licence fees. 
Robinson also held private discussions with the unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council, and subsequently stated that they were ‘not averse to still 
further taxation by way of an increase in rates’ if the other measures he took to 
increase revenue were not adequate.665 
 
Against this background the investigation of historical records and 
circumstances establishes a financial imperative as the dominant driving force 
for the enactment of the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation in 1894.  
 
Having regard to the methods used to achieve this end, it is noteworthy that 
before the 1894 stamp duty amendment, stamp duty changes based only on 
stamp duty structures yielded a poor financial outcome.666 Indeed, changes 
made only to the stamp duty structures, without dealing with the mechanisms, 
continued to yield poor financial results after 1894.667  
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1894668 warranted particular 
attention as the amendments made to stamp duty structure alone, were able to 
achieve the desired result. Thus the aim of the 1894 stamp duty amendment 
investigation was to gain further understanding of the factors that enabled 
structural amendments effected by the 1894 Ordinance to successfully achieve 
the revenue objective. 
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1894669 introduced three new 
chargeable instruments. First, it imposed a HK2¢ stamp on letters for appointing 
proxies to vote at meetings. 670  Such letters were classified as powers of 
attorney.671 Second, it imposed a HK$1 stamp on affidavits.672 Third, it imposed 
a duty on the surrender of a lease with the same tax rate as for execution of the 
lease. 
 
                                            
665 Ibid. 
666 See for example section 3.3.1. 
667 See for example section 3.3.6. 
668 No 13 of 1894. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 13 of 1894, s 4. 
671 Letter from William Robinson to George Robinson (4 January 1895), CO129/266, 5. 
672 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 13 of 1894, s 6. 
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The 1894 Ordinance also significantly increased the tax rate for insurance 
policies from HK10¢ to HK25¢,673 and the duties for probates from 1% to 2%, 
and from 1% to 3% for estates with net values exceeding HK$10,000 and 
HK$20,000, respectively. 674  In percentage terms, these increases were 
considerable. 
 
Thus, amendments to stamp duty structures to achieve the financial aim, 
increased stamp duty revenue from HK$188,240 in 1894 to HK$229,168 in 
1895,675 representing an increase of HK$40,928 (22%) for the year. The 1894 
stamp duty amendment was considered a success as the increment exceeded 
Robinson’s target of HK$40,000.  
 
Because the revenue collection from the three newly added chargeable 
instruments was negligible,676 it can be concluded that the revenue increase 
was directly attributable to the upsurge in tax rates for probates and insurance 
policies. 
 
Four factors have been identified as contributing to the immense financial 
success of the Ordinance by solely amending the duty rates and deductions of 
stamp duty structures.  
1. Significant tax rate increments matched to social and economic circumstances 
Robinson said that the year 1894 was the worst year in the history of Hong 
Kong filled with unfortunate events.677 The economy in 1895 was still affected 
as ‘Hong Kong was boycotted in every direction’678 and there were still plague 
cases in 1895–96.679 It can be inferred from Robinson’s oral history account 
that he realised that it would be highly ineffective to raise the tax rates for 
instruments that were linked to trade and commerce for additional revenue. For 
example, raising the rates for bills of exchange during this period might have 
                                            
673 Ibid s 5. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Hong Kong Government, ‘Hong Kong Blue Book 1884’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1885), c6. 
676 Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Stamp Revenue Return for Years 1894 and 1895, 
Government Notification No 8’ (Hong Kong Government 11 January 1896). The 1895 stamp 
duties collected on proxies, affidavits and surrenders of a lease, were HK$9, HK$120 and 
HK$0, respectively.  
677 Hong Kong Hansard 28 November 1894, 2. 
678 Ibid. 
679 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 217. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 160 
been fruitless as the underlying transactions to support the tax decreased 
substantially. Sadly, in the worst plague period for Hong Kong, the death rate 
was high and it would be revenue effective to attach higher stamp duty rates to 
probates based on the value of the deceased estates. 
 
With the advent of these natural disasters, typhoons and the plague in 1894, an 
awareness of the importance of insurance increased. Robinson understood this 
and chose to increase the stamp duty rate for insurance policies. Whilst 
commercial activities decreased, insurance policy sales increased rapidly. 
2. Increment capacity that could be exploited without inciting uproar  
The increment capacity was used to identify suitable instruments marked for 
significant tax rate increase. For instance, insurance policies were selected as 
they were only taxed at a fixed rate of HK10¢, whereas similar instruments of 
agreement were taxed at a fixed rate of HK50¢ under the 1886 Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance before the amendments.  
3. Equity restoration performed on selected instruments for significant tax rate 
increments 
The 1894 Ordinance authorised deductions to be made from the value of the 
deceased estates for probate stamps.680 In all preceding Hong Kong stamp 
legislation, approval for deductions was not given under any head of charge. 
This was the first time the concept of deduction was used in Hong Kong stamp 
duty law to arrive at the tax base. Mortgaged debts and personal debts were 
deductible from the values of the estate for stamp purposes.681 The stamp duty 
system recognised the costs of the estates and only imposed tax on the net 
values of the estates. 
 
In arriving at the net estate values, vertical equity was re-established. The 
doctrine incorporated into the stamp duty system was taken from British 
legislation. The relevant British Act was the Customs and Inland Revenue Act 
1881, which included a similar section682 with the same effect. The benefit of 
doing so was that the doctrines were tested and proven viable in Britain before 
being put into force in Hong Kong. This assured sustainability of the law. The 
                                            
680 Letter from William Robinson to George Robinson (4 January 1895), CO129/266, 5. 
681 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 13 of 1894, s 2(1) & (2). 
682 Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1881 (44 Vict c 12), s 28. 
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restoration of equity for probates was instrumental in inducing the taxpayer to 
perceive the tax as fair and thus promoting compliance. 
4. Recognition of cultural customs and sensitivities.  
When comparing the 1881 British Customs and Inland Revenue Act with the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1894, the British Act allowed funeral expenses to 
be deductible against the estates whereas the Hong Kong Ordinance did not. 
The Hong Kong Attorney General, William Goodman explained that it was 
‘undesirable in the circumstances of this colony’ to permit such deductions.683 
 
The Attorney General’s viewpoint showed that the government was aware of 
the Chinese Confucian traditions, which emphasised respect for one’s parents 
as the greatest virtue. The eldest son of every family was obliged to give his 
parents a proper funeral befitting the deceased’s status. Without a proper 
funeral, the family would be disgraced and the deceased could not be at 
peace.684 It was against the Chinese ethos of filial piety that expenditures for a 
funeral were deducted for tax purposes against the deceased’s estate. This 
would create an impression that the deceased paid for his own funeral instead 
of the son.  
 
This development of the stamp duty shows that in the late nineteenth century in 
Hong Kong, tax laws were adopted from Britain, but in order to further enhance 
the sustainability and acceptability of such adopted doctrines, the Hong Kong 
legislator performed adaptability studies to attune the law to local customs. In 
the example above, this policy was to ensure the Chinese would not be 
discouraged from paying stamp duty on probates due to customary matters. 
 
Contrasting with the American Stamp Act 1765 which led to the American 
Independence War, the Hong Kong initiative showed the importance of 
recognising local customs and traditions.685 The British government failed to 
recognise the individual liberty of the American people in applying the principles 
of Magna Carta in America, whereas the Hong Kong government paid attention 
                                            
683 Letter from William Robinson to George Robinson (4 January 1895), CO129/266, 5. 
684 Dorothy Perkins, Encyclopedia of China: The Essential Reference to China, Its History and 
Culture (New York, Round Table Press 1999), 171. 
685 See section 2.4. 
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to Chinese customs founded in Confucian traditions when formulating the new 
tax law.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that in order to ensure that structural stamp duty 
amendments achieved the revenue objective it was of paramount importance to 
select the instruments prudently for significant tax increments by reflecting the 
accompanying social and economic circumstances. Further the ability of the 
populace to bear the incremental imposts had to be considered. Another 
contributory measure was the restoration of equity for the selected instrument in 
inducing the taxpayer to perceive the tax as fair, thus promoting compliance. 
Lastly, it was important to observe local customs and operations to avoid 
barriers to revenue collection. 
3.3.6 Law that failed to double stamp duty revenue as projected 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the colony’s infrastructure needs gave rise 
to significant public debt and a budgetary deficit, providing a clear motivation for 
revenue raising through taxation. It suggests that a financial imperative was the 
motivational underpinning of further changes to Hong Kong’s stamp duty 
regime. 
 
In 1902, Hong Kong was in deficit due to the need to extensively increase 
public works and for land resumption compensation to end the annual 
recurrence of plague in the colony.686 Governor Sir Henry Blake (in office 1898–
1903) informed the Legislative Council that in order to service the loan to 
quench the deficit and provide for the ensuing interest expenditures, stamp duty 
had to be increased to provide additional revenue of HK$84,000 per annum.687 
In his stamp duty legislative policy, driven by financial imperatives, the question 
arose whether doubling or trebling the stamp duty rates across the board would 
generate double or treble the revenue. The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1902688 provided an opportunity to gauge the financial result of such 
arrangement.  
 
                                            
686 Hong Kong Hansard 9 October 1902, 55–56. 
687 Hong Kong Hansard 9 October 1902, 56. 
688 No 38 of 1902. 
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The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1902, 689  which doubled or 
trebled the tax rates for most heads of charge, came into operation on 1 
January 1903. It was a financial failure. The total stamp revenue collected in the 
year 1903 was less than in the previous year, 1902.690 This failure was contrary 
to the belief that revenue might at least double. A survey of the Hong Kong 
Hansard as well as the Governor’s correspondence with the Colonial Office 
revealed the Hong Kong government did not discuss or give any reasons for the 
failure. By examining the background, however, the failure may be seen to be 
attributable to two factors.  
 
First, certain vital contributors to stamp revenue such as conveyances, leases, 
policies of insurance and probates were left out of the increment exercise.  
 
Second, and more significantly, the tax rates were raised drastically overnight 
with certain instruments being taxed at unreasonable levels. 691  This invited 
fiscal disobedience. Generally, the payment of Hong Kong stamp duty in 1902 
was voluntary subject only to some exceptions. In other words the only sanction 
was a penalty that had to be paid when unstamped instruments were admitted 
for legal proceedings. Taxpayers would be tempted to disobey the stamp 
requirement if they did not intend to seek legal protection on the concluded 
instruments and such instruments also did not require statutory registration. 
This temptation would be intensified as the tax rates rose to relatively high 
levels and caused loss of revenue. The effect in Hong Kong at that time would 
have been substantial as the Chinese, being the majority population, still 
shunned British legal proceedings due to ignorance and unfamiliarity. 
 
The discussion demonstrates that a harsh revenue-enhancing amendment 
targeted at the stamp duty structures, without insightful consideration of the 
possible responses by the taxpaying public, was unlikely to succeed in fulfilling 
the financial imperative. That had already been proven once before under 
MacDonnell’s 1868 stamp duty amendment.  
                                            
689 Ibid. 
690 The stamp revenues in 1902 and 1903 were HK$517,238 and HK$516,357 respectively. See 
Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Statement of Stamp Revenue, Government Notification No 
39’ (Hong Kong Government 23 January 1904). 
691 It was unreasonable as compared to the prevailing duty rates in Britain at that time. See 
section 4.3.6. 
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3.3.7 Law that efficaciously doubled stamp revenue 
The reforms and amendments of the early twentieth century were equally driven 
by financial considerations. World War I broke out in 1914. However, the war 
did not generate a financial imperative for Hong Kong as the Hong Kong 
economy did not suffer immensely. 692  Ironically, Hong Kong found itself in 
severe financial difficulties after World War I. Following four years of not 
carrying out public works due to the war, many works of an urgent nature had 
been in abeyance and it was necessary to proceed with them en masse.693 To 
compound the problem, the revenue derived from the opium monopoly fell 
markedly from around HK$8 million annually during the war to less than HK$5 
million in 1920. 694  This was due to the adopted policy of reducing opium 
smoking in the colony.695 Under these circumstances, Governor Sir Reginald 
Stubbs (in office 1919–1925), introduced the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
1921 696  which aimed to raise additional revenue of HK$1 million, 697  an 
anticipated 70% increase over the 1920 stamp revenue.698 The officer in charge 
of drafting the legislation was Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in office 1915–
1930). 699 
 
The 1921 legislation was a comprehensive stamp duty reform that introduced 
many changes to the stamp duty structure as well as the mechanism to 
enhance revenue. The following table shows the Hong Kong stamp duty 
revenue figures before and after the reform: 
  
                                            
692 In fact there were rapid developments of Chinese shipping as well as banking businesses in 
Hong Kong, as their British counterparts were preoccupied with the confrontation. See Steve 
Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2004), 87. 
693 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 45. 
694 Ibid. 
695 See section 3.4.2. 
696 No 8 of 1921. 
697 Hong Kong Hansard 7 April 1921, 21; Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 40. 
698 Hong Kong Government, ‘Hong Kong Blue Book 1920’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1921), c3. 
699 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 180. 
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Table 3.3: Stamp revenues, 1920–1922 
Calendar Year Annual stamp duty collection (HK$) 
1920 1,392,821a 
  
1921 2,138,572b 
  
1922 2,665,675c 
a Hong Kong Blue Book 1920, c3. 
b Hong Kong Blue Book 1921, c3. 
c Hong Kong Blue Book 1922, c3. 
 
As the 1921 Stamp Ordinance came into operation on 2 May 1921,700 the 1921 
collection reflected a mixed collection result under the new law and the old law. 
A more affirming comparison can be made between the revenues collected in 
1920 and 1922. The increase was HK$1,272,854 (91%). It must be concluded 
that the reform was a huge financial success exceeding the expectation of the 
Hong Kong government. The financial success of Stubbs’s government was in 
sharp contrast to Blake’s administration which had instituted policy to aspire to a 
similar outcome around twenty years before. 
 
With the foregoing in mind, the objective in examining the 1921 stamp duty 
reform was to identify the factors that enabled stamp revenue to nearly double 
in the following year. Investigation of the general history of Hong Kong, 
Legislative Council records and a thorough examination of the 1921 Stamp 
Ordinance, revealed three main factors that contributed to the immense 
financial success of the 1921 Ordinance. 
 
1. Widening tax base matched to economic circumstances 
In an unequivocally revenue-raising reform to enhance revenue, Kemp 
amended the tax structure by widening the tax base. The 1921 stamp duty 
reform introduced six new chargeable instruments into the stamp duty structure. 
Duties imposed on exchange contracts, 701  telegraphic transfers, circular 
                                            
700 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 45. 
701 Exchange contracts were contracts for sale and purchase of foreign currency. Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 2(10). 
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notes,702 letters of credit and traveller’s cheques, were entirely new and did not 
even exist in the British Stamp Act of the same era. Share contract notes and 
certificates to practice703 were adopted from British law.704  
 
By analysing the new impositions, it can be concluded that of the six new 
chargeable instruments, five were related to financial services and stock-trading 
activities.  
 
Venerable Hong Kong historians advocate that trade remained the mainstay of 
the Hong Kong economy during the inter-war years, while considerable 
industrial development also took place.705 However since reliable statistics for 
different sectors of the economy are not available for this period, the exact 
scope and foci of economic development cannot be ascertained.706 
 
Examination of legislative records relating to stamp duty reveals that financial 
services acted as another pillar to the Hong Kong economy during the inter-war 
years which was not readily discerned by Hong Kong historians. Proof to 
support this stage of financial service development was found in the Legislative 
Council debate on the 1921 stamp duty reform relating to the importance of a 
telegraphic transfer operation to the Hong Kong economy.707 The discussion 
reveals Kemp had matched new taxable instruments to a relatively new but 
important sector of the economy in order to generate considerable and 
sustainable income. 
 
                                            
702 A document requested by a bank to a foreign bank to pay a specific sum of money to a 
named person. 
703 Certificates to practice were annual certificates that professionals, such as doctors, dentists 
and solicitors and other designated professions, had to obtain before the commencement of 
practice in Hong Kong. In Britain, it was specified under the British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 
Vict c 39), ss 44–45 that only the legal profession, such as solicitors, barristers or related 
personnel, were required to take up the certificates.   
704 Per Joseph Kemp, Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 30.  
705 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2004), 107; John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2007), 92–93. 
706 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2004), 107. 
707 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 42. During the discussion on whether to accept the 
imposition of stamp duty on telegraphic transfers, Archibald Lang, an unofficial member, 
informed the Council that with a stamp duty on telegraphic transfers, the colony would lose 
HK$30 million a year as clients would refuse to bring their money to Hong Kong to be sent 
home. Alexander Stephen, another unofficial member, disagreed and remarked: ‘The clients 
must come to the biggest market, which is Hong Kong’. 
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2. Tax rates increment capacity that could be exploited without driving trade away 
The examination of legislative records in search of reasons for the doubling of 
revenue within a year showed that Kemp did not obtain the sum by simply 
doubling all existing duties in 1921. In order to achieve the pre-set objective, 
some duties were doubled, a handful was more than doubled but some were 
not increased at all. 708  The precept that Kemp followed to determine the 
magnitudes is therefore of great interest. It was ascertained that Kemp’s 
adopted policy was to observe the stamp duty increment capacity that could be 
exploited without driving trade away. The evidence to support this conclusion 
can be found in the Legislative Council discussions on the effect of the 
proposed increase of stamp duty rates on trade and commerce709 as well as the 
public’s reaction that the 1921 stamp duty reform was an ‘attack on free 
trade’.710 The historical records establish that Kemp understood some duties 
could not be safely doubled in formulating his policy because such would have 
the effect of driving trade away from the colony, a consequence which was 
highly undesirable to the colonial government. From the standpoint of stamp 
duty collection, driving trade away would certainly lead to an undesirable 
reduction of the overall stamp duty revenue yield as the system depended 
largely on commercial documents. 
 
3. Kemp’s radical stamp duty mechanisms 
That Kemp’s driving imperative was to raise revenue is revealed by the 
revolutionary changes he made to the stamp duty collection mechanism in 1921 
to ensure revenue procurement.  
 
In Britain at that time, the payment of stamp duty on written instruments was 
voluntary, subject to only a few clear exceptions.711 The principal sanction of the 
British Stamp Act 1891712 that was in force in 1921 was nullity of evidence. If 
the parties to a transaction by a written instrument were prepared to forgo any 
legal proceedings which would require the production of that instrument, there 
was no obligation upon them to stamp. Kemp confirmed this view: ‘It was no 
                                            
708 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 199–201. 
709 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 43–44. 
710 Ibid 41. 
711 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 199. The 
exceptions were made so as not to have negative influence on trade. 
712 54 & 55 Vict c 39. 
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offence not to stamp an instrument (in Britain) and the Crown cannot sue for the 
duty.’713 
 
Kemp reversed the British tradition completely by rendering the payment of 
stamp duty on written instruments compulsory, subject to a few clear 
exceptions.714 Only attested copies, duplicates, agreements with a corporate 
body and agreements under hand were still treated on a voluntary basis.715 
Kemp made the payment of stamp duty a civil debt, and the non-payment of 
stamp duty, a criminal offence.716 In other words, the Collector of Stamp Duty 
could sue for the unpaid stamp duty even if the parties to the written 
instruments were prepared to forgo any subsequent legal proceedings related 
to such instruments. The Hong Kong doctrine had significantly departed from 
the British tenet for the first time. This was a bold and resolute step taken by 
Kemp to secure stamp revenue. 
 
Notwithstanding the law had been altered to make stamp duty payments 
compulsory, another issue that needed serious consideration was how to 
ensure compliance and thus system sustainability. It is found that Kemp 
introduced some new provisions into the stamp duty legal framework to support 
the compulsory imposition of stamp study. 
 
Kemp stepped up the fine to a maximum of HK$10,000 and more seriously he 
added imprisonment, not exceeding one year, as a possible penalty for evading 
stamp duty.717 Kemp informed the public that the government would not hesitate 
to ask for imprisonment where stamp duty was ‘deliberately and systematically’ 
evaded.718  
 
In addition, Kemp also lifted the corporate veil for instigating stamp duty 
offences. The Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921 provided that office bearers 
of a company would be criminally liable if the company had committed a stamp 
                                            
713 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 29. 
714 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, sch. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 5(7). 
717 Ibid s 43. 
718 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 35. 
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duty offence. 719  The 1921 Ordinance further attached criminal liability to 
taxpayers who had destroyed any books of accounts or instruments for the 
purpose of evading stamp duty.720 All these rules were peculiar to Hong Kong 
and had no precedent in the British Stamp Act721 of the same era. These 
regulations would intimidate the taxpayers to pay up the relatively small amount 
of stamp duties forthwith when the written instruments were executed rather 
than to later face severe consequences. 
 
Kemp introduced the concept of ‘jointly and severally liable’ to stamp duty for 
instruments that involved two or more parties.722 To illustrate, the persons liable 
for stamping of a transfer of trademark under the 1921 Ordinance were ‘all 
persons executing’.723 The Collector could sue any party to the transfer for the 
full amount of duty in arrears. Before the implementation of Kemp’s concept, the 
Stamp Office could only collect the duty from the transferee based on British 
tradition. The British Inland Revenue criticised the Hong Kong provision, 
determining that the identity of the accountable parties was unnecessarily 
harsh:  
In the United Kingdom, an instrument of transfer of property is 
usually executed by one only of the principal parties to the 
transaction – the transferor – whose interest in and control over the 
instrument ceases when he hands it to the transferee in exchange 
for the consideration money. In these circumstances the liability 
which the Hong Kong Ordinance imposes on a vendor would be an 
intolerable burden in the United Kingdom.724 
 
Notwithstanding the censure, Kemp maintained that Hong Kong should keep 
the provision and explained: ‘The idea is that every person who puts his name 
to the document is under an obligation to see that it is duly stamped.’725  
 
                                            
719 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 39. 
720 Ibid s 41. 
721 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39). 
722 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 5(5). 
723 Ibid sch. 
724 Letter from British Inland Revenue to Under Secretary of State of the Colonial Office (22 
October 1921), CO129/472, 667. 
725 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (12 January 1922), CO129/474, 40. 
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The evidence collected shows that it was again a significant departure from the 
British stamp duty principle as to who had the liability to settle the duty. It 
appears that the law was formulated to ensure that the Stamp Office could sue 
any party to the instrument for the full amount of duty even if another party had 
evaded. Nevertheless, the new rule was even more effective in pre-empting 
such evasions by affecting the behaviours of the taxpayers to safeguard 
themselves from criminal proceedings by ensuring that other parties to the 
instruments paid the duties.  
 
Another provision introduced by Kemp to ensure people complied with the 1921 
Stamp Ordinance was to render unstamped documents wholly inadmissible in 
civil proceedings or registrations.726 This was another great departure from the 
British stamp duty legislation in 1921727 where documents could be admitted on 
payment of penalties.728  
 
Kemp also introduced a new section to empower the Collector of Stamp Duties 
to inspect and search any premises with a Magistrate’s search warrant, 729 
where he thought there might be any books of accounts, or other documents 
that might indicate stamp duty evasion.730 Again, the first observation is there 
was no parallel in the British Stamp Duty Act during the same period.731 Kemp 
created the concept to enforce the compulsory stamp duty obligation. The 
power of inspection aimed to decrease evasion and strengthen voluntary 
compliance.  
 
Lastly, Kemp applied the principle of splitting generally, to all chargeable 
instruments, and placed the onus of proof with the taxpayers.732 The intention of 
the law was to prevent taxpayers from dividing transactions into a series of 
smaller transactions so as to avoid the higher tax brackets. At that time, Britain 
only enforced the rule on receipts.733 Again, Kemp had departed from the stamp 
                                            
726 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 6. 
727 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39). 
728 Ibid ss 14–15. 
729 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 50. 
730 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 40. 
731 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39). 
732 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 10. 
733 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39), s 103(3); Per Joseph Kemp, Hong Kong Hansard 
14 April 1921, 30. 
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duty law of Britain and widened the application of the British splitting doctrine in 
Hong Kong to all relevant instruments. 
 
Contrasting the 1921 reform with the unsuccessful stamp duty amendments of 
1902, 734  it is found that Kemp’s formula of introducing novel instruments 
consistent with the stage of economic development was, in essence, similar to 
Robinson’s pioneering initiatives in 1894.735 Further, both Robinson and Kemp 
had pondered the maximum increment capacity that could be exploited with 
existing dutiable instruments even though they gauged by different yardsticks. 
The 1921 reform had clearly avoided the pitfall associated with doubling the 
duties across the board established by the 1902 stamp amendments executed 
by Blake.736 
 
Perhaps the most important lesson from the 1921 reform was to reaffirm the 
unparalleled importance of making fundamental prudent changes to the stamp 
duty mechanism to enhance revenue collection. Before 1921, the Hong Kong 
government had launched stamp duty changes in compliance with the 
aforementioned principles with good results737 but never in the history of Hong 
Kong stamp duty had an almost 100% increase in revenue been achieved 
within a year of implementation, as occurred following the 1921 reform. The 
landmark difference in the 1921 reform was that Kemp made stamp duty a 
compulsory tax. In effect, Kemp had transformed the stamp duty legislation into 
a penal statute. To support this he introduced various ground-breaking 
mechanisms.738 The fact that most of these mechanisms are still in use today739 
supports the assertion that Kemp’s work laid a foundation stone for stamp duty 
financial successes as well as system sustainability in subsequent years.740 
                                            
734 See section 3.3.6. 
735 See section 3.3.5. 
736 See section 3.3.6. 
737 See for example, the 1884 Hong Kong stamp duty reform, section 3.3.3. 
738 To support this landmark advancement, the concept of ‘jointly and severally liable’ on stamp 
duty payments, as well as the notion of not allowing unstamped documents to be admissible in 
civil proceedings and registration, were introduced. In addition the Collector of stamp duty was 
given the power to inspect premises.  
739 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981). 
740 The ensuing changes to the mechanisms are discussed under the section Sustainability in 
Chapter 4. See section 4.2. 
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3.3.8 Unwarranted exemption that caused revenue depletion 
The group of Stamp Duty Ordinances enacted before World War II confirmed 
that a predominant imperative of the Hong Kong government was to raise 
revenue, thus focusing on the issue of unwarranted exemptions which had the 
effect of substantially reducing revenue.  
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1885741 focused on the question 
of exemption specifically for military personnel. This was the starting point to 
demonstrate why it was ill-judged to create such a privileged class of stamp 
duty taxpayer in Hong Kong in the nineteenth century. The pitfall highlighted is 
still relevant today for policy makers contemplating stamp duty exemption 
policy.  
 
The Colonial Office instructed the Hong Kong government to exempt stamp 
duty on receipts given by the officers and soldiers stationed in Hong Kong for 
their salaries received from the British government.742 This was to assimilate the 
law of the colony to that of Britain in a similar situation.743  
 
First, the policy to exempt military personnel from stamp duty caused an 
unnecessary loss of revenue. In 1868, Governor MacDonnell wrote to the 
Colonial Office to express his discontent regarding the exemption of rates and 
taxes on houses occupied by British military personnel stationed in Hong Kong. 
This caused a heavy loss of revenue to the Hong Kong government.744 What 
MacDonnell had articulated on rates was pertinent to stamp duty.  
 
Second, the policy to exempt military personnel from local taxation was 
inadmissible as it effectuated a double depletion of the colonial government’s 
revenue. The British government had already demanded a direct military 
contribution from the Hong Kong government’s revenues to defray the 
remunerations of the military officers and soldiers. Thus it was considered 
                                            
741 No 2 of 1885. 
742 Letter from George Bowen to Edward Stanley (5 September 1884), CO129/217, 268. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Richard Grenville (19 October 1868), CO129/133, 69.  
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unreasonable for the British military personnel to be also exempted from Hong 
Kong tax thereby inducing another reduction in colonial revenue.745 
 
Third, it would cause a vicious cycle of provoking other taxpayer groups to 
demand similar favoured tax treatment and cause the unnecessary loss of 
revenue, as well as the double depletion of revenue. The proof to support this is 
found in the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1890.746 Essentially, the 
only change this measure introduced was to exempt Hong Kong civil servants 
from paying stamp duties on receipts given by them on salaries they received 
from the government. In his submission to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies on the amendment, Governor Sir William Des Voeux (in office 1887–
1891) remarked that similar stamp duties belonging to the army and navy had 
been expressly exempted and he found no correspondence showing why the 
exemption for civil servants had not been effected previously. Des Voeux 
consulted the Hong Kong Executive Council (which was made up of Hong Kong 
senior civil servants) on the matter; the Council’s opinion was that the 
exemption for the civil servants was accidentally omitted in the previous stamp 
duty legislation.747 It is clear, from the examination of Hong Kong stamp duty 
history in this study, that the omission was not accidental; it was not intended at 
all. An explicit example was MacDonnell’s refusal to grant stamp duty 
exemption on powers of attorney by civil servants for the receipt of their salaries 
by another person in 1868.748 The presence of a privileged class of taxpayers 
would hinder the Hong Kong Governor from maintaining social stability and 
seeking economic development. 749 Perhaps MacDonnell understood the 
undesirable effects of the presence of privileged classes of taxpayers. If 
MacDonnell were still in charge of Hong Kong in 1890, he would certainly have 
banned the 1890 amendment which depleted revenue unnecessarily and 
caused inequity.  
                                            
745 Ibid 71. 
746 No 14 of 1890. 
747 Letter from William Des Voeux to Henry Holland (12 August 1890), CO129/246, 144. 
748 This was a deduction made by comparing the original recommendation of the 1868 
Commission of enquiry to render the powers of attorney by civil servants for the receipt of their 
salaries by another person to be exempted with Governor MacDonnell’s final rejection of the 
notion, which was apparent from his subsequent announcement of the final 1868 Stamp Duty 
Bill. See Report of Commission on Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 (27 March 1868), 
CO129/131, 56–57; Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘1868 Stamp Duty Bill Read First Time’ 
(Hong Kong Government 9 May 1868). 
749 Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd 
edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 13–15. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 174 
3.3.9 Stamp duty law to capture tax revenue from capital gains 
A dominant financial imperative clearly underpinned the Hong Kong stamp duty 
reform immediately after the World War II. Following the Japanese occupation 
during 1941–1945, there was a severe revenue exigency to rebuild the colony. 
Governor Sir Mark Young (in office 1946–1947) appointed a Taxation 
Committee in 1946 to consider ‘what new sources of revenue are available for 
immediate utilisation’. 750  The 1946 Taxation Committee recommended the 
increment in the value of property to be assessed without suggesting how Hong 
Kong should go about implementing it.751 
 
The legislature responded by introducing the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1946.752 Preliminary examination of the 1946 legislation reveals that 
it levied a capital gains tax via the stamp duty mechanism. This broke the 
common present day belief that the colony had never imposed a capital gains 
tax in its revenue law history.753 
 
The examination of the 1946 stamp legislation provides answers as to why the 
government did not set up a separate capital gains tax system in Hong Kong. In 
addition, the analysis yields an answer as to whether the path adopted was 
successful. 
 
Turning to the design of the 1946 Stamp Amendment Ordinance, fourteen 
sections were added to the original 1921 Stamp Duty Ordinance754 to host the 
capital gains tax.  
 
                                            
750 Draft Report of The Taxation Committee of 1946 (Undated), CO129/593/3, 106. The actual 
report seems not to have survived till the present day. A draft of the report is retrieved from the 
aforementioned Colonial Office record. However, it is certain that Hong Kong had acted upon 
the report to make changes to its stamp duty law as it made representation that the 1946 Hong 
Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance was a result of the recommendation made by the Taxation 
Committee. See Hong Kong Hansard 17 October 1946, 168. 
751 Draft Report of The Taxation Committee of 1946 (Undated), CO129/593/3,107. The other 
recommendations were to levy a new tax on meals and liquors sold in hotels and restaurants, to 
increase the duty on imported liquor and tobacco and; to increase port dues, water charges and 
licence fees. 
752 No 22 of 1946. 
753 Michael Littlewood, ‘Hong Kong’s Once – And Future? – Capital Gains Tax’ (1998) 2(4) Asia 
Pacific Journal of Taxation, 7. 
754 The new sections were inserted as ss 5A(1) – 5A(14) to the principal Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance, No 8 of 1921. 
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In a nutshell, it stipulated that the 10% charged on the ‘excess consideration’ 
was in addition to the stamp duty already payable in respect of the conveyance 
on sale. 755  It described a complicated method to measure the ‘excess 
consideration’. In essence, stamp duty was levied on the difference between 
the consideration of the conveyance and the last consideration recorded after 1 
January 1938 in the Hong Kong Land Office.756 The stamp duty on capital gains 
was levied on the ‘new conveyance’ executed on or after 30 September 
1946.757 The black letter law did not mention whether only the first conveyance 
or all subsequent conveyances were subject to the additional duty. 
Contemporary research did not discuss this aspect of the law. 758 From the 
examination of a secondary source, the Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue reported in 1957 that excess stamp duty on ‘new conveyance’ was 
payable only once on the first conveyance after the war, so collections 
diminished over time.759 The Ordinance also allowed taxpayers to reduce tax 
liability by augmenting the base consideration with costs of improvement as well 
as the cost of restoring the property. The tax was borne by the seller. 
 
Certainly the government would have the option to introduce a separate capital 
gains tax system in the colony. Nonetheless, by analysing the historical 
background, it might not have been the best option for three reasons. First, the 
British Inland Revenue would not be able to supply Hong Kong with model 
capital gains tax legislation for adoption, as it was not then available.760 Second, 
Hong Kong needed the revenue in the near term. It lacked time to draft a brand 
new branch of revenue law as well as legislative time to submit the draft law to 
                                            
755 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 22 of 1946, s 2. 
756 Excess consideration was defined as the amount by which the value of the consideration for 
the property comprised in any new conveyance exceeds the value of the consideration 
previously attributable to such property. The value of consideration previously attributable shall 
be the last conveyance on sale after 1 January 1938 as recorded in the Hong Kong Registers of 
Land Office. If there was no record, the value of consideration previously attributable shall be 
deemed to be the value on the 1 January 1938 or the date when the property was first acquired 
from the Crown, whichever shall be the later date. See further: Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance, No 22 of 1946, s 2. 
757 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 22 of 1946, s 2. 
758 See Michael Littlewood, ‘Hong Kong’s Once – And Future? – Capital Gains Tax’ (1998) 2(4) 
Asia Pacific Journal of Taxation, 7. 
759 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1956–57’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1957), 19.  
760 Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2002), 215. 
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thorough discussion. Third, the government had no resources to set up an 
additional department to administer a separate branch of tax.    
 
These limitations led to the integration of capital gains tax into the existing 
stamp duty system. In 1946, the Hong Kong stamp duty collection and anti-
avoidance provisions were already time tested and needed no extensive 
remodelling to incorporate the new tax. In particular, the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system was proven to be successful in collecting estate duty before the 
provisions were repealed in 1921.761 No new set up costs for an additional 
department were required, as the Collector of Stamp Duty would be in charge of 
the collection.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that stamp duty could be used conveniently as a 
means by which to levy taxes that were in substance more aptly classified as 
other branches of the tax regime. Noticeably, death duty was also levied in 
Hong Kong as stamp duty on probates,762 until the establishment of estate duty 
legislation in 1915.763 In this case, the vehicle to impose stamp duty on capital 
gains was the conveyance on sale. 
 
Yet, the evidence collected suggests that the tax was not successful and was 
quickly repealed. After two years of the operation, the excess stamp duty on 
capital gains of 10% was repealed by the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1948764 and replaced with an excess stamp duty of 3% on the full 
transactional values of the conveyances in addition to the normal stamp duty.765 
The imposition of a stamp duty on the gross conveyance consideration was to 
preserve the original function of levying tax on capital appreciation. The reason 
articulated to effect the change was that the 1946 measures to ascertain the 
value of capital gains ‘proved complicated’ and ‘a cause for delay in practice’.766 
It showed that the failure was not attributable to the capacity of the stamp duty 
system to accommodate other forms of taxation. The failure was due to the lack 
                                            
761 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 31. 
762 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 22 of 1901, sch. Another example was an attempt to levy 
sales tax by using sales agreements as the collection instrument. See Letter from Reginald 
Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 205–206. 
763 Hong Kong Estate Duty Ordinance, No 16 of 1915. 
764 No 46 of 1948. 
765 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 46 of 1948, s 3. 
766 Hong Kong Hansard 25 August 1948, 245. 
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of legislative time to formulate a viable convenient formula to ascertain the 
capital gains. Eventually, the 3% excess duty on assignments was abolished by 
the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1969.767 It was repealed after 
twenty years in operation as the yield of the duty dwindled due to the 
diminished supply of unconveyanced pre-war property.768 
 
The introduction of Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1948769 led to the 
postulation of the theorem that Hong Kong stamp duty on the conveyance of 
property imposed on gross conveyance consideration fulfilled the function of a 
capital gains tax. In any event, if the duty rate was fixed for each conveyance 
document regardless of its transaction value, stamp duty was not compromised 
as a capital gains tax. This was not the case for Hong Kong stamp duty. 
 
In Hong Kong, the applicable rate was ad valorem. In this case, stamp duty on 
conveyances would comprise two components. It was the sum of the stamp 
duty imposed on the original purchase consideration plus stamp duty imposed 
on the capital gain (or less the amount equivalent to the rate of stamp duty 
applied to the capital loss).770 This may be presented in simple algebraic form 
as follows: 
 
RC = RP + R (C – P)771 
where: 
R = Stamp duty rate 
C = Conveyance consideration  
P = Seller’s purchase cost 
 
The foregoing formula yielded certain deductions which were tied to whether 
stamp duties were paid by the buyers, sellers or shared between buyers and 
sellers. 
 
                                            
767 No 17 of 1969. 
768 Per John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong Hansard 13 March 1969, 98. 
769 No 46 of 1948. 
770 Charles Kennedy, ‘Stamp Duties as a Capital Gains Tax’ (1955) 23(3) The Review of 
Economic Studies, 241. 
771 Ibid. 
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When only the seller paid the stamp duty, it was revealed that the seller would 
be subject to a capital gains tax equivalent to R(C–P). In the event that the 
property depreciated, the seller would not be penalised on the realised capital 
loss as a negative R(C–P) was generated to reduce the stamp duty payable. As 
such, this demonstrates that stamp duty could be regarded as a capital gains 
tax. This was the case when the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 
1948772 provided that the excess stamp duty of 3% would be levied on the value 
of the assignments and the liability to pay fell on the seller.773 
 
In all other cases, the Hong Kong practice followed the British precedent in 
which it was customary for the buyer to settle the stamp duty.774 When only the 
buyers paid the stamp duty,775 it was revealed that they settled the portion of 
stamp duty gains R(C–P) for the previous owners or they inherited the benefits 
of the losses R(C–P). It was not plausible to argue that buyers were subject to 
capital gains tax, as their purchasing decisions did not give rise to any capital 
gains or losses realised by them. The analysis shows that stamp duty was not a 
payment of capital gains tax from the buyers’ perspective. 
 
Nonetheless, it can also be recalled that Kemp introduced the concept of ‘jointly 
and severally liable’ in 1921, to apply to stamp duty for instruments that involved 
two or more parties, to pre-empt evasion.776 Following the discussion to this 
point, when the sellers and the buyers shared the stamp duty on conveyances, 
it was a quasi-capital gains tax disguised as stamp duty with the sellers’ portion 
justly admitted as a capital gains tax in nature. 
 
The foregoing discussion examined the connection of stamp duty and capital 
gains tax on immovable properties that were purchased for long-term capital 
investment purposes. It is submitted that the explored concepts were equally 
applicable in the event that such properties were purchased for short-term 
investment purposes.777 In that event, it can be argued that the Hong Kong 
                                            
772 No 46 of 1948. 
773 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 22 of 1946, s 9. 
774 See section 3.3.7. 
775 In the present day, there is an unwritten convention in Hong Kong that the buyer will bear the 
stamp duty on conveyances of sale. 
776 See section 3.3.7. 
777 Presently, the Hong Kong Inland Revenue Department adopted the six badges of trade as 
arrived at by the United Kingdom Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income in 
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stamp duty system was in effect collecting income tax in certain instances when 
the sellers were liable to pay stamp duty. 
 
It is further submitted the concepts discussed above are equally applicable to 
stamp duties imposed on Hong Kong share transactions. 
 
3.3.10 The merit of third party collection mechanism 
The financial imperative continued as the major driving force behind 
developments in the Hong Kong stamp duty regime in the 100 years following 
the introduction of stamp duty in the 1860s. Financial Secretary Arthur Clark (in 
office 1952–1961) forecasted a severe budget deficit for fiscal year 1961/62 of 
HK$194 million.778 Clark proposed to borrow and at the same time raise some 
extra revenue by additional charges and taxation. One of the proposals was to 
raise an additional HK$2.5 million from stamp duty through third party collection. 
 
The 1961 budget deficit was mainly triggered by financial commitments to 
essential public works such as improvement to water supplies, airport 
expansion, 779  roads and tunnels work, 780  hospital construction 781  and public 
housing development.782 In particular, water projects took up around HK$110 
million, that is, around 13% of the estimated total 1961/62 revenue of HK$878 
million. These water undertakings were pressing as emphasised by Governor 
Sir Robert Black (in office 1958–1964) in 1961: ‘In recent years, we have all had 
much to say about that important adjunct to our economic existence as well as 
to our domestic comfort, namely, water.’783 
                                                                                                                                
1955 to distinguish revenue receipts from capital receipts. See Patrick K W Ho, Hong Kong 
Taxation and Tax Planning (14th edn, Hong Kong, Pilot Publishing Company Ltd 2015), 191. 
778 Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1961, 43. 
779 This relates to the construction of the airport terminal building for Kai Tak Airport. 
780 This relates to the construction of the Lion Rock Tunnel. 
781 This relates to the construction of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. 
782 Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1961, 42. 
783 Ibid 25. See also K W Chau, ‘Management of Limited Water Resources in Hong Kong’ 
(1993) 9(1) International Journal of Water Resources Development, 65. Water rationing was a 
constant reality for Hong Kong residents during that era, occurring on average more than 300 
days per year. The worst crisis occurred in 1963–64 when water was delivered only every 4 
days for 4 hours each time. In the 1960s, Hong Kong embarked on a three-pronged approach to 
supply water to an increasing population. The strategy involved seawater flushing, the 
construction of larger freshwater reservoirs in bays that used to be covered by the sea, and 
water imports from Mainland China. See also Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1961, 42, HK$110 
million was spent in 1961/62 to construct the Shek Pik Reservoir, and Plover Cove Reservoir 
with its main dam being one of the largest in the world at the time of its construction, plus many 
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The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1961 784  comprised partial 
amendments to stamp duty structures to enhance revenue. It made hire 
purchase agreements assessable for stamp duty with a fixed rate of HK$5. In 
addition, bank notes duty was also increased from 1% to 1.5% per annum on 
the average value of bank notes in circulation. Further the duty on agreements 
other than hire purchase was increased from HK$1 to HK$3. 785 
 
By analysing the financial outcome of the new law, the core provision that 
contributed most to the pre-set revenue objective of HK$2.5 million was the 
increased duty on share contract notes from 0.1% to 0.2%, as illustrated 
below:786 
 
Table 3.4: Analysis of stamp duty collections for contract notes – two years to 31 
March 1962 
Type of document 31 March 1961 
(HK$) 
31 March 1962 
(HK$) 
Increase (HK$) Increase (%) 
Contract Notes 3,374,472 6,098,843 2,724,371  80.7%  
 
The years 1961 and 1962 provided a suitable platform for comparison, as the 
Hong Kong economy was buoyant in both fiscal years with a high level of land 
sales and share trading.787 Contract note revenue increased markedly by 80.7% 
during the first year of operation of the 1961 stamp amendment legislation. This 
alone met the government objective for the 1961 stamp amendment. 
 
Through the review of the law governing the stamp duty on contract notes, it 
can be concluded there were two cornerstones to the financial accomplishment.  
 
                                                                                                                                
other water projects. Even with the water imports from Mainland China from the 1960s, Hong 
Kong did not stop embarking on water projects in the 60s, 70s and 80s as the government 
feared that China might exercise the ‘water weapon’ in its relationship with Hong Kong. 
784 No 16 of 1961. 
785 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1961–62’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1962), 15. 
786 Ibid 27. 
787 Ibid 3. 
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First, the tax incidence was on asset goods.788 Asset goods were able to deliver 
a short-term speculative yield or long-term capital gains. As such, taxpayers 
would be more co-operative in paying the related stamp duties in anticipation of 
future gains to offset the stamp duties paid. 
 
Second, and more significantly, with the concept of compulsory payment and 
the third party collection mechanism already in place for contract notes since 
the 1921 stamp duty reform, the revenue loss associated with the programme to 
increase revenue with a substantial upsurge in duty rates, 789  could be 
controlled. The compulsory stamp duty on public share dealings was collected 
by stock agencies and rendered defaults by the seller and buyers 
implausible.790 
3.3.11 Financial disappointment on significant stamp duty increase on asset goods  
Another major financial imperative making necessary changes to the stamp 
duty legislation occurred in the early 1970s. During the fiscal year 1973/74, the 
Hong Kong government aimed to create a more equitable and less 
cumbersome Hong Kong tax system by granting substantial income tax relief. 
Further, the government abolished the heavy oil tax in order to reduce electricity 
charges, put an end to the tax on table water to stabilise the price of this non-
alcoholic beverage and abolished the tax on admission charges to cinemas.791 
All these measures gave rise to a compelling financial imperative to fill the 
resultant revenue gap. The introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
1973 792  facilitated the principal objective of revenue raising by significantly 
increasing the stamp duty rates levied on asset goods.  
 
                                            
788 Asset goods are items that are purchased for their potential to change price rather than 
purchased for consumption. See George Cooper, The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, 
Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy (Petersfield, Harriman House 2008), 101. 
789 See section 3.3.7. 
790 See Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 26; Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 
of 1921, sch. The stamp duty legislation provided that the stock agencies add stamp duty to 
their brokerage fees and collect the stamp duty from the transferors as well as the transferees. 
The brokers were the persons liable for the compulsory stamping of the contract notes before 
the execution of the documents. The stamp duty legislation specified clearly that the 
government could deny any legal claims to the brokerage fees with reference to the sale or 
purchase of shares if the broker failed to comply. 
791 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1973, 487–89. 
792 No 41 of 1973. 
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In order to compensate for the substantial revenue foregone, the government 
doubled793 the ad valorem stamp duty on contract notes, transfers of shares 
and marketable securities.794 This section provides an analysis relating to the 
selection of contract notes duty in 1973 as the only instrument to fill the revenue 
gap. In the search for justification, the general characteristics of stamp duty, as 
well as the specific characteristics of contract notes stamp duty from the fiscal 
perspective, are illuminated. This section explains why the stamp duty 
amendment failed from the financial standpoint, even though a similar exercise 
succeeded in 1961,795 and also explains adherence to the tenet of selecting 
instruments for duty increments matching economic circumstances, as 
proposed by Robinson796 and Kemp.797 
 
Financial Secretary Haddon-Cave (in office 1971–1981) specified restoring the 
balance between direct and indirect taxation as the sole reason for making up 
all the revenue losses by increasing stamp duty on share transactions only. He 
mentioned there was a case for ‘raising additional revenue from one of our main 
instruments of indirect taxation, the Stamp Ordinance, so as to restore the 
balance between direct and indirect taxation.’ He gave no further explanation 
for wanting to restore the balance other than this was ‘a fair way of creaming off 
something extra’ from the active stock investors.798   
 
From an economic perspective, the shift from direct to indirect taxation had a 
positive impact on employment. The merit of the tax shift was linked to the 
possibility of spreading the taxation burden across a wider number of taxpayers 
under stamp duty, thus reducing the direct tax burden on salary earners paying 
income tax.799 
 
                                            
793 From HK20¢ to for every HK$100 to HK$4 for every HK$1,000. See Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance, No 41 of 1973, s 12(d). 
794 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 41 of 1973, s 12 (d). 
795 See section 3.3.10. 
796 See section 3.3.5. 
797 See section 3.3.7. 
798 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1973, 489–90. 
799 European Commission Services, ‘Macroeconomic Effects of a Shift from Direct to Indirect 
Taxation: A Simulation for 15 EU Member States’ (72nd Meeting of the OECD Working Party 
No 2 on Tax Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics, 14–16 November 2006). This provides general 
modern views of the economic effects of shifting from direct to indirect taxation. 
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Analysing the prevailing circumstance yields three reasons why Haddon-Cave 
chose to double the stamp duty rate for share transactions to make up for the 
revenue foregone.  
 
First, were the factors discussed in section 3.3.10 about the taxpayers’ 
willingness to co-operate in paying the stamp duties on asset goods as well as 
the utilisation of the third party collection system.  
 
Second, the investigation demonstrates that the government was able to shift 
the majority of the stamp duty administration and collection cost associated with 
public stock dealings to the stock exchanges via its Stamp Ordinance. The cost 
to the Stamp Office was only the engagement of tax inspectors to audit the work 
of the stock exchanges. This might not have been achievable if Haddon-Cave 
had chosen other revenue sources. Strong evidence to support this assertion 
can be found in Haddon-Cave’s 1974/75 budget debate when he refused to 
abolish stamp duty on cheques which was collected by banks. He said: ‘I can 
understand the bank’s desire to abolish this duty because they do virtually all 
the work involved in its administration but I don’t think they find it particularly 
difficult.’800 Further, when advocating the benefits of repealing most heads of 
charge in 1978, he disclosed that the administrative cost of stamp duty 
collection to the private sector could be substantial.801  
 
Third, reviewing the economic environment suggests the transformation of the 
Hong Kong economy in the 1970s paved the way for Haddon-Cave’s plan. 
Hong Kong moved away from its dependence on light industry and shifted 
towards the property market, stock market and financial services. In the 
1972/73 fiscal year, spectacular turnovers on the Hong Kong stock exchanges 
produced a phenomenal and unprecedented HK$500 million in contract notes 
stamp duty as compared to HK$91 million in the 1971/72 fiscal year. 802 
Moreover, the HK$500 million in stamp duties collected from contract notes was 
70% of the total stamp duties collected in fiscal 1972/73 of HK$713 million803 
                                            
800 Hong Kong Hansard 28 March 1973, 649. 
801 Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1978, 556. 
802 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1972–73’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1973), 40. 
803 Ibid 4. 
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and 26% of the total revenue of HK$1,933 million. 804  The fundamental 
economic transformation, the buoyant economic conditions together with the 
heavy weighting of contract notes stamp duty within the stamp duty system, 
provided a perfect platform to grant generous tax relief in other areas and 
concentrate on deriving revenue from contract notes stamp duty. The unofficial 
members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council as well as the stock exchanges 
did not register any opposition when Haddon-Cave piloted the double increment 
of duty. 
 
Nonetheless, the doubling exercise was unsuccessful. Haddon-Cave estimated 
the extra yield from a doubling of the rate of stamp duty levied on contract notes 
would be HK$300 million on the basis of his ‘possible conservative forecast of 
turnover next year (1973/74)’ and that would ‘more than offset the cost of tax 
reforms and reliefs’ he had proposed.805 The actual result was that no extra 
yield was forthcoming. The stamp duty on contact notes dropped from HK$500 
million (1972/73) to HK$ 248 million (1973/74). This was attributable to the 
stock market crash toward the end of 1973 after reaching an all-time high on 9 
March 1973.806 Haddon-Cave said: ‘Wrong I was, but naturally the fault was not 
mine!’807 
 
The collected evidence shows that it was not prudent to initiate policies that 
depended solely on incremental stamp duties on asset goods for revenue, 
when the related asset-prices had already risen significantly to an all-time high. 
There was a consequent risk that the asset goods market bubble would burst 
during a period of herd behaviour in the asset goods market. The avoidance of 
such policy initiatives would prevent an acutely unfavourable budget variance 
similar to that experienced as a consequence of the 1973/74 Hong Kong 
budget. 
                                            
804 Ibid. 
805 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1973, 490. 
806 Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd, ‘A Glimpse of the Past’ 
<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/exchange/corpinfo/history/documents/hkex-01e.pdf> accessed 
12 May 2015. 
807 Hong Kong Hansard 27 February 1974, 559. 
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3.3.12 Financial accomplishment on significant stamp duty increase on asset goods 
The phenomenal 1973 Hong Kong stock market crash when the Hong Kong 
Hang Seng index fell from 1,800 points to 300 points in a few months caused a 
serious financial burden to the Hong Kong government. The injurious effects to 
trade and commerce significantly decreased revenue yield from income tax. 
Further, it was unavoidable that stamp duty revenue from stocks fell in step with 
the stock market free fall.   
 
The financial imperative that arose in the context of the continued economic 
downturn following the 1973 stock market crash drove the government to 
increase stamp duties for various instruments from fiscal 1974/75 to 1976/77 to 
assist in yielding extra revenue.808  
 
In particular, the government introduced two Stamp Amendment Ordinances to 
increase the duty on conveyances on sale from 2% to 2.25% in 1975 and from 
2.25% to 2.75% in 1976. 809 They were successful financially. 
 
This needs to be contrasted with the 1973/74 fiscal failure of doubling duty on 
share contract notes in a search for guiding principles to determine how to 
make use of asset goods-related instruments to yield extra revenue. 
 
The government did not provide any reasons for earmarking conveyances on 
sale to ease financial exigency other than the ‘time has now arrived’ to make up 
the loss of revenue from the abolition of 3% excess duty on conveyances of 
sale in 1969.810 An interpretation of the prevailing circumstances suggests that 
the revival of the property market during 1975811 was a major factor considered 
in the decision.  
 
                                            
808 See Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 27 of 1975, s 2. They were cheques, 
traveller cheques, cashier orders and dividend warrants. Stamp duties on these instruments 
were collected by financial intermediaries before effecting the services and rendered avoidance 
associated with tax rates increase exercise difficult. 
809 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 34 of 1975, s 3; Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance, No 33 of 1976, s 4. 
810 Hong Kong Hansard 26 February 1975, 501; Hong Kong Hansard 25 February 1976, 557. 
811 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1975–76’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1976), 22. 
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The measure was a financial accomplishment as the actual results met the 
predicted extra revenue yield812 and the total stamp duty yield on conveyances 
on sale was HK$183,533,968 in the 1976/77 fiscal year, more than double the 
figure of HK$79,521,126 in fiscal 1974/75.813 
 
It was in this context that a simple principle emerged. In order to be successful 
in achieving a financial objective, additional stamp duty was best imposed on 
asset goods that were in a recovery market. Sensibly, stamp revenue then had 
a greater chance to succeed, with the probable higher transaction frequency 
and elevated prices. It should be contrasted with the earlier financial failure 
occasioned by imposing additional stamp duty on stock contact notes at a time 
when the market had peaked. Retrospectively, the historical lesson might sound 
rudimentary, but even a seasoned financial administrator such as Haddon-Cave 
once fell into the trap. 
3.3.13 Was financial imperative the most influential driver for Hong Kong stamp 
duty development? 
The analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty history reveals that the most powerful 
imperative that drove the development of stamp duty law was the need for 
revenue. Three principal reasons stand out.   
 
First, the investigation outlined in section 3.3 highlights the large number of 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinances implemented with explicit or implied objectives to 
pursue revenue in the period 1867 to 1977. During this 110 year period, other 
Hong Kong stamp duty legalisation was promulgated for purposes having a 
non-revenue focus (and which are considered below) though these numbered 
far less than initiatives linked to a financial imperative. An analysis of the stamp 
duty law promulgated during the last 20 years of British rule (ie 1978 to 1997) 
shows that the former dominant financial imperative influencing the stamp duty 
system gave way to other emerging imperatives.814 Indeed, no stamp duty laws 
were promulgated during the last 20 years of British rule, for the sole purpose of 
revenue raising. This might be attributable to the significant growth in Hong 
                                            
812 Per Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 25 February 1976, 557. 
813 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1976–77’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1977), 22. 
814 See below section 3.4.5; section 3.4.6; section 3.4.7; section 3.5.3; section 3.5.4. 
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Kong’s economy after 1977, 815  generating a stable source of tax revenue. 
Another possible reason was that the colonial government refrained from 
making substantive changes to the stamp duty system for revenue purposes 
during the politically sensitive period before the reversion of sovereignty. 
Notwithstanding these discoveries, it is notable that the financial imperatives 
remained the most powerful in shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty system in its 
130 years of development under British rule.  
  
Second, the examination of stamp duty history demonstrates that the Hong 
Kong government adopted many British stamp duty laws and tenets in 
response to financial imperatives. It had also designed many significant ground-
breaking stamp duty regulations of its own, such as making stamp duty 
payments compulsory, rather than voluntary, to enhance stamp duty revenue 
yield to meet financial exigencies. Some of these Hong Kong rules were ahead 
of Britain at the time of their introduction.  
 
Third, most of these rules are still retained in the current Hong Kong stamp duty 
system. Thus, it is aptly interpreted that the financial imperative was the 
principal driving force that shaped the Hong Kong stamp duty system.  
3.4 Social imperatives 
The analysis of Hong Kong Stamp duty history presented above emphatically 
demonstrates that the fundamental driver of reform and change that shaped the 
Hong Kong stamp duty law was the financial imperative to relieve the colony’s 
various and successive fiscal exigencies. Revenue generation was by far the 
most important factor and underlay most reforms and amendments to the Hong 
Kong stamp duty law. This section continues to assess whether there were 
other important imperatives that moulded the form and nature of the stamp duty 
law. It explores the extent to which social changes, as well as the demand for 
social welfare policies, were also primary drivers for stamp duty reforms and 
amendments. After establishing the social imperatives that shaped the stamp 
duty law, this section assesses the relative success of the measures 
implemented by the Hong Kong government to fulfil these social demands.  
                                            
815 See generally Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2004), 175–79. 
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3.4.1 The issue of mui-tsai   
It has been seen that the government of Hong Kong was not committed to 
providing welfare or promoting social policies in the nineteenth century, and that 
this lack of interest had a consequential influence on stamp duty legislation.816 
 
There is some evidence, however, that there was one clear attempt by the 
Hong Kong government to deal with social issues via the stamp duty system in 
1884. Certainly, the major, if unacknowledged, objective of the 1884 reform was 
to collect additional revenue. 817  Nevertheless, it had a secondary less 
discernible social objective.  
 
There was an issue of mui-tsai – ‘little sisters’. In the nineteenth century, many 
Chinese girls and women in Hong Kong were mui-tsai who had been sold to 
wealthier families through an intermediary known as a pocket mother. This 
practice helped poor families find better homes for their daughters, while 
providing domestic help for wealthier families. In October 1879, Hong Kong 
Chief Justice Sir John Smale (in office 1866–1881) condemned the mui-tsai 
practice as violating British as well as Hong Kong law prohibiting slavery. 
Smale’s attack caused a stir among the Chinese community. They felt that 
Smale had unnecessarily condemned a time-honoured Chinese custom.818 To 
the Chinese, mui-tsai were half servant, half family member. Also, there was a 
powerful custom that required the master to find a husband for the servant girl 
when she was of age, and the moment she was married she was free forever. 
This distinguished the practice from slavery.819 To the British, it was unnatural 
that young girls should be sold into domestic servitude and they wanted to stop 
the practice. However due to immense pressure from the wealthy Chinese 
community, the Colonial Office decided that the only thing necessary was to 
ensure that mui-tsai were not being sold into prostitution and passed an 
Ordinance to this effect in 1887.820 
 
                                            
816 See section 2.2.3. 
817 See section 3.3.3. 
818 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 58–60. 
819 Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Domestic Servitude in Hong Kong, Government 
Notification No 28’ (Hong Kong Government 4 February 1880). 
820 An Ordinance for the better protection of young girls, No 9 of 1887. 
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All the newly added chargeable instruments in the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1884 were found in the British Stamp Act 1870821 except for the 
servant security bonds.822 Servant security bonds were instruments peculiar to 
Hong Kong. It was specified under the head of servant security bonds that 
stamp duty would be levied on instruments entered into by domestic servants 
wherein they gave a security for the due discharge of their duties. While this 
was probably enacted for revenue purposes, from another perspective, the 
application of tax provisions to domestic servants, defining them by reference to 
the need for servants to give a security, distinguished the profession from the 
controversial Chinese mui-tsai domestic servitude. Unlike mui-tsai whose rights 
were permanently transferred for a payment, domestic servants were under an 
employment contract for a fixed period of time. The stamp duty law reinforced 
the British view that mui-tsai were illegal and should not be recognised by the 
Hong Kong government. The education effect emanating from the stamp duty 
law was not great. The Chinese subsequently protested vehemently when 
Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1922, made the 
order to terminate the mui-tsai practice in Hong Kong around forty years from 
the promulgation of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1884.823 
3.4.2 Opium 
At the turn of the twentieth century, there is evidence demonstrating that social 
changes occurring in China materially affected the progression of the Hong 
Kong stamp duty regime.  
 
In 1906, Emperor Kwang Hsu of the Imperial Qing Court set about reform, 
issuing an edict requiring all his subjects within China to quit opium smoking. 
The Emperor gave his people ten years from 1907 to break the habit.824 Kwang 
Hsu wanted to end the evil of the opium trade. This edict was similar in principle 
to the edict issued by Emperor Dao Guang of the Imperial Qing Court to end the 
opium trade in 1838, which triggered the First Opium War and the cession of 
Hong Kong.825 In 1906, the British response was very different from seventy 
                                            
821 33 & 34 Vict c 97. 
822 See Appendix I. 
823 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 395–96. 
824 Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–1919: Years of Discretion (Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong University Press 1975), 100. 
825 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 14–16. 
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years before. The British and the Qing governments concluded that Britain 
would reduce the export of raw opium to China by one-tenth annually beginning 
on 1 January 1908 so that the opium trade would cease automatically on 31 
December 1917. This result was in line with the vote of the British House of 
Commons in 1891, condemning the opium trade. At the same time, the British 
government’s wish was made very clear to the Hong Kong government via a 
telegram on 6 May 1908, instructing that public opium smoking would no longer 
be countenanced in Hong Kong. All opium divans in the colony had to be closed 
by 1910.826 
 
In light of the new opium policy, inevitably the Hong Kong government’s 
revenue would be reduced in gradual steps until the opium trade with China 
ceased in 1917. The fiscal impact on the Hong Kong government was 
substantial. To illustrate, opium-related revenue was HK$2,041,990 and 
HK$1,551,930 in the years 1906 and 1907 respectively, representing 40.9% 
and 32.8%, respectively, of the annual income of the Hong Kong 
government.827 
 
In 1909, raising revenue to restore the fiscal balance was the main task of 
Governor Sir Frederick Lugard (in office 1907–1912). Before 1909, most of the 
Hong Kong Governors made use of stamp duty to ease financial imperatives. 
Unlike them, Lugard focused on other possible revenue sources. The 
investigation looks into how the associated social factors prevented Lugard 
from relying on stamp duty exclusively. 
 
The historical evidence suggests that a comprehensive stamp duty increment 
was shunned in 1909 to preserve the sustainability of the stamp duty system. 
Most of the prescribed stamp duty rates were already at their saturation points 
in 1909 and any further increase would have been socially undesirable. It was 
not possible for the Governor to effect a comprehensive increment to all heads 
of charge even during the severe 1909 revenue exigencies as the tax rates had 
previously been doubled or trebled as recently as 1902. In any case, there was 
                                            
826 Hong Kong Hansard 24 September 1908, 116; Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–
1919: Years of Discretion (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1975), 100. 
827 Hong Kong Government, ‘Hong Kong Blue Book 1907’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1908), c6. 
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no point in doing so, as a similar exercise in 1902 was proven a fiscal failure. 828 
If the stamp duty rates were to be augmented across the board again, there 
would be a chance that the successful duty might fail. The resulting 
unreasonable rates could lead to deliberate tax evasion as more taxpayers 
began to show little respect for the stamp duty system. More alarmingly, any 
further increase could trigger taxpayer discontent and threaten social unrest. 
Similarly, Lugard was prevented from increasing property rates in the colony, 
hitherto the only other form of taxation. Murray Stewart, a Legislative Council 
unofficial member, warned the colonial government after the announcement of 
the British government’s decision to curtail opium traffic: ‘We believe that to 
raise the rates on property at the present time would be little short of 
disastrous.’ 
 
Following the development of the 1909 social constraints to inhibit the use of 
stamp duty to substantially enhance revenue, Lugard needed to search for 
another viable form of taxation to restore fiscal balance and to prevent further 
over-loading the stamp duty system. Lugard introduced import duties on liquors 
in 1909.829 It will be recalled that a proposal for liquor duties in 1846 led to 
vehement protests from the business community on the basis that import duties 
would be contrary to the proclamation of Hong Kong as a free port. The incident 
facilitated the introduction of stamp duty in Hong Kong.830 Sixty years after that 
disapproval of import duties in Hong Kong, the perceived saturation of stamp 
duty rates in turn facilitated the establishment of an import duties system in 
Hong Kong. After liquors, the colonial government added tobaccos and 
perfumes to the import duties system as a substitute for opium revenue. 
 
Lugard, however, did look to the stamp duty.831 He introduced the Hong Kong 
Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1909832 with the sole object of increasing stamp 
duty revenue. 833  These were partial amendments made to the stamp duty 
structure as well as the mechanism. His aim for the Ordinance was to ‘ensure a 
more complete and thorough collection’ which would bring ‘stamp duty 
                                            
828 See section 3.3.6. 
829 Hong Kong Hansard 10 September 1909, 94. 
830 See section 2.1.1. 
831 See section 3.3.4. 
832 No 19 of 1909.  
833 Letter from Frederick Lugard to Robert Crewe-Milnes (18 July 1909), CO129/357, 119. 
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collection up to the same total’ as the previous year owing to his prediction that 
there would be depressed trade as a result of the decrease in opium traffic.834 
He did not aim to exceed the previous year’s collection, due to social 
constraints. 
 
The change in the social attitude towards the opium trade continued to have an 
impact on the progression of Hong Kong stamp duty development. It is 
submitted that the British government’s determination to curtail the opium trade 
was the key social imperative that triggered financial exigency, ultimately 
leading to the introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 
1921.835  
3.4.3 Inter-war period 
The inter-war period saw a greater interest in social legislation and welfare 
because of similar developments in Britain where laissez-faire economics was 
losing ground to the welfare state ideal.836 Still, Hong Kong was far from being a 
welfare state at any moment during Britain’s rule. ‘Even at its mightiest’, wrote 
historian David Faure, ‘Britain had no social policy on Hong Kong as such.’837 
The review of stamp duty history during this period indicates the attitudes of the 
British officials in Hong Kong were nevertheless influenced by developments in 
Britain and they tried to take a more active role in relieving hardship. Some of 
the minor partial stamp duty amendments after 1921 reflected this stage of 
social development in Hong Kong. An example was the promulgation of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1929838 which relieved hardship by 
lowering the tax rates for instruments of apprenticeship, surrender of leases and 
so on.839 
3.4.4 British Military Administration’s pragmatic stamp duty proclamation 
The demand for social stability immediately after the World War II to permit the 
British government to retain control of Hong Kong had significant influence on 
                                            
834 Hong Kong Hansard 24 September 1908, 124. 
835 See section 3.3.6. 
836 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 107. 
837 David Faure, A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 1997), 1. 
838 No 26 of 1929. 
839 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 26 of 1929, ss 7–12; Letter from Cecil 
Clementi to Sidney Webb (23 December 1929), CO129/522, 15–17. 
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Hong Kong’s stamp duty policies. This social imperative was not expressed but 
the investigation of the historical circumstances surrounding the promulgation of 
the stamp duty law immediately after the World War II implies its presence.   
 
The Japanese occupied Hong Kong during 1941–1945. Immediately after the 
British re-occupation in 1945, the straightforward change was to repeal the 
Japanese stamp duty system completely and to re-establish the British Hong 
Kong stamp duty regulation.840 Further the British Military Administration (BMA) 
also issued a special stamp duty proclamation.  
 
This section examines the social reasons why the Hong Kong government did 
not retain any of the Japanese stamp duty regulations. 841  It also critically 
reviews the proclamation to identify the hidden social objective it was seeking. 
In the process, this section provides an interpretation as to whether the 
proclamation on stamp duty was successful in meeting its pre-determined 
objective. 
 
An appraisal of the associated circumstances identifies the reasons why the 
Japanese stamp duty system was discarded completely. Initially, this was 
probably due to the relatively short period of military occupation.842 Another 
reason was the British revenue structure was likely to be superior to the 
Japanese system. The evidence to support this assertion is General Douglas 
MacArthur’s843 1947 observation of the Japanese tax system as largely arbitrary 
and inefficient.844 In any event, to prevent further blemish to the pride of the 
                                            
840 By virtue of the British Military Administration of Hong Kong Proclamation No 1, 1 September 
1945, the Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance, No 35 of 1911 and Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921 were reinstated. 
841 Gunseika no Honkon 香港占領地總督部報道部, Shinseisita Dai Tōa no Chūkaku軍政下の香
港: 新生した大東亞の中核 [Hong Kong under Japanese Military Administration] (Honkon 
Senryōchi Sōtokubu Hōdōbu Kanshū ed, Honkon, Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha 1944), 194. From 
the military records written in Japanese, it was revealed that the stamp duty system adopted by 
the Japanese military government in Hong Kong was based on the Japanese stamp duty law 
issued during Showa 17 (1942). The tax was levied on certificates and written statements with 
tax rates similar to those imposed by the Japanese government in Japan. 
842 This can be compared to the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 in which 
pre-World War II Japanese law retained influence even during modern times in Taiwan. See Fa 
Lo Chang, The Legal Culture and System of Taiwan (The Netherlands, Kluwer Law 
International 2006), 3. 
843 The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers stationed in Tokyo. 
844  General Douglas MacArthur was of the opinion the entire Japanese tax system was 
incompetent, and in order to ensure that Japan became a great democratic power in a few 
decades, it was necessary to create and operate a sound tax system for Japanese purposes. 
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British Empire, the British would not permit the use of Japanese law in their 
overseas territories.845 
 
Despite revoking the Japanese revenue system, the BMA proclaimed that since 
the Japanese military government imposed stamp duty in Hong Kong during the 
occupation, it would be inequitable to charge stamp duty again on those 
assignments executed by the Japanese Registration Office, where fresh 
registrations were necessary under the British forms and language following the 
re-occupation. In other words, property transactions executed by the enemy’s 
registration office and the related stamp duties duly paid to the enemy’s 
administration, would be respected.846 
 
An investigation into the stamp duty policy reveals that restoring equity might 
not be the only reason for its enactment. There were other unarticulated social 
reasons behind the formulation of the policy. The British re-occupation of Hong 
Kong was not without serious challenge. The Hong Kong Chinese residents 
were in doubt as to the legitimacy of the continued British rule in the wake of the 
rise of Chinese nationalism as well as the Japanese humiliation of the British 
Empire by defeating it totally in Asia. These factors gave rise to anti-British riots 
in 1945.847 The Chinese Kuomintang government was constantly looking for 
justification to recapture Hong Kong.848 The United States, the leader of the 
Allied power, was anti-colonial by tradition and advocated that Hong Kong 
should be returned to the Chinese Kuomintang government.849 Civil unrest in 
Hong Kong would be a good cause for reversion of sovereignty. 
 
                                                                                                                                
Accordingly, MacArthur brought in a tax mission in 1948 led by Carl S Shoup, Professor 
Emeritus of Columbia University, to review the Japanese tax system. The mission 
recommended the Japanese government to repeal its stamp duty system. See Carl S Shoup, 
‘The Tax Mission to Japan’ in Malcolm Gills (ed), Tax Reforms in Developing Countries 
(Durham, Duke University Press 1989), 177.  
845 British Military Administration of Hong Kong Proclamation No 1, 1 September 1945, Article 4. 
All proclamations, enactments and orders made by the sanction of any Japanese authority 
during the period of Japanese occupation, were abolished except where revived by the British 
Military Administration. 
846 British Military Administration of Hong Kong Proclamation No 1, 1 September 1945, Article 
3(B). 
847 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2004), 142. 
848 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 129. 
849 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 180. 
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The analysis of Hong Kong’s prevailing civil conditions justified the BMA’s 
stamp duty proclamation to avert further resentment from the Chinese 
inhabitants as well as to re-build their confidence in the colonial administration. 
This was to promote stability to ensure Britain could retain control of Hong 
Kong. The BMA’s pragmatism as displayed on stamp duty policy formulation 
contributed to the speedy850 recovery of Hong Kong.  
3.4.5 Stamp duty policy to encourage entry level private home ownerships  
It can be recalled that the primary objective of the 1866 introduction of stamp 
duty to Hong Kong was to enhance revenue but also with an expressed 
secondary objective to improve living standards.851 It took one hundred years of 
development for another commendable social engineering objective to emerge 
in Hong Kong and in consequence, sculpted the stamp duty legislation. This 
time, the social imperative took centre stage and became the primary impetus 
for the stamp duty development.  
 
Investigation of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1967852 reveals 
that its sole objective was to encourage private home ownership. This section 
reviews the reasons behind the policy implementation, and the consequent 
examination exposes why the British stamp duty tenet under similar 
circumstances was not followed, and what lessons were learned. In addition, 
the section deal with whether the stamp duty policy promulgated was fruitful in 
advancing the pre-determined social objective. Lastly, it reveals that the 
implementation of the 1967 stamp policy engendered certain undesirable 
complications that survived until the present day, becoming entrenched in the 
system even when the original historical reason for their existence had been 
invalidated. 
 
The method prescribed by Financial Secretary John Cowperthwaite (in office 
1961–1971) to achieve the pre-determined social objective was to give stamp 
duty concessions to ‘cheaper kind of flats to which ordinary citizen can 
                                            
850 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 129. By early 1946 trade had returned to 60% of its pre-war level and civil government 
was restored on 1 May 1946, just eight months after the Japanese surrendered. 
851 See section 2.1.2. 
852 No 28 of 1967. 
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aspire’. 853  In the process, the law had the perceived effect of encouraging 
private developers to provide housing within the means of the ordinary 
people. 854  With the increase in homeowners and the supply of entry-level 
private flats, the government visualised stabilisation of residential rental values. 
The policy aimed to solve the social problem of rising rentals in the tight 
accommodation situation at that time. In turn, it was expected to reduce the 
stress imposed on the demand for public housing. The concession was 
estimated to reduce the revenue collection by some HK$5 million.855 
 
It was found that this social objective was similar to that originated by the British 
government in 1963 in Britain.856 Under the British Finance Act 1963, it was 
provided that conveyances for land under £30,000 were exempted from stamp 
duty.857 Contrasting with the British practice, Hong Kong did not imitate the 
British relief en masse. The Hong Kong concession put forward by 
Cowperthwaite was in the form of reduced stamp duty rates instead of total 
exemption for conveyances under a certain threshold. This directed the 
examination of the reasons the British initiative was not followed. 
 
Through reviewing the Hong Kong legislative record, it was discovered that 
Cowperthwaite did consider granting a stamp duty exemption on properties 
under a certain value, as practised in Britain in the 1960s.858 Nevertheless, he 
decided against it, saying:  
Although I spoke at the time of the budget of making conveyances 
under HK$20,000 free of duty, further consideration has suggested 
that such conveyances should continue to be stampable and should 
not be stamped completely free. This is because special 
arrangements will be necessary to administer the concessionary 
                                            
853 Per John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1967, 92. 
854 Per Li Fook Shu, Hong Kong Hansard 15 March 1967, 126. 
855 Per John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1967, 93. 
856 John Cowperthwaite informed the Legislative Council that to give a measure of relief from 
stamp duty to encourage home ownership was effected in Britain a few years before. See Hong 
Kong Hansard 1 March 1967, 92. 
857 Finance Act 1963, s 55. 
858 Apparently, Cowperthwaite disclosed his original intention was to render properties under 
HK$20,000 to be stamp duty free during the 1967 Hong Kong budget speech. See Hong Kong 
Hansard 1 March 1967, 92–93. 
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rates and care will have to be taken to prevent their abuse; and these 
arrangements will add to the cost of the Stamp Office.859  
 
The analysis of Cowperthwaite’s speech revealed an important point that was 
articulated obliquely by him. If provisions similar to those used in Britain were 
introduced, taxpayers might defraud the revenue by breaking up the 
conveyances into smaller separate parts with values set below the exemption 
threshold and thus go unnoticed by the Stamp Office since no documents were 
required to be submitted for stamping. It would involve significant expenditure to 
prevent the undesirable erosion of revenue. As such, Cowperthwaite insisted 
that a symbolic tax at a flat rate of HK$20 was to be collected for conveyances 
under HK$20,000.860 In this way, the Stamp Office would be informed of all 
conveyances on sale in the first instance and provide an opportunity to 
scrutinise the transactions.  
 
In addition, the 1967 legislation also instigated a stepped rate system, coupled 
with the concept of marginal relief where the consideration marginally exceeds 
the HK$20,000 or HK$40,000 levels, to achieve the social objective. This is 
rightfully classified as ad valorem (standard rate with static percentage and 
progressive percentage basis).861 
 
The following table illustrates the concepts and reveals the maximum savings in 
stamp duty as allowed by the 1967 legislation: 
  
                                            
859 Hong Kong Hansard 26 April 1967, 293. 
860 The applicable rate was set at HK$1 for every HK$100 or part thereof of the consideration 
under the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921. It was increased to HK$2 for every 
HK$100 or part thereof of the consideration via the Hong Kong Stamp amendment Ordinance, 
No 46 of 1948. 
861 See section 2.3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Analysis of 1967 stamp duty marginal relief for conveyances 
Consideration 
(HK$) 
Stamp duty 
rates (HK$) 
Maximum 
duties payable 
under the 1967 
relief (HK$) 
Maximum 
duties 
payable 
prior to the 
1967 relief 
(HK$) 
Maximum 
savings in 
stamp 
duty (HK$) 
1–20,000 20 20.00 400.00 380.00 
     
20,001–20,180 20 plus the 
amount 
exceeding 
20,000 
200.00 403.60 203.60 
     
20,181–40,000 1 for every 
100 
400.00 800.00 400.00 
     
40,401 onward 2 for every 
100 
N/A  N/A N/A 
 
The table shows that the stamp duty for property with a consideration of 
HK$20,000 or below may be reduced from HK$400 to HK$20, a fall of HK$380 
(or 95%) in stamp duty collected.  
 
The substantial drop in stamp duty rates brought about by the 1967 stamp 
amendment was successful in encouraging more lower-income earners to 
become owners of private housing. The Commissioner for Rating and Valuation 
revealed a year later that ‘the first effects had been favourable in encouraging 
persons of moderate means to buy their own properties.’ 862 Further, the Hong 
Kong government continued to positively adjust the relief in stamp duties for 
conveyances of low-valued properties during the 1970s to further enhance the 
                                            
862 Per Derek Jones (Acting Hong Kong Financial Secretary), Hong Kong Hansard 23 May 
1973, 821.  
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desirability of home ownership,863 demonstrating that the government perceived 
the actual outcomes to be encouraging. 
 
Cowperthwaite did not explain the basis for how he derived the complicated 
1967 marginal relief formula in the Legislative Council meetings. It was likely 
that he had done it arbitrarily. Yet, it was certain that his intention was to give an 
additional incentive to home ownership. It can be concluded that, in order to 
achieve the pre-set social imperative, Cowperthwaite enhanced the equity of 
the scheme by sacrificing simplicity. The marginal relief system has been 
retained in the modern Hong Kong stamp duty structure. Whilst the formulation 
evolved with increasing complexity, it has survived and become so ingrained in 
the system that the original historical reason for its existence has long been 
forgotten. Future stamp duty reform may consider doing away with the marginal 
relief system. Nevertheless, marginal relief still has its merit in that it avoids a 
sharp rise in the stamp duty when the value of the property shifts into the next 
band of a higher stamp duty rate. The abolition of the marginal relief needs to 
be handled very carefully so as to avoid occasioning undesirable social 
impacts. 
3.4.6 Stamp duty changes to support Britain’s secret mission 
Another striking social imperative to stamp duty reform occurred in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. After World War II, Britain established its own welfare 
state.864 The colonial government was indifferent to this proposal, even though 
it had been asked to follow the British lead.865 The Hong Kong government tried 
to spend as little as possible on welfare and social services. The real 
breakthrough came when Governor Sir Murray MacLehose took office (in office 
1971–1982). Unlike his predecessors, he found the idea of welfare appealing as 
long as it was viable and not being abused. He pioneered massive public 
housing projects, free primary school education, underground mass transit 
railway construction, huge country parks projects, public welfare services and 
                                            
863 Per Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1973, 488; Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance, No 41 of 1973, s 12(e). 
864 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2004), 175–76. 
865 Ibid 166. 
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public assistance.866 The local residents found him and his new Hong Kong ‘too 
good to be true’.867 From every angle, MacLehose was a kind and capable 
Governor who cared about the rights and welfare of the local people that he 
governed.  
 
Yet, there might have been a clandestine reason for the change in governing 
style pioneered by him. From a hitherto secret document released to the public 
from the British National Archives on 1 January 2002, it was found that, before 
MacLehose took up governorship, he had been entrusted with a secret mission 
that was only known to himself and no one else in Hong Kong.868 In short, he 
was required to prescribe policies to ensure that Hong Kong’s development in 
all areas would far exceed parallel developments in Mainland China. This was 
to increase the bargaining power of the British government with the Chinese 
government in negotiating the future of Hong Kong which was an important 
focus around ten years after MacLehose’s arrival. 
 
The evidence collected in this section was intended to ascertain whether 
MacLehose had initiated stamp duty changes to accomplish his secret mission. 
If that is determined in the affirmative, to then decide whether the related stamp 
duty changes were effective in causing constructive social development to arise 
which attracted the respect of the Hong Kong people and the rest of the world.  
 
MacLehose’s Financial Secretary, Philip Haddon-Cave (in office 1971–1981) 
spelled out the government’s vision for tax reform as:  
Changes designed either to make the burden of the system of 
taxes and levies more equitable, or to simplify the 
administration of the laws under which these taxes and levies 
are raised, or to increase the efficiency of their administration 
                                            
866 David Faure, A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 1997, 300–307; Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong University Press 2004), 161. 
867 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 161. 
868 Guideline for the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, 18 October 1971, FCO 
40/329; P K Li李彭廣, Guan Zhi Xianggang: Yingguo Jie Mi Dang An De Qi Shi管治香港 : 英國
解密檔案的啟示 [Governing Hong Kong Insights from the British Declassified Files] (Hong Kong, 
Oxford University Press 2012), 21. 
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in the sense that higher yields are derived from the same rates 
of charge.869  
 
From Haddon–Cave’s point of view, it can be inferred that during the 1970s, 
MacLehose’s government would refrain from introducing tax reforms or 
amendments that were viewed as solely instigated for the purpose of extracting 
revenue. To go one step further, Haddon-Cave announced the government’s 
self-induced desirability of affording relief ‘in particular circumstances to a 
particular class of taxpayers’.870  
 
In accord with the new benevolent philosophy, the Hong Kong Stamp Duty 
Amendment Ordinance 1973 871  deleted the following instruments from the 
stamp duty structure: affidavits,872 agreements, agreements for hire purchase, 
attested copies, bills of lading, charter parties, godown warrants, import or 
export declarations, letters of hypothecation, notarial acts, notes of protest of a 
bill of exchange, policies of insurance, receipts and shipper books (Chinese).873  
 
Investigation revealed that the basis for identifying the deleted items was 
founded on two criteria: whether the duty was irksome to the public and/or 
Stamp Office; and, whether the revenue yield insignificant and/or declining.874  
 
The study of the history of Hong Kong stamp duty from its beginning in 1866 
reveals that the colonial government neither gave up its revenue sources lightly, 
nor readily afforded relief. There was an abrupt change of attitude in the 1970s 
to move towards popularity engineering by doing both. The changes coincided 
with the MacLehose secret mission on behalf of Britain. It was a strong indicator 
that there was a co-relationship between the secret mission and the 1973 
stamp duty changes. 
 
                                            
869 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1973, 482. 
870 Ibid 480. 
871 No 41 of 1973; see Appendix V. 
872 Affidavits were written sworn statements of fact. 
873 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 41 of 1973, s 12(a)–(c); see Appendix V. 
874 Per Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1973, 489; Per Philip Haddon-
Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 28 March 1973; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 41 
of 1973, s 12. 
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The Commissioner of Inland Revenue reported a year later that the public 
welcomed the policy of abolition of minor duties. He reported that the policy also 
relieved the Stamp Office of a considerable administrative burden and enabled 
it to render a quicker and more efficient service in other directions.875 This 
indicates that the stamp duty policies of MacLehose’s government were 
successful socially and won the respect of the local people that it governed. 
3.4.7 Hong Kong brain drain and stamp duty policy 
A further modern key social imperative shaping the Hong Kong Stamp Duty 
occurred as late as the final decade of the twentieth century, and is revealed by 
the introduction of four Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinances during 
the ten year period from 1988–1997.  
 
Financial Secretary Piers Jacobs (in office 1986–1991) announced in his 1988 
budget speech that the Hong Kong government would provide a stamp duty 
concession. He announced that the concession was designed to facilitate wider 
home ownership and assist the middle-income group to acquire property.876 
Based on the successful stamp duty experience gained in encouraging lower 
income community private home ownership, he reduced the stamp duty rates 
applicable to small and medium-sized properties. 877  In addition, he also 
introduced a new formula for determining marginal relief, which would provide a 
greater benefit to duty payers and have the effect of pushing the various duty 
rate thresholds upward.878 
 
Compared with those Hong Kong stamp duty amendments that were effected in 
the 1960s and 1970s to encourage lower income community home ownership, 
the major difference in the 1988 stamp legislation was the insertion of the 
middle income group under the umbrella of stamp duty home ownership 
concession. Jacobs did not attempt to explain the principal imperative behind 
his revenue contractionary stamp duty policy during the legislative process of 
                                            
875 Per Derek Jones (Acting Hong Kong Financial Secretary), Hong Kong Hansard 23 May 
1973, 821. 
876 Hong Kong Hansard 2 March 1988, 813–14. 
877 With effect from 1 April 1988, the 1988 Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance lifted the 
threshold at which the top rate of 2.75% began to apply from the previous conveyance value of 
HK$500,000, to HK$1.5 million. Further, it cut the rate of duty for properties costing between 
HK$250,000 and HK$1.5 million. See Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance, No 29 of 
1988, s 2. 
878 Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance, No 29 of 1988, s 2. 
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the 1988 Stamp Ordinance, which he estimated would cost the government 
HK$300 million in the fiscal year 1988/89, benefiting 100,000 people.879 
 
Investigation into the historical circumstances suggests that the pressing social 
problem of ‘brain drain’ from Hong Kong, apparent following the 1984 
conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, shaped the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance of 1988. The brain drain refers to the abnormal increase in the 
number of Hong Kong residents emigrating due to uncertainty about the future 
of Hong Kong under a communist China regime after 1997. These emigrants 
included skilled professionals, technologists, supervisors, managers, sales and 
marketing specialists, the retention of whom was considered important to the 
sustainability of Hong Kong’s success beyond 1997.  
 
Remarks by Governor Sir David Wilson (in office 1987–1992) in his 1988 
Legislative Council address indicated that the government was keen to 
prescribe policies to tackle the brain drain predicament:  
The more we do to make Hong Kong a better place to live in, by 
maintaining our buoyant economy, by improving education, housing, 
the environment and the quality of life, the less likely people are to 
want to cut themselves off from their roots and leave this remarkable 
territory to which they are so deeply – and rightly – attached.880  
 
Although unannounced by Jacobs when he piloted the 1988 Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance in the Legislative Council, the evidence collected shows 
that there was a nexus between the social imperative of preventing brain drain 
and the 1988 stamp duty legislation of offering concessions to middle class 
home buyers which enabled them to maintain a standard of housing which was 
appropriate to their career status.  
 
Perhaps the conclusive evidence to support this deduction was found in the 
remark by a Chinese Legislative Council unofficial member, Dr Ho Kam-Fei (in 
office 1978–1988), appraising the government’s introduction of the 1988 Hong 
                                            
879 Per Piers Jacobs, Hong Kong Hansard 2 March 1988, 813–14. 
880 Hong Kong Hansard 12 October 1988, para 199.  
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Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance.881 He commented on the effect of the 
reduced rates of stamp duty on properties to facilitate the middle-income 
earners to purchase their own home: ‘Home-ownership would certainly 
strengthen a sense of belonging, which would, in turn, act as a hedge against 
the brain drain. This group of home-buyers would consist largely of 
professionals and technologists and constitute the mainspring of our 
economy.’882  
 
It can be deduced that the government found the concession fruitful in 
achieving its aforementioned social agenda, as it subsequently introduced over 
the next ten years, three more pieces of similar revenue contractionary stamp 
duty legislation consistent with the predominant social impetus.883 This class of 
stamp duty law definitely did not have a predominant financial objective; so 
much is evident from the observation that these initiatives cost the Hong Kong 
government billions of Hong Kong dollars from 1988 to 1997.884  
3.4.8 The relative importance of social imperatives in driving Hong Kong stamp 
duty development 
The analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty history validates that the most powerful 
imperative driving the development of stamp duty law was financial. However, 
other considerations were not totally ignored. The examination of the evidence 
shows that various social imperatives also caused or inhibited changes to the 
stamp duty system. It is inferred that the social imperative was the second most 
influential driving force that shaped the Hong Kong stamp duty system. Three 
principal reasons stand out. 
 
First, during the nineteenth century, a few and highly specific social reasons 
were already playing a part in shaping the stamp duty law. The increasing 
importance of such social considerations in formulating stamp duty law became 
more apparent after the World War II, emerging as a prominent consideration 
sparked off by MacLehose taking office as Hong Kong Governor. Nonetheless, 
                                            
881 No 29 of 1988. 
882 Hong Kong Hansard 20 April 1988, 1108. 
883 1994 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 36 of 1994; 1996 Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance, No 28 of 1996; 1997 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 43 
of 1997. 
884 Per Kwong Ki-Chi, Hong Kong Hansard 27 April 1994, 3373. 
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as a whole, the number of instances of Hong Kong introducing stamp duty 
legislation in response to a social impellent, were far less than initiatives linked 
to a financial imperative. However, the frequency was higher than those 
initiatives linked to an economic imperative.885  
 
Second, the stamp duty system was used as a major tool in attaining social 
objectives during the 1960s until the end of British rule in 1997. The evidence 
collected confirms that social imperatives even surpassed revenue collection 
considerations in moulding the stamp duty system during the last few decades 
of British administration in Hong Kong. As an illustration, the government 
adhered to the tenet of abolition of cumbersome duties and stamp duty law 
which was sparked off by MacLehose’s government in the 1970s. The evidence 
demonstrates that resulting stamp duty law had significant lasting impact on the 
Hong Kong stamp duty system development. Stamp duty law introduced in 
response to economic imperatives only started to have a significant impact from 
1979 onwards.886 
 
Third, the earlier stamp duty provisions enacted in response to social 
imperatives were mostly out-dated and repealed. Nevertheless, the stamp duty 
changes introduced between 1960s and 1990s to pursue social objectives are 
still retained in the current Hong Kong stamp duty system. It is submitted that 
stamp duty changes introduced from 1979 onwards, in response to economic 
impellents, scored similarly on this ranking factor.887 
3.5 Economic imperatives 
So far, the analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty history shows that financial 
imperatives were the most important underlying nearly all stamp duty reforms 
and amendments in the first 110 years of the Hong Kong stamp duty history. 
Social imperatives formed the next important group of drivers in the 
development of Hong Kong stamp duty. This section turns to an assessment as 
to whether a third possible class of imperatives, those of an economic nature, 
also drove the development of the Hong Kong stamp duty regime. The aim is to 
assess to what extent the stamp duty law promulgated by government was 
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intended to stimulate economic growth, and whether any Hong Kong stamp 
duty policy impeded economic growth.  
 
A growing and buoyant economy usually leads to a growth in stamp duty yields 
as most of the related chargeable instruments are linked to commercial 
activities. In this light, distinguishing financial imperatives from economic 
imperatives, is difficult. Hence there is a need for appropriate and distinctive 
definitions. This study distinguishes the economic imperatives from the financial 
imperatives by stressing the structural nature of the economic, whereas the 
financial have more to do with the conduct, or performance, of the stamp duty 
legislation in yielding revenue.  
3.5.1 Non-protectionist tax policy confirmed 
The 1888 Stamp Duty Bill had a clear economic agenda. The 1888 Bill to 
amend Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, proposed by Governor Sir William Des 
Voeux (in office 1887–1891), was not accepted by the Colonial Office. In 
examining why the Bill was rejected, it was established that the British 
government deemed non-protectionist stamp duty policies as the guiding 
principle for Hong Kong in 1888. Successive Hong Kong revenue law legislators 
have in varying degrees followed that tradition until the present day. This 
section analyses why the British government chose the non-protectionist stamp 
duty path for Hong Kong, by examining the associated economic factors. In 
addition, the study also considers whether the chosen policy was beneficial to 
Hong Kong’s economy in the long run. 
 
In 1888, the applicable stamp duty fixed rate for fire insurance policies was 
HK10¢ per policy. The 1888 Bill was introduced to amend the duties on fire 
insurance, as follows: 
 
1. If issued by a company registered in the colony: HK10¢ per policy; 
2. If issued by any other company, to be charged on the premium paid: 
HK50¢ on every HK$10 or part thereof up to HK$100 and HK$5 on every 
succeeding HK$100 or part thereof.888 
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The Bill was read a second time, with no opposition, 889 in the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council. It can be concluded from the above that the Hong Kong 
government tried to launch an interventionist tax policy to encourage people to 
purchase fire insurance from local companies instead of from foreign insurance 
companies. The principal argument in support of the law was that local 
insurance companies would be heavily taxed if their business transactions 
occurred elsewhere; for example in Calcutta and Madras.890 Thus, it was fair 
that Hong Kong should impose a higher tax on fire insurance policies concluded 
by foreign insurance companies. In the words of a famous British economist, 
Joan Robinson: ‘It was just as sensible to drop rocks in our harbours as other 
nations had rocky coasts.’891 
 
The Colonial Office consulted the British Board of Trade to seek its opinion on 
the possible consequences of the Bill. The Board was of the view that the tax 
differentiation between foreign and local companies ‘ought to be appreciated as 
being an interference with freedom of trade’ and likely to have a detrimental 
effect on the interests of the colony.892  The Board objected and urged the 
placement of ‘all insurance agencies in the colony on equal footing as regards 
taxation and not afford any special protection to local insurances companies.’893 
At the same time the legislative process for the Bill also attracted written protest 
from the London Fire Office Committee. Addressing the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, it strongly criticised Des Voeux’s Bill as ‘inequitable and wholly 
inconsistent with the modern legislation in this country’.894 Upon consideration 
of the protest and the opinion of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of State 
informed Des Voeux of his rejection of the Bill. 895  Such rejection may be 
understood as a rejection of stamp duty policy that might have the effect of 
impeding Hong Kong’s economic growth. 
                                            
889 Hong Kong Hansard 5 March 1888, 24. 
890 Letter from Chairman of the Fire Office Committee London to Henry Holland (24 April 1888), 
CO129/240, 324. 
891 Joan Robinson, Essays in the Theory of Employment (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1947),192; 
Joel Slemrod, ‘Free-Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation’ (1995) 2(3) International Tax 
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892 Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Commercial Department of the Board of Trade to 
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893 Minutes on the Bill to Amend Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1888 (1 December 1887), 
CO129/235, 119. 
894 Letter from Chairman of the Fire Office Committee London to Henry Holland (24 April 1888), 
CO129/240, 323. 
895 Letter from Frederick Stewart to Henry Holland (7 January 1889), CO129/239, 376. 
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It must be concluded that the decision by the British government was to adopt 
unilateral stamp duty polices to promote free trade in Hong Kong even though 
tax barriers were set up for similar transactions in other jurisdictions. In 
hindsight, with non-protectionist tax policies, economists argued that overall 
domestic income could be maximised when domestic consumers and providers 
faced world prices that were not distorted by taxes.896 In short, from its early 
colonial days until the present, it was demonstrated that protectionist stamp 
duty policies had no place in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong stamp duty and the 
Hong Kong income tax systems contained no provisions to protect local 
companies or taxpayers from foreign competition. In general, there were many 
different economic theories arguing for and against free trade tax policies that 
were concerned with the production of wealth in a jurisdiction.897 Nonetheless, 
from the Hong Kong perspective, free trade tax policies adopted for its stamp 
duty and income tax systems doubtlessly assisted in creating the Hong Kong 
economic miracle of the twentieth century. 
3.5.2 Control inflation 
The government did not articulate any other purpose for the 1946 stamp 
amendment other than to raise money to rehabilitate Hong Kong by imposing 
stamp duty on capital gains.898 Yet, that is not to say that another motive was 
absent. The evidence reveals that stamp duty levied on capital gains served a 
non-financial regulatory purpose.  
 
An examination of the 1946 Hong Kong Annual Report, 899 found that ‘land 
prices since the re-occupation (by Britain) had risen very considerably as 
compared with the pre-war figures, in some cases by as much as 300%.’900 A 
tax on capital gains was expedient to check ‘unhealthy speculation in 
property’.901 This could be generalised into a wider policy concern of controlling 
                                            
896 Joel Slemrod, ‘Free-Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation’ (1995) 2(3) International Tax 
and Public Finance, 471. 
897 Ibid 471–89. 
898 See section 3.3.9. 
899 Hong Kong Government, ‘1946 Hong Kong Annual Report’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1947), 3. 
900 Ibid. 
901 Ibid. This provides an answer to the question posed by Michael Littlewood, ‘Hong Kong’s 
Once – And Future? – Capital Gains Tax’ (1998) 2(4) Asia Pacific Journal of Taxation, 7: ‘Profits 
made by trading in property would seem, according to the terms of the Stamp Ordinance … and 
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post war inflation. 902  Another related observation, which supports the 
hypothesis, is the legislator prudently refrained from indexing the gain for 
inflation, as that would be contrary to the secondary intention of the law, to fight 
inflation.  
 
Following the development to this point, there was reason behind the law that 
only allowed deductions for repair works and improvements on building, but not 
other expenditures such as interest and selling costs. 903 This move was to 
encourage post-war reconstruction. It must be concluded that the government 
did not want the law to hamper the speed of rehabilitating the buildings 
damaged by the war while controlling speculative activities via its 1946 stamp 
duty policy.904 
3.5.3 Less is more 
Stamp duty policy to enhance economic development was not of high priority 
until the late 1970s when a relationship between economic advances and the 
modernisation of Hong Kong stamp duty can be discerned. The government 
decided to decrease the duty rates, and numbers of chargeable instruments, 
and it is arguable that the government in fact unintentionally applied supply-side 
economics to its stamp duty system; a theory that advocates a reduction of 
taxes would increase revenue.905 Whether the reform was beneficial is a further 
issue to consider. 
                                                                                                                                
to the terms of the Inland Revenue Ordinance, to have been chargeable to both excess stamp 
duty and profits tax. It seems unlikely that the two Ordinances were administrated so as to 
produce this result, but how (if at all) it was avoided is unclear.’ The government might not have 
intended to avoid such result. It intended to tax the profits on gains on speculations of 
immovable properties to intervene in the market to control inflation. 
902 This provides answer to the question posed by Michael Littlewood, ‘Hong Kong’s Once – 
And Future? – Capital Gains Tax’ (1998) 2(4) Asia Pacific Journal of Taxation, 7: ‘Why the tax 
introduced in 1946 was charges only on gains on the disposal of property, and not on gains 
made on disposal of shares, is unclear.’ Apparently, the government desired to check the 
unhealthy speculation of properties and not shares in 1946. 
903 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 22 of 1946, s 13. 
904 This observation provides reason behind the inequity observed by Michael Littlewood, ‘Hong 
Kong’s Once – And Future? – Capital Gains Tax’ (1998) 2(4) Asia Pacific Journal of Taxation, 7: 
‘A further inequity was that the Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1946 made no provision for the 
deduction of expenditure other than expenditures on improvements. Consequently, expenditure 
on items such as interest and selling costs would appear not to have been deductible.’ 
905 Philip Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd 
edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 285. Supply-side economics is a school of 
macroeconomics that argues that economic growth can be most effectively created by lowering 
barriers for people to produce (supply) goods and services as well as invest in capital. 
According to supply-side economics, consumers will then benefit from a greater supply of goods 
and services at lower prices; furthermore, the investment and expansion of businesses will 
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Financial Secretary Philip Haddon-Cave (in office 1971–1981) introduced the 
following legislation: the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1977,906 
Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance (No 2) 1977,907 Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance 1978,908 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance (No 
2) 1978909 and the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance (No 3) 1978.910  
 
The consolidated effect of all these amendments was a comprehensive reform 
to limit stamp duty to instruments related to: 
1. Conveyances of immovable properties; 
2. Leases; 
3. Share contract notes and transfers. 
 
Essentially, the government radically deleted twenty-seven heads of charge and 
many associated mechanisms in these two years (1977 and 1978).911  
 
In the search of factors influencing Haddon-Cave’s stamp duty reform, it was 
discovered that economic advancement played a major role. Since its 
foundation, Hong Kong’s economy has relied heavily on entrepôt trade. This 
economic reliance had been disrupted due to the Korean War912 in the 1950s. 
The Hong Kong economy suffered as the United Nations and the United States 
enforced a total embargo against trading with China.913 This forced Hong Kong 
Chinese entrepreneurs to take initiatives to embark on establishing light 
industries. The 1950s saw a transformation from heavy dependence on China’s 
entrepôt trade to an industrialised economy.914 The dominant question in the 
1970s was whether the growth of light industries could be sustained due to the 
                                                                                                                                
increase the demand for employees. Typical policy recommendations of supply-side economists 
are lower marginal tax rates and less regulation. 
906 No 34 of 1977. 
907 No 51 of 1977. 
908 No 22 of 1978. 
909 No 23 of 1978. 
910 No 24 of 1978. 
911 See Appendix V for more details. 
912 It was a war between North and South Korea, in which a United Nations force led by the 
United States of America fought for the South, and China fought for the North, which was also 
assisted by the Soviet Union. 
913 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2004), 162. 
914 Kui Wai Li, The Hong Kong Economy Recovery and Restructuring (Singapore, McGraw-Hill 
Education 2006), 34. 
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scarcity of land and natural resources. The colonial government concluded that 
it was impossible and in the early 1970s resolved to diversify Hong Kong’s 
economy. It decided to upgrade its networks of banks, commercial services, 
financial and stock exchange services into a regional hub for business 
services.915 This facilitated the significant growth in stamp duty revenue from 
stock trading and conveyance transactions. 
 
The shift from light industries to financial services and property development 
enabled the rescission of certain comparatively non-income producing 
instruments that had been associated with the old economy. Haddon-Cave 
removed some of the archaic heads of charge which were seldom used in the 
1970s. He informed that the loss of revenue associated with the removal of 
such items would be negligible. 916  Yet, the public would be spared some 
inconvenience. 
 
By the 1970s, many new instruments emerged with the advancement of the 
economy and commercial practices. Despite the efforts of the government to 
amend the statute frequently, it was still difficult to interpret whether some of 
these documents used in the 1970s were subject to stamp duty. In Hong Kong 
the stamping had been compulsory and not voluntary since 1921 (unlike in 
Britain).917 With the multiplicity of documents that were assessable for stamp 
duty, the application and attempted enforcement of the provisions of the Stamp 
Ordinance would be complicated and expensive. Evidence to support this 
assertion is found in the legislative record. In 1978, Haddon-Cave described the 
stamp duty legislation that was enacted half a century previously as a piece of 
‘esoteric and antiquated revenue law’ with arbitrary provisions that were 
obscure and difficult to enforce in the 1970s.918 
 
The solution prescribed by Haddon-Cave was to drastically reduce heads of 
charge. The benefit associated with the reduction was the Stamp Office could 
                                            
915 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2004), 175–76. 
916 Per Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 2 March 1977, 639. As an illustration, the 
removal of agreements of service with a corporate body, comprador notes, letters of allotment, 
letters patent and trademarks would only cost HK$30,000 in 1976/77 when the total stamp 
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917 See section 3.3.7. 
918 Per Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1978, 556. 
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redeploy staff to other areas. Further, businesses and banks would also enjoy 
administrative savings, as it was no longer necessary to employ a large number 
of staff to calculate stamp duties payable, and to advise them or their clients 
how not to fall foul of the compulsory stamp duty law.919 
 
So far, the discussion demonstrates it was economic progression and diversity 
that caused the changes to stamp duty law. Yet further examination also shows 
that the government aimed to facilitate economic growth by the substantial 
reduction of heads of charge. Haddon-Cave exemplified during the 1978/79 
budget speech that with his ‘major surgical exercise’, the impediment to the 
issue of marketable securities and foreign exchange transactions, would be 
removed; visitors would no longer be required to pay the irritant stamp duties on 
currency transactions; aspiring home owners would no longer have to pay 
stamp duties on mortgages and the consumers on the street would be freed 
from duty on cheques. 920  Analysing his arguments, the financial, tourism, 
construction and commercial industries would have one less inhibiting factor to 
the achievement of economic growth. 
 
The following table shows the stamp duty revenues as well as the stamp duty 
office personnel employed for two years before and after the stamp duty reform 
introduced in 1978/79:921 
  
                                            
919 Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1978, 556. 
920 Ibid 556–57. 
921 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1978–79’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government Printer 1979), sch 26; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong 
Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 
1981–82’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government Printer 1982), sch 26. 
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Table 3.6 Total stamp duty revenues and Stamp Office personnel from 1976/77 to 
1980/81 
Fiscal years Stamp duty revenues 
(HK$) 
Stamp Office personnel  
1976/77 427,696,982 60 officers and clerks 
   
1977/78 489,981,714 60 officers and clerks 
   
1978/79 (Year of Change) 761,827,094 60 officers and clerks 
   
1979/80 933,568,542 54 officers and clerks 
   
1980/81 2,052,482,744 56 officers and clerks 
Source: Data extracted from the Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Hong Kong 
Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Relevant Fiscal 
Years (Hong Kong, Government Printer, Relevant Years). 
 
The first observation is that the Stamp Office collected substantially more 
revenue with fewer staff. It justifies Haddon-Cave’s prescient prediction that 
administrative expenditures would be reduced. 
 
The second observation is that stamp duty revenue was raised significantly 
following the year of change. Using stamp duty collected as a gauge of the 
economic circumstances, the surge in revenue implied tremendous economic 
growth with the significant reduction of taxable instruments within the stamp 
duty system as predicted by Haddon–Cave. 
 
A third observation is that the efficiency of the Stamp Office improved five-fold 
over the five years, from HK$7.1 million collected per staff member in 1976/77, 
to HK$36.7million per staff member in 1980/81. 
 
With the great reduction in the number of instruments together with the 
reduction of stamp duty on shares contract notes from HK$8 per mille to HK$6 
per mille announced under the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance (No 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 214 
3) 1978,922 Haddon-Cave predicted the reform would cost the government an 
estimated HK$155 million in the fiscal year 1978/79 alone.923 In actual fact, 
Table 3.6 demonstrates that stamp duty revenue actually rose by HK$272 
million in the year of change. This was true not only in the short run, as further 
evidence collected demonstrates that the stamp revenue continued to escalate 
in the ten years after the implementation of the policy. Table 3.7 shows the 
stamp duty revenue collected over an extended period of time. 
 
Table 3.7: Total stamp duty revenues 1979/80 to 1988/89 
Fiscal years Stamp duty revenues (HK$) 
1979/80 933,568,542 
  
1980/81 2,052,482,744 
  
1981/82  2,167,820,520 
  
1982/83 1,391,351,039 
  
1983/84 1,094,238,860 
  
1984/85 1,156,575,286 
  
1985/86 1,696,037,567 
  
1986/87 3,044,931,618 
  
1987/88 5,237,435,249 
  
1988/89 5,094,534,338 
Source: Data extracted from the Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Hong Kong 
Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Relevant Fiscal 
Years (Hong Kong, Government Printer, Relevant Years). 
 
The stamp revenue yield during the fiscal years 1982/83 to 1985/86 was 
hampered due to the uncertainty of Hong Kong’s future surrounding the 
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scheduled reversion of the New Territories to the Chinese Communist 
government in 1997. 924  This uncertainty coincided with the first formal 
negotiation with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the People’s Republic of China 
during the visit of the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to China in 
September 1982. Nonetheless, the stamp duties collected during these years 
were still around two to three times the recorded revenues immediately before 
the year of change. 
 
The stamp revenue resumed escalation after the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
was concluded on 19 December 1984 in Beijing and arranged that Hong Kong 
would retain a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty with the 
preservation of the maintained lifestyle in Hong Kong. As an illustration, the 
Hong Kong stamp revenue collected in 1988/89 was HK$5,094,534,338 925 
which was around ten times more than the stamp revenue yield immediately 
before the year of change of 1977/78. 
 
The evidence demonstrates that the 1978/79 reform produced desirable and 
unexpected by-products of revenue in the short run as well as in the long run. 
As such, it was determined that the outcome of Haddon-Cave’s stamp duty 
pursuit coincided with the expected outcome postulated by the supply-side 
economic theorem. 
 
Lastly, it must be concluded that the less-is-more approach was successful from 
the sustainability standpoint, as none of the deleted items have since been 
needed or revived. 
3.5.4 Hong Kong’s economic development into a financial centre  
Another striking economic imperative to stamp duty changes occurred in the 
later part of the twentieth century. 
 
Hong Kong historians and economists argue that Hong Kong’s economic 
development into a world-class financial centre was mainly attributable to two 
factors. First, the Hong Kong government’s policy of guaranteeing free flows of 
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capital movement in and out of Hong Kong. There were never barriers 
implemented to restrict exchange between the Hong Kong dollar and other 
currencies. All financial assets were easily transferable or convertible with 
minimum regulation or interference.926  Second, the Hong Kong government 
adhered to its golden rule of maintaining a low direct income tax environment. 
As an illustration, in 1966, Financial Secretary Philip Haddon-Cave (in office 
1971–1981) warned that 20% was the maximum direct rate of income taxation 
which could be imposed on the economy without danger of serious damage. 927 
 
There is evidence, however, to suggest that a lesser-discerned third stamp duty 
factor was also responsible for the development. Examination of Hong Kong 
stamp duty history validates the economic imperative of building Hong Kong 
into a world-class financial centre, facilitating changes in its stamp duty law to 
complement the aforementioned two main factors.    
 
There are three instances of this:  
The first instance occurred in 1986. The law at that time was that institutions 
would be subject to a 1% stamp duty on issuing bearer loan capital (a form of 
stock under the Stamp Ordinance) denominated in Hong Kong dollars. Clearly, 
this stamp duty charge had an inhibiting effect on the raising of capital through 
the issue of loan capital in Hong Kong. The government introduced the Hong 
Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1986928 to exclude such instruments from 
charge to Hong Kong stamp duty.929 Doubtlessly, this amendment encouraged 
the issue of corporate bonds by Hong Kong companies and foreign companies 
in Hong Kong. The existence of more bonds denominated in Hong Kong dollars 
in turn encouraged the growth of secondary markets, thus enhancing the status 
of Hong Kong as a major financial centre.930 Accordingly, it must be concluded 
that the economic imperative was predominant in conceiving the 1986 stamp 
duty amendment.  
                                            
926 Alvin Rabushka, Value for Money: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process (Hoover Institution 
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35. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 217 
 
The second instance occurred in 1989. The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1989 exempted certain stock borrowing and lending transactions 
from stamp duty.931 The lending and borrowing of share scrip are used as the 
means of expediting the settlement of transactions. Stock lending and 
borrowing are internationally accepted methods of resolving legitimate 
temporary settlement problems. The stamp duty amendments were used to 
encourage the development of an active stock borrowing and lending market in 
Hong Kong. This would help to improve Hong Kong’s competitiveness with 
other major securities markets. The scope of the stamp duty relief on such 
transactions was subsequently extended by the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1994.932 The further relaxation assisted in facilitating short-selling 
activities and other core-market development such as stock options. The 1994 
Stamp Ordinance was to remove hindrance to participation in the Hong Kong 
financial market. This would support competition with other major financial 
centres which had been trying to attract major players from the Hong Kong 
market to establish stock borrowing and lending operations in their own 
jurisdictions.933 It is thus submitted that the leading reason for implementing 
these stamp duty amendments was not for financial or social necessities, but for 
economic concerns. 
 
The third instance occurred in 1991. The Hong Kong government decreased 
the overall stock contract notes stamp duty from the prevailing 0.6% to 0.5% via 
the introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1991.934 An 
evaluation of the imperative behind the change again pointed to economic 
considerations. The government implemented the 1991 amendment in 
recognition of the world-wide trend towards eliminating the duty on stock 
transfers. The decrease in duty rate also reflected the government’s regard for 
how the total dealing costs in Hong Kong compared to those in other major 
financial centres.935 This was to serve the economic imperative of ensuing Hong 
Kong remained competitive as an important international financial centre. 
                                            
931 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 67 of 1989. 
932 No 70 of 1994. 
933 Per the Secretary for Financial Services Michael Cartland, Hong Kong Hansard 15 June 
1994, 4233–34. 
934 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, s 7. 
935 Per Piers Jacobs, Hong Kong Hansard 6 March 1991, para. 155.  
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 218 
Similar exercises were carried out for the same reason in 1992936 and 1993937 
to reduce the overall rates from 0.5% to 0.4% and from 0.4% to 0.3% 
respectively. 
 
The fourth instance of this third stamp duty factor emerged in 1992. The 
prevailing law in 1992 imposed stamp duty on the sale and purchase of Hong 
Kong dollar debt instruments. The aim of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance [No 2] 1992938 was to exempt from stamp duty, Hong Kong dollar 
debt instruments issued by certain multilateral agencies.939 The law confines the 
exemptions to four multilateral agencies, namely, the Asian Development Bank, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Finance Corporation and the European Investment Bank. The related legislation 
also provided that additions might be made to the list of exempt agencies by 
resolution of the Legislative Council. Investigation shows that of the four exempt 
agencies, only one, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, has previously issued Hong Kong dollar bonds in Hong Kong.940 
As such the launch of the 1992 Ordinance might have attracted more first class 
issues by multilateral agencies. This would in turn have helped the expansion of 
the Hong Kong dollar capital markets, and so further promote Hong Kong's 
development as an international financial centre. 
 
To this point, the evidence indicates that the expansion of Hong Kong into a 
major international financial centre was not a miracle by only offering low direct 
income taxation and state of the art financial regulatory framework; it was 
partially made possible by pre-emptive changes in the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system responding to the economic imperative to expand the financial market. 
The evidence put forward here justifies the belief that economic imperatives 
were an integral part of the government’s agenda while formulating Hong 
Kong’s stamp duty law.  
                                            
936 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 36 of 1992, s 3. 
937 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 31 of 1993, s 2. 
938 No 18 of 1992. 
939 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 2], No 18 of 1992, s 2. 
940 Per Yeung Kai-Yin, Hong Kong Hansard 29 January 1992. 
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3.5.5 Identification of the third most influential imperative that drove the Hong 
Kong stamp duty development  
The examination of the evidence to determine whether economic imperatives 
played a role in shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty law, indicates that before 
the 1970s, economic considerations were not an important colonial government 
consideration, if at all, in formulating stamp duty legislation. A possible 
exception was the failed attempt by Des Voeux to pilot an interventionist Stamp 
Ordinance to favour the local insurance companies. This should be compared 
to financial and social imperatives, which were detected, from the very 
beginning of stamp duty development in the nineteenth century.   
 
Nonetheless, the evidence collected reveals that the momentous advancement 
in the Hong Kong economic structure in the 1970s generated the imperative for 
modifying the stamp duty legislation to keep pace with the new economic 
settings. Moreover, in the late 1970s, the Hong Kong government also saw the 
opportunity to alter the stamp duty legislation to further advance the Hong Kong 
economy. The analysis of the stamp duty history shows that the government 
prescribed stamp duty law to achieve the economic aim of building Hong Kong 
as a major international financial centre. 
 
Based on the above analysis, it must be concluded that economic imperatives 
were not intuitively obvious, as compared to financial and social imperatives, in 
the formulation of stamp duty policy in the first 100 years of stamp duty 
development. Nevertheless, economic considerations became an important 
factor in the late 1970s when it gave rise to a complete overhaul of the law at 
that time to bring it to its contemporary state. Economic considerations 
continued to be the major focus in the last decade of British rule to maintain 
Hong Kong’s status as a key international financial centre. As such, it is 
submitted that economic considerations should be ranked as the third most 
important imperative in driving the stamp duty reforms and amendments in 
Hong Kong after the primacy of financial and social imperatives.  
3.6 Conclusion 
An examination of the relative numbers of instances that Hong Kong stamp duty 
legislation was introduced for revenue raising as well as the significance of the 
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resulting stamp duty law to the development of the system demonstrate that the 
financial imperative was the most important driver in the development of the 
stamp duty system in Hong Kong.  
 
It emerges that most of the stamp duty reforms and amendments during the 
period 1867 to 1977 were effected on an ad-hoc basis, instigated in the main by 
British demands for additional military contributions, world recessions, wars, 
plagues and the devaluation of the silver-based Hong Kong currency. These 
historical events generated financial imperatives that were indicated clearly by 
budget deficits. Some of these events led to the necessity of obtaining loans 
which incurred interest expenses and additional resources to establish sinking 
funds. It has been shown that whenever there was a revenue exigency, the 
Hong Kong government would first consider increasing stamp duty. The 
investigation offers reasons for this phenomenon. Essentially, stamp duty could 
be increased quickly without additional administrative charges. 
 
The evidence demonstrates that revenue-driven stamp duty amendments or 
reforms that merely changed the stamp duty structures were unlikely to achieve 
the stated revenue aims. The revenue-driven stamp duty objective was likely to 
be accomplished by stamp duty legal reforms targeting both the stamp duty 
mechanisms as well as the structures. 
 
This was true even if the tax rate structures were doubled or tripled across the 
board. It was discovered that the nature of stamp duty and the Hong Kong 
social structure, offered explanations for the failure associated with 
amendments that only tackled stamp duty structures. Traditionally, stamp duty 
was a voluntary tax in Britain, and Hong Kong initially adopted this ideology. 
Taxpayers tended to disobey if they did not intend to seek the courts’ protection 
for relevant instruments. With a sudden substantial increase of tax rates and 
chargeable instruments, the taxpayers’ incentive to comply would be 
substantially reduced. They might consider themselves to be in a better position 
to pay the heavy penalties latter if legal judgement was deemed essential, 
rather than pay the high taxes up-front when the instruments were concluded. 
This was particularly so for the Chinese in the nineteenth and the early 
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twentieth centuries as they tended to avoid British Courts due to apprehension 
and an ignorance of the British legal system.  
 
However the study reveals an exception to this finding. Legal changes that only 
tackled the stamp duty structures would succeed provided that the four factors 
identified under the analysis of Governor Robinson’s Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance 1894 were contemplated. In 1921, Attorney Joseph 
Kemp further added to the understanding of how best to amend stamp duty 
structures to meet revenue aims. In general, the historical evidence shows that 
revenue-enhancing changes, attaching stamp duty to instruments without 
considering the social and economic realities, were bound to fail. For example, 
in 1868, MacDonnell did not achieve his financial objective by introducing 
chargeable instruments linked to commerce, and thus increased tax rates for 
existing instruments associated with trade during a recession. On the other 
hand, in 1894, Robinson augmented the tax rates for insurance and probates 
during a year marked by natural disasters that caused property damage and 
plagues that decimated a large proportion of the population. Robinson’s 
measures exceeded his financial expectation. If Robinson had concentrated on 
increasing tax rates for commercial instruments in 1894, the conjecture was that 
he was certain to fail in obtaining additional revenue because of a marked 
decrease in commercial activities in this year of tragedies. 
 
With regard to the question whether it was possible to have successful revenue 
enhancing reforms or amendments that focused only on stamp duty 
mechanisms, the evidence collected indicates persuasively that it was 
achievable. The study also identifies various stamp duty mechanisms that were 
put in place by the Hong Kong government to secure revenue and maintain 
system sustainability. It was found that some of the effective mechanisms were 
invented in Hong Kong with no British precedents. It can be concluded that the 
most distinguished Hong Kong advancement of stamp duty mechanism since its 
introduction in 1866, was the transformation of stamp duty from a voluntary tax 
to a compulsory tax in 1921. This was a departure from the British tenet. The 
evidence establishes that this concept together with third party collection 
mechanism tremendously reinforced revenue protection. The investigation 
showed that the resulting synergy was the cornerstone in facilitating financial 
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achievements in respect of amendments that only focused on stamp duty 
structures enacted after World War II. Further, the study reveals the 
government had recourse to the established stamp duty mechanisms to collect 
estate duty and capital gains tax, which rightfully belonged to other revenue law 
branches, with mixed outcomes.  
 
With regard to other measures not related to stamp duty structures and 
mechanisms that affected stamp duty collection, the historical evidence 
demonstrated it was absolutely undesirable to institute policies to grant stamp 
duty exemptions to privileged classes of stamp duty payers.     
 
The examination of the Hong Kong stamp duty history showed that the 
requirement for social policies and welfare had a material impact on the 
development of stamp duty regulation. The social imperative was the second 
most important imperative in driving the stamp duty law development. The 
analysis of early Hong Kong stamp duty history in the nineteenth century 
convincingly indicates that the attempt to use the stamp duty system to educate 
the public to differentiate lawful transactions from unlawful transactions was 
unsuccessful. In the study of the stamp duty system in the early twentieth 
century, it is clear that the curbing of the opium trade ultimately reflected 
declining stamp duty revenue and in time gave rise to further development of 
the stamp duty regime. The post-World War II evidence, illustrated that stamp 
duty amendments adopted to encourage home ownership, were successful. 
The investigation also showed that there was a causal link between Governor 
MacLehose’s secret mission and stamp duty policy promulgated by the 
government to solicit popularity in the 1970s to increase bargaining power for 
the Sino-British negotiation on the future of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the 
historical analysis demonstrates that social policies in the 1960s had given rise 
to the undesirable and complicated marginal relief system, and this had 
prevailed within the stamp duty law long after the related and initial social 
objective had ceased to be relevant.  
 
The analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty history further advocates that economic 
imperatives were the third most important primary driver of stamp duty 
development. It was found that the Hong Kong Legislative Council passed an 
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interventionist stamp duty policy in 1888 to protect the local insurance industry. 
The evidence shows that these changes were not sustainable and were swiftly 
made redundant by the British government. The historical material reveals that 
the tradition of not adopting protectionist tax policies in Hong Kong probably 
started in 1888 as stamp duty was the earliest form of Hong Kong taxation that 
could accommodate such policies. The rule was not broken during the next 110 
years under British administration. The economic history of Hong Kong’s 
development from a cluster of modest villages to a major international financial 
centre in less than 150 years tends to support the appropriateness of the 
decision by the Colonial Office in 1888. 
 
The investigation illustrates that, in the late 1970s, the advancement of the 
Hong Kong economy was a major imperative that led to the modernisation of its 
stamp duty legislation. The principal reformative measure was to significantly 
reduce the number of taxable instruments. It was also evidenced that the 
modernisation in turn facilitated further economic advancement. The evidence 
also conclusively demonstrates that changes made to modernise the stamp 
duty law in response to the economic imperative in the late 1970s, yielded 
unexpected revenue increments. The role of stamp duty in economic 
development acted in response to particular economic issues, inequities, 
desired outcomes and policy settings.  
 
From a broader perspective, the evidence shows that the nature and 
importance of the imperatives changed as Hong Kong progressed. From the 
introduction of Hong Kong stamp duty in 1866 until the 1960s, stamp duty 
changes were mainly effected to enhance revenue. This is not to say the stamp 
duty changes in the first one hundred years were not affected by other factors; 
those other factors were just not as prominent as their financial counterparts. 
From the late 1960s to 1997, many stamp duty changes were made in 
response to different social needs. By the late 1970s, economic development 
also emerged as a significant factor in shaping the stamp duty system alongside 
with its social counterpart. The role of the stamp duty system as a major 
revenue source for the government remained unchallenged from the 1970s to 
1997. It was demonstrated that effective design to enhance economic 
development and at the same time to capture the resulting stamp revenue, 
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stamp duty yield would naturally be enhanced in concert with economic 
advancement. As such, the colonial government found no necessity to 
introduce stamp duty reform or amendment that focused only on revenue 
enhancement after the 1970s, a peculiarity that persisted until the British 
departed the colony in 1997. 
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Chapter 4 Secondary Imperatives Shaping the Hong Kong 
Stamp Duty Progression  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the primary imperatives driving the development 
of the Hong Kong stamp duty system, and established that financial, social and 
economic forces were the key drivers in the development of the Hong Kong 
stamp duty system. The aim of this chapter is to identify whether there were 
other drivers that shaped the stamp duty system, from its commencement in 
1866 until the end of British rule in Hong Kong in 1997. Specifically, the 
objective of this chapter is to analyse and determine to what extent the content 
of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance was influenced by the pursuit of system 
sustainability, political demands and other less obvious pragmatic needs in 
achieving the modern form of the Ordinance. Lessons drawn from such analysis 
will permit a comprehensive understanding of the successes or failures941 of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinances promulgated in fulfilling these demands.  
 
In the process of clarifying and identifying the secondary imperatives, the 
chapter also aims to rank them in order of their relative importance. The ranking 
is based on the three criteria discussed in Chapter 3; namely, the frequency 
with which stamp duty law was enacted in response to the identified impetus, 
and the significance as well as the sustainability of the resulting stamp duty 
law.942  
4.2 Sustainability imperatives 
Focussing initially on the sustainability of the stamp duty system, we investigate 
whether this phenomenon gave rise to another class of stimuli effecting change 
in the Hong Kong stamp duty law.  
 
Sustainable development is defined in the 1987 United Nations’ Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future as 
the ability to assure progress ‘meets the needs of the present without 
                                            
941 The meaning of ‘success’ in this context is defined in Chapter 3. See section 3.1. 
942 See section 3.1. 
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compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. Other 
scholars have defined sustainability as the very characteristic of a process 
(phenomenon, system) to maintain a desirable path, within a given or 
acceptable lane, for an indefinite period of time.943 Specifically, in the context of 
the fiscal system, sustainable development means the continuing capacity to 
pay governmental expenditures and to initiate tax policies which generate 
benefits not only in the short-term, but also in the medium and long term.944  
 
These features are analysed so as to adapt the resultant concepts to this study. 
Sustainable development of the Hong Kong stamp duty system subsumes three 
dimensions of the law to ensure the following: 
1. Solvency. The capacity of the stamp duty system to consistently 
generate more stamp duty revenue than the associated collection cost, 
and to generate sufficient revenue for the government to pay its financial 
obligations, while maintaining the prevailing stamp duty tax structure 
(that is, without the need to augment tax rates or introduce novel 
chargeable instruments); 
2. Stability. The design and capacity of the Hong Kong stamp duty system 
to ensure taxpayer compliance, through resisting collapse arising from 
the failure of the system to adapt to changing circumstances. 
3. Fairness. The capacity of the stamp duty law to demonstrate clarity and 
impartiality in the stamp duty treatments of various instruments to ensure 
taxpayer compliance, and prevent a weakening of the system.  
 
Thus the aim of this section is to assess to what extent the promulgated stamp 
duty law was envisioned as a means to ensure any of the three foregoing 
dimensions of sustainability was maintained. To fulfil this aim, a number of 
significant Hong Kong stamp duty laws have been selected, to exemplify the 
landmark developments in offering convenience to the taxpayers, the 
comprehensibility of stamp duty law, the regulations introduced to determine the 
taxability of instruments with a foreign element, safeguard provisions to protect 
taxpayer rights, noncompliance provisions and exemption rules.  
                                            
943 Ana Patricia Homorodean and others, ‘Sustainability of Tax System in Romania’ (2014) II[3 
(5)] SEA - Practical Application of Science, 327.  
944 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
Our Common Future (United Nations 1987), pt I.3, para 27.
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4.2.1 An extension of convenience 
In seeking to ascertain whether the sustainability imperative was a driver in the 
development of Hong Kong stamp duty during the nineteenth century, the Hong 
Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1895945 is particularly revealing.  
 
The principal object of the 1895 stamp legislation was to enable the instruments 
under the respective heads of charge listed in Table 4.1, to be stamped without 
penalty at any time within seven days from their date of execution. The 
government’s proclamation makes it clear that this initiative was intended to 
enhance taxpayer satisfaction with the stamp duty collection mechanism and 
was a response to the previous high level of taxpayer frustration with the 
unreasonable and inconvenient requirement that the instruments be stamped 
before execution.946 
 
It might be argued that the 1895 Ordinance was also promulgated for a 
clandestine revenue objective, as there was a nexus between stamp revenue 
enhancement and improving taxpayer convenience. 947  The 1895 Ordinance 
provided a unique opportunity to test the hypothesis that stamp duty revenue 
would increase with the introduction of convenience alone.  
  
                                            
945 No 26 of 1895. 
946 Hong Kong Hansard 14 December 1895, 19. 
947 See section 2.3.6. 
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Table 4.1: Stamp revenues associated with instruments that could be stamped 
within seven days without penalty, 1895–1896 
Heads of chargea Revenue in 
1895 (HK$)b 
Revenue in 
1896 (HK$)c 
Increase/(Decrease) 
(HK$) 
Agreements 3,094 3,479 385 
Arbitration awards 28 2 (26) 
Attested copies 132 121 (11) 
Bonds concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
140 126 (14) 
Conveyances 13,895 14,051 156 
Co-partnership deeds 118 154 36 
Declarations of trust 20 70 50 
Deeds of gift 125 158 33 
Instruments under seal  360 290 (70) 
Leases at a premium 0 0 0 
Lease duplicates 0 0 0 
Leases at a rent 1,053 1,243 190 
Letters of hypothecation 558 409 (149) 
Mortgages 4,849 4,162 (687) 
Notarial acts 201 186 (15) 
Notes of protest 117 91 (26) 
Powers of Attorney  1,054 1,014 (40) 
Servant security bonds 510 329 (181) 
Settlements 28 61 33 
Total 26,282 25,946 (336) 
a Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 26 of 1895, s 4(iv). 
b Hong Kong Government Gazette, 9 January 1897. 
c Hong Kong Government Gazette, 9 January 1897. 
 
Table 4.1 demonstrates that the 1895 amendment was not effectual in 
generating more revenue in the short term. After comparison with the penny tax 
reform, it may be concluded that offering convenience alone does not 
necessarily lead to an increase in revenue. In order to secure more stamp 
revenue, the convenience mechanism had to be coupled with other factors such 
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as significant monetary incentives and the presence of voluminous 
transactions.948  
 
These findings confirm that the Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1895 949 was 
conceived solely to make the law more taxpayer-oriented, potentially 
decreasing taxpayers’ frustration in complying with the law. This ensured 
taxpayers’ voluntary compliance to enhance solvency and stability, which was 
the cornerstone of the system’s sustainability, conclusively reinforcing the 
underlying concern of the 1895 stamp duty amendment.  
 
In order to assess whether this imperative continued to drive the amendment of 
the stamp duty law after 1895 to the present day, three specific amendments 
have been selected and will be examined; namely the Ordinances of 1911,950 
1961951 and 1991.952  
 
First, the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1911953 enabled transfers 
of shares and bills of exchange to be stamped after execution with the prior 
agreement of the Collector of Stamp Duty.954 The effect of the law was similar to 
the 1895 legislation. 
 
Second, the Stamp Duties Management Amendment Ordinance 1961 955 
authorised the Stamp Office to grant allowances for spoiled or misused stamps 
by providing cash refunds.956 Previously, when the duty was overpaid or a 
stamp was spoiled, the law stated that stamps of the same value might be given 
to the taxpayers.957 In practice, the payer was given an allowance card which 
permitted free stamping of documents subsequently presented, up to the value 
                                            
948 Ibid. 
949 No 26 of 1895. 
950 No 34 of 1911. 
951 No 57 of 1961. 
952 No 34 of 1911. 
953 No 34 of 1911. 
954 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 34 of 1911, s 2. 
955 No 57 of 1961. 
956 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1961–62’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1962), 16. 
957 Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance, No 35 of 1911, s 9 before the 1961 
Stamp Duties Management Amendment Ordinance, No 57 of 1961 came into effect. 
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involved.958 The intention of the original law before the 1961 amendment was to 
prescribe effective Stamp Office internal control procedures by ensuring no 
cash would be handed out to the public by the stamp duty officers, preventing 
fraud and errors. While the original law adequately covered the case of those 
persons who required frequent stamping of documents, it was not suitable for 
those who required stamping of documents on single or infrequent occasions. 
The discussion demonstrates there was a trade-off between taxpayer 
convenience and the law intended to safeguard the Stamp Office’s internal 
control system. The evidence shows that the government reviewed the trade-off 
consistently, and progressively offered taxpayers convenience with regard to 
tax administrative issues when resources were available as Hong Kong 
developed. This enhanced taxpayer satisfaction, contributing to sustainability, 
by enhancing the fairness of the stamp duty system. 
 
Third, the introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 3] 
1991959 was another example where offering convenience was an impellent 
which shaped the Hong Kong stamp duty law. During the legislative process the 
government informed the Legislative Council members that the related changes 
sought to facilitate the implementation of the international trend towards 
paperless trading in stock dealing in Hong Kong by ending the use of physical 
paper stamps. The amendment would enable the Collector of Stamp Duties to 
enter into a contract with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) for the central 
collection of duty payable. Under the new system, authorised officers of the 
HKSE would be able to endorse contract notes to signify that duty had been, or 
would be, paid to the Collector.960 
 
An examination of the law found that the legislation authorised the Collector to 
enter into a contract with the HKSE without specifying much detail. 961  The 
legislative process did not disclose the content of the contract either.962 Further 
investigation into secondary sources relating to implementation of the law 
reveals the prevailing practice of affixing stamps for the stamp duty chargeable 
on contract notes issued in respect of every sale or purchase of any Hong Kong 
                                            
958 Per John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong Hansard 29 November 1961, 312.  
959 No 85 of 1991. 
960 Per Pier Jacobs, Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1991.  
961 1991 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 3], No 85 of 1991, s 5. 
962 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1991. 
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stock, was replaced by a new centralised stamp duty collection system requiring 
members of the HKSE to pay to the HKSE on the next trading day, the total 
stamp duty so payable on all dutiable trade on a given trading day. Then the 
HKSE should pay the aggregate amounts directly to the Collector. Accordingly, 
members of the HKSE would no longer be required to affix adhesive stamps 
onto contract notes and to make the relevant cancellation thereto to denote 
payment.963 
 
The discussion justifies that the stamp duty law was amended in 1991 due to 
the imperative to offer stock trading convenience. It is overt that the traditional 
way of affixing a physical stamp would not be effective in a high volume and 
paperless environment. The stability (thus sustainability) of the stamp duty 
system would be threatened if the legislation was not amended in step with the 
advancement of the stock trading process to offer convenience by doing away 
with the physical revenue stamps completely. 
 
The evidence thus establishes that the desire to offer convenience motivated 
the Hong stamp duty changes. The examination of the stamp duty law after 
1895 demonstrates that the imperative to align convenience with the 
preservation of sustainability, continued to influence the drafting of Hong Kong 
stamp duty provisions. No doubt, some of the above-mentioned amendments 
were repealed naturally as the government only imposed duty on instruments 
related to stocks and immovable properties after 1978. Nonetheless, the 
orthodox principle of offering convenience to enhance sustainability has a 
conspicuous place throughout the history of Hong Kong stamp duty and 
continued to be a driver of stamp duty changes in modern times.  
4.2.2 Comprehensibility of stamp duty law  
A second imperative potentially shaping the form of Hong Kong stamp duty was 
that of the comprehensibility of the law. Stamp duty law that was easier to 
comprehend was less likely to be avoided or evaded. Incomprehensible 
language in the stamp duty law could negatively affect tax compliance in 
general and increase the administrative costs of the Stamp Office, threatening 
the system’s existence. In other words, incomprehensibility of the stamp duty 
                                            
963 Richard Hechinger ‘Announcement from the Stock Exchange Phasing Out the Use of 
Adhesive Stamps as of 2 September 1991’ (Hong Kong Stock Exchange 9 August 1991). 
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law could induce insolvency and instability as well as giving rise to unfairness 
that could imperil system sustainability.  
 
The examination of Hong Kong stamp duty at the end of the nineteenth century 
shows that the stamp duty law had become immensely complex. This 
phenomenon is attributable to the continued adoption of British stamp 
legislation in Hong Kong since its introduction in 1866. This branch of the British 
law was complicated, and the reforms or amendments during the first forty 
years of the Hong Kong stamp duty system were characterised by the insertion 
of novel heads of charge and the addition of accompanying rules to counter 
noncompliance. There was no fundamental focus on enhancing the 
comprehensibility of the system in the nineteenth century.    
 
The analysis of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1911964 reflects 
an ever-increasing tendency for the stamp duty law to be incomprehensible in 
the early twentieth century. All of the mechanisms to counter noncompliance 
(which are discussed in section 4.2.4 below) introduced in the 1911 Hong Kong 
Stamp amendments were based on the British Stamp Act 1891 965 and the 
British Stamp Management Act 1891.966 Hong Kong law was usually modelled 
on, and copied word for word from, the complex and detailed British stamp duty 
law. No significant departure from the British rules was detected. The formula 
adopted by the Hong Kong government in implementing stamp duty 
mechanisms in the early twentieth century was simple: detect the shortcomings 
and look for solutions from the law in Britain. Colonial Treasurer Alexander 
Thomson (in office 1899–1918) summed up the approach in conceiving the 
1911 Stamp Ordinances: 
In going through the old Ordinances of the colony in connection with 
this subject (Hong Kong stamp duty) I discovered a number of 
defects in addition to several, which I noted from time to time in the 
past few years. This Bill cures these defects and at the same time 
makes some fuller explanation of the existing law. There is nothing 
                                            
964 No 34 of 1911. 
965 54 & 55 Vict c 39. 
966 54 & 55 Vict c 38. 
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new in the principle of the Bill that has not been in force in 
England.967 
  
As for the amendments to the stamp duty structure, the Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance 1911 968  also included accountable receipts, floating 
policies and share warrants to bearer, as new chargeable instruments.969 The 
Legislative Council had a lengthy discussion on the 1911 Ordinance, with the 
unofficial members raising numerous questions on the operation of the new law, 
notably as to the meaning of the new chargeable instruments. For instance, 
Henry Pollock, an unofficial member who was a King’s Counsel as well as the 
founder of the University of Hong Kong, asked the government: ‘What is an 
accountable receipt?’ Edbert Hewett, an unofficial member who was the head of 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company970 operation in Hong Kong, 
also desired the government to clarify the meaning of accountable receipts. 
Chaloner Alabaster, the Attorney General, explained that it was an instrument 
used in shipping. The unofficial members remained bemused. Even at the 
moment when the clause was committed, Hewett protested: ‘I never heard of 
the thing before. I don’t know what it means.’971  
 
The unofficial members’ illuminating remarks point directly to the fact that 
elements of stamp duty law in 1911 were already quite unintelligible to a layman 
or even a lawyer with no prolonged experience of stamp duty law. The unofficial 
members included a prominent legal expert and an experienced shipping 
merchant, and if they could not comprehend the elements of the stamp duty 
statute, it was safe to assume that the layman would have immense difficulties 
with the stamp duty law. It was also foreseeable that the Chinese taxpayers 
would be utterly lost due to the addition of the language barrier.  
 
The Legislative Council discussion of the 1911 Amendment Ordinance 
indicated the need for the Hong Kong government to alleviate the problem of 
legislative complexity. If the problem were allowed to worsen, Hong Kong 
people might be taxed by stamp duty law that they could not understand at all. 
                                            
967 Hong Kong Hansard 20 July 1911, 136–37. 
968 No 34 of 1911. 
969 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 34 of 1911, s 15. 
970 Popularly known as P&O today, a British shipping and logistics company.  
971 Hong Kong Hansard 3 August 1911, 144–47. 
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In that event, the sustainability of the Hong Kong stamp duty system would be 
jeopardised.  
 
To make the matter worse, in that same year (1911) the government introduced 
a Stamp Duties Management Ordinance972 to operate alongside the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1901973 and its consequent Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinances.974 
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance 1911 975  introduced 
numerous additional administrative provisions to supplement the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1901,976 initiating the following new rules: 
1. The Collector of Stamp Duty was enabled to grant a licence to any 
person to distribute adhesive stamps, and the penalties for unauthorised 
dealings were specified.977 Such power was not found in the 1901 Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance. 
2. The conditions and procedures were specified for obtaining allowances 
for spoiled or misused stamps, both impressed and adhesive.978 In the 
1901 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, it stated that allowances might be 
given for spoiled impressed stamps under certain situations but did not 
specify the claiming procedures.979 
3. Fifteen offences 980  relating to the physical use of the stamps were 
specified. The 1901 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance stated its own set of 
offences with some provisions similar to those promulgated under the 
Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance 1911.981 
 
Given that the introduction of a separate Ordinance to complement the existing 
stamp duty legislation would inevitably complicate the law, its rationale must be 
                                            
972 No 35 of 1911. 
973 No 22 of 1901. 
974 No 38 of 1902; No 19 of 1909; No 44 of 1909. 
975 No 35 of 1911. 
976 No 22 of 1901. 
977 Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance, No 35 of 1911, ss 3–6. 
978 Ibid ss 7–9. Spoiled and misused stamps might be created when an instrument is drawn and 
stamped but was never required, or that such mistakes were made in drawing it up. An 
instrument might turn out to be absolutely void that bears a high value stamp. 
979 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 22 of 1901, s 13. 
980 Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance, No 35 of 1911, ss 10–18. 
981 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 22 of 1901, ss 22–28. 
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explored. The Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance 1911982 was 
based on the British Stamp Duties Management Act 1891.983 It has been found 
that the British tradition of introducing a separate Stamp Duties Management 
Act to complement the main Stamp Duty Act started in 1870.984 The British 
parliamentary records do not reveal why the British Parliament passed the 1870 
British Stamp Duties Management Act with no debate. Apparently, the House of 
Commons only spent time debating the British Stamp Act 1870 that was 
presented to the Parliament concurrently.985 Management Acts were omitted 
from debates, as they were procedural, not substantive.  
 
The only viable rationale for instigating such a dual legislation system in Hong 
Kong was that the Stamp Duties Management Acts were not solely enacted for 
stamp duty purposes. They were enacted to govern the operations of the Post 
Office as well as the Excise Duty Office with regards to the use of stamps. For 
example, the Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance 1911 986 
provided that any ‘excise labels’ should be deemed to be ‘stamps’. 987  The 
Ordinance also stipulated that the expression ‘duty’ should also mean 
‘postage’988 and the Postmaster General should have the same power as the 
Collector of Stamp Duty under the Ordinance in all areas affecting the Post 
Offices of Hong Kong.989 
 
The practice of using two separate Ordinances to administer Hong Kong stamp 
duty inevitably increased the complexity of the system. In order to advise 
definitively on the procedures and offences pertaining to stamp duty, it was 
necessary to examine both the Stamp Ordinance and Stamp Duties 
Management Ordinances, side by side. The information was scattered through 
the two sets of laws. To make the subject more intractable, some of the 
provisions stated in the two statutes were nearly identical in intent but 
expressed in different words. Very close examination was required to extract 
                                            
982 No 35 of 1911. 
983 Letter from Frederick Lugard to Lewis Harcourt (31 August 1911), CO129/379, 203. 
984 Indeed, it was a long-standing British tradition. There was a Taxes Management Act for the 
old assessed taxes and for the income tax back in 1803. 
985 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 4 August 1870, series 3, vol 203, col 1518 & 
1560; House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 5 August 1870, series 3, vol 203, col 1573. 
986 No 35 of 1911. 
987 Hong Kong Stamp Duties Management Ordinance, No 35 of 1911, s 20. 
988 Ibid s 21. 
989 Ibid s 22. 
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the subtle differences, if any. For instance, section 25 of the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1901 990  and section 10(1) of the Hong Kong Stamp Duties 
Management Ordinance 1911991 both articulated the meaning attached to the 
forging of stamps and related penalties.  
 
Certainly, the convention of implementing stamp duty in Hong Kong by using 
two Ordinances augmented the taxpayers’ compliance costs as well as the 
government’s administrative costs, by creating frustration and confusion. This 
adopted British tradition was unhelpful in building up the sustainability of the 
stamp duty system in Hong Kong. 
 
It was evident that there existed a clear imperative to improve the 
comprehensibility of stamp duty law with the ultimate aim to maintain system 
sustainability. It must now be seen how this imperative drove the development 
of Hong Kong stamp duty.  
 
In a failed attempt to make the law more comprehensible, the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1901992 greatly increased the heads of charge from thirty-five 
headings to fifty-one headings but a comparison of the new and the old 
charging schedules reveals that no new chargeable instrument was 
introduced.993 Some heads of charge were repetitive in the 1901 Ordinance. For 
instance, Head 9: ‘Attorney, letters or powers of’ is the same as Head 36: 
‘Letters or powers of attorney’ and Head 42: ‘Powers of attorney.’ This should 
be compared with a singular Head 30: ‘Powers of attorney’ under the 1886 
Ordinance.994 The 1901 amendment was an attempt to make the law more 
user-friendly. Nonetheless, in the process, the law was made more 
cumbersome with a formidable list of fifty-one heads of charge. In particular, 
when the law was translated into Chinese for the Chinese population, it made 
no real sense to have a longer list. It was a challenging task to go through the 
long schedule to comprehend the law. 
 
                                            
990 No 22 of 1901. 
991 No 35 of 1911. 
992 No 22 of 1901. 
993 See Appendix II. 
994 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 16 of 1886, sch. 
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During the legislative process of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921,995 
Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in office 1915–1930) did not mention that the 
demand for comprehensibility was a driver for the 1921 major stamp duty 
reform. As an educated conjecture, he was too preoccupied with piloting the law 
through the Hong Kong Legislative Council,996 promulgated in respect of the 
other aspects of the 1921 reform – the increasing of revenue, prevention of 
evasion and correction of defects in the prevailing stamp duty law. During his 
speech introducing the 1921 stamp duty reform, he was not explicit as to his 
intention to enhance stamp duty law comprehensibility and no opposition was 
expected to such amendments. Nonetheless by analysing the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1921,997 it can be found that Kemp included extensive new 
definitive sections to give precise meanings to the chargeable instruments.998 
Previously, the definitions were inexact or non-existent. Furthermore, he added 
three columns in the charging schedule to show clearly for each instrument, the 
following detail:  
1. The nature of stamps (ie whether the applicable stamps were over-
embossed or adhesive);  
2. The points of time before which the instruments had to be stamped; 
3. The persons liable for stamping.999 
Moreover, in response to an unabated need recognised by government for 
comprehensibility, Kemp redrafted the charging schedule in 19211000 to correct 
the defects of the repetitive heads of charge that were introduced in the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 1901.1001  
 
The new measures improved the clarity of the Stamp Ordinance significantly. 
Surmising from the evidence collected, it is concluded that the need for 
comprehensibility did play a part in shaping the 1921 stamp duty reform. 
Nevertheless, as compared to other expressed driving forces which influenced 
the 1921 stamp duty reform, it cannot be said that improving comprehensibility 
                                            
995 No 8 of 1921. 
996 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 29. 
997 No 8 of 1921. 
998 Ibid s 3. 
999 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, sch. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 No 22 of 1901. 
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(thus sustainability) was a major impellent that shaped the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system.    
 
The potential of comprehensibility as a driving force for stamp duty development 
is examined, relating to the period after the 1921 major stamp duty reform and 
before the 1978 landmark reduction of the number of chargeable instruments. 
During this period, the Stamp Duty Ordinance was amended over sixty times, 
but none of the amendments were made with comprehensibility in mind. 
Indeed, these amendments made the comprehensibility of the law even worse. 
The evidence shows that the demand for comprehensibility to maintain 
sustainability was secondary to the demand for revenue and social welfare in 
shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty system from 1922 to 1978. Financial 
Secretary Philip Haddon-Cave (in office 1971–1981) remarked in 1978 that 
stamp duty as a tax on legal documents had been extended during the period 
‘to a wide range of documents at relatively high rates by international standards’ 
with provisions that were ‘difficult to interpret’.1002 This shows the amendments 
during this period impeded the comprehensibility of the stamp duty law.  
 
Investigating the reason for the government’s indifference towards enhancing 
comprehensibility during the period from 1922 to 1977, it is surmised that Kemp 
was believed to have solved the comprehensibility problem in 1921, as 
demonstrated above. It is also possible that the Hong Kong government’s 
apparent lack of interest in enhancing comprehensibility before 1978 could have 
been due to the non-payment of stamp duty being made a criminal offence in 
1921 and no longer considered a voluntary matter. In order to avoid a criminal 
charge, taxpayers were forced to ascertain their liabilities despite the 
incomprehensibility of the law. The government’s lack of interest could also be 
due to the setting up of other effective noncompliance counter measures during 
the twentieth century which eased the necessity to ameliorate the intelligibility of 
the stamp duty law.1003  
 
In the quest to establish whether comprehensibility was a driver in the 
development of Hong Kong stamp duty in the later part of the twentieth century, 
                                            
1002 Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1978, 555–56. 
1003 See section 4.2.4. 
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the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 19781004 shows that there was a 
rekindling of the impetus to improve comprehensibility. It can be recalled that an 
economic imperative drove Haddon-Cave to drastically reduce the ambit of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance in 1978 by deleting twenty-seven heads of 
charge.1005 The government took the opportunity to downsize the stamp duty 
law by deleting many out-dated, complicated and redundant provisions to 
improve comprehensibility. 1006  Even though it can be argued that the 
enhancement of comprehensibility was merely incidental to the quest for 
economic development stimulated by the 1978 stamp duty reform, it can be 
asserted that improving comprehensibility was recognised as a desirable aim 
and was acted upon by the tax reformer. The discussion reveals that 
comprehensibility was a force in shaping the stamp duty law in 1978, but not 
the major impetus.    
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1981 1007  is particularly relevant in this 
context. During its introduction the Deputy Financial Secretary Henry Ching (in 
office 1976–1984) remarked in the Legislative Council that the law was an 
outcome of a tidying exercise that was initiated towards the end of 1978, 
suggesting thereby that the stamp duty legislation was enacted to improve 
comprehensibility. He said: 
It [referring to the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1981]1008 not only 
clarifies a number of old areas of doubt, but should also greatly assist 
the legal profession, and others concerned with stamp duty matters, 
towards a proper interpretation of the law and the underlying 
intentions of the legislature. It is essentially a consolidation measure, 
and, upon enactment will repeal the present Stamp Ordinance and 
the associated Stamp Duties Management Ordinance, as well as 
subsidiary legislation made under those Ordinances.1009  
                                            
1004 No 22 of 1978. 
1005 See section 3.5.3. 
1006 For example, see Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 22 of 1978. Under this 
Ordinance, many stamp duty mechanisms were deleted. To name a few, the provisions 
governing cheques supplied by authorised banks, the effect of non-compliance in the case of 
bills of exchange, the foreign bills and notes, the bills in sets, the penalty regarding an 
unstamped bill or note, the exchange contracts, the mortgages of shares chargeable as 
agreements and the telegraphic transfers, were deleted. 
1007 No 31 of 1981. 
1008 Ibid. 
1009 Hong Kong Hansard 11 March 1981, 647. 
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Analysing the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1981,1010 it is learned that the most 
significant alteration made by the Hong Kong government was to take resolute 
steps to clear the irregularities embedded within the British-style stamp duty 
system used in Hong Kong. As discussed above, the oddity of history in the 
British stamp duty system was the operation of the Stamp Duties Management 
Ordinance operating in parallel with the Stamp Ordinance. The Stamp Duties 
Management Ordinance made provisions for certain administrative matters, and 
for various offences, in relation to postage stamps, as well as stamps used for 
the purposes of the Stamp Ordinance, with responsibilities split between the 
Collector of Stamp Revenue and the Postmaster General.1011  
  
Clearly, it was more appropriate for postal matters to be covered by the Post 
Office-specific legislation. Accordingly, the Hong Kong government decided to 
remove references to postage stamps from the stamp duty legislation and to 
introduce appropriate amendments into the Post Office Ordinance. In relation to 
the stamp duty system, in 1981, Haddon-Cave repealed the Hong Kong Stamp 
Duties Management Ordinance 19111012 and the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
1921.1013 He combined them into one single Stamp Ordinance – the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1981 1014  to simplify and considerably improve 
comprehensibility. 
 
A Hong Kong Legislative Council unofficial member Peter Wong (in office 1976–
1988) summed up the state of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 19811015 at the 
time:  
I therefore welcome the Stamp Duty Bill 1981, which is a sensible 
and progressive measure designed to facilitate the collection of 
stamp revenue and the removal of anomalies. In England, the 
Stamp Duties Management Act, 1891 and the Stamp Act, 1891, as 
amended by various Finance and Revenue Acts, notably the 
Finance Acts, 1949, 1970 and 1971, constitute the present law on 
                                            
1010 No 31 of 1981. 
1011 Hong Kong Stamp Duty Management Ordinance, No 35 of 1911, s 22. 
1012 No 35 of 1911. 
1013 No 8 of 1921. 
1014 No 31 of 1981. 
1015 Ibid. 
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the subject of stamp duties. The Bill now before the Council brings 
under one umbrella the existing Stamp Ordinance and the Stamp 
Duties Management Ordinance. In this respect, we are, for a 
change, ahead of English legislation.1016  
 
A survey of the historical circumstances at that time did not identify any ulterior 
financial motive that the government might have had in the introduction of the 
1981 Stamp Ordinance. 1017  After all, there was no requirement to raise 
additional revenue at that time and the stamp duty revenue was on the rise after 
the promulgation of the ‘less is more’ approach under 1978 Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance.1018 Further, the analysis of the 1981 Ordinance shows 
that it was not designed to meet any social, economic and political agenda. 
Thus, the evidence presented shows that, in 1981, the imperative to improve 
comprehensibility took centre stage for the first time in moulding the stamp duty 
law.  
 
It is clear that the amelioration fuelled by the need to improve the clarity of the 
Hong Kong stamp duty law was successful, as the 1981 stamp legislation 
persisted in its original form to this day. Further evidence to support this 
conclusion is found in the comments written by leading Hong Kong tax 
practitioners and writers on the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation promulgated 
in 1981:  
Although practitioners still complain of the complexity of, and the 
difficulty in advising upon, the Stamp Duty Ordinance, it is none the 
less compact, fairly well organized and perhaps deserving the epithet 
of the only modern piece of fiscal legislation enacted in Hong 
Kong.1019  
 
Following the development to this point, the evidence demonstrates that the 
demand for comprehensibility on the whole had limited influence on the 
                                            
1016 Per Peter C Wong, Hong Kong Hansard 13 May 1981, 876. Peter C Wong was the 
president of the Hong Kong Law Society between 1973 and 1975. He was appointed as 
unofficial member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council in the 1970s and 1980s. 
1017 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 31 of 1981. 
1018 See section 3.5.3. 
1019 P G Willoughby and A J Halkyard, A Guide to Hong Kong Stamp Duty (Hong Kong, 
Butterworths Asia 1999), 2. Referring to Stamp Duty Ordinance enacted in 1981. 
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development of stamp duty law based on the number of instances that stamp 
duty laws were amended to improve comprehensibility. There were only three 
such instances identified and another instance when the law was simplified but 
in that case incidentally to the dominant economic consideration. Nonetheless, 
the ground-breaking practice of bringing all stamp duty provisions under one 
Ordinance, triggered by the imperative to make the stamp duty law more 
comprehensible in 1981 was effective in paving the way for the future 
development of the stamp duty regime by safeguarding the law from 
unnecessary complication.  
4.2.3 Specific problems of sustainability: jurisdiction to tax  
The preceding two sections show that the demand for definite rules and 
regulations to enhance system sustainability was clearly evident in some stamp 
duty changes. This section continues to investigate whether the need for 
sustainability shaped the stamp duty law development in relation to instruments 
that included a foreign element, distinguishing between onshore (thus taxable) 
and offshore (thus non-taxable) instruments.  
 
The proposition is that the demand for system sustainability would influence the 
legislators to develop legislation specifically designed to discern the applicable 
jurisdictions for levying the instruments. 1020  This need arises due to the 
inadequacy of the initial Hong Kong stamp duty regime which was designed in 
1866 when economies were relatively closed and the movement of money 
across national borders was limited. It follows that the law did not take into 
account the trend towards globalisation and the integration of economies, made 
possible by the increasing ease with which business transactions were 
conducted across borders, beginning in the early nineteenth century.1021 The 
trend towards globalisation might have exposed the deficiencies of the stamp 
duty regime.  
 
Analysing the law, the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance introduced in 1866 
was indeed unclear as to whether chargeable instruments with foreign elements 
                                            
1020 See section 2.3.4 for examples on instruments with a foreign element. 
1021 Kevin H O'Rourke and Jeffrey G Williamson, ‘When Did Globalization Begin?’ (2000) 
WP(7632) National Bureau of Economic Research, 28. 
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should be subject to stamp duty.1022 It can be recalled that the first Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance levied duty on foreign bills of exchange that were: 
1. bills drawn within but payable out of the colony; and 
2. bills drawn out of the colony which shall be accepted, endorsed, 
transferred, paid or otherwise negotiated within the colony.1023 
 
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Ordinance only specified some 
rudimentary rules to identify which foreign bills of exchange were subject to 
stamp duty.1024 The reason for the 1866 Hong Kong legislative omission of 
more explicit law to determine the taxability of other instruments with foreign 
elements was attributed to the fact that the contemporary British stamp duty law 
was yet to establish any concrete legislation to dictate how instruments with 
foreign elements were to be treated.1025 
 
Examining the evidence, it is submitted that the sustainability of the stamp duty 
system would be threatened on two grounds. First, the Stamp Office might not 
be able to distinguish applicable jurisdictions, and thus revenue maintenance 
may be at risk due to the potential for disputes about the treatment of 
instruments with a possible foreign element, giving rise to consequent revenue 
leakage. This would pose a solvency problem if the number of such instruments 
was substantial. Second, the stability of the system might be jeopardised if 
taxpayers were able to exploit ambiguous stamp duty law regarding whether the 
instruments were onshore (thus taxable) or offshore (thus non-taxable). 
Accordingly, these two threats might lead to a weakening or collapse of the 
stamp duty system, reflecting the effects of intensification arising from 
globalisation and the integration of economies. Consequently, the determining 
of applicable jurisdictions, thus affecting sustainability, might have emerged as 
a potential imperative and driving force behind the changes to Hong Kong 
stamp duty legislation.   
 
The study of Hong Kong stamp duty history shows that the demand for clear 
law to identify the applicable jurisdictions of the instruments (thus sustainability 
                                            
1022 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866. 
1023 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, s 11; see section 2.3.4. 
1024 Ibid. 
1025 See section 2.3.4. 
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of the stamp duty system) attracted a response in the form of the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1884.1026 The 1884 Ordinance recorded the first breakthrough 
in this area. It stipulated that instruments executed outside the colony, but 
brought into force or registered within Hong Kong, should attract Hong Kong 
stamp duty. Analysing the law, it was quite clear that the documents had to be 
legally enforceable in Hong Kong in order to attract Hong Kong stamp duty. 
This position should be contrasted with the wider provision under the British 
Stamp Act 1891 belonging to the same period, which was not incorporated by 
the Hong Kong government. The British Stamp Act 1891 provides that the 
British tax authorities could collect stamp duties on documents that related to 
any matters or things, done or to be done, in Britain.1027 Inevitably, the British 
law invited litigation.1028    
 
The Hong Kong unambiguous, simple to follow, general rule, to determine the 
jurisdictions of application of instruments, undoubtedly prevented disputes 
between the taxpayers and the Stamp Office, and enhanced the system 
sustainability. The examination of the Hong Kong stamp duty history shows that 
the ethos of the 1884 section, conceived to provide a clearer picture of the legal 
position on jurisdictions of instruments, was retained in the 1921 stamp duty 
reform 1029  and was in force till it was repealed by the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1981. 1030  By 1981, the rule was no longer necessary as the 
government had repealed all chargeable instruments except documents 
executed in respect of conveyance of immovable properties and stocks which 
had specific legislation enacted to dictate their jurisdictions for tax.  
  
It is found that besides enacting the general rule as discussed above, the 
demand for locality identification drove the Hong Kong stamp duty reformers to 
introduce new legislative provisions in order to distinguish jurisdictions for 
specific instruments to attain system sustainability.   
 
                                            
1026 No 15 of 1884. 
1027 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39), s 14(4). 
1028 See for examples, IRC v Maple & Co (Paris) Ltd [1908] AC 22; Ansell v IRC [1929] 1 KB 
608; Oscar Faber v IRC [1936] 1 All ER 617. 
1029 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 17. 
1030 No 31 of 1981. 
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With respect to the specific law enacted for bills of exchange, the first law in this 
area was enacted in 1866, as discussed above. Evaluation of the Hong Kong 
stamp duty history shows that there were minor amendments to the wording of 
laws over time to close loopholes1031 but the philosophy of the 1866 regulations 
was intact until the law was no longer necessary and repealed in 1978 with the 
abolition of bills of exchange as chargeable instruments.1032 
  
More significantly, the appraisal of the Hong Kong stamp duty history uncovers 
that the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 19211033 was the first piece of legislation 
to deal specifically with the taxing right of instruments in respect of immovable 
properties that were tinted with foreign components. The rule prescribed was 
simple; all instruments which related to immovable properties situated out of the 
colony should be exempted from stamp duty. In other words, conveyances 
executed overseas in respect of Hong Kong immovable properties attracted 
Hong Kong stamp duties; conveyances executed in Hong Kong in respect of 
immovable properties situated outside of the colony were exempted. It must be 
concluded that this rule was effective in making the law absolutely clear in this 
respect. It was a rational exemption, as the Hong Kong government had no 
jurisdiction over properties situated outside of Hong Kong. Although the legal 
form changed from being a specific exemption in the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1921 1034  to a direct description of the chargeable instrument as 
‘Hong Kong’ immovable property in the schedule annexed to the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1981, the substance remained.1035 The tenet developed in 
1921 remains as a core concept in today’s Hong Kong stamp duty system.  
 
Examining how the law was influenced by the continuous pursuit of stamp duty 
system sustainability in Hong Kong, the investigation reveals that the first 
specific law to distinguish the locality of the share contract notes was passed in 
1968. The Commissioner of Hong Kong Inland Revenue, Arthur Duffy (in office 
1963–1972) explicated that the novel rule introduced in 1968 to discern the 
locality of shares and related documents was the ‘result of the culmination of 
                                            
1031 For example, the instruments had to be stamped before the holder presented it for payment, 
indorsed, transferred or in any manner negotiated or paid the bills or notes.  
1032 See section 3.5.3; Appendix V. 
1033 No 8 of 1921, s 34(3). 
1034 No 8 of 1921, s 34(3). 
1035 No 31 of 1981, first sch. 
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some ten years’ research and deliberation.’1036 The law Duffy referred to was 
the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1968, introduced to the effect 
that stamp duty on stock contract notes would only be payable if the transfer 
was required to be registered in Hong Kong. 1037  In other words, the law 
prescribed a simple rule to clarify that stocks with share registers maintained 
outside of Hong Kong were classified as offshore and the related transfers 
would not attract stamp duty. This cleared the uncertainty that had existed since 
the 1866 stamp duty introduction. The principle has remained as the keystone 
of the Hong Kong stamp duty system until the present day.  
 
The available evidence reveals that the Hong Kong government did not 
vigorously pursue the definition of assessable jurisdictions notwithstanding 
demands to clarify the rules. The imperative to define relevant jurisdictions and 
the assessment of transactions to ensure system sustainability was a minor 
driver in shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty system.  
 
It is suggested that the government’s apparent disinterest was occasioned by 
stamp duty being primarily paid on a voluntary basis until 1921. The motivation 
to pay stamp duty was mainly due to the need for the holder of the instrument to 
gain Hong Kong judicial protection, of the instruments executed. Nonetheless, 
the Hong Kong Courts’ capacity to enforce instruments with foreign components 
was questionable. Therefore, the taxpayers would not voluntarily pay duties on 
such instruments even if the stamp duty law had impeccable provisions to deal 
with issues arising from jurisdictions to tax.  
 
Even after 1921 when the payment of stamp duty was made compulsory in 
Hong Kong, the government remained lax with regard to making specific rules 
relating to the many instruments under the Stamp Ordinance. Probably, this 
was due to the complications involved, as well as the anticipated difficulties 
associated with enforcement. 
 
                                            
1036 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1968–69’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1969), 19. 
1037 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 304; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 30 
of 1968, s 16. 
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Nonetheless, the specific regulations promulgated in 1921 and 1968, driven by 
the demand to identify jurisdictions of instruments in respect of conveyances 
and stocks respectively, were instrumental in maintaining the Hong Kong stamp 
system sustainability during the period of globalisation in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. This was particularly the case during the rapid advance of the 
Hong Kong economy after the World War II, which rendered stamp duty 
revenue on stocks, immovable properties and related transactions, increasingly 
important.1038 It was even more significant when the Hong Kong government 
eventually reduced the list of taxable instruments to those related to stocks and 
conveyances in 1978.1039 The system sustainability was conditional upon the 
enactment of clear law in this area.  
4.2.4 Procedural developments in countering noncompliance1040 
The examination of stamp duty history suggests that the need to cultivate 
system sustainability by enhancing the law to counter stamp duty 
noncompliance was potentially another force driving the reform of the Hong 
Kong’s stamp duty regime. Stamp duty system sustainability is partly contingent 
upon effective noncompliance measures. Without these rules, the stamp duty 
system might not be able to generate adequate revenue to maintain solvency. 
Moreover, the stability of the system might be threatened in the event a 
government attempt to enhance revenue by aggressively raising stamp duty 
rates, inducing taxpayers’ to be noncompliant. In this instance, the fairness of 
the system would be jeopardised as the stamp duty burden would be borne by 
taxpayers who chose to comply, while non-compliant taxpayers would escape 
without repercussions. Ostensibly, the three cornerstones of system 
                                            
1038 See Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental 
Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1970–71’ (Hong Kong, 
Government Printer 1971), 54; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong 
Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 
1980–81’ (Hong Kong, Government Printer 1981), sch 26. The stamp duty collected on share 
contract notes immediately after the implementation of the Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment 
Ordinance, No 30 of 1968 were HK$19,543,475 and HK$26,940,823 for the fiscal years 
1969/70 and 1970/71 respectively, representing 20.7% and 20.8% of the total stamp revenues 
for those two fiscal years. The stamp duty collected on share contract notes was 
HK$309,701,047 and HK$989,648,912 for the fiscal years 1979/80 and 1980/81 respectively, 
representing 33.2% and 48.2% of the total stamp revenues for those two fiscal years. 
1039 See section 3.5.3. 
1040 As discussed in Chapter 2, in this thesis, the term stamp duty noncompliance encompasses 
both the modern day tax taxonomy of stamp duty evasion and stamp duty avoidance as well as 
the act of deciding not to pay stamp duty when the instruments were executed. See section 
2.3.8. 
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sustainability – solvency, stability and fairness – were linked to procedural 
developments in countering noncompliance.    
 
An analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty evolution from 1867 to 1997 reveals that 
there were several provisions in the Stamp Ordinance to counteract 
noncompliance. They were: 
1. Provisions to ensure compliance; that the necessary duties were paid 
voluntarily and all instruments required to be stamped, were in fact 
stamped. 
2. Provisions to counteract stamp duty evasion. For the purpose of this 
study, stamp duty evasion is defined as the illegal circumvention of 
duties by deliberately misrepresenting the true state of the dutiable 
transactions to the Collector of Stamp Duty.  
3. Provisions to curb stamp duty avoidance. For the purpose of this study, 
stamp duty avoidance is defined as the legal use of stamp duty law to 
reduce tax burden.  
In order to discern to what degree the imperative to counter noncompliance 
influenced the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance during the period of study, 1867 to 
1997, each type of provision will be considered in turn.  
 
Provision to ensure compliance (voluntary and full payment)  
It can be recalled that the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 prescribed 
general noncompliance measures to encourage voluntary compliance. 1041 
General rules to counter noncompliance refer to legislation that is not enacted 
for any particular class of transaction. The rules are applicable to all 
transactions. The initial 1866 general noncompliance provisions were outlined in 
the following terms: 
1. Awarding the whole or part of the fine gained by the Hong Kong 
government to informers of incidences of documents being executed but 
not stamped.1042 
2. Rendering unstamped documents inadmissible in courts before the 
payment of the assessed duties as well as the penalties.1043 
                                            
1041 See section 2.3.8. 
1042 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 12 of 1866, s 30. 
1043 Ibid s 15. 
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3. Ordering public officers not to act upon unstamped documents before the 
payment of the payment of the assessed duties as well as the 
penalties.1044 
4. Levying penalties on instruments presented for stamping after the time 
limits prescribed by the Ordinance.1045 
The function of these provisions was to encourage voluntary compliance in the 
first instance rather than being faced with legal consequences later on. Such 
rules were needed as it was no offence not to stamp a document in 18661046 
and the government had no way of knowing whether taxable written instruments 
had been executed but not duly stamped.  
 
The examination shows that the government repealed measure 1 above, the 
provision rewarding informers who discovered noncompliance, when it carried 
out the 1884 stamp duty reform.1047 In the absence of any explanation provided 
by the government during the legislative process, it is suggested that the law 
was unpopular among taxpayers and would cause social disharmony and 
threaten the sustainability of the stamp duty system. An examination of 
newspaper coverage at the time, does not reveal any discussion of measure 1, 
or provide any other reason, as these reports concentrated solely on the 
amendments to the stamp tax structure.1048 Another possible explanation for the 
repeal was that the law was ineffective and did not really make sense, as 
technically a failure to stamp only became an offence in 1921. 
 
The examination of the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation during the next thirty 
years from 1884 to 1914, demonstrates that the demand for general 
noncompliance measures to encourage voluntarily compliance had only a minor 
influence on the Hong Kong stamp duty law. The changes detected during this 
period generally related to intensifying the magnitudes of monetary penalties in 
                                            
1044 Ibid. 
1045 Ibid s 16. 
1046 Per Joseph Kemp, Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 29. 
1047 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884. 
1048 See Editorial, ‘Hong Kong Legislative Council on The Stamp Ordinance’ Hong Kong Daily 
Press (Hong Kong 8 January 1885), 2; Editorial, ‘The Daily Press’ Hong Kong Daily Press 
(Hong Kong 14 January 1885), 2; Editorial, ‘Amended Stamp Ordinance’ Hong Kong Daily 
Press (Hong Kong 28 March 1885), 2. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 250 
the event of detected noncompliance.1049 It is possible that the related British 
tenets inherited in 1866 were adequate in promoting voluntary compliance in 
the early years of the system’s existence. The evidence to support this theory is 
that the British stamp duty system continued to depend on the same principles 
to ensure voluntary compliance for the entire twentieth century.1050  
  
The historical evidence suggests that the need to ensure stamp duty voluntary 
compliance had more impact on the Hong Kong stamp duty development from 
1914 onwards. This was triggered by the 1908 British government decision to 
curtail the opium trade in Hong Kong, forcing the Hong Kong government to 
enhance stamp duty revenue to make up for the loss of the substantial opium-
related income.1051 The Hong Kong government started to make changes to the 
stamp duty structures by the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 
19091052 to enhance revenue and eventually some tax rates were aggressively 
doubled by virtue of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921.1053 These changes 
might have led to taxpayer noncompliance normally associated with such 
exercises. For that reason, there was greater demand for a legislative response 
to pre-empt fiscal disobedience through strengthening legislation that boosted 
voluntary stamping.  
 
The first response was the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1914.1054 
It prescribed that where the issuers had the legal obligation to cancel adhesive 
stamps on receipts, these were to be cancelled by the issuers before delivering 
them out of their hands.1055 Obviously, the law was to prevent dishonest people 
from re-using the adhesive stamp. On further thought, the more subtle 
implication of the law was to make it explicit that adhering stamps on receipts 
was not voluntary; it was intended to be compulsory. This was useful, as 
whether stamp duty was a voluntary or compulsory tax, was still ambiguous in 
                                            
1049 For example, see Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 15 of 1884, s 10, which increased the 
monetary penalties.   
1050 J G Monroe and R S Nock, Monroe and Nock on the Law of Stamp Duties (7th edn, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell 1989), 18–29. 
1051 See section 3.4.2. 
1052 No 19 of 1909. 
1053 No 8 of 1921. 
1054 No 14 of 1914. 
1055 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 14 of 1914, s 2. 
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Hong Kong in 1914. The 1914 Ordinance hinted at the legal trend to make 
stamp duty a compulsory tax to enhance the sustainability of the system.  
 
The second response was included in the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921, 
introducing many revolutionary stamp duty mechanisms.1056 It was an integral 
part of the stamp duty reform with the dominant objective being to enhance 
revenue by significantly increasing stamp duty rates.1057 It can be recalled that 
these mechanisms included the concept of making the payment of stamp duty a 
compulsory civil obligation, and the non-payment of stamp duty, a criminal 
offence; 1058  the concept of joint and several liability to stamp duty for 
instruments that involved two or more parties;1059 and, the concept of rendering 
unstamped documents wholly inadmissible in civil proceedings or 
registrations. 1060  It can be said that, besides being enacted for a revenue 
objective, these general concepts countering noncompliance were also initiated 
to meet the secondary requirement to enhance system sustainability. It is 
submitted that these rules assisted in alleviating the threat to the stamp duty 
system’s sustainability by outstripping the possibility of widespread 
noncompliance commonly associated with a significant increase in stamp duty 
rates, as was the case in 1921.1061    
 
About a year following the actual implementation of the new rule (1921) to 
render unstamped documents wholly inadmissible in civil proceedings or 
registrations,1062 the colonial government realised that the rule would cause 
considerable hardship in the case of contracts. It was brought to the attention of 
the Hong Kong government in 1922 that agreements were very frequently 
entered into by persons who had no legal advice, and who probably never 
thought of the question of stamping at all.1063 If litigation occurred, the party 
relying on the agreement might find they were unable to enforce their rights, 
solely because the agreement was not stamped. The other party to the contract 
was thus provided with an unworthy defence to an obligation that was otherwise 
                                            
1056 See section 3.3.7. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 5(7); see section 3.3.7. 
1059 Ibid s 5(5). 
1060 Ibid s 6. 
1061 See section 3.3.7. 
1062 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, s 6. 
1063 Letter from Claud Severn to Winston Churchill (17 October 1922), CO129/476, 295. 
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perfectly good. Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in office 1915–1930) said the 
stringency of the original principle was to compel the general public to stamp all 
agreements. After a review of the law, the colonial government found that ‘the 
sporadic cases of individual hardship would probably never teach the 
community at large’ and there would be no justification to insist the agreements 
be wholly inadmissible if not stamped within seven days.1064 Accordingly, the 
Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 19221065 was introduced to the effect 
that non-payment of stamp duty on agreements and some other instruments 
was no offence. These instruments would still be stamped after the seven day 
period had lapsed subject to payment of penalties. Without the amendment, it 
was clear that the public might show contempt in the face of the stamp duty 
system’s unfairness and thus threaten its sustainability. The evidence leads to 
the conclusion that the law was modified by the need to preserve the system.  
 
The demand for sustainability continued to influence legislators, leading them to 
relax the strictness of the law originating in 1921 to prevent community 
resentment. Ultimately (1981), the law was amended to the effect that all 
chargeable instruments not duly stamped beforehand might be received in 
evidence in civil proceedings, if the court so ordered, upon the personal 
undertaking of the solicitor representing the party to cause the instrument to be 
stamped in respect of the stamp duty chargeable thereon and the payment of 
any applicable penalty.1066 The law remains in force till the present day.   
 
With a view to restoring impartiality and, thereby, the sustainability of the 
system, the Hong Kong stamp duty mechanism was again fundamentally 
altered in 1976. The principle originating in 1921, which made it a criminal 
offence if a person liable for stamping a document failed to ensure that it was 
properly stamped, was repealed. 1067  Investigating the rationale behind the 
change, shows that the legislative amendment was prompted by the Privy 
Council’s expressed concern over whether the law in Hong Kong could impose 
criminal liability on parties acting bona fide, for example, where the value of 
                                            
1064 Ibid 296. 
1065 No 24 of 1922. 
1066 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 31 of 1981, s 15 (1A). 
1067 Hong Kong Hansard 26 May 1976, 914; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 33 
of 1976, s 2. 
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property assigned was found to be substantially more than the price at which it 
had changed hands.1068  
 
As regards the doctrine of joint and several liability introduced in 1921, the 
examination of stamp duty history shows that no change was effected. It was 
retained in Head 1: Immovable property in the current Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance.1069 Modern day taxpayers may query the necessity of the doctrine 
as solicitors usually collect all stamp duties from the transferee (buyer) of the 
real properties before proceeding with the legal formalities. Through the review 
of the historical origins of the doctrine, it is concluded that the rule was not 
initially designed only for conveyances of sale. Its application in 1921 was for a 
wide variety of instruments with multiple parties, with the objective being to 
counter non-compliance. All such instruments have been repealed today except 
for agreements of purchase and sale for an immovable property and 
conveyances for sale. The intended function of the principle depleted 
significantly.1070 Perhaps the modern transferees (buyers) of real property may 
use the phrase ‘jointly and severally liable’ stated in the Stamp Ordinance to 
bargain with the transferors (sellers) to share the stamp duty burdens, a 
practice which was not envisioned in the 1921 stamp duty reform. 
 
The evidence shows that the need to enhance sustainability had led to the 
introduction of a number of noncompliance provisions to encourage voluntary 
payment. Nonetheless, some of these amendments conceived after 1921 were 
to neutralise the detrimental effects on impartiality arising from the 
noncompliance provisions introduced by Kemp in 1921.  
 
Provisions to counteract stamp duty evasion 
Evasion, which is the fraudulent non-payment of the duty, has been and 
continues a serious matter for all tax systems. The key general counter evasion 
rule that was enacted under the Hong Kong first Stamp Duty Ordinance was to 
levy penalties if a taxpayer was found to be wilfully inserting an amount lower 
than the true consideration in respect of instruments subject to ad valorem 
                                            
1068 Lap Shun Textiles Industrial Co Ltd v Collector of Stamp Revenue [1976] AC 530, 535. 
1069 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981). 
1070 In modern days, the principle retained its usage in the event that the Hong Kong Inland 
Revenue Department issued a further assessment on conveyances on sale, which it considered 
the stated considerations were under-declared. 
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duty.1071 The rule was used to counter stamp duty evasion when the documents 
were presented to the Stamp Office for voluntary stamping.  
 
An examination of the legislative history of the stamp duty shows that there 
were six major anti-evasion enactments that were added into the stamp duty 
system because of the need to counter stamp duty evasion during British rule.  
 
The first of these enactments was prescribed under the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1884.1072 The examination of the 1884 stamp duty reform shows that 
the legislator imposed, for the first time, imprisonment as well as hard labour as 
penalties for any person who forged stamps, so as to thwart stamp duty 
evasion.1073  
 
The evidence reveals that the second of these enactments was introduced in 
1901. Governor Sir Henry Blake (in office 1898–1903) found appealing, the idea 
of concentrating on stamp duty levied on probates to enhance revenue yield. 
He increased the related rates and at the same time introduced noncompliance 
provisions specifically designed to thwart the evasion of stamp duty on 
probates.1074  The introduction of the 1901 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance1075 
repealed all the earlier stamp duty legislation in force. The 1901 legislation was 
a stamp duty amendment with the major objective to ameliorate the anti-evasion 
mechanism for probates. The Hong Kong government implemented provisions 
to prevent rich persons who fell seriously ill from conveying away their 
properties within twelve months before their death, so as to evade stamp duty 
on probate.1076 The evidence reveals that two factors caused the Hong Kong 
administration to implement these provisions. First, there were cases 
discovered by the government where a person, or persons, had deliberately 
evaded duties by entering into schemes such as that noted above. It was 
imperative that the government prevent further losses by urgently implementing 
corresponding anti-evasion legislation. Second, after the 1894 stamp duty 
amendment to increase stamp duty rates on probates, this branch of stamp duty 
                                            
1071 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, s 27. 
1072 No 15 of 1884. 
1073 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, s 20. 
1074 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 22 of 1901. 
1075 No 22 of 1901.  
1076 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 22 of 1901, s 18(1)(a). 
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started to contribute significantly to Hong Kong stamp revenue.1077 No doubt, 
these noncompliance provisions were developed for the dominant purpose of 
guaranteeing revenue flow, and partly conceived with system sustainability in 
mind. 
 
It has been discovered that the third of these enactments, the 1911 Hong Kong 
Stamp Amendment Ordinance,1078 was promulgated to reinforce the original 
1866 counter-evasion measures. The Ordinance required taxpayers to state 
fully the circumstances of the instruments for the Stamp Officer’s scrutiny to 
determine their nature and failing to do so would incur a penalty.1079 Moreover, 
the 1911 legislation also provided that if more than one instrument was written 
upon the same piece of paper, every one of the instruments was to be 
separately and distinctly stamped.1080 In addition, the 1911 law was clear that 
the applicable exchange rate was as prevailed on the date of the instruments, 
so as to determine the Hong Kong dollar equivalents for any chargeable 
documents denoted in foreign currencies, thus preventing the evasion of duties 
by manipulating the exchange rates.1081 
 
The fourth enactment in response to the demand for counter-evasion rules to 
maintain system sustainability was the concept of empowering the Collector of 
Stamp Duties to inspect and search any premises to prevent evasion. Such law 
was unheard of in Britain at that time. 1082  This rule, stemming from the 
introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921,1083 is overt evidence of 
the Ordinance spawning many revolutionary methodologies to counter 
noncompliance and prevent revenue leakage while the government set about 
significantly increasing the stamp duty rates under the same Ordinance.1084  
 
                                            
1077 For example, the top three sources of stamp duty revenue in 1899 were bank notes 
(HK$102,230), conveyances (HK$69,338) and probates (HK$33,572). The result was consistent 
with 1900, where the top three sources were conveyances (HK$116,552), bank notes 
(HK$111,522) and probates (HK$77,818). See Hong Kong Government Gazette, ‘Return of 
Stamp Revenue for the Years 1899 and 1900, Government Notification No 30’ (Hong Kong 
Government 19 January 1901). 
1078 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 34 of 1911. 
1079 Ibid s 5. 
1080 Ibid s 4. 
1081 Ibid s 7. 
1082 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 8 of 1921, s 40. 
1083 No 8 of 1921. 
1084 See section 3.3.7. 
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The Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by The Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (1962) revealed that the Stamp Office relied heavily on this power 
thereafter to detect breaches of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance as well as 
wilful evasions of stamp duty by dispatching stamp duty inspectors to various 
commercial organisations. Moreover, the Hong Kong Stamp Office was open to 
complaints and information received relating to the omission or neglect of 
stamped documents and vowed to follow up to a satisfactory conclusion.1085 
The examination of the 1956–1957 report demonstrates that evasion was 
indeed a daunting problem as the Stamp Office detected no fewer than 89,410 
instances of failure to stamp and some of these cases were suspected to be 
wilful evasions and thus prosecuted.1086 Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Stamp 
Office concluded that the department’s continuous and concerted effort in 
assigning stamp duty inspectors to various commercial establishments had 
made the public ‘more aware of their responsibilities’ and decreased stamp duty 
infringements significantly.1087 In plain language, the taxpayers were intimidated 
to pay up at the first instance rather than being subsequently detected and 
subjected to the imposition of heavy penalties. It has been discovered that, from 
the 1960s, while the Hong Kong Stamp Office inspectors detected violations, 
they considered there were few deliberate attempts to evade stamp duty. As 
clear evidence, the Stamp Office disclosed that practically none of the 
infringement cases detected by its departmental inspectors were deliberate 
attempts to evade duties in the fiscal year 1960–1961.1088 The evidence reveals 
that the law allowing inspection and searches was effectual in decreasing 
stamp duty evasion from 1921 to the 1960s. That possibly explains why there 
was no prolific promulgation of legislation to counter stamp duty evasions from 
1921 to 1967.  
 
                                            
1085 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1961–62’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1962), 11. 
1086 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1956–57’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1957), 20. 
1087 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1957–58’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1958), 19; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual 
Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1959–60’ 
(Hong Kong, Government Printer 1960), 11. 
1088 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1960–61’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1961), 11. 
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The Stamp Office revealed that its frequent investigations found no deliberate 
attempts to evade duty in the fiscal years 1960–61 to 1966–67.1089 On the one 
hand, as explained above, the result suggests physical inspections curbed 
stamp duty evasion effectively in the forty years from 1921 to 1961. On the 
other hand, the outcomes of the physical investigation reports are also 
disturbing as they point to the withering of stamp duty inspection practice from 
the 1960s. It was not realistic to believe that there were no stamp duty evasions 
at all as suggested by the reports. It is submitted that the taxpayers might have 
found ways to circumvent inspections.  
 
Fundamentally, the analysis shows that the need for a counter-evasion 
mechanism (thus enhancing sustainability) continued to be an imperative in 
shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty law in the second half of the twentieth 
century. The law’s response was the introduction of a fifth counter-evasion 
enactment in 1968. The 1968 amendments made third party professionals, such 
as lawyers and accountants who might ‘use’ their clients’ unstamped (or under-
stamped) documents, to be liable for stamp duty while acting for their clients.1090 
The intention of the government was clearly to shift responsibility to third party 
professionals to ensure all documents handled by them were properly stamped. 
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce made numerous 
representations to oppose this noncompliance provision on the ground that the 
law had created a new criminal offence1091 and made innocent persons liable 
                                            
1089 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1960–61’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1961), 11; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual 
Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1961–62’ 
(Hong Kong, Government Printer 1962), 15; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the 
Financial Year 1962–63’ (Hong Kong, Government Printer 1963), 15; Hong Kong Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue for the Financial Year 1963–64’ (Hong Kong, Government Printer 1964), 15; Hong 
Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1964–65’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1965), 17; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual 
Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1965–66’ 
(Hong Kong, Government Printer 1966), 18; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the 
Financial Year 1966–67’ (Hong Kong, Government Printer 1967), 18.  
1090 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 298; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 30 
of 1968, s 11. 
1091 Non-payment of stamp duty was made a criminal offence under the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance, No 8 of 1921. The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 33 of 1976 
repealed the principle. 
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for the failure of others to stamp. 1092  Nonetheless, the unique Hong Kong 
system, whereby the public could not remove Governors and senior officials by 
franchise, did not impede the passage of this controversial provision.1093 The 
law was harsh with regard to professionals but it was an effective method to 
curb evasion, and at the same time it shifted the Stamp Office’s inspection costs 
to the professionals. Indeed, the attempt to enact tax law in this way supported 
the sustainability of the system by maintaining revenue flow and at the same 
time, controlling the government’s collection cost. 
 
Further evidence to support the reasoning that the demand to ameliorate 
counter-evasion regulation drove the 1968 changes in stamp duty law, is found 
in the Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by The Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue. This obliquely reveals that physical inspections of documents were 
not carried out as frequently as before, from the fiscal year 1967–68 onwards. 
Inspections were streamlined to concentrate on assessing documentation of 
banks, moneychangers, stockbrokers, and company prospectuses, to ensure all 
stamp duties on share and property transactions had been properly reported 
and stamped.1094 The reduction in the scope of inspection was probably due to 
the introduction of the 1968 amendments as an additional measure with the 
sole aim of countering evasions which enabled the Stamp Office to reduce its 
reliance on the stamp duty inspection mechanism.    
 
The final counter-evasion enactment was introduced in the 1960s in the form of 
imposing obligations on taxpayers to disclose specific information to curb 
avoidance activities. In 1967, Financial Secretary John Cowperthwaite (in office 
1961–1971) contrived a rule to prevent the falsification of revenue which was 
made possible by the introduction of the system of marginal relief in 1967 to 
encourage home ownership. 1095  In order to prevent abuse of the system, 
                                            
1092 Per John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 298. 
1093 See section 2.4.2 for discussion on the Hong Kong political system and its impacts on the 
Hong Kong stamp duty system. 
1094 For example, see Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual 
Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1967–68’ 
(Hong Kong, Government Printer 1968), 17; Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the 
Financial Year 1968–69’ (Hong Kong, Government Printer 1962), 19; Hong Kong Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue for the Financial Year 1981–82’ (Hong Kong, Government Printer 1982), 24. 
1095 See section 3.4.5.  
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Cowperthwaite introduced an additional mechanism in 1967 against attempts to 
falsify the revenue and imposed an obligation on those who executed 
conveyances on sales, and who wished to take advantage of the reduced rates 
of duty, to certify that the transaction did not form part of a larger transaction, or 
of a series of transactions, on which duty would be payable at a higher rate.1096 
The law has remained to the present time as an integral part of the Hong Kong 
stamp duty system for nearly half a century.1097 Nevertheless, there was only 
one example of this certification detected. 
 
Promulgating a specific disclosure requirement for each and every taxable 
instrument to counter-evasion and underpin system sustainability was a 
relatively insignificant driver of Hong Kong stamp duty changes. In Hong Kong, 
methods to calculate stamp duty liabilities were kept fairly straightforward and 
usually based on the prescribed ad valorem or fixed rates applied to the values 
of the transactions with no other criteria affecting the calculation of the duties. 
This practice made unnecessary the prescription of lengthy counter-evasion 
rules to ensure disclosure of factors related to the instruments affecting the 
computation of duties. The evidence to support this observation was derived 
from the examination of tax computation methods for marine insurance policies 
of Britain and Hong Kong before World War II. In Britain, the British Stamp Act 
1891,1098 as well as the British Marine Insurance Act 1906,1099 was clear that 
any marine policy had to disclose, apart from the sum insured, the number of 
voyages as well as the period of the journeys and other factors. This counter-
evasion disclosure requirement was necessary and a driver for British stamp 
duty changes as the duties payable were dependent on these elements.1100 The 
Hong Kong stamp duty on marine insurance was based on an ad valorem duty 
applied to the sum insured only, which rendered statutory disclosure of other 
factors redundant. Consequently, this branch of counter-evasion law was never 
a driver for Hong Kong stamp duty changes.   
 
The contextualisation of Hong Kong stamp duty history suggests that political 
resistance might supress the government’s desire to promulgate law to counter 
                                            
1096 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 28 of 1967, s 2. 
1097 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 31 of 1981, s 29.  
1098 54 & 55 Vict c 39, s 93. 
1099 6 Edw 7 c 41, s 23. 
1100 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39), first sch. 
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stamp duty evasion. Further, it could be that the law formulated to encourage 
voluntary compliance was adequate to begin with in preventing the falsification 
of transaction values, as the entailing penalties and consequences of not 
reporting voluntarily in good faith, were daunting. As a whole, the evidence 
shows that the need to enhance system sustainability by preventing duty 
evasion was definitely a force in the development of Hong Kong stamp duty. It 
should be ranked as a middle-ranking force in shaping Hong Kong stamp duty 
law as some of the legislation introduced was significant and contributed 
substantially to countering stamp duty evasion. Nonetheless, the frequency of 
landmark stamp duty law being enacted in response to this imperative was still 
low during the 130 years of Hong Kong stamp duty history under British rule.   
 
Legislative control of stamp duty avoidance 
Having just been considering the stamp duty law with a focus on countering 
fraudulent evasion, we now turn to countering, or at least minimising stamp duty 
avoidance, the legal use of the law to lessen tax liability. In the following 
paragraphs the emphasis is shifted to considering whether the demand for 
stamp duty law to counter avoidance (thus enhancing sustainability) was a 
possible impellent in driving the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance development. 
 
The promulgation of specific counter-avoidance provisions for share trading was 
first seen in 1886. In that year, the Hong Kong Governor appointed a Special 
Stamp Duty Committee to consider the possibility of boosting revenue by 
marked increases in stamp duty rates to improve Hong Kong’s defences. This 
was occasioned by the outbreak of the Sino-French War in August 1884. The 
British government had warned that French forces might attack Hong Kong and 
if so, Hong Kong was defenceless. 1101  However, the Special Stamp Duty 
Committee reported that ‘no urgency exists for additional taxation at this time’, 
but it may sanction an increase in stamp duties after reviewing the probable 
expenditures of the colony.1102 The basis for this advice was attributable to the 
                                            
1101 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 295. Sir Andrew 
Clarke, the Inspector-General of Fortifications and Director of Works of Britain, wrote to Hong 
Kong Governor Sir George Bowen and warned him that if the French Army attacked Hong 
Kong, Bowen would definitely become a prisoner based on his assessment that Hong Kong was 
defenceless. 
1102 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1886, 61. 
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ending of the Sino-French war on 9 June 1885 with the conclusion of the Treaty 
of Tientsin, in which France achieved most of her war objectives. 
 
The original Ordinance to substantially increase stamp duty rates was thus 
withdrawn in May 1886 by the Administrator of Hong Kong William Marsh (in 
office 1885–1887). The object of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1886 was 
altered from ‘greatly increasing the stamp duties’ to ‘make a few slight 
alterations in the present legislation’ during the second reading.1103 Marsh was 
concerned about the avoidance of stamp duty on the transfer of shares of public 
companies. At that time, stamp duties on public share transactions were based 
on an ad valorem scale imposed on the transaction values stated on the 
contract notes. 1104  Under this circumstance, taxpayers were given the 
opportunity to reduce their stamp duty liabilities by under-declaring the 
transaction values. The Stamp Office would not have been able to challenge the 
probable understatements as the law lacked declared benchmarks. Thus, 
instead of increasing stamp duty rates significantly, Marsh took the opportunity 
to introduce share trading anti-avoidance measures through enactment of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1886. 1105  Marsh described this as a small 
amendment which ‘experience has shown to be necessary’ and ‘advantage will 
be taken of the circumstance’ to introduce in 1886.1106 The 1886 stamp duty 
legislation specified that the tax was to be computed on the market value of the 
shares on the day of stamping, instead of being calculated on the consideration 
entered into by the parties, as provided in the preceding legislation.1107 This was 
an advance in stamp duty anti-avoidance measures. It was the first time the 
Hong Kong law had used the concept of market value to prevent taxpayers from 
under-declaring the assessable basis of their taxable transactions.  
 
It can be concluded from the analysis that the need for anti-avoidance law was 
a trivial driver in influencing stamp duty changes in the nineteenth century in 
Hong Kong for two reasons. First, there was only one largely inconspicuous 
                                            
1103 Letter from William Marsh to Granville Leveson Gower (27 May 1886), CO129/226, 306. 
1104 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, sch. The applicable ad valorem duty was 
HK10¢ for every HK$100 or part thereof. 
1105 No 16 of 1886. 
1106 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1886, 62. 
1107 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 16 of 1886, schedule, head 36; Letter from William Marsh 
to Granville Leveson Gower (27 May 1886), CO129/226, 307. 
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occurrence of such a law being promulgated in the nineteenth century, a very 
specific anti-avoidance provision relating to share trading. Second, the evidence 
demonstrates that Marsh prescribed the anti-avoidance law hastily (during the 
second reading of the related Bill) which was totally unconnected with, and 
annulled, the original objective of raising revenue so that the passing of the Bill 
could be preserved. 1108 
 
Evaluating the history of Hong Kong stamp duty anti-avoidance provisions, the 
evidence reveals that it took nearly forty years for another development to 
emerge. It occurred during the inter-war years1109 to curb tax avoidance on the 
blank transfer of shares. A blank transfer is a transfer signed by the transferor, 
but with a blank for the name of the transferee. In a blank transfer neither the 
transferee’s name and signature nor the date of sale are filed in the transfer 
deed. The transferee is at liberty to sell it to a subsequent buyer without 
inserting his name and signature. Thus, the physical holder of the certificate is 
assumed to be the new owner of the securities. The process of purchase and 
sale can be repeated any number of times with the blank deed and ultimately 
when it reaches the hands of one who wants to retain the shares can insert his 
name and date and have it registered in the company’s books.  
 
The prevalent Hong Kong stamp duty law in the early twentieth century was to 
levy a fixed nominal duty on the bought notes and the sold notes and to impose 
an ad valorem duty on the final instrument of transfer. For example, the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 19211110 provided that ad valorem duty of HK20¢ per 
HK$100 or part thereof was chargeable on an instrument of transfer and a 
nominal fixed duty of HK$2 was chargeable on the brokers’ brought and sold 
notes.1111 Under this system, the ad valorem duty was avoided due to the 
accepted legalised custom existing in the colony of executing blank transfers to 
pass title through a series of buyers and sellers instead of executing fresh 
instruments of transfer at each stage. As such, many taxpayers were able to 
escape ad valorem stamp duty assessment with no consequences.  
 
                                            
1108 Letter from William Marsh to Granville Leveson Gower (27 May 1886), CO129/226, 306. 
1109 This relates to the period between the World War I and the World War II. 
1110 No 8 of 1921. 
1111 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921, sch, head 40. 
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Attorney General Joseph Kemp’s observation in 1921 is particularly revealing 
regarding the significance of the blank transfers problem at that time: ‘The use 
of blank transfers obviously leads to a great many transfers of shares escaping 
duty.’1112 During the 1921 Kong Hong stamp duty reform, Kemp’s first proposal 
to tackle this huge problem was to impose heavy penalties on transfers of 
shares registered at varying periods after execution. The Hong Kong 
Stockbrokers’ Association rejected it on the basis that the stockbroking 
operation would be affected.1113 During negotiations with the Association by 
Kemp, it was arranged that instead of enforcing the immediate registration of 
transfers, an increase to the stamp duty on share contract notes was 
preferred.1114 The problem had not been solved as blank transfers were still 
unrestrained and cast doubt on the survivability of the stamp duty system with 
regard to share transactions. 
 
In the second attempt to ameliorate the stamp duty law to reduce stamp duty 
avoidance arising from blank transfers, the Hong Kong government appointed a 
Committee constituted of trade and commercial representatives, chaired by 
Kemp, to devise a solution in 1929.1115 Kemp introduced the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 19291116 with the main objective being to introduce anti-avoidance 
measures in respect of the blank transfer of shares. In this regard, the 
Legislative Council endorsed the recommendation of the Committee to reduce 
the evasion by passing a provision in the stamp duty legislation to disallow 
companies distributing dividends to an un-registered person. 1117  Previously, 
some companies would just distribute dividends to the holders of the physical 
share certificates. 
 
The 1929 stamp legislation was not, however, effective as public share 
investors were willing to forgo the dividends on the presumption that trading 
gains would be more substantial. Registration of shares took time and during 
the process, trading opportunities would be lost. The deficiency of the law 
forced the government to conceive another piece of legislation.  
                                            
1112 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 36. 
1113 Letter from William Shenton to Thomas Southorn (2 February 1929), CO129/522, 26. 
1114 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 42.  
1115 Letter from Cecil Clementi to Sidney Webb (23 December 1929), CO129/522, 6. 
1116 No 26 of 1929. 
1117 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 26 of 1929, s 6. 
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Meanwhile, the Japanese commenced its full-scale invasion of China in 1937, 
and the British government entered the World War II conflict in 1939. The Hong 
Kong Governor surrendered to the Japanese on Christmas Day 1941. Following 
the cessation of World War II hostilities, Hong Kong was re-occupied by Britain 
in 1945 and the Hong Kong government resumed the examination of the issue 
of the blank transfer of shares. The introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance 19471118 was to secure revenue derived from stock 
exchange transactions by reversing the incidence of stamp duty so that ad 
valorem duty would be chargeable on brokers’ brought and sold notes and the 
nominal duty reserved for the transfer deeds.1119 This was more effective than 
the avoidance law implemented around twenty years before, barring companies 
from the distribution of dividends to anyone who had real equity interest but did 
not appear on the company’s share register. It can be concluded that adjusting 
the incidence of tax was an effective way to curb avoidance of tax as the Hong 
Kong government did not consider any further legislative changes in this 
respect after 1947. 
 
Besides highlighting the driving force behind the introduction of the 
aforementioned Ordinances, the discussion also demonstrates that in order to 
prescribe effective anti-avoidance rules, it was not enough for the legislators 
merely to engage in periodic review of commercial customs to attain an 
understanding of related operations. Greater weight had to be given to 
analysing the thoughts and viewpoints of the taxpayers. It took Hong Kong a 
quarter of a century to realise this. The incidence of tax for share transactions 
introduced in 1947 has been retained in the stamp duty system until the present 
day.  
 
These analyses of the Hong Kong stamp duty anti-avoidance rules related to 
share trading, and were developed in 1929 and 1947. These rules can be 
compared to legislative provision made in 1992 to regulate dealings in real 
property, in order to demonstrate that the 1992 measures were driven by 
sustainability enhancement rather than a more obvious social aim.  
                                            
1118 No 38 of 1947. 
1119 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 38 of 1947, s 4. 
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The examination of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 19921120 
indicates the dominant sustainability objective might not have been publicly 
declared. The government announced that the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 1992 1121  was enacted to fulfil a social imperative of controlling 
property speculation in order to stabilise housing prices, which would benefit 
genuine home buyers.1122 
 
Based on the historical analysis of the Hong Kong anti-avoidance rules effected 
on share trading and comparing them to those regulations prescribed under the 
1992 legislation, the following paragraphs seek to prove that the dominant 
impellent for the 1992 measures was sustainability enhancement rather than 
meeting a social aim. 
 
There were three main instruments that were prepared for the sale of 
immovable properties in Hong Kong: 
1. Temporary sale and purchase agreements (signed at the estate agent’s 
office); 
2. Formal sale and purchase agreements (signed at the buyer’s and seller’s 
respective law firms to confirm the temporary sale and purchase 
agreements); 
3. Conveyances of property on sale (signed at the buyer’s and seller’s 
respective law firms to formally recognise the transfer of legal titles of the 
properties). 
 
Before the amendments effected in 1992, stamp duty was only payable on 
conveyances of property on sale. This implied that the properties could change 
hands many times by entering into formal sale and purchase agreements 
between different parties for the same property without attracting any stamp 
duty. The 1992 legislation imposed stamp duty on each purchaser and vendor 
who entered into a formal agreement for the sale of immovable property and 
charged only a nominal sum on the final conveyance of property on sale. This 
                                            
1120 No 8 of 1992. 
1121 Ibid. 
1122 Hong Kong Hansard 6 November 1991. 
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ensured stamp duty payable on residential property was not deferred until the 
conveyance was finally executed. 
 
The Hong Kong government expressed the aim of the law was to curb 
speculative activity in the residential property market, by making stamp duty 
payable on sale and purchase agreements. The Secretary for The Treasury 
Yeung Kai-Yin (in office 1991–1993) remarked that the government was 
tackling a major social problem through amendments to tax legislation. 
According to Yeung, the 1992 amendments would provide a major disincentive 
for speculators. It would also benefit genuine home-buyers by restoring the 
balance of market forces which had been seriously distorted by speculative 
activity.1123  
 
Many Hong Kong publications also perceived that the 1992 stamp amendments 
were conceived to meet the social imperative of curbing residential property 
speculation.1124 Nevertheless, the examination of Hong Kong stamp duty history 
demonstrates otherwise. The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 
19921125 focused on making changes to the incidence of tax on instruments 
relating to the sales of Hong Kong immovable residential properties. The 
doctrine of reversing the incidence of stamp duty applied in the 1992 
amendments was identical to the principle utilised in the Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance 19471126 in respect of share transactions. It can be 
recalled that the 1947 Stamp Ordinance was developed to curb stamp duty 
avoidance with the sole aim of sustaining revenue flow originally intended by 
the stamp duty law. The 1947 Stamp Ordinance was definitely not intended to 
supress share-market speculation.  
 
In this light, the evidence points to the demand for sustainability (comprising 
solvency as well as fairness objectives) intended by the stamp duty law at the 
outset, was a hidden dominant imperative in driving the introduction of the Hong 
                                            
1123 Per Yeung Kai-Yin, Hong Kong Hansard 29 January 1992. 
1124 CCH Tax Editors, 1996/1997 Hong Kong Master Tax Guide (Hong Kong, CCH Asia Ltd 
1996), 471; David Flux and David G Smith, Hong Kong Taxation Law and Practice (Hong Kong, 
Chinese University Press 1999), 529. 
1125 No 8 of 1992. 
1126 No 38 of 1947. 
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Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1992. 1127  The Ordinance was not 
introduced for the purposes of social demand in curbing property speculation as 
advocated by Yeung. It was intended as an anti-avoidance provision enacted 
for system sustainability. It is suggested that the reason for the government to 
steer the 1992 Stamp Ordinance through the Legislative Council as a piece of 
legislation enacted for a social objective, was to pre-empt political 
repercussions.  
 
Further evidence to support the conclusion was that Hong Kong property 
market prices continued to escalate1128 after the introduction of the 1992 stamp 
duty measures, demonstrating the stamp duty policy failed to dampen 
speculation at the time. The property prices became so high that Governor 
Chris Patten’s (in office 1992–1997) administration vowed to take measures to 
regulate the property market in 1994 by many key non-fiscal measures with the 
aim to supress speculation.1129 Apparently, the reversal of tax incidence was not 
effective in curbing speculation.  
 
The contextualisation of Hong Kong stamp duty demonstrates that the 
government did not develop any general anti-avoidance stamp duty legislation 
to enable the Collector of Stamp Duty to disregard transactions he considered 
falsified. It is possible that the colonial government adhered to the British ethos 
of not legislating in general terms against tax avoidance, a practice which was 
established in the eighteenth century and prevailed till the 1980s in Britain.1130  
 
The study points to the demand for specific anti-avoidance provisions to 
maintain system sustainability, as an element in shaping the Hong Kong stamp 
duty law. Nonetheless, the evidence demonstrates that the need for specific 
anti-avoidance provisions to achieve sustainability was only a prominent driver 
                                            
1127 No 8 of 1992. 
1128 There were sharp increases in property prices in 1992 and 1993. See Hong Kong 
Government, ‘Report of the Task Force on Land Supply & Property Prices, Planning, 
Environment & Lands Branch June 1994’ (Hong Kong, Hong Kong Information Service 
Department 1994), executive summary & pt II. 
1129 These measures include the cutting of quotas for private sales of uncompleted flats from 
50% to 10%; prohibit resale of uncompleted flats before conveyance; restrict forward sales to 
not more than nine months before conveyance and increase initial deposit from 5% to 10% of 
the purchase price. For details, see Hong Kong Government, ‘Report of the Task Force on Land 
Supply & Property Prices, Planning, Environment & Lands Branch June 1994’ (Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong Information Service Department 1994), part VII. 
1130 See section 2.3.8. 
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in moulding the stamp duty legislation for two types of transactions – documents 
for share trading and the conveyance of immovable properties. In this regard, 
the changes instituted in 1947 and 1992 respectively were retained as cardinal 
stamp duty mechanisms until the present day.1131  
 
As a whole, therefore, the examination indicates that the demand to ensure 
stamp duty system sustainability by promulgating anti-avoidance law was a 
minor influence based on the scope and occurrence of the related changes. 
This outweighed the significance of the 1947 and 1992 stamp duty law 
introduced. 
4.2.5 Taxpayers’ protection  
It is generally accepted that the introduction of prosecution protection 
mechanisms1132 as well as appeal process safeguards1133 to ensure compliance 
with the law by both taxpayers and stamp duty officials would circumvent 
resentment and lead to the sustainability of the entire system. This section 
assesses how far these mechanisms and safeguards were enacted for system 
sustainability, and the extent to which the demand for these processes to 
enhance sustainability was the motive force in shaping the Hong Kong stamp 
duty law. In addition, this section also deals with whether the mechanisms and 
safeguards so established were successful in maintaining the sustainability of 
the whole system.  
 
These mechanisms and safeguards were crucial in maintaining sustainability as 
they upheld the fairness of the system by providing taxpayers with protection 
from wrongful prosecutions as well as recourse to alternative, and unbiased, 
rulings to test those emanating from the stamp duty officers in charge. 
Taxpayers might disregard the stamp duty law and refrain from complying if 
they were not protected from the excesses of the Hong Kong Stamp Office’s 
immensely powerful organisation, thus undermining system sustainability. This 
subject was even more prominent, when Hong Kong stamp duty was made 
                                            
1131 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981), s 19 and sch 1, note 2 of 
head 1(1A). 
1132 See section 2.3.7. Prosecution protection mechanism refers to the system in place to 
prevent unjust prosecution as well as the right to appeal against conviction. 
1133 See section 2.3.7. Stamp duty assessment appeal process safeguards refer to granting of 
rights to aggrieved taxpayers to appeal to the regular courts or to an adjudicating body within 
the tax process itself against the assessment issued by the tax authority. 
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compulsory and the Collector of Stamp Duty was granted police powers in 1921 
to ensure enforcement.1134 To further justify the demand, one of the factors that 
caused the American revolt against the imposition of stamp duty by Britain in 
1765, was the lack of plausible mechanisms and safeguards instituted within 
the American stamp duty system prescribed by the British government.1135 In 
this light it can be concluded that the introduction of the relevant mechanisms 
and safeguards in the Hong Kong context would ensure the sustainability of the 
whole system by enforcing compliance by all and circumventing resentment. 
 
The analysis is separated into two parts: 
1. Development of assessment appeal process safeguards; 
2. Development of prosecution protection mechanisms. 
 
Assessment appeal process safeguards  
It can be recalled that in the first Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance,1136 there was no 
explicit statement of the taxpayer’s appeal channel. 1137 The demand for an 
unambiguous directive in this area led to the amendment under the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 1884 which explicitly allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Hong Kong.1138 This change was probably stimulated by a development in 
Britain at that time, in response to a political demand, to allow an appeal on tax 
matters to regular British courts.1139  
 
Subsequently, the need for judicial safeguards prompted legislative amendment 
to give the Chief Justice the power to direct stamp duty cases to be heard by 
the Full Court of two judges if he deemed it necessary. 1140 There were no 
material changes to the judicial appeal channel except the stamp duty disputes 
were to be heard first by a lower District Court of Hong Kong set up in 19531141 
                                            
1134 See section 3.3.7 and section 4.2.4. 
1135 See section 2.4.1. 
1136 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 12 of 1866. 
1137 See section 2.3.7.  
1138 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 15 of 1884, s 14. 
1139 For a full account of the development in Britain at that time, see Chantal Stebbings, The 
Victorian Taxpayer and the Law: A Study in Constitutional Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 131–39. 
1140 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 8 of 1921, s 15(6). 
1141 Peter Wesley Smith, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1998), 68. 
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before appealing to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong.1142 In any instances, in 
order to appeal to the Privy Council in Britain, leave to appeal was required 
either from the Supreme Court of Hong Kong or the Privy Council.  
 
It can be recalled that from the beginning in 1866, the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system inherited the British tenet of lay adjudication. 1143  The adjudication 
process was contributory in maintaining system fairness as it provided a 
platform for the taxpayers to obtain high quality judgments delivered by 
technically competent tax administrators. Taxpayers could be protected from 
unfair stamp duty treatment and thus increase their willingness to comply which, 
in turn, reinforced the integrity of the system thus maintaining its sustainability. 
Nonetheless, it has been said that the initial adjudication fee set at HK$10 in 
1866 was far too high for any taxpayer to contemplate using the service.1144 The 
demand for more equitable safeguards to ensure system sustainability drove 
the government to amend the law in 1868 to reduce the fee substantially from 
HK$10 to HK$1.1145  
 
In the 1880s, the Hong Kong government was concerned as to the poor level of 
taxpayer satisfaction with the adjudication system, a factor which was of 
considerable importance in ensuring the sustainability of the stamp duty 
adjudication system. Accordingly, in 1886, the law was amended to direct the 
Collector of Stamp Duty to impress a particular stamp to denote that documents 
submitted to him were in his opinion not subject to tax.1146 This ensured the 
courts and public officers would receive such documents as properly stamped 
without further explanations being required from the taxpayers who had 
engaged the adjudication service. This approach improved taxpayers’ 
satisfaction with the adjudication process and went some way to ensuring the 
sustainability of the adjudication system. 
 
The change to the safeguard provision of the original stamp duty law in the 
quest for system sustainability was again seen in a minor amendment made in 
                                            
1142 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 16 of 1961, s 4.   
1143 See section 2.4.6. 
1144 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, s 20; see section 2.4.6.  
1145 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 5 of 1868, s 1(2); Report of Commission on 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866 (27 March 1868), CO129/131, 56. 
1146 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 16 of 1886, s 11. 
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1984. The 1984 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 2] gave the 
Hong Kong District Court the right to appoint a member of the Land Tribunal to 
sit and assist in any proceedings to confirm stamp duty assessments related to 
immovable properties.1147 The aim of the amendment was the recognition that 
stamp duty litigation sometimes involved technical problems regarding the value 
of land. Some members of the Lands Tribunal had the expertise to assist in 
resolving those problems. The law enabled the District Court to call upon that 
expertise in deciding the appeals. 1148  The appointment of an independent 
member of the Lands Tribunal would potentially safeguard the taxpayers from 
being taxed inequitably. In other words, the legislative changes enabled the 
judicial system to enhance its capability as an alternative recourse for taxpayers 
appealing against excessive stamp duty assessments on immovable properties. 
This would avert taxpayer resentment by improving system fairness and thus 
enhance system sustainability.  
 
Prosecution protection mechanisms  
The introduction of a law to bridge the stamp duty system with the colony’s 
independent judicial system, conclusively indicated the demand for assessment 
appeal process safeguards that influenced the stamp duty legislation. In this 
context, a series of legislative amendments enacted, clearly demonstrated that 
the need for protecting the taxpayers from unwarranted prosecutions, was also 
a motive force in shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty code.  
 
A minor legislative addition in response to the demand for a prosecution 
protection mechanism was introduced during the 1884 stamp duty reform and 
sustained until the 1980s. It was the rule that taxpayers should not be 
prosecuted for any offence after two years from the date of the offence.1149 The 
regulation was subsequently amended in 1968 in favour of the Collector of 
Stamp Duty by extending the period from two years to six years from the date of 
the offence.1150  
 
                                            
1147 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 2], No 43 of 1984, s 2. 
1148 Hong Kong Hansard 16 May 1984, 973. 
1149 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, s 22.  
1150 Hong Kong Hansard 24 July 1968, 306; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 30 
of 1968, s 21; Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 31 of 1981, s 61. 
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Instead of enhancing the protection mechanism, the main1151 object of the Hong 
Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 19151152 was to confirm that the consent of 
the Hong Kong Attorney General was no longer necessary to initiate 
prosecutions under the Stamp Ordinance, 1153  which diminished taxpayers’ 
protection. It has been revealed that the need to obtain prior approval from the 
Attorney General before prosecution was the protection that Governor Sir 
Richard MacDonnell (in office 1866–1872) had specifically incorporated into the 
original Hong Kong stamp duty system in 1866 to protect the Hong Kong 
taxpayers from the poor standard of judgment of the Hong Kong 
Magistrates.1154 It was necessary, as the Hong Kong Magistrates at that time 
usually had no formal legal training to render proper judgments on stamp duty 
matters.1155 After fifty years of development, the quality of training had improved 
and the Hong Kong government felt that the law in this area was out-dated and 
should be repealed. Nonetheless, the protective element in the Stamp 
Ordinance was weakened significantly. There would now be no constraint to 
prevent stamp duty officers abusing their powerful positions. It would infer that 
all stamp duty officers had the power to initiate prosecutions against the 
taxpayers. Ultimately, this would lead to taxpayer resentment and undermine 
public co-operation and in turn, result in an issue of sustainability. During the 
public consultation conducted by Hong Kong Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in 
office 1915–1930) in respect of the 1921 Hong Kong stamp duty reform,1156 the 
public bodies demanded the law be amended to introduce protection for 
taxpayers from unnecessary prosecutions. Kemp stated that it was proposed to 
add a clause into the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance to the effect that ‘no 
prosecution shall be instituted under this Ordinance except with the consent of 
the Collector’ in order to ‘prevent the initiation of prosecutions by unauthorised 
persons.’ 1157  The evidence shows that Kemp acceded to the demand for 
protection mechanism in order to ensure system sustainability.     
 
                                            
1151 Another object was to give the Governor power to authorise stamping after execution of 
documents that cannot be stamped after execution. See Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance, No 1 of 1915, s 2. 
1152 No 1 of 1915. 
1153 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 1 of 1915, s 3. 
1154 See section 2.3.7; Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 12 of 1866, s 29. 
1155 See section 2.3.7. 
1156 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921. 
1157 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 42. 
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Another event that justified the need for protection mechanisms with regard to 
the stamp duty system occurred in 1921. In the context of raising revenue, it 
can be recalled that Kemp introduced the power of inspection which aimed to 
decrease evasion and strengthen voluntary compliance.1158 Initially the intention 
of the Hong Kong government was to allow the Collector to search premises 
without the need to seek authorisation from the Court as a delay might result in 
a relevant document not being found, or being not able to prevent a person 
from ‘attempting to throw a document into fire’. 1159  Clearly, this vested 
enormous power in the tax bureau and left the public open to persecution at the 
hands of a corrupt Collector. The unofficial members protested in the Legislative 
Council and entered into a lengthy debate with the Governor and other 
government officials. The government relented and introduced a protection. It 
was agreed that Stamp Office inspection exercises should only be carried out 
with a Magistrate’s search warrant.1160 This was the first and only significant 
Hong Kong debate conducted in the Legislative Council on stamp duty 
prosecution protection mechanisms. It shows the awareness of the need for 
such mechanisms as the government began to compel the compulsory payment 
of stamp duty with penal sanctions, and conferred police power on the Collector 
of Stamp Duty. It is concluded that the mechanism introduced was fair, as in all 
Hong Kong cases dealing with smuggling in 1921 required a search warrant 
issued by the Court when the smuggling of goods was suspected.1161 There 
was no reason why the Stamp Office Officers should be exempted from 
applying for a warrant if they had just cause for inspecting taxpayers’ premises. 
 
The evidence establishes that the demand for assessment appeal process 
safeguards as well as prosecution protection mechanisms was only a minor 
driver of the Hong Kong stamp duty changes in the quest for sustainability. The 
reason is that the most significant advancement made in this area had already 
been made in 1884 by explicitly linking the stamp duty system with the 
independent Hong Kong judicial system. Once appeals to regular courts were 
formally permitted, there was no record of any strong demand to reform the 
Hong Kong stamp duty law to deal with conflicts between dissatisfied taxpayers 
                                            
1158 See section 3.3.6. 
1159 Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 50. 
1160 Ibid. 
1161 Per Henry Pollock, Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921, 50. 
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and the Collector of Stamp Duty from 1884 until the reversion of sovereignty in 
1997. It can also be concluded that the few changes made to the stamp duty 
system were adequate and effective in maintaining system sustainability by 
focusing on the taxpayers’ concerns about how the stamp duty disputes were to 
be handled fairly.  
4.2.6 Relief and exemption 
An investigation into stamp duty policy reveals that relief and exemption might 
have played a part in the furtherance of the stamp duty system’s sustainability. 
On the one hand if such exemption was granted properly and fairly, it would 
supress taxpayers’ resentment towards the system and help to preserve 
sustainability. On the other hand, if stamp duty immunity was granted unfairly 
and extensively, the taxpayers would feel contempt for the system and this 
could threaten its sustainability.1162  
 
The investigation of Hong Kong stamp duty history shows that there were 
numerous occasions when the law was amended due to demands for 
customary exemptions of duty for certain transactions by consulate members, 
charitable organisations and the Sino-British Joint Liaison group 1163 
members.1164 Evaluation of the political processes regarding these exemptions 
reveals that there were no Legislative Council debates recorded on the passing 
of the amending law. In any event, no opposition was expected for three 
reasons. First, the public would not perceive the granting of such customary 
exemptions as generating undesirable advantages, since the beneficiaries were 
not expected to be involved in commercial or speculative activities. Second, the 
consulate members and the Sino-British Joint Liaison group members were few 
                                            
1162 For an account of how exemption and tax immunity generated negative social effects and 
caused tax system sustainability problems, see Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact 
of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 13–
15. 
1163 A meeting group formed in 1985 between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the People's Republic of China after signing of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration, a treaty for the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to China. It 
was set up for liaison, consultation and the exchange of information to implement the Joint 
Declaration and make smooth, the transfer of Hong Kong Government in 1997. 
1164 See for example, the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 23 of 1976, which gave 
stamp duty exemption to conveyances of consular premises; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance, No 61 of 1984, which gave stamp duty exemption to transactions concluded by the 
Chinese Visa Office; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 18 of 1985, which gave 
stamp duty exemption to the Joint Liaison Group; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance No 
36 of 1989, which gave stamp duty exemption to transactions concluded by the International 
Committee of Red Cross.  
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and the exemptions would have an insignificant effect on the overall stamp duty 
income. Third, the community was predisposed to embrace the exemptions 
granted to charitable organisations as ultimately such exemptions benefited the 
poor and the needy. The evidence suggests that the granting of customary 
exemptions would neither enhance nor impair system sustainability. They were 
essentially inconsequential changes, and as such were not drivers in the overall 
Hong Kong stamp duty legislative changes.  
 
The only key stamp duty change detected as being driven by a demand to grant 
an exemption, was promulgated in 1968. The government found the proposal 
by commercial bodies to alleviate stamp duty burden between associated 
companies to be reasonable and believed it would uphold the fairness (and 
thereby enhance the sustainability) of the stamp duty system.1165 The Hong 
Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1968 1166 introduced stamp duty relief for 
the transfer of assets between associated companies. This was designed to 
ease the process of company reorganisation. It was the requirement of this 
exemption that one firm had beneficial ownership of not less than 90% of the 
other. Shares and marketable securities transactions between associated 
companies were originally not covered when the law was first introduced in 
1968. 1167  It was modelled on the British stamp duty law. 1168  The law had 
evolved to define companies as associated if a third such body was the 
beneficial owner of not less than 90% of the issued share capital of each. In 
addition, share transactions between associated companies were granted 
exemption from duty in 1991 in respect of stock transfers upon restructuring of 
their intra-group shareholdings.1169  
 
This combined body of evidence thus shows that any demands for exemption 
and relief were insignificant drivers in the development of Hong Kong stamp 
duty. Besides the customary exemptions identified, there were no other key 
changes made apart from the aforementioned relief granted to transactions 
                                            
1165 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 297. 
1166 No 30 of 1968. 
1167 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 297; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 30 
of 1968, s 3. 
1168 Finance Act 1930 (20 & 21 Geo 5 c 28), s 42. 
1169 Per Piers Jacobs, Hong Kong Hansard 6 March 1991, para, 157; 1991 Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance, No 43 of 1991, s 6. 
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between associated companies during the 130 years of British rule to maintain 
system sustainability. The evidence demonstrates that the Hong Kong 
government adhered to the principle of not acceding to pressure groups’ 
demands to grant unnecessary exemptions so as to avoid the creation of a 
privileged class of taxpayers. It has been shown that such entitlement could 
have provoked other taxpayer groups to demand favourable tax treatments 
which might impair sustainability.1170 Thus, it can be concluded that perhaps it 
was the government’s caution exercised in this area of the stamp duty law that 
enhanced the sustainably of the entire stamp duty system.   
4.2.7 The relative importance of sustainability as a driver for stamp duty changes 
The evidence demonstrates that in the nineteenth century there were few 
instances when the colonial government amended the law exclusively to ensure 
system sustainability. Such amendments were passed to link the stamp duty 
system with the judicial system, or to ameliorate the adjudication provisions as 
well as to offer convenience to taxpayers. Similarly, the evidence reveals that in 
the first half of the twentieth century, there were stamp duty laws written to 
enhance sustainability. However they were mainly executed on an ad hoc basis 
concurrently with the Hong Kong government’s stamp duty revenue 
procurement measures. Clear evidence to support this observation was the 
introduction of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 19211171 which spawned many 
revolutionary methodologies to prevent revenue dissipation while the 
government set about significantly increasing the stamp duty rates under the 
same Ordinance.1172  
 
After World War II, the evidence demonstrates that the Hong Kong government 
might have pioneered a proactive administrative approach to ensure timely 
stamp duty legislation was promulgated to ensure the sustainability of its stamp 
duty system. Evidence to support this notion was identified in the Legislative 
Council records. Financial Secretary Philip Haddon-Cave (in office 1971–1981) 
remarked that the law governing the Hong Kong tax system at large had to be 
‘adapted from time to time consistent with commercial practices’.1173 In addition, 
he explained that the government’s general policy was to ensure each and 
                                            
1170 See section 3.3.8.  
1171 No 8 of 1921. 
1172 See section 3.3.7. 
1173 Per Philip Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1978, 540. 
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every levy – be it direct or indirect – was simple and easy (and therefore 
inexpensive) to administer for both government and taxpayer and did not 
encourage evasion, for a low and narrowly-based tax system simply could not 
afford to finance costly overheads.1174 As a result of this general direction on tax 
policy, not-for-revenue improvements to stamp duty law were made frequently 
from the 1960s onwards and some of these were for the enhancement of 
system sustainability.1175  
 
Haddon-Cave further confirmed this stamp duty tradition when he moved the 
second reading of the 1972 Stamp Amendment Ordinance.1176 He said:  
Hardly a year passes, Sir, when the Stamp Ordinance is not 
amended, not in any fundamental sense but there are always, it 
seems, loopholes to be closed, anomalies to be removed and 
obscurities to be clarified. This bill is in that honourable 
tradition.1177  
Moreover, Haddon–Cave said in his 1978 Hong Kong budget speech: ‘Statute 
law cannot keep pace with commercial practice and economic reality in a 
rapidly changing world. Our Stamp Ordinance has been amended no less than 
twenty-one times in the last ten years alone.’ 1178 
 
As a whole, the evidence demonstrates that the number of legislative changes 
associated with each of the six factors traditionally regarded as necessary to 
ensure sustainability – offering convenience, offering comprehensibility, 
discerning jurisdictions, establishing noncompliance counter measures, 
introducing taxpayer’s protections and prescribing relief and exemptions – were 
generally small on an individual basis. Only the combined effect of these 
sporadic occurrences made them a significant class of imperatives.  
 
Although prolific as a class, the analysis shows that the legislative changes in 
response to the demand to maintain sustainability often appeared as minor 
amendments with only a few exceptions. The evidence confirms that repeated 
                                            
1174 Ibid. 
1175 There were twenty-three stamp duty amendments made during the 1960s and 1970s. On 
average, the government passed more than one stamp duty amendment per year. 
1176 No 2 of 1972. 
1177 Per Charles Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 5 January 1972, 307. 
1178 Per Charles Haddon-Cave, Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1978, 556. 
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reviews initiated by the government after World War II contributed to the stability 
of the stamp duty system. Nonetheless, a large portion of the resulting changes 
were repealed before the reversion of sovereignty in 1997.  
 
As such, it is submitted that sustainability as a driver of stamp duty legislative 
changes was less powerful than the financial, social and economic 
imperatives. 1179  Nevertheless, sustainability was more powerful than other 
minor influences underlying the development of the tax, to be discussed in the 
latter part of this chapter.  
4.2.8 The general threats to stamp duty system sustainability  
Given the apparent lack of concerted effort by the government throughout the 
history of the Hong Kong Stamp Duty to initiate ground-breaking legislation to 
ensure the sustainability of the stamp duty system, it must be seen how the 
system was sustained in practice. In order to do so, the Hong Kong stamp 
system will be compared with the initial implementation of stamp duty in 
Mainland China nearly fifty years after it was first introduced into Hong Kong.  
 
The introduction and operation of stamp duty in Mainland China under the late 
Qing court and the Republic of China is of key significance. First, it contributes 
to the understanding of the Chinese attitude to the implementation of stamp 
duty as mentioned in the imperial Qing court discussion records.1180 Second, it 
provides an insight into how Hong Kong stamp duty legislation could be 
sustained and emerged as an important revenue source in Hong Kong. This is 
effected by analysing the problems and pitfalls of the less successful stamp 
duty execution in the neighbouring Mainland China, from the time of the Qing 
administration in late nineteenth century until the Chinese Communist Party 
defeated the Kuomintang government in 1950. Understanding the drawbacks of 
implementing stamp duty in China in its early stages helps to identify the 
                                            
1179 See section 3.6. 
1180 The imperial Chinese Qing court discussions were mainly in the form of memorials. 
Memorials were submitted to the emperor by high-ranking officials during the Qing dynasty. The 
emperor would return to the sender once he had reviewed and annotated them with his 
comments in vermilion ink. All memorials that had been commented by the emperor were to be 
returned to the palace archives for storage. Officials were forbidden from keeping them in 
private possession. With the use of a centralized storage system during the Qing dynasty, 
copies of the Qing court memorials were available in major libraries in China and Hong Kong 
today. 
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elements embedded in the Hong Kong stamp duty system that would prevent a 
repetition of the Chinese experience in Hong Kong.  
  
Chinese stamp duty was first introduced in 1909 by the Qing government.1181 
This was the first form of tax that China copied from the west. According to the 
Qing imperial court’s discussion records the Qing mandarins advocated the 
introduction of stamp duty in China as it could help to reform the China tax 
system by eliminating some old fashioned taxes. Further, the tax rates were low 
but a large number of taxpayers would fall into the stamp duty net to provide an 
enormous governmental income. In addition, the government perceived stamp 
duty as the least likely mechanism to instigate a revolt by the Chinese 
taxpayers. The Qing court perceived the stamp duty tax as the most likely to be 
sustained as compared to other choices. 1182  Two years after the 
implementation, the Qing dynasty was replaced by the Republic of China. 
During the Republic of China era, the Chinese stamp duty law gave rise to 
numerous conflicts that frustrated system sustainability.  
 
The British tenet of taxation only with representation  
The Chinese government frequently issued administrative orders to interpret the 
law and to amend it. Administrative orders were also regularly employed to 
increase tax rates on existing assessable items and to designate additional 
items to be taxed. This led to strong opposition from the taxpayers.1183 For 
example, in 1914, the Ministry of Finance of the Chinese government amended 
the stamp duty rates by announcing an executive order approved by the 
President of China without any parliamentary discussion. The change was 
effected by a mere announcement. This fuelled vehement objections from trade 
associations and citizens in all major Chinese provinces as the effect was that 
stamp duties were levied on all transactions of less than ten dollars, 
transactions that were previously exempted. The strength of objection led to the 
suspension of the executive order.1184 Citizens demanded that stamp duty law 
                                            
1181 Lixin, 饒立新, Zhongguo Yin Hua Shui Yan Jiu中國印花稅研究 [Study on Stamp Duty of 
China] (Beijing, Zhongguo Shui Wu Chu Ban She 2009), 61. 
1182 Ibid 33–34. 
1183 Ibid 96. 
1184 Zhiqing Duan and Pan Shoumin Pan段志清 及 潘壽民, Zhongguo Yin Hua Shui Shi Gao中
國印花稅史稿 [History of Chinese Stamp Duty] (Shanghai, Shanghai Gu Ji Chu Ban She 2007), 
68. 
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and its amendments must seek consensus in the Chinese parliament. It was not 
proper to promulgate the law by an order issued by the Ministry of Finance.1185  
 
The erosion of the stamp system sustainability, caused by the Chinese 
government through its recurrent administrative orders to interpret the law and 
to increase duties in the early twentieth century, was prevented in Hong Kong 
by the adoption of the principle of taxation only with representation inherited by 
the Hong Kong government.1186 
 
The contribution of English case law to the system sustainability  
English law was introduced to Hong Kong on 5 April 1843, the day that Queen 
Victoria granted the Letters Patent to Hong Kong. The formula adopted by the 
colonial government was to adapt a comprehensive collection of Britain’s 
enacted statutes and judicial decisions and apply them in Hong Kong. The 
general approach was to automatically receive the English law that existed on 5 
April 1843. However, any English law that was considered inappropriate and 
unsuitable for Hong Kong was excluded.1187. 
 
The Hong Kong Supreme Court Ordinance 1873 1188 reaffirmed that statutes 
passed by the British Parliament after 5 April 1843 had no application in Hong 
Kong unless specifically adopted as local Ordinances. 1189  This raised the 
question whether English judicial decisions delivered after 5 April 1843 were 
also applicable in Hong Kong. The 1873 Hong Kong Supreme Court Ordinance 
provided no answer. 1190  In practice, all English judicial decisions were 
applicable in Hong Kong until China resumed the exercise of sovereignty in 
1997. The reason for this was that English judicial pronouncements subsequent 
                                            
1185 Ibid 69. 
1186 See section 2.4.2.  
1187 In 1843, the Letters Patent granted the Hong Kong Governors the right to make and enact 
laws and Ordinances for the Peace, Order and good Government of the Colony of Hong Kong. 
In 1873, The Hong Kong Supreme Court Ordinance, No 3 of 1873 formally incorporated the 
formula for introducing English law into Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Supreme Court Ordinance 
No 3 of 1873, s 5–8 was explicit that only English law (and not Scots law) was adopted. See 
also Peter Wesley Smith, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1998), 39. 
1188 Hong Kong Supreme Court Ordinance, No 3 of 1873. 
1189 Ibid s 5. 
1190 Ibid. 
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to the cut-off date merely declared what had always been the law.1191 After the 
1997 handover, in line with Article 8 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the English 
case law previously in force, and the basis for interpretation of many Hong Kong 
Ordinances before the handover, remained as the accepted authority. English 
case law, determined after the 1997 handover, was not binding in Hong Kong. 
All the important judicial decisions on stamp duty with lasting value and decided 
before 1997, mostly originated in Britain. As discussed, these remain applicable 
in Hong Kong to the present day.  
 
There were two cases that were heard before 1945 that imparted principles that 
were instrumental in upholding the stamp system sustainability rather than 
being merely technical clarifications. In the absence of these fundamental 
principles, the entire Hong Kong stamp duty system would wither because both 
the Stamp Office as well as the taxpayers’ rights would not be adequately 
safeguarded.  
 
Carlill v Carbolic Smokeball Co1192 
In order to avoid stamp duties, some traders on Mainland China refrained from 
preparing taxable contracts or documents in commercial dealings. In the 
interest of preventing the loss of revenue attributable to such avoidance 
activities, the Republic of China stamp duty administrators diverged from the 
general principle of taxing documents. Instead, they levied stamp duty based on 
the perceived trades involved. In essence, the nature of the stamp duty had 
changed to that of business turnover tax.1193 In other words, the Republic of 
China government deviated from the general principle for taxing documents and 
levied stamp duty on trade transactions even if the related taxable documents 
were absent. The effect was undesirable as the revenue authorities were given 
the power arbitrarily to define what matters were subject to stamp duties based 
on the transactions effected and not on related documents. There was a 
complete breakdown of the taxpayers’ protection for stamp duty matters and the 
tax authorities could potentially abuse their immensely powerful position. The 
                                            
1191 Peter Wesley Smith, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1998), 39. 
1192 [1892] 2 QB 484; aff’d [1893] 1 QB 256. 
1193 Lixin Rao, Zhongguo Yin Hua Shui Yan Jiu中國印花稅研究 [Study on Stamp Duty of China] 
(Beijing, Zhongguo Shui Wu Chu Ban She 2009), 96. 
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principle derived from the British decision of Carlill v Carbolic Smokeball Co 
effectively stopped this undesirable practice. 
 
The case was heard in Britain in 1892. The Carbolic Smokeball Company 
manufactured and sold the Carbolic Smokeball. The company placed an 
advertisement in various newspapers offering a reward of £100 to any person 
who used the smokeball three times per day as directed and contracted 
influenza. After seeing the advertisement, Carlill purchased a ball and used it as 
directed. Carlill contracted influenza and made a claim for the reward. The 
Company refused to pay and Carlill sued for damages arising from breach of 
contract.  
 
The High Court was asked whether the advertisement, which was the only 
written document effecting the transaction, was required to be stamped as an 
agreement before it could be admitted in evidence.1194 Under the 1891 British 
Stamp Act at that time, an agreement needed to be stamped before it could be 
admitted as evidence.1195 The court held that: 
No document requires an agreement stamp unless it amounts to an 
agreement, or a memorandum of an agreement. The mere fact that a 
document may assist in proving a contract does not render it 
chargeable with stamp duty; it is only so chargeable when the 
document amounts to an agreement of itself or to a memorandum of 
an agreement already made. A mere proposal or offer until accepted 
amounts to nothing. If accepted in writing, the offer and acceptance 
together amount to an agreement; but, if accepted by parol, such 
acceptance does not convert the offer into an agreement nor into a 
memorandum of an agreement.1196 
 
The cardinal rule derived from this decision was that stamp duty was levied on 
taxable written instruments, and not on transactions. In the case, the non-
taxable written advertisement offer would not change its character to a taxable 
written agreement by virtue of the fact that the transaction had actually been 
effected orally or by conduct. There would not be any question of stamp duty if 
                                            
1194 [1892] 2 QB 484 at 488. 
1195 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39), first sch. 
1196 [1892] 2 QB 484 at, 490 (Hawkins J). 
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the chargeable document was non-existent.  
 
The decision in Carlill v Carbolic Smokeball Co provided the stamp duty payers 
with protection1197 as the government’s power to tax was restricted. It was also 
in the interests of the government to have this protection as the absence of 
such safeguard could lead to tensions and consequent expression of taxpayers’ 
resentment. Furthermore, the safeguard also enhanced compliance and public 
co-operation. 1198  The ethos of the decision definitely contributed to the 
sustainability of the Hong Kong stamp duty system.  
 
Limmer Asphalte Paving Co v IRC1199  
The previous case demonstrates how the undesirable effect of revenue 
authorities, being given the power to arbitrarily determine the taxable sums for 
stamp duty purposes based on transactions and not on documents, was curbed 
by the application of English case law.  
 
It is also observed that reciprocally, erosion of the system sustainability also 
occurred when the taxpayers’ right to define the nature of their instruments was 
unchecked. Under the stamp duty system, different instruments were subject to 
different duty rates. A simple way to escape liability was to label a taxable 
instrument as a certain non-taxable instrument or an instrument chargeable with 
lower duties. The stamp duty system would not be sustainable if all taxpayers 
were permitted freely to define the nature of their instruments. The principle 
which originated in Limmer Asphalte Paving Co v IRC effectively restricted such 
freedom and as such constituted a major contribution to the sustainability of the 
Hong Kong stamp duty system. 
 
The case was heard in Britain in 1872. The court was asked to determine 
whether an instrument granting an exclusive right to use Limmer Asphalte 
Paving Co’s asphalt for £7,500 within Lancaster and Chester was a deed or a 
                                            
1197 For instance, in the absence of the Carlill v Carbolic Smokeball decision, if a person 
purchased a pack of Carbolic Smokeball in 1892 London, the parties needed to pay a receipt 
stamp on the receipt issued and at the same time the tax department had the right to demand 
stamp duty on the unwritten sales and purchase agreement based on the effected transaction. 
The result would be perplexing. 
1198 Chantal Stebbings, The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law: A Study in Constitutional Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press 2009), 3. 
1199 (1872) LR 7 Ex 211. 
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conveyance of a right. The issue was contentious as under the 1870 British 
Stamp Act, a deed was only subject to a fixed 10s duty whereas a conveyance 
was subject to an ad valorem duty and the expected duty payable by the 
taxpayers was around £37.1200 
 
Martin B laid down the principle: 
In order to determine whether any, and if any what, stamp duty is 
chargeable upon an instrument, the legal rule is that the real and true 
meaning of the instrument is to be ascertained; that the description of 
it given in the instrument itself by the parties is immaterial, even 
although they may have believed that its effect and operation was 
something other than what the courts affirms.1201 
 
This case set the general principle of stamp duty law that the liability to stamp 
duty was determined by the substance rather by the form of the instrument. The 
name given to the instrument by the taxpayer was irrelevant; the liability was 
determined by the true underlying nature of the transaction effected.  
 
This could be viewed as an effective anti-avoidance law. It was an 
unambiguous message to taxpayers that they could not label their instruments 
freely to derive a tax benefit. Indeed, this judge-made law thwarted behaviours 
that would, if unchecked, threaten the sustainability of the stamp duty system. In 
Hong Kong today, this principle is still of great importance. In particular, a lease 
which grants an exclusive right of possession is chargeable with stamp duty, 
while a license which confers a non-exclusive right of possession is duty free 
under the current Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance.1202  
 
The body of evidence suggests that for countries contemplating a stamp duty 
system as a source of revenue, the ideologies underlying these principles 
should be legislated in the absence of the established English case law system.  
 
British unwritten stamp duty guidelines 
                                            
1200 British Stamp Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict c 97), sch. 
1201 (1872) LR 7 Ex 211 at, 214–15. 
1202 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981). 
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In order to raise revenue, the Chinese provincial governments printed adhesive 
stamps excessively. The officials were more interested in selling the adhesive 
stamps than ensuring the stamps were used according to law. In order to 
accelerate stamp sales, provincial governments appointed stamp distributors, 
which were usually business establishments. They were given a good margin in 
the business of adhesive stamp distribution. The result was the devaluation of 
the stamps since taxpayers could obtain the stamps at a discount from the 
stamp distributors. In the long run, stamp duty became nominal since the 
market price for the stamps was way below their face value due to the discounts 
entailed with the distribution method and abundant market supply.1203  
 
In a way, the Hong Kong stamp duty sustainability was maintained by adhering 
to certain unwritten British stamp duty tenets which prevented harmful policies 
from gaining a foothold and thus threatening the sustainability of the system. 
The British government did not permit the Hong Kong government to print its 
own stamps. All stamps were to be printed in London with strict control by the 
home government to circumvent the temptation of the colonial government to 
sell excess stamps at a discount through appointed stamp distributors during 
financial exigencies. This was not written into the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
and was only revealed by the letters between the Hong Kong Governors and 
the Colonial Office.1204  
 
Governors’ near absolute authority  
This section turns to an assessment as to whether the near absolute authority 
granted to the Hong Kong Governors in relation to stamp duty matters was a 
possible class of factor which maintained the sustainability of the stamp duty 
system.  
 
It can be recalled that, in 1868, Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell (in office 
1866–1872) appointed a Commission of Inquiry (the Commission) to discuss 
the amendment of the Stamp Ordinance with the Hong Kong General Chamber 
                                            
1203 Lixin Rao, Zhongguo Yin Hua Shui Yan Jiu中國印花稅研究 [Study on Stamp Duty of China] 
(Beijing, Zhongguo Shui Wu Chu Ban She 2009), 97. 
1204 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115, 56–
59. 
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of Commerce (the Chamber of Commerce).1205 During the meeting with the 
members of the Chamber of Commerce, the Commission expressed the view 
that the government would make a very material reduction to the stamp duties 
levied on bills of exchange by substituting the original fixed rate with an ad 
valorem scale. However, to make up the loss, the Commission suggested new 
chargeable instruments which included: average statements, godown-orders, 
bank cheques, inward bills of lading, treasury bills of lading to ports out of 
China, and insurance policies. The Commission stressed that the objective of 
the amendments was about restoring vertical equity and not about enhancing 
revenue.1206 
 
The Chamber of Commerce debated the Commission’s proposal. One notable 
motion was to keep the schedule of heads of charge unchanged, and ensure 
any expansion.1207 However, the members favoured more motions for lower tax 
rates for some instruments. For example, the motion for reducing the tax rate on 
bills of exchange from HK$1 to HK3¢1208 received the greatest support from the 
Chamber of Commerce members. There were some recommendations from the 
Chamber of Commerce. First, was the proposal to reduce tax rates for all 
existing instruments.1209 Second, was to allow taxpayers a fourteen-day grace 
period to have documents stamped without a fine.1210 The members objected to 
all additional heads of charge proposed by the Commission except for a small 
tax on insurance policies.1211 
 
MacDonnell rejected all the Chamber of Commerce’s stamp duty demands 
without providing any reason, and did so with no repercussions. The public was 
not able to remove him at any election. It was evident from the commencement 
of the Hong Kong stamp duty system that the Governor had near absolute 
power in terms of stamp duty legislative matters due to the unique system of 
government, which enabled him to disregard public pressure in the event he 
deemed it essential to tackle predicaments as determined by him.   
                                            
1205 See section 3.3.1.  
1206 The Hong Kong General Chamber Of Commerce General Meeting, In Re: The Stamp Act 
(20 March 1868), CO129/131, 58. 
1207 Ibid 59. 
1208 Ibid. 
1209 Ibid 58–59. 
1210 Ibid 60. 
1211 Ibid. 
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The ethos was unchanged after one hundred years when in 1974 Governor Sir 
Murray MacLehose (in office 1971–1982), rejected the joint petition from the 
four recognised stock exchanges in Hong Kong to reduce the rate of stamp duty 
on contract notes in respect of share transactions forthwith, in response to the 
adverse economic conditions.1212  
 
The evidence demonstrates that the absolute power granted to the Hong Kong 
Governors made possible under an election-free political environment had 
significant influence on how the stamp duty law was shaped in the colony. This 
unique system, constrained only by appointed (unelected) Legislative Council 
unofficial members, enabled the government to concentrate on making the right 
tax strategies rather than on politically correct tax decisions and maintain 
system sustainability. After all, only the Colonial Office could remove the 
Governors and other senior officials and not the public.  
 
It can also be deduced that in order for this political structure supporting the 
Hong Kong stamp duty system to be credible and sustainable, the quality of the 
Governors was of paramount importance. In this regard, the British government 
had a proven and reliable system for selecting capable candidates with integrity 
and political intelligence to take up office as Governor. For example, in the 
twentieth century, the Colonial Office maintained a ‘List A’ consisting of selected 
Administrative Officers of less than 55 years of age who were suitable to take 
up governorships. Once there was a vacancy, the Colonial Office would select a 
few candidates from ‘List A’ for the Secretary of State for the Colonies to make 
the choice. Thereafter, the British Prime Minister would make the final decision 
before submitting it to the monarch for formal consent. The Colonial Office also 
maintained a ‘List B’ consisting of younger Administrative Officers who had 
shown potential to be appointed as Colonial Secretaries.1213 They could be 
upgraded from ‘List B’ to ‘List A’ once they had exceeded expectations in their 
positions as Colonial Secretaries.1214  
                                            
1212 Hong Kong Hansard 5 June 1974, 887. 
1213 Colonial Secretary was the second in command of a British colony ranked only under the 
Governor within the governing structure of a colony. 
1214 Anthony Kirk-Greene, On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial and Overseas Civil 
Services 1837–1997 (London, I B Tauris 1999), 101–102; P K Li李彭廣, Guan Zhi Xianggang: 
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4.3 Political imperatives  
Sustainability imperatives thus form the first class of secondary imperatives 
driving the development of the Hong Kong stamp duty. The second class of 
such lesser imperatives was political in nature. The inter-relationship between 
the political history of Hong Kong and the history of Hong Kong stamp duty 
changes gave rise to two major lines of enquiry. First, was whether the demand 
for stamp duty changes drove advancements in the Hong Kong political 
processes and methods. Second, was the extent to which the resultant changes 
in the political processes and methods to create and approve the law shaped 
the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation.  
 
It has been seen that the legislative process during the 1866 introduction of 
stamp duty was proposed by the government, scrutinised by the Legislative 
Council unofficial members and endorsed by the Colonial Office.1215 It is also 
clear that public resistance by the British merchants was not uncommon with 
regard to the introduction of revenue laws in Hong Kong. 1216 The progress 
made in the methods used by the Hong Kong government to surmount these 
political roadblocks to promulgate stamp duty legislation must be examined. Of 
particular interest is how the Hong Kong government managed to steer the 
attitude of the Legislative Council unofficial members in order to pre-empt the 
Hong Kong public from opposing everything related to stamp duty in the early 
colonial days, and to adopt a more co-operative attitude beginning from the 
twentieth century. It must be established whether these political changes had 
any effect on how the stamp duty law was formulated in Hong Kong. 
4.3.1 Stamp duty and Hong Kong constitutional development 
The introduction of stamp duty in 1866 led to events in history that had a strong 
influence on Hong Kong’s constitutional development. After the implementation 
of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 18661217 on 10 October 1867, the law was 
challenged as taxation without representation.1218 
 
                                                                                                                                
Yingguo Jie Mi Dang An De Qi Shi管治香港 : 英國解密檔案的啟示 [Governing Hong Kong 
Insights from the British Declassified Files] (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press 2012), 3–4. 
1215 See section 2.4.2. 
1216 See section 2.2.2. 
1217 No 12 of 1866. 
1218 Minutes on Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Richard Grenville dated 14 October 1867 (24 
December 1867), CO129/125, 30. 
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A reform association1219 was established in 1867 with Alfred Sinnett,1220 a local 
newspaper editor, as its secretary and leader. The reform association appealed 
directly to the British Parliament to demand the abolition of the stamp duty law 
on the basis that the decision to impose stamp duty in Hong Kong was contrary 
to the wishes of the Hong Kong community.1221 Sinnett proclaimed in a local 
newspaper, The Hong Kong Daily Press, that: ‘the Stamp Ordinance was 
frightening the Chinese and would drive Chinese traders away from the 
Colony’.1222 He was deeply against using the Stamp Duty Ordinance to raise 
revenue for a military contribution to Britain.1223 He advocated the suspension or 
abolition of the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation, and demanded a more 
representative government. He put his demands directly to the British 
Parliament without informing the Hong Kong government.1224 
  
Sinnett’s actions taken against the implementation of stamp duty in Hong Kong 
were bound to be unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the British Parliament 
refrained from debating any tax issues arising from British colonies after the 
American Stamp Duty Act Crisis leading to the American Independence 
War.1225 All colonial taxation matters were left to the discretion of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies and the respective Governors. 
 
Second, it was the Secretary of State for the Colonies who attended to Sinnett’s 
petition. Sinnett had unwisely linked the new Hong Kong stamp duty with 
military contribution.1226 In fact, it was the Colonial Office that demanded the 
military contribution. It was unlikely that the Secretary of State would agree to 
the suspension of the implementation of the 1866 Hong Kong Stamp 
                                            
1219 The reform association was formed partly due to the passing of The Representation of the 
People Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict c 102 in Britain. It was a piece of British legislation that 
enfranchised part of the urban male working class in England and Wales for the first time. 
1220 Alfred Sinnett was born on 18 January 1840. Sinnett was admitted to the London University 
(now University College London) as a scholarship student, but left without finishing his studies. 
He learned mechanical drawing, and worked briefly as a draftsman until he eventually obtained 
a position as assistant and sub-editor of The Globe, an evening newspaper in Britain. Late in 
1865, he accepted the editorship of the ‘Hong Kong Daily Press’, where he worked in Hong 
Kong for three years. 
1221 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 86. 
1222 Editorial, ‘The Stamp Act’ Hong Kong Daily Press (Hong Kong 25 January 1867), 2 
1223 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 86. 
1224 Ibid 87. 
1225 See section 2.4.2. The war refers to American Independence War (1775–1783). 
1226 Editorial, ‘The Daily Press’ Hong Kong Daily Press (Hong Kong 14 September 1867), 2 
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Ordinance. Evidence can be found in the correspondence between Governor 
Sir Richard MacDonnell (in office 1866–1872), and the Colonial Office in which 
MacDonnell protested that the military contribution demanded by the Colonial 
Office would negatively affect him balancing the Hong Kong budget. 1227 
Ultimately, the officials at the Colonial Office succeeded in convincing 
MacDonnell to accept the demand for military contribution and MacDonnell 
remarked: ‘Unquestionably, it is a just contribution and compared with that of 
Singapore an extremely light one’.1228 Unknown to MacDonnell, the Colonial 
Office official scribbled beside MacDonnell’s remark: ‘admitted for the first 
time’.1229   
 
Though not able to reverse the Colonial Office’s approval for Hong Kong stamp 
duty, Sinnett’s petition and his articles in the local press were significant in that 
they led to discussions on constitutional reform in Hong Kong. There was a 
general demand for a more representative government. At that time, the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council consisted of the Governor, four official members and 
three unofficial members.1230 In a report sent to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in 1869 regarding the demand for a more representative government, 
MacDonnell stated that the community at large was indifferent to the subject 
and constitutional reform was neither practicable nor desirable. Due to the 
difference in language, religion, custom and interest, adding more British 
unofficial members would not lead to a more representative government.1231 On 
the other hand, the ethnic Chinese could not be appointed as they could not be 
trusted with British confidential information, in case of a breakdown in Anglo-
Chinese relations.1232 
 
Despite the rejection of constitutional reform by MacDonnell, there were 
improvements in the Hong Kong government. First, the views of the unofficial 
members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council on financial matters received 
                                            
1227 Letter from Richard MacDonnell to Henry Herbert (10 September 1866), CO129/115, 33. 
1228 Ibid. 
1229 Ibid. 
1230 In 1866, the members were the Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell, the Acting Chief Justice 
Henry John Ball, the Acting Colonial Secretary W H Rennie, the Attorney General Julian 
Pauncefote, the Colonial Treasurer F H A Forth, and three prominent British merchants James 
Whittall, John Dent, H B Gibb, all Britons.  
1231 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 87. 
1232 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press 2004), 27. 
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more attention after Sinnett’s petition.1233 Second, successive Governors drew 
lessons from the events of 1866 and answered the public demand for a more 
representative government by appointing more British Legislative Council 
unofficial members before the end of the nineteenth century.1234 In 1880, the 
first Chinese unofficial member was also appointed.1235   
4.3.2 The importance of skilful politics and procedural justice 
The appraisal of the events after Sinnett’s 1867 petition shows clearly that the 
petition was a driver for political development in response to stamp duty 
revenue demand. The evidence demonstrates that the petition had an 
immediate influence on how the Hong Kong government introduced stamp duty 
changes to enhance revenue.  
 
Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell piloted the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 18681236 in order to raise revenue.1237 In contrast to the enactment of 
the earlier Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866,1238 MacDonnell refrained from 
announcing publicly his real financial intentions in making the 1868 
amendments. Sinnett’s petition had an impact on how MacDonnell steered the 
Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1868 1239  through the legislative 
process to circumvent political resistance. MacDonnell’s logic was simple: 
revenue-yielding changes concealed under the shelter of non-revenue 
enhancing alterations would not attract another petition.  
 
In order to achieve his real revenue aims, it has been seen that MacDonnell 
labelled the 1868 stamp duty amendment an exercise to improve fairness and 
equity for taxpayers. 1240  MacDonnell also appointed Phineas Ryrie as a 
member of a Commission formed to make recommendations to correct 
imperfections and restore equity. Ryrie was an unofficial member of the 
                                            
1233 G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962: A Constitutional History 
(Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 87. 
1234 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press 2004), 27. 
1235 Ibid. Ng Choy was appointed in 1880 as the first Chinese Legislative Council unofficial 
member in the history of Hong Kong. He was born in British Singapore, educated in Britain 
where he was called to the bar. 
1236 No 5 of 1868. 
1237 See section 3.3.1.  
1238 No 12 of 1866. 
1239 No 5 of 1868. 
1240 See section 3.3.1.  
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Legislative Council and the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce.1241 Since 
Ryrie was at the helm of the most influential British business association in 
Hong Kong at that time, it was anticipated that he might fend off the protest by 
the British business community on new provisions targeted at revenue. Since 
MacDonnell agreed to the majority of the suggestions by the Commission on 
restoring vertical equity, the other two unofficial members, William Keswick and 
J P Duncanson1242 had reservations about launching a protest. The Hong Kong 
Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1868 was passed in the Legislative Council with 
no opposition and the public did not protest. 
 
This analysis of the events leading to the 1868 stamp amendment legislation 
reveals the importance of the Hong Kong government’s successful adoption of 
procedural justice. Though the true aim of the amendment was revenue 
enhancement,1243 by initiating the process of establishing a commission and 
consulting the Chamber of Commerce, the amendment was ultimately well 
received by the legislators and the general public. To the general public, 
perception was reality. They did not challenge the publicly-stated aim of 
restoring equity through the amendment. 
 
MacDonnell’s display of political skill facilitated many equity restoration 
provisions to be written into the stamp duty legislation.1244 They were used as a 
smokescreen to enable the introduction of the revenue-raising provisions. 
Without the Sinnett petition, it is doubtful whether MacDonnell would have been 
keen to restore equity, as the public did not seek it. Such equity-restoration 
stamp duty provisions would not have been introduced but for the political 
effects of the Sinnett petition.  
 
For the purpose of this study, MacDonnell’s arrangement also reveals the 
concept that the demand for stamp revenue drove developments in political 
method. Conversely, the resultant developments in political methods affected 
the way in which the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation was written.  
                                            
1241 The Hong Kong General Chamber Of Commerce General Meeting, In Re: The Stamp Act 
(20 March 1868), CO129/131, 58. 
1242 British heads of prominent trading firms Jardine, Matheson & Co and Gibb, Livingston & Co, 
respectively. 
1243 See section 3.3.1. 
1244 Ibid. 
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4.3.3 Delayed response to the Colonial Office’s inquiries 
From the foundation of Hong Kong till the end of World War II, any enacted 
legislation in Hong Kong was subject to the final endorsement of the Colonial 
Office.1245 The appraisal of the early Hong Kong stamp duty history in the 
nineteenth century identifies an unorthodox way to circumvent the political 
demands of the Colonial Office.   
 
Hong Kong historian Frank Welsh remarked: ‘It might have been possible to find 
a man more unsuited to be a colonial Governor than John Pope Hennessy (in 
office 1877–1883), but it would not have been easy.’1246 Indeed, the historical 
study of Hong Kong stamp duty below suggests he was a difficult person with 
whom to communicate and work. Nonetheless, the evidence also suggests that 
he might not have been completely ‘wanting in sound judgement and common 
sense’ as suggested by Lord Kimberley, the Secretary of State for the 
Colony,1247 at least insofar as it related to stamp duty matters. 
 
In 1877, Hennessy was eager to secure stamp duty payments from the Chinese 
community to enhance revenue collection. He was relentlessly formulating 
schemes to encourage as well as ensure that the Chinese contributed their 
rightful shares.1248 
 
Hennessy, in a letter to the Secretary of State dated 21 August 1877, informed 
London that he planned to sanction a Chinese Stamp Agency to facilitate the 
sales of stamps to the Chinese; however, he advised that he would temporarily 
suspend the plan pending further consultation.1249 In direct contrast, in his letter 
dated 9 October 1877 to the Secretary of State, Hennessy announced that he 
had already started a Chinese Stamp Agency on 18 July 1877.1250 The senior 
colonial officer attending to Hennessy was bewildered at the conflicting 
information and demanded an explanation. 1251  This is typical of the widely 
                                            
1245 See section 2.4.2. 
1246 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 255. 
1247 Ibid 256. 
1248 See section 3.3.2. 
1249 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (21 August 1877), CO129/178, 586. 
1250 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Henry Herbert (9 October 1877), CO129/179, 208. 
1251 Minutes on operation of the Chinese Stamp Agency (19 November 1877), CO129/179, 207. 
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accepted view of historians that Hennessy habitually made indefinite and 
inaccurate statements and lacked management skills.1252  
 
Hennessy replied by letter, one and a half years after the founding of the 
Chinese Stamp Agency, with information regarding the operation of this 
establishment. 1253  Because many questions posed by the Colonial Office 
regarding the Agency remained unanswered, the senior Colonial Office official 
remarked that he ‘did not feel competent to offer any remarks as to the mode of 
collecting the revenue’. The Secretary of State agreed, but the Chinese Stamp 
Agency had been in operation for more than a year and it was ‘hardly 
worthwhile pursuing the matter’ with Hennessy.1254 It was not an exceptional 
event of administrative oversight and the Colonial Office preferred not to pursue 
it further, anticipating that it would probably lead nowhere.  
 
On the one hand, Hennessy’s actions reflect that he was administratively 
inefficient and left correspondence from the Colonial Office unattended. On the 
other hand, rather than being judged administratively inefficient, perhaps 
Hennessy's actions may have been a calculated strategic ploy, even if 
somewhat devious, to give the Agency time to establish itself, believing the 
Colonial Office would be unlikely to unwind it after the extended passage of 
time.  
 
Again, the evidence demonstrates that the quest for stamp duty revenue drove 
the introduction of new political methods to circumvent disagreement, although 
in this case, the technique was deceitful. At the same time, the substance of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance was shaped by Hennessy’s political response to 
the demand for stamp revenue. It was apparent that in order to avoid the need 
to obtain political sanction from the Colonial Office to establish the Chinese 
Stamp Agency, Hennessy did not enact the regulation he conceived for the 
agency, such as how the stamp duty distributor should be identified and 
appointed as well as how the distributor’s margin should be determined and 
                                            
1252 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 170–71; 
Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 255. 
1253 Letter from John Pope Hennessy to Michael Hicks Beach (20 May 1879), CO129/184, 421. 
1254 Minutes on Establishment of a Stamp Agency for the Chinese (26 July 1879), CO129/184, 
418. 
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settled. 1255  The rules were not formally written into the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance due to political considerations, as the Colonial Office might not have 
approved Hennessy’s formulation should such legislation be submitted to them. 
Hennessy’s action was improper as it was apparent that legislative sanction 
was needed even to confer power to the Governor to establish subsidiary 
government Stamp Offices to distribute stamps later on in 1884.1256  
4.3.4 Finance Committee inauguration  
With an improved economy and resources available in the 1880s to recruit 
better-trained civil servants, unlike his predecessors, Governor Sir George 
Bowen (in office 1883–1887) was no longer alone in introducing tax legislation. 
No doubt the Governor was still the only person who had the absolute 
discretion to dictate the Bills that could reach the Legislative Council, but he 
worked with the Colonial Secretary, the Colonial Treasurer and the Attorney 
General (all de facto official members of the Legislative Council) as a team to 
pilot the tax Bills through the Legislative Council with the Attorney General 
taking the lead. It was in this political context that Bowen introduced the 1884 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance.1257  
 
The stamp duty reform of 1884 reinforces the finding that the need to 
circumvent political opposition continued to be an imperative in the history of 
Hong Kong stamp duty. In order to pre-empt strong opposition to the Stamp 
Duty Bill 1884 during Legislative Council debates, Bowen announced that a 
Finance Committee would be set up in accordance with the practice in other 
British colonies. The committee should comprise the whole Legislative Council, 
except the Governor, to examine in the first instance1258 the details of every 
proposed vote in relation to the revenues and expenditures of the colony before 
debating them formally in the Legislative Council.1259 The Bill for the Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinance 18841260 was subjected to this process.  
 
                                            
1255 See section 3.3.2.  
1256 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 15 of 1884, s 2. 
1257 No 15 of 1884. 
1258 In fact the first ever Finance Committee was established in 1872 by Sir John Pope 
Hennessy but it would only consider questions submitted to it by the Governor. See, G B 
Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 85. 
1259 Hong Kong Hansard 28 February 1884. 
1260 No 15 of 1884. 
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The analysis of the 1884 stamp legislation shows that Bowen followed 
MacDonnell’s practice of concealing the real financial intention by stressing that 
the legislation was introduced for some other dominant purposes in order to 
ensure the consensus of the Finance Committee before putting the Bill to a 
formal debate. MacDonnell claimed his 1868 stamp duty amendments were 
solely for equity restoration. To build on the concept, Bowen stressed that his 
1884 stamp duty reform was to restore equity as well as to simplify the stamp 
duty law and offer convenience.1261  
 
It is arguable that without any agenda to curtail political opposition, the 
government would not be able to introduce the many detailed stamp duty 
legislative changes to promote the various non-financial objectives. As an 
illustration, Bowen might only effect a law to add new chargeable instruments 
into the stamp duty schedule without spending considerable time in tempering 
other areas of the law to seek a smooth legislative process.1262   
 
The Bill was consequently passed successfully in the Legislative Council with 
no heated debate.1263 The reason for this was that all differences had been 
resolved in Finance Committee private discussions and the real financial 
intention was less obvious. 
4.3.5 The creation of trust  
Before the 1890s, the tactics used by Governors to avert political opposition 
against financially-driven stamp duty amendments were usually deceptive, 
shielding the real revenue aims with equity restoration and other inducements 
as well as to engage in insincere discussions with the pressure groups. 
Although the evidence proves that the Governors succeeded in gaining 
acceptance,  there was a question as to how many times the Hong Kong 
government could continue using the same strategy to avoid political opposition 
against stamp duty changes to enhance revenue. This could not go on forever 
without being detected. In order to ensure that any trust between government 
and taxpayer was not entirely undermined by such political tactics, the 
                                            
1261 See section 3.3.3.  
1262 Ibid. 
1263 Hong Kong Hansard 23 April 1884. 
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government had to find a way to ensure new Stamp Duty Ordinances openly 
disclosed their real financial objectives without provoking undue opposition.  
 
An assessment of historical stamp duty records indicates the driving force of the 
governorship of Sir William Robinson (in office 1891–1898) was to encourage a 
heightened sense of trust between the taxpayers and the government with 
regard to Hong Kong’s fiscal system.  
 
Robinson introduced the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 18941264 to 
meet revenue exigencies occasioned by natural disasters.1265 In piloting his 
stamp duty proposal through the legislative process, Robinson commissioned a 
retrenchment committee to suggest alternatives to cut government expenditures 
to complement the increase in stamp duty. The retrenchment committee 
subsequently produced a report to highlight the overpaid jobs, the over-manned 
posts and overspent administrative expenditures in the Hong Kong 
government.1266 This was an important medium by which to create trust in the 
Hong Kong government to facilitate the acceptability of increased stamp duties, 
rates and other fees. Without established trust, it was difficult for the public to 
consent to collective actions by government. A similar ideology for reducing 
government spending to create trust in the state to enhance legitimacy was put 
forward by William Gladstone in nineteenth century Britain, and this had 
become central to the notions of British liberty and identity. 1267  Robinson 
understood the British approach and implemented it in Hong Kong. This result, 
once again, affirms that stamp revenue demand drove the advancement of 
Hong Kong’s political methods to steer the implementation of stamp duty law 
away from political resistance.  
 
A political imperative was again material in influencing how the Stamp 
Ordinances were drafted. With the creation of trust, Robinson was the first 
Governor able to instigate straightforward amendments to enhance revenue by 
merely introducing new instruments and increasing existing duty rates without 
provoking uproar. Once the political opposition was effectively pre-empted by 
                                            
1264 No 13 of 1894. 
1265 See section 3.3.5. 
1266 Hong Kong Hansard 28 November 1894, 3. 
1267 Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001), 59. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 298 
the creation of trust, the design for stamp duty legislation to raise revenue could 
be simple and direct without unnecessary cover to conceal the actual intention.    
 
There is evidence that subsequent Hong Kong governments successfully 
followed this British principle of creating trust. As an illustration, in 1961, when 
Hong Kong faced severe deficits due to compelling public works, Financial 
Secretary Arthur Clarke (in office 1951–61) informed the Legislative Council that 
he had applied the ‘brakes to expenditures’ with a view to gaining support for 
his revenue-generating measures.1268 First, he forbade heads of government 
departments from spending more than one half of their voted provision during 
the first six months of the year without his special permission. Second, they 
were prohibited from spending any money without his prior approval in each 
case. Clarke insisted that for granting approval, full justification for the 
expenditure had to be supplied, and it had to be shown that the proposals were 
not extravagant. Third, departmental heads were ordered to save 10% of their 
recurrent provision.1269 These measures were effective in securing support from 
the unofficial members, and his stamp duty augmentation law1270 faced little 
resistance. These measures also enabled the 1961 revenue-enhancing stamp 
duty law to be direct without the need for any concealment of the underlying 
financial motive.1271  
4.3.6 Restriction of legislative time  
The restriction of legislative time refers to a situation in which the government 
manipulated the processing of Bills in an effort to achieve political expediency. 
In other words, the government proposed amendments to stamp duty 
legislation, with a view to limiting the opportunities for Legislative Council 
members or the public to propose changes liable to decelerate or thwart the 
passing of the Bill.1272 An examination of the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance 19021273 focuses on the exigencies of legislative time, and whether it 
was desirable to restrict discussion time for stamp duty legislation. 
 
                                            
1268 Hong Kong Hansard 1 March 1961, 38. 
1269 Ibid. 
1270 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 16 of 1961. 
1271 See section 3.3.10. 
1272 John H N Pearce, ‘The Rise of the Finance Act: 1853-1922’ in Peter Harris and Dominic de 
Cogan (eds), Studies in the History of Tax Law vol 7 (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2015), 71. 
1273 No 38 of 1902. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 299 
During the Legislative Council Meeting on 9 October 1902, Governor Sir Henry 
Blake (in office 1898–1903) tabled his financial estimates for the year 1903, 
predicting a substantial deficit of around HK$1 million on the estimated 1903 
annual revenue of around HK$4.6 million. Thus it was essential for the 
government to obtain a loan. Blake informed the unofficial members that in 
order to service the loan and provide for the ensuing interest expenditures, 
stamp duty had to be increased.1274  
 
Blake explained that the deficit was mainly due to the Bubonic plague that 
attacked Hong Kong about the turn of the century. In 1901, the epidemic was so 
bad that many Europeans lost their lives and many Chinese began to leave the 
colony. The demand for an enquiry led to the dispatch of two specialists from 
Britain, Professor W J Simpson to deal with the plague, and Osbert Chadwick to 
deal with sanitation, drains and housing. Their report recommended extensive 
work on water supply and drainage. In addition, the joint report highlighted that: 
Too many houses are crowded on too small a space; that the 
tenement houses are occupied by too many people, and that the 
design of Chinese tenement houses hitherto authorised by law is so 
faulty as to be in a high degree insanitary.  
Furthermore, Professor Simpson concluded the plague was spread by rats and 
again advised that the houses should be re-designed.1275   
 
Blake informed the Legislative Council unofficial members that he was 
determined to end the annual recurrence of plague in the colony. First, he 
decided to increase public works extensively in accordance with the report. 
Second, he decided to expend significant funds, estimated at HK$40,000, to 
displace a number of people and for whom compensation and accommodation 
must be provided elsewhere. The government recovered land previously sold 
for redevelopment for the ‘ultimate reconstruction of the city on a more sanitary 
system’.1276 Third, Blake had set up a bacteriological department in the colony 
that employed Japanese experts to examine the rats and other health-related 
                                            
1274 Hong Kong Hansard 9 October 1902, 56. 
1275 Ibid 55–56. 
1276 Ibid 56. 
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matters.1277 Immediately after his explanations, he introduced the Bill for the 
Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance 1902.  
 
The evidence shows that Blake spent much time in the Legislative Council 
demonstrating the connection between the estimated increase in stamp 
revenue and the benefits that the public would gain from the government 
initiatives. With the re-establishment of trust by Blake, providing the cost-benefit 
analysis of the Bill at its first reading fulfilled a political demand to prevent 
obstructive opposition. During the second reading of the Bill on 20 October 
1902, the Colonial Secretary Henry May (in office 1902–1911), explained the 
intention to double or treble the tax rates for most heads of charge.1278 He said: 
‘The fees under the Stamp Ordinance are in the majority of cases the same 
today as they were in 1868, and having regard to the great fall in exchange1279 it 
seems requisite that they should now be increased.’1280 By examining the Bill, it 
can be concluded that what May had said was accurate.1281 The legislator was 
careful not to earmark those heads of charge that had been hit by an increase 
in tax rates after the 1868 Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance.  
  
With a political agenda to achieve a swift passing of the stamp duty law, the 
1902 amendment to the stamp duty structure was clearly designed to enable 
the unofficial members to make a speedy decision with minimal deliberation 
required. The feedback received was either to agree with May’s simple 
reasoning and pass the proposed Bill with no discussion, or to object and 
discuss on what basis the tax rates should be levied. There was no requirement 
                                            
1277 Hong Kong Hansard 20 October 1902, 59; G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, 
Oxford University Press 1958), 279. 
1278 See section 3.3.6. 
1279 He was referring to the devaluation of the silver-based Hong Kong currency due to a rapid 
fall in silver prices during the late nineteenth century. See G B Endacott, Government and 
People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University 
Press 1964), 117. 
1280 Hong Kong Hansard 20 October 1902, 62. 
1281 See Appendices I and II. The heads of charge with tax rates that remained unchanged 
during the 1902 exercise were Head 1: Adjudication fees, Head 5: Arbitration awards, Head 15: 
Bonds concerning respondentia and bottomry, Head 17: Charter parties, Head 21: 
Conveyances, Head 27: Duplicates or counterparts, Head 29: Foreign attachment bonds, Head 
32: Leases at a premium, Head 34: Leases at a rent, Head 41: Policies of insurance, Head 43: 
Probates and letters of administration, Head 46: Servant security bonds and Head 47: 
Settlements. These included a few heads of charge that had seen a tax rate increase after the 
introduction of the 1868 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance. Taxes rates for Head 13: 
Bills of exchange, Head 38: Mortgages and Head 51: Transfers of share in any public company 
were earmarked for increase notwithstanding that they had been altered after the promulgation 
of the 1868 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance.   
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 301 
to conduct lengthy debates regarding the unfamiliar new legal operations or the 
merits of novel heads of charge. 
 
The government achieved the expected outcome as only one unofficial 
member, George Playfair, asked for the second reading of the Bill to be 
postponed as he anticipated public uproar.1282 The government rejected his 
request and highlighted the lack of further legislative time due to the urgency of 
the proposal. The Colonial Secretary remarked: ‘It is already late in the year, 
and the Bill should be on its way home [Colonial Office in London] if we expect 
to get on with the public works at early date next year.’1283 The government, in 
forcing a speedy enactment without allowing further legislative time, warned the 
unofficial members that any delay in passing the law would delay public works 
and cause further deaths due to the recurrence of plague. The Hong Kong 
Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1902 1284  was passed, with only minor 
amendments to the tax rates, on 23 October 1902. 
 
The Colonial Office senior officials who examined the proposed 1902 stamp 
legislation were of the opinion that some of the stamp duty rates such as those 
levied on co-partnership deeds, declarations of trust and instruments under seal 
passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, were unreasonably high 
compared to those in Britain.1285 Nevertheless, the Colonial Office refrained 
from vetoing the Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1902 1286  and 
resolved that it was ‘undesirable to raise any objection or direct any amendment 
reducing the contemplated increase of revenue’.1287  
 
This shows that the Hong Kong government engineered a situation to restrict 
opportunities for the proposal of lengthy amendments which might slow down 
the progress of the stamp duty legislation enactment. This was clearly politically 
motivated. The evidence shows that this imperative resulted in defects in the 
revenue law which the Colonial Office had noticed but refrained from 
                                            
1282 Hong Kong Hansard 20 October 1902, 62. 
1283 Ibid 63. 
1284 No 38 of 1902. 
1285 Minutes on Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 38 of 1902 (24 November 1902), CO129/313, 
161. 
1286 No 38 of 1902. 
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commenting upon. These legislative defects driven by political demands 
contributed to the failure of the 1902 amendment to achieve its expected 
revenue objective.1288 The crucial point identified is, that political expediency to 
overcome the exigencies of legislative time in enacting revenue law, could give 
rise to legal defects which may have cumulative effects if not subsequently 
remedied. 1289  
 
It was nine years later that the Hong Kong government corrected the defects of 
the immoderately raised duties. The 1911 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance substantially decreased the tax rates for co-partnership deeds, 
declarations of trust and instruments under seal.1290 The reduction was induced 
in consequence of representation by the Hong Kong Law Society which pointed 
out the related duties were prodigiously excessive.1291  
 
The examination of the political process of the 1921 Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance1292 provides a direct contrast to the approach adopted in 1902. It 
reveals that one of the factors that contributed to the sustainability of the 1921 
stamp legislation until 1981 was the non-restriction of legislative time. The 
unofficial members were given sufficient time to go through the new legislation 
slowly, phrase by phrase, to make the law acceptable and sustainable. The 
colonial government even allowed an extra Legislative Council session to 
discuss the Stamp Bill. Instead of the usual three sessions, it was changed to 
four.1293  
4.3.7 The power of consultation 
The evaluation of whether political imperatives drove Hong Kong stamp duty 
development, points to genuine public consultations as another vehicle for 
making sensible and politically acceptable stamp duty decisions.   
 
                                            
1288 See section 3.3.6. 
1289 For a British perspective on a similar issue see John H N Pearce, ‘The Rise of the Finance 
Act: 1853-1922’ in Peter Harris and Dominic de Cogan (eds), Studies in the History of Tax Law 
vol 7 (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2015), 71. 
1290 No 34 of 1911, s 15. The tax rate for co-partnership deeds was reduced from HK$25 to 
HK$5. The tax rate for declarations of trust and instruments under seal was reduced from 
HK$30 to HK$10. 
1291 Letter from Frederick Lugard to Lewis Harcourt (31 August 1911), CO129/379 199. 
1292 No 8 of 1921. 
1293 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921. 
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The role of consultation raised four specific sets of questions. First, what was 
the government’s main reason for engaging in consultation and were there 
other goals fulfilled by consultation? Second, what were the characteristics of 
the parties called upon by the government to seek opinions and were the 
government’s selection criteria efficacious? Third, how were the consultation 
processes affected by the stamp duty law and did the consultation produce 
constructive stamp duty dogma? Fourth, what was the improvement made to 
the consultation system and how was it possible?   
 
Regarding the first question, namely the reason the government engaged in 
consultation, the examination of the public legislative records as well as the 
private letters between the Governors and the Colonial office, revealed that the 
reason for engaging in the first genuine consultation of 1894 under the 
governorship of Sir William Robinson (in office 1891–1898) was to ensure the 
taxpayers were complaisant with regards to the proposed stamp duty legislation 
to enhance revenue. Robinson proposed the tax rate for insurance policies be 
increased from HK10¢ to HK25¢.1294 In order to pre-empt probable protests 
from the insurance sector, the government held pre-legislation conferences with 
insurance industry representatives.1295 The 1894 Ordinance was passed by the 
Legislative Council with no opposition, demonstrating that consultations with 
affected parties were useful in preventing unwanted clamour and to enhance 
acceptability of the tax law.  
 
The study of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921 1296 again points to the 
benefits of consultation in ensuring the passage of proposed legislation. 
Governor Sir Reginald Stubbs (in office 1919–1925) remarked in his letter to 
Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that: ‘The 1921 Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance 1297  was drafted by Joseph Kemp, the Hong Kong 
Attorney General in consultation with a Committee on which principal Hong 
Kong business interests were represented.’1298 It demonstrates that the Hong 
Kong government in 1921 made use of open discussion and consultation, in 
addition to Legislative Council debates, to ensure the Stamp Duty Bill became 
                                            
1294 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 13 of 1894, s 5; see section 3.3.5. 
1295 Letter from William Robinson to George Robinson (4 January 1895), CO129/266, 5. 
1296 No 8 of 1921. 
1297 No 8 of 1921. 
1298 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 180. 
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law without giving rise to serious public opposition and friction. The government 
accomplished its objective as there was no intense protest at all during the 
legislative stage. Kemp remarked: ‘The provision of the Ordinance as ultimately 
passed excited little opposition’.1299 Indeed there were also no revolts or public 
denunciations of the subsequent enforcement of the Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1921, a law which introduced significant increments to duty rates, 
coupled with more onerous collection mechanisms.1300 The examination of the 
1921 Stamp legislation enhances the understanding of how the colonial 
government pre-empted public protests and unofficial members’ objections that 
were commonly associated with major revenue augmentation initiatives.  
 
Regarding the second question as to the nature of those consulted, another key 
observation arising from analysing Stubbs’ remark in the preceding paragraph is 
that, ironically, the Hong Kong government only consulted the business 
community and left the other sectors out of the discussions. Further, by 
examining the list of committee members, it can be concluded that all members 
were British business leaders and no Chinese merchants were appointed.1301 
This reflected the prevailing political situation. The predominant position of the 
British businesses in the colonial structure had been maintained since the 
foundation of the colony. Tax Bills could be passed without severe 
consequences so long as the government obtained prior mutual understanding 
with major British business leaders in Hong Kong. It can be conjectured that 
these prominent British businessmen influenced the appointment of members of 
the Legislative Council and Executive Council, as nearly all Council members 
were also British businessmen. Furthermore, these British business leaders in 
Hong Kong maintained strong ties with Britain1302 and thus were able to make 
their opinions known to the British government, directly. 
 
The circumstances also reflect the political reality that trade was of paramount 
importance to the colonial government and the administration took steps to 
avoid imposing excessive burdens on trade and thereby drive the British 
merchants away or provoke political resistance from the British commercial 
                                            
1299 Ibid 206. 
1300 See section 3.3.7. 
1301 Per Lau Chu Pak, Hong Kong Hansard 30 April 1921, 57. 
1302 P K Li, Hong Kong from Britain to China Political Cleavages, Electoral Dynamics and 
Institutional Changes (England, Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2000), 21. 
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community. Furthermore, the Hong Kong Hansard contains no evidence to 
suggest that the government and the Legislative Council unofficial members 
actively included the relief of poverty and community hardship in their stamp 
duty debates before World War II – they were only interested in trade and 
commerce.1303 
 
The Chinese unofficial member, Lau Chu Pak (in office 1913–1922) protested in 
the Legislative Council that: 
The government has overlooked the interests of the Chinese 
merchants in not having appointed a single Chinese on the 
Committee to consider the Bill (stamp duty) before its introduction 
into this honourable Council. Seeing that they are the largest 
taxpayers in the Colony more than any other section of the general 
community I, and my Chinese colleague, submit Sir, that they have 
just ground for complaint.1304 
 
Stubbs expressed regret but did not provide any convincing reasons for the 
oversight.1305 Studying the political circumstances, two factors are identified to 
support the colonial government’s attitude towards the Chinese in respect of 
representation on tax matters granted to them. First the colonial government 
was free from mass electoral pressure. The Chinese would have no avenue to 
block the Stamp Duty Bill from becoming law even if they constituted the 
majority. Second, the Chinese had a submissive attitude. Lin Yu Tang, a 
famous Chinese scholar, observed in 1935 that: 
There is so much of this virtue (of Confucian patience) that it has 
almost become a vice. The Chinese people have put up with more 
tyranny, anarchy and misrule than any Western people have put up 
with, and seem to have regarded them as the law of nature. In a 
certain part of Szechuan the people have been taxed thirty years in 
advance without showing more energetic protest than a half-audible 
curse in the privacy of household. Christian patience would seem 
like petulance compared to Chinese patience … We submit to 
                                            
1303 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921; Hong Kong Hansard 25 April 1921; Hong Kong Hansard 
28 April 1921; Hong Kong Hansard 30 April 1921. 
1304 Hong Kong Hansard 30 April 1921, 57. 
1305 Ibid 58. 
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tyranny and extortion as small fish swim into the mouth of a big fish. 
Perhaps had our capacity for sufferance been smaller, our suffering 
would also be less.1306  
 
Besides having a submissive attitude, most of the Chinese came to the colony 
to escape the chaos in Mainland China, seeking a better living and greater 
economic opportunity. Although the evidence suggests that the colonial political 
system was far from perfect or just, it did maintain a relatively more stable 
environment with moderate policies that were badly needed by the Chinese as 
compared to Mainland China. With this in mind, the Chinese were not impelled 
to protest against colonial taxes and rules.  
 
This clearly demonstrates the selected parties for frank open discussions were 
racially as well as occupationally biased. The hard truth was that the exclusion 
of the Chinese and the non-commercial class from discussions would not have 
affected the passing of the Stamp Ordinances, as these groups had no political 
recourse to protect their interests. This, in a way, prevented further 
complications and enabled expedition of the legislative process with fewer 
deliberations to handle. The government approach was successful.  
 
It can be concluded that the ethos of the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinances 
favoured the opinions of British merchants, playing down the needs of the non-
commercial class, and reinforced by showcase public consultations to neutralise 
political resistance. Nonetheless, based on the analysis of various Hong Kong 
Stamp Ordinances and, in particular the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1921,1307 
it can be objectively stated that the government was always careful not to 
recommend any stamp duty policies that oppressed the Chinese and the non-
commercial class in order to preclude the possibility of civic uproars. 
 
Regarding the third question, it must be considered how such consultative 
meetings aiming to avert political opposition, shaped the stamp duty law. 
Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in office 1915–1930) had meetings with 
various bodies, individuals and members of the Legislative, as well as the 
                                            
1306 Yutang Lin, My Country and My People (New York, Day 1935), 44. 
1307 No 8 of 1921. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 307 
Executive, Councils, to seek their views on the proposed Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1921 after the first reading of the Stamp Duty Bill 1921. At the 
second reading of the Bill, Kemp informed the Legislative Council that the 
proposal for stamp duty on agreements for the sale of goods, contained in the 
original draft Bill, had been abandoned after further consultations held with 
diverse parties.1308 
 
The investigation regarding the rejection of agreements for sale of goods 
illustrates why they were not admissible for stamp duty. The agreements for the 
sale of goods were specifically exempted in 1866 during the introduction of 
stamp duty in Hong Kong.1309 Kemp aimed to lift the exemption so that the 
government would have a larger stamp duty yield. Kemp remarked: ‘The 
proposed duty does not appear to exist anywhere else.’1310 Indeed, he was fairly 
accurate if he had been referring to stamp duty law, as there was no British 
precedent to levy stamp duty on agreements for the sale of goods. 1311 
Nevertheless, upon further deliberation, what Kemp had suggested was akin to 
levying a general excise duty1312 on a wide variety of goods disguised in the 
form of stamp duty. The British Parliament first imposed the excise duty in 
Britain in 1643, to provide money for the parliamentary forces whilst engaged in 
the civil war against the Crown.1313 Thus, excise duty was certainly not a new 
idea in 1921.  
 
Kemp aimed to introduce a stamp duty on agreements for the sale of goods (in 
substance, excise duty) in order to replace the revenue loss upon relinquishing 
stamp duty on probates (in substance, estate duty). After his meetings with 
various bodies in Hong Kong, he understood his proposal aroused a 
‘considerable amount of opposition’1314 and had to be shelved. Historically the 
British government could never obtain the consent of the Parliament for a 
                                            
1308 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 206. 
1309 See section 2.3.3.  
1310 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 206. 
1311 British Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39), sch. 
1312 Excise duties were duties paid when purchases were made on goods. 
1313 Basil Sabine, A Short History of Taxation (London, Butterworths 1980), 90–91; The National 
Archives, ‘A Brief History of HM Customs and Excise’. 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/hmce.htm> 
assessed 22 January 2015. 
1314 Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), CO129/468, 206. 
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general excise, and this state of affairs continued into the twentieth century.1315 
A principal concern had been to avoid the economic drag that was destructive 
of the Netherlands economy in the seventeenth century caused by rampant 
excise duties.1316 An eighteenth century British economic agent in The Hague 
(the capital city of the province of South Netherlands today) wrote to London 
about Dutch taxes: ‘I have reckoned a man cannot eate a dishe of meate in an 
inn but that one way or another he shall pay 19 excises out of it. This is not 
more strange than true.’1317 High internal prices in the Netherlands caused by a 
general excise depressed trade and commerce and forced the Netherlands into 
an economic decline in the eighteenth century.1318  
 
From the findings, it can be concluded that it was essential for the British Stamp 
Acts to include an exemption with regard to agreements for sale of goods to 
prevent the undesirable effect of driving the prices of certain commodities to 
very high levels. As such, it was reasonable for the various parties to object to 
Kemp’s proposal in Hong Kong. The evidence thus shows that the government 
took advice from the consultative meetings and that the system of consultation 
shaped the evolution of specific Hong Kong stamp duty provisions. There is 
other post 1921 evidence such as the consultation processes leading to the 
promulgation of stamp duty counter noncompliance rule on blank transfers1319 
as well as the rule to determine locality of share transactions1320 to demonstrate 
that consultation processes did affect how the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinances 
were written. 
 
The fourth question deals with the improvement made to the consultation 
system and how such improvement was made possible. The Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance 19681321 amended the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 
19211322 in many respects and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue described 
                                            
1315 Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd 
edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 261. 
1316 Ibid 267.  
1317 Charles Wilson, The Dutch Republic and the Civilization of the Seventeenth Century (New 
York, McGraw-Hill 1968), 232. 
1318 Charles Adams, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (2nd 
edn, Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books 1999), 268. 
1319 See section 4.2.4. 
1320 See section 4.2.3. 
1321 No 30 of 1968. 
1322 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921.  
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 309 
the stamp duty reform as ‘a result of the culmination of some ten years’ 
research and deliberation’. 1323  This can be contrasted with previous 
consultations that usually took no longer than a year, even for the 1921 major 
stamp duty reform. 1324  The 1968 reform was the result of the first long 
consultation conducted for Hong Kong stamp duty.  
 
It took a decade because the Hong Kong government consulted widely, to 
ensure any substantial changes took into account the needs of commercial 
practice as well as of public revenue.1325 It demonstrates that even though the 
Hong Kong government was free from electoral pressure, it still embarked on a 
self-imposed and lengthy public consultation with various pressure groups to 
foster trust and support for its tax policies. The long consultation process 
initiated in the 1960s was one of the factors that contributed to the acceptability 
of the controversial provisions devised under the 1968 stamp duty amendments 
to maintain system sustainability.1326  
  
As an illustration, the 1968 reform introduced into the stamp duty system many 
contentious anti-avoidance policies such as rendering lawyers, accountants and 
other professionals acting on unstamped documents to be liable for the unpaid 
duties, 1327  as well as the complicated rules to prevent evasion of duty 
chargeable on leases of property.1328 These proposed changes engendered no 
debate in the legislative process as apparently the Financial Secretary had 
already ironed out the differences with the affected parties and considered the 
issues thoroughly before submitting the law to the Legislative Council.1329 The 
evidence also shows that stamp duty law promulgated as a consequence of 
such long consultation was successfully engineered for long-term political 
acceptance. Indeed, the modern stamp duty legislation 1330  retained many 
elements introduced under the 1968 stamp duty legislation.1331 
                                            
1323 Hong Kong Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ‘Hong Kong Annual Departmental Report by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the Financial Year 1968–69’ (Hong Kong, Government 
Printer 1969), 19. 
1324 Hong Kong Hansard 14 April 1921, 37. 
1325 Per John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 93. 
1326 See section 4.2 for the meaning of sustainability. 
1327 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 302. 
1328 Hong Kong Hansard 26 June 1968, 305. 
1329 Hong Kong Hansard 24 July 1968, 345. 
1330 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, c 117 (Originally No 31 of 1981). 
1331 Examples are:  
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Long consultation on tax policies was possible under the Hong Kong political 
umbrella, as the danger associated with party switching, relating to the 
alignment of views between incoming and the outgoing parties, was non-
existent. Indeed, there is no record that any Governors and senior civil servants 
had conflicts with the previous appointees. It was simply not necessary for them 
to hold conflicting views in order to gain office. They just needed to perform their 
jobs well in order to be promoted by the Colonial Office or given recognition in 
the form of a knighthood.  
 
The possibility of engaging in long consultations certainly also discouraged the 
government from adopting a policy of doing nothing on tax matters in order to 
avoid trouble. Undoubtedly, the political environment assisted in fostering a 
constructive evolution of the stamp duty that succeeded as an important source 
of revenue for the government until today. 
 
The body of evidence shows conclusively that genuine consultations were 
usually motivated by the government’s need to insulate political resistance in 
respect of stamp duty amendments designed for revenue raising or to maintain 
system sustainability. The analysis demonstrates clearly that although Hong 
Kong had limited taxation with representation in the Legislative Council under 
British rule, as the official members were always the majority till the 1970s,1332 
the government made up for the deficiency by utilising frank open discussions 
with selected parties. The analysis shows that the use of consultations to 
achieve the end, in turn, had moulded the stamp duty system.  
 
Successive Hong Kong governments respected the system of consultation as a 
fundamental culture to adhere to in designing any Stamp Duty Bills. This 
entrenched tradition was overtly acknowledged by Hong Kong Financial 
                                                                                                                                
1. Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 30 of 1968, s 16. The ground-breaking 
rule that stamp duty was payable only in respect of shares, the transfer of which was 
required to be registered in Hong Kong. See section 4.2.3. 
2. Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 30 of 1968, s 21. The rule that 
prosecution had to be brought within two years from the discovery of the offence by the 
Collector of Stamp Duty or within six years from the date of the commission of the 
offence whichever is earlier. See section 4.2.5. 
1332  Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China, ‘History of the Legislature’ 
<www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/intro/hist_lc.htm> accessed 20 September 2016. 
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Secretary Philip Haddon–Cave (in office 1971–1981) when he referred to ‘the 
consultative system which is, I agree, such an integral part of the decision-
making process here in Hong Kong’, when he was debating the 1981 Hong 
Kong Stamp legislation.1333 The Hong Kong government respected this tradition 
and seldom deviated from the established principle. It can also be said that 
such ideology was retained in the current Hong Kong functional constituency 
system 1334  implemented six years before the resumption of Chinese 
sovereignty.  
4.3.8 British stamp duty law as precedent to gain acceptance 
Through the examination of Hong Kong stamp duty history from 1866 to 1997, it 
is seen that the Hong Kong government adopted numerous British stamp duty 
laws in its stamp duty reforms or amendments. Perhaps superficially, this was 
due to pragmatic considerations, namely that the practical British stamp duty 
provisions had stood the test of time and were unlikely to give rise to 
undesirable effects. Close analysis of the historical records reveals that another 
political consideration may have been responsible for the frequent adoption of 
British stamp duty provisions into the Hong Kong stamp duty system, namely 
the need to obtain political approval of stamp duty legislative amendments by 
the Colonial Office as well as the Hong Kong Legislative Council unofficial 
members.  
 
It has been seen that the introduction of the 1901 Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance 1335  was a stamp duty amendment to implement an anti-evasion 
mechanism for probates.1336 This measure was founded upon British legislation 
to thwart the same device by which probate duty might be evaded. Upon 
examination, the relevant contemporaneous British legislation was the British 
                                            
1333 Hong Kong Hansard 27 May 1981, 909. 
1334 Yasli Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese 
Sovereignty and the Basic Law (2nd edn, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1999), 233–
34. A functional constituency is a professional or special interest group involved in the electoral 
process. Eligible voters in a functional constituency include natural persons of those professions 
or interest groups as well as other designated legal entities such as organisations and 
corporations. Examples of functional constituencies today are legal, medical, and accountancy, 
commercial, industrial and so on. 
1335 No 22 of 1901.  
1336 See section 4.2.4. 
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Customs and Inland Revenue Act 18811337 that had exactly the same wording 
as that adopted by Hong Kong in 1901.  
 
Through the analysis of the Hong Kong Hansard, it is postulated that this 
encouraged acceptance by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council 
because they were less sceptical about law taken from Britain and indeed they 
did not question the new law.1338 In addition, the approach also ensured that the 
new Hong Kong provisions attracted the least possible scrutiny by the Colonial 
Office. The Colonial Office sanctioned the law speedily, praising the Hong Kong 
Attorney General for having done a good job.1339  
 
In addition, the 1901 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance1340 also set the probate tax 
rates on a higher scale than those contained in the 1894 Hong Kong Stamp 
Amendment Ordinance. 1341  The unofficial members agreed, as the Acting 
Attorney General Henry Pollock (in office 1896–1901) gave evidence that the 
duties before the augmentation were still very low as compared to those in 
Britain. 1342  This confirmed that Hong Kong colonial officials often made 
references to the practices in Britain so as to increase the legitimacy of the tax 
law they promulgated in the colony and to attain political acceptance by 
reducing the possibility of critical intervention by the Colonial Office and the 
objections of Legislative Councillors as well as the general public.  
 
In a contrary circumstance in 1921, there was a clear instance where the Hong 
Kong government introduced stamp duty law that had no precedent in Britain. It 
will be recalled that Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in office 1915–1930) 
altered the fundamental British stamp duty principles for stamp duty 
mechanisms and applied them in Hong Kong via the 1921 Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinance. 1343  This was the first time that the Hong Kong government 
introduced new stamp duty mechanism rules that had no precedent in Britain, or 
anywhere else. The evidence shows that Kemp, being a reformist with 
                                            
1337 44 & 45, Vict c 12, s 38(2). 
1338 Hong Kong Hansard 29 July 1901, 39. 
1339 Minutes on Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 22 of 1901 (4 December 1901), CO129/307, 
484. 
1340 No 22 of 1901.  
1341 No 13 of 1894. See section 3.3.5. 
1342 Hong Kong Hansard 29 July 1901, 39. 
1343 No 8 of 1921; see section 3.3.7. 
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imagination and with a willingness to take risks, was not approved of by the 
officials in the British Inland Revenue, who wrote to the Colonial Office to 
register their vehement disapproval of Kemp’s proposal. Kemp was fortunate in 
having Winston Churchill heading the Colonial Office during the promulgation of 
the 1921 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance. Displaying British pragmatism and a 
willingness to deviate from established traditions, Churchill sanctioned all 
Kemp’s stamp duty innovations despite the British Inland Revenue’s severe 
criticisms.1344 Without Churchill’s support, the British government would have 
annulled Kemp’s reform. 
 
The evidence demonstrates that adhering to British stamp duty law was a 
certain way to guarantee political approval locally as well as from the Colonial 
Office. Deviation from British rules would ordinarily attract political disapproval. 
The imperative to gain political approval by trying to adopt British stamp duty 
legislation has been a formative factor in the development of the Hong Kong 
stamp duty system under the British rule. 
4.3.9 Political changes to encourage stamp duty innovation 
It has been seen how the political imperative to obtain consent from the British 
merchants in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Legislative Council unofficial 
members and the British Colonial Office, influenced the development of Hong 
Kong stamp duty law. It must now be seen whether stamp duty law was 
moulded by the total relinquishment of the British government’s control over the 
stamp duty legislative process in Hong Kong after World War II. In other words, 
did the removal of such a key political imperative influence the development of 
the Hong Kong stamp duty regime?  
 
Immediately after World War II a fundamental change was made to the political 
system. Both the Colonial Office and the British Treasury were moving away 
from the concept of detailed control of a colony’s finances. Reflecting on why 
Britain lost its colonies to the Japanese, the British government concluded that 
the considerable correspondence between the Governors, the Colonial Office 
                                            
1344 Letter from British Inland Revenue to Under Secretary of State of the Colonial Office (22 
October 1921), CO129/472, 665–69; Minutes on Operation of Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance No 
8 of 1921 (22 October 1921), CO129/472, 670; Letter from Winston Churchill to Reginald 
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and the British Treasury before the war was counter-productive. 1345  It was 
resolved that the Governors would be able to make decisions with the benefit of 
the colonies in mind and in the absence of the tedious controls exercised by the 
Colonial Office and the British Treasury.1346 More specifically for Hong Kong, it 
was formalised that from 1 April 1948 full financial control from Britain would 
cease.1347 The necessity for the Colonial Office’s sanction was retained for 
annual estimates, expenditures and loans.1348 In 1958, Hong Kong was granted 
even greater financial autonomy. It was no longer required to submit annual 
estimates and expenditures to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for 
approval.1349 It meant that all determining power on financial matters including 
taxation was transferred to the Hong Kong Legislative Council. The composition 
of the Legislative Council changed rapidly with more appointments of unofficial 
members. The colonial government introduced elected Legislative Council 
members in 1985. Eventually, all members were elected in 1995 and the 
system was retained after the change of sovereignty in 1997.1350  
 
Based on the evidence collected, it can be observed that the pursuit of 
sustainability for the British colonial governing system (in which the revenue 
system was a subset), following the British government’s reflection on its war 
failures with the Japanese, led to the modification of the political process. In this 
connection, research into a group of post-World War II Hong Kong Stamp 
Ordinances demonstrates that this major alteration to the political process had 
influenced the drafting of the law. 
 
The Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 1946 1351  which introduced 
stamp duty on capital gains exemplifies the forces at play that enabled the 
implementation of stamp duty on capital gains in Hong Kong at a time when 
even the British government was yet to impose a capital gains tax in Britain. 
                                            
1345 Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics, and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918-
58 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2012), 106. 
1346 Ibid. See generally CO 323/1895/2 for discussion on treasury control policy in the British 
colonies immediately after the World War II. 
1347 Hong Kong Hansard 6 October 1948, 280. 
1348 Ibid. 
1349 Hong Kong Hansard 6 March 1958, 46. 
1350 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (5th edn, Hong Kong, Oxford 
University Press 1995), 116; G B Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841-1962: 
A Constitutional History (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1964), 248. 
1351 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 22 of 1946; see section 3.3.9. 
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More remarkably, the idea of levying stamp duty on capital gains was totally 
novel in the British revenue system. 1352 
 
All revenue legislation passed in the Legislative Council during the pre-World 
War II era was subject to the approval of the Colonial Office and British 
Treasury. The evidence demonstrates that these British authorities frequently 
commented on or even criticised proposed stamp legislation and influenced the 
Governors to make amendments. In one instance, the Colonial Office banned, 
in totality, the stamp duty regulation promulgated locally.1353 It has also been 
seen that the basis of their decisions was usually derived from a comparison of 
the Hong Kong stamp duty law with prevailing practices in Britain. Thus, it can 
be speculated that the British authorities would probably have forbidden the 
implementation of a stamp duty on capital gains, as it might not be accepted 
that Hong Kong embark on the implementation of revenue law in which Britain 
had no prior experience. Furthermore, capital gains tax was still subject to 
debate within the British government at that time without any practical 
outcome.1354 The key problems stressed by the British government were the 
immense administrative problems and taxpayers’ formidable resentment. 1355 
Although Hong Kong had offered solutions to ease the British government’s 
concerns by imposing capital gains tax via the stamp duty system, it would still 
be politically risky if the Colonial Office were to sanction such legislation, as 
after all, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was a political cabinet minister 
appointment answerable to the British Parliament. 
 
In essence, it can be deduced that the main factor driving the actual 
implementation of the innovative Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance 
19461356 was that after World War II the Governor was not obliged to submit the 
stamp duty legislation to the Colonial Office and the British Treasury for 
approval. A survey of the index of the correspondence between the Colonial 
                                            
1352 Britain introduced a tax on short-term or speculative capital gains in 1960s. The British 
government first imposed capital gains in Britain in 1965, see Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The 
Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002), 215. 
1353 See section 2.3.6. 
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Office and the Hong Kong Governors during 1946 1357  confirms the British 
government adhered to the new tenet. The number of letters decreased 
significantly as compared to the pre-war period and there was absolutely no 
communication in relation to the passing of the 1946 stamp legislation.1358 It can 
also be reasoned that Hong Kong Governors were pivotal in approving any 
stamp duty policies from 1946 onwards.  
 
When the Stamp Duty Amendment Bill 1946 was submitted to the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, there was no opposition to the tax at all.1359 It could be that 
the term ‘excess stamp duty’1360 used to classify the new tax as imposed under 
the prevailing stamp duty system was easier to accept politically than the more 
revealing terms ‘new capital gains tax’ or ‘new income tax’1361 that would invite 
widespread resistance. Nonetheless, the analysis of the reasons behind the 
smooth enactment of the 1946 stamp legislation reveals two subtle political 
advancements to pre-empt opposition. These were made to compensate for the 
absence of additional legitimacy previously conveyed by the Colonial Office’s 
sanction on stamp duty policies.  
  
First, the tax was proposed by the 1946 Taxation Committee appointed by the 
Governor.1362 Two Taxation Committees had been formed in the colony before 
1946 to recommend stamp duty related changes.1363 The difference between 
these two Committees and the 1946 Committee was that in order to add greater 
legitimacy to the recommendations promulgated, besides appointing members 
of the same affluent sector of the British community as had its predecessors, 
three prominent Chinese were appointed out of six non-government office-
                                            
1357 Great Britain Colonial Office, Hong Kong: Original Correspondence (CO129): Contents, 
1943-1951 (London, Public Record Office); Great Britain Colonial Office, Hong Kong and Pacific 
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1358 Ibid. 
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bearer members. In order to represent the interests of the community at large, 
the Governor invited Ronald Hall, 1364  the colony’s Anglican Bishop to be a 
member.1365 The 1946 Taxation Committee, for the first time in the revenue 
history of Hong Kong, also invited the general public to make 
representations.1366 
 
Second, the Governor made use of the Select Committee to pre-empt heated 
debates. When the recommendations in the form of a Bill reached the 
Legislative Council, the Governor immediately referred the Bill to a Select 
Committee comprising the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary, David 
Landale and Lo Man Kam (both unofficial members), to resolve the public 
criticisms of the method proposed to derive the taxable gain.1367 As a result, no 
debates were recorded in the whole legislative process.1368  
 
It will be recalled that the stamp duty on capital gains tax was not sustainable; it 
was only in operation for two years before it was repealed.1369 The main reason 
given by the Hong Kong government was that the formula used to derive the 
capital gain was complex and problematic to administer in practice.1370 From the 
standpoint of the political process, this failure was attributed to the review 
processes being inadequate due to considerations of political expediency. 
Although not articulated during the legislative process, the unofficial members 
might have had a prior understanding that the tax was a temporary measure 
that warranted no vigorous disagreement. The evidence to support this 
reasoning was found in the 1946 Taxation Committee’s report. It states that: ‘A 
tax of this nature, dependent on increasing property values, is not a reliable 
measure for permanent inclusion in a system of taxation.’1371  As such, the 
unofficial members did not inject effort and time to perfect the Ordinance. The 
unofficial members understood the post-war social and economic 
                                            
1364 See generally David M Paton, R O: The Life and Times of Bishop Ronald Hall of Hong Kong 
(Gloucester, Diocese of Hong Kong and Macao and Hong Kong Diocesan Association 1985). 
Ronald Hall was described as a figure with a burning compassion for the less privileged. He 
emphasized the needs of ordinary people, especially victims of social upheaval. 
1365 Draft Report of The Taxation Committee of 1946 (Undated), CO129/593/3,106. 
1366 Ibid. Eight representations were eventually received. 
1367 Hong Kong Hansard 11 October 1946, 166; Hong Kong Hansard 17 October 1946, 168. 
1368 Hong Kong Hansard 3 October 1946; Hong Kong Hansard 11 October 1946; Hong Kong 
Hansard 17 October 1946. 
1369 See section 3.3.9. 
1370 Hong Kong Hansard 25 August 1948, 245. 
1371 Draft Report of The Taxation Committee of 1946 (Undated), CO129/593/3,107. 
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consequences that rendered the government desperately in need of funds to 
perform rehabilitation works and to solve social problems. These did not allow 
the comfort of a prolonged legislative review of the novel stamp duty.1372 It 
appears in the Hong Kong Hansard that David Landale and Lo Man Kam 
focused on how to improve the Bill quickly to a satisfactory standard rather than 
formulating opposing arguments to facilitate fruitful debates.1373 
 
Another factor that caused the failure of the 1946 stamp duty amendment was, 
ironically, attributable to the relinquishing of Hong Kong financial control by the 
British government after World War II. With this, the Hong Kong government 
also avoided asking for the British government’s advice so as not to invite 
unwelcome objections to its financial policies. The evidence reveals that the 
lack of support and practical recommendations from the British revenue experts 
eroded the sustainability of the stamp duty legislation introduced.   
 
However, in the longer term, the British government’s decision to relinquish 
complete control over Hong Kong’s financial affairs did more good than harm to 
the colony’s stamp duty system. Hong Kong was able to pursue its own stamp 
duty policies freely without any hindrance from the British government. As an 
illustration, the Hong Kong government was able to embark on bold Stamp 
Amendment Ordinances to repeal a substantial number of chargeable 
instruments in 1977 and 1978 to suit the local conditions, without any 
interference from the British government.1374 
4.3.10 The relative importance of political imperatives in directing Hong Kong stamp 
duty development  
The political imperative in this study has been considered of less importance 
than the demand for sustainability in shaping the Hong Kong stamp duty 
system, for two reasons.  
 
                                            
1372 Hong Kong Hansard 25 July 1946. 
1373 Hong Kong Hansard 17 October 1946, 168–69. 
1374 See section 3.5.3; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 34 of 1977; Hong Kong 
Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 2], No 51 of 1977; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment 
Ordinance, No 22 of 1978; Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 2], No 23 of 1978; 
Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance [No 3], No 24 of 1978. 
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First, the evidence reveals that a demand to raise revenue, or a need to 
enhance the stamp system sustainability, would normally lead to political 
opposition to the related stamp duty proposal. In sequence, the elements of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinances were influenced by the resulting political 
methods engaged in by the government to circumvent opposition. Another way 
to present the relationship is to visualise it as a two-way process. The need for 
stamp duty law to enhance revenue and preserve the system drove the political 
process development. Conversely, the utilisation of political methods to 
surmount political resistance shaped the stamp duty law and implementation 
process. Indeed, the discussion establishes there were many instances where 
the stamp duty system was significantly influenced by political demands and 
some of the laws introduced have been sustained to the present day. 
Nonetheless, it is not valid to position political demand as a more powerful 
imperative than the demand for revenue or sustainability. The reason for 
introducing the many stamp provisions to overcome political pressure was 
related in the first instance to enhancing revenue and/or improving stamp 
system sustainability. In other words, the political imperatives which moulded 
the stamp duty law were first induced by the need to raise revenue and/or to 
maintain system sustainability.  
 
Second, the study did not detect any significant incident arising from introducing 
or amending a Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance that was initiated on purely 
political grounds. In this regard, the closest incident that could be distinguished 
in that manner was the political pressure exerted (1974) by the local commercial 
communities to reduce stamp duty rates, which the Governor rejected.1375  
 
However, political imperative was considered higher than the pragmatic 
imperative discussed below, based on the frequency of related stamp duty 
measures enacted, the impact of the law created as well as the sustainability of 
the rules.1376  
4.4 Pragmatic imperatives 
The appraisal of Hong Kong stamp duty history indicates that there was yet 
another kind of imperative that shaped the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation, 
                                            
1375 See section 4.2.8. 
1376 See section 4.4. 
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one unrelated to the need to raise revenue, or to promote social policies or to 
enhance economic growth. This was the pragmatic imperative. 
 
The characteristics of a number of seemingly unimportant stamp duty 
amendments can be analysed to ascertain their underlying purpose; that is, 
whether they were attempts to fulfil a specific regulatory objective of instituting 
fiscal accountability or to promote certain non-fiscal internal control policies, or 
to achieve both aims. It must also be seen whether such stamp duty measures 
were successful.  
4.4.1 Stamp duty as a tool to institute fiscal accountability 
Governor Sir Arthur Kennedy (in office 1872–1877) did not implement any new 
policies and was content with the practical task of administering the colony after 
succeeding Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell (in office 1866–1872). 1377 
Kennedy did not instigate any stamp duty law to enhance revenue or equity; 
instead he made use of the stamp duty system to improve the practical 
management of the colony.  
 
During Kennedy’s tenure, a stamp duty was imposed on emigration officers’ 
certificates. By virtue of the Hong Kong Ordinance to Impose Stamp Duties on 
Emigration Certificates 1872,1378 the fees imposed by the Hong Kong Chinese 
Passengers Ordinance 18711379 were converted to stamp duties,1380 which were 
added to the schedule of the Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance 
1868.1381 
 
                                            
1377 See Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–1919: Years of Discretion (Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong University Press 1975), 32–39. Sir Arthur Kennedy had a balanced and non-
confrontational approach, and administered Hong Kong with unerring judgement and common 
sense and was the first Governor to invite the Chinese to functions at the Government House. 
Both the Chinese and British regretted his departure in March 1877. On the news of his death in 
1883, a Hong Kong public meeting decided to erect a statue in the Hong Kong Botanical 
Garden in his memory; he was the only Governor of Hong Kong to be so honoured; G B 
Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 160. 
1378 An Ordinance to impose stamp duties in lieu of the fees payable to emigration officer of 
Hong Kong, No 13 of 1872. 
1379 An Ordinance to modify the regulations of the “Chinese Passenger Act, 1855”, No 8 of 
1871. 
1380 An Ordinance to impose stamp duties in lieu of the fees payable to emigration officer of 
Hong Kong, No 13 of 1872, s i. 
1381 Ibid s iii. 
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To determine the rationale for this amendment in the law, it is necessary to 
investigate the events leading to it. With the beginning of the California Gold 
Rush in 1848, a demand for unskilled labour rapidly developed. Numerous 
Chinese coolies were prepared to undertake the long voyage for the sake of 
higher wages. The coolie trade was organised by labour contractors who 
engaged the coolies and delivered them to ports to be housed in barracoons to 
await transport. The conditions on board the ships in the coolie trade were 
deplorable, leading to high rates of mortality.1382  
 
The British Parliament aimed to prevent the abuse of Chinese emigrants 
conveyed from British ports in China by enacting the Chinese Passenger Act 
1855.1383 Under this Act, the British government imposed regulations on ships 
departing from British ports in China with Chinese passengers. For example, 
the Act specified the mandatory space to be allocated to each passenger, the 
diet for the passengers, the total amount of medical supplies to be carried on 
board ships, and many other regulations. The ship operators had to satisfy 
these regulations before an emigration officer’s certificate could be issued, 
authorising the ship to leave British ports in China.1384 The Act also authorised 
the Hong Kong government to enact Ordinances modifying the regulations of 
the Act. 1385  In 1871, the Hong Kong government enacted the Hong Kong 
Chinese Passengers Ordinance, requiring the owners or charterers of ships to 
pay HK$25 when applying for an emigration officer’s certificate. Another HK$25 
was payable when the emigration officer granted the certificate.1386 
 
It was unclear whether the Hong Kong Treasury or the Hong Kong Emigration 
Office had title to the fees. The lack of clarity arose because the authority to 
collect the fees originated in the Chinese Passenger Act 1855, an Act of the 
British Parliament, rather than an Ordinance passed by the Hong Kong 
government. 
 
                                            
1382 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 218. 
1383 18 & 19 Vict c 104. 
1384 Chinese Passenger Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 104), sch A, B & C. 
1385 Ibid s 2. 
1386 An Ordinance to impose stamp duties in lieu of the fees payable to emigration officer of 
Hong Kong, No 13 of 1872, s 11. 
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The correspondence between Kennedy and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Lord Wodehouse, confirmed that the emigration officer was retaining 
the fee for his own use.1387 The amount was substantial because the emigration 
officer had cleared seventy-three ships in ten months in 1872.1388 This was 
unacceptable to the Colonial Office. 
 
The Secretary of State instructed Kennedy to rectify the situation by preparing 
the Hong Kong Ordinance to Impose Stamp Duties on Emigration Certificates 
18721389 to annul the fee payable to the Hong Kong emigration officer under the 
Chinese Passengers Ordinance 1871.1390 This would ensure that a Hong Kong 
stamp duty would be levied on certificates issued to Chinese passenger ships.  
 
The emigration certificates had to be presented to the Stamp Office for 
stamping, which made it impossible for the emigration officer to retain the fees. 
This measure was successful; the emigration officer wrote to the Hong Kong 
government, explaining that he would comply and, in addition, refund the fees 
he had thus far retained.1391 Nevertheless, in the same letter, he requested that 
the government increase his remuneration.1392  
 
The objective of the stamp duty amendment was, therefore, the practical one of 
restoring fiscal control and accountability. The amendment was influenced by 
the development of fiscal policy in Britain in the nineteenth century. The Select 
Committee on Public Monies of 1857 in Britain suggested that governmental 
revenues be unified and treated as a single pool of money regardless of how 
they were raised. The British Parliament formalised the recommendation by 
passing the Exchequer and Audit Department Act 1866.1393 The entire revenue 
collected by Britain from all sources was paid to the Exchequer. Thus, the gross 
revenue collected by the Commissioner of Customs, the Commissioner of 
                                            
1387 Letter from Arthur Kennedy to John Wodehouse (17 January 1873), CO129/162, 11. 
1388 Comments given by senior officials in the Colonial Office in response to the Letter from 
Arthur Kennedy to John Wodehouse (17 January 1873), CO129/162, 10. 
1389 An Ordinance to impose stamp duties in lieu of the fees payable to emigration officer of 
Hong Kong, No 13 of 1872. 
1390 The Secretary of State for the Colonies issued the instruction on 2 September 1872. See 
Letter from Arthur Kennedy to John Wodehouse (17 January 1873), CO129/162, 11. 
1391 Letter from Henry Thomsett to Cecil Smith (4 January 1874), CO129/162, 14. 
1392 Ibid 15. 
1393 29 & 30 Vict c 39; see Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in 
Britain, 1799–1914 (Cambridge University Press 2001), 66–67. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 323 
Inland Revenue, and the Postmaster General, rather than the net revenue 
arising, was paid to the Exchequer. 1394  Government departments were not 
allowed to retain any income to defray their own operating costs. The danger in 
allowing the departments to retain revenue was that they had every incentive to 
use it for their own ends and only pay the smallest possible amount over to the 
Exchequer. The Exchequer and Audit Department Act also required that the 
costs of operating these public services be voted on and approved by 
Parliament.1395 These were the main principles of Gladstone’s British finance 
reform in the nineteenth century.1396  
 
The correspondence between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
Kennedy shows conclusively that the Colonial Office was eager to enforce a 
similar ideology in Hong Kong.1397 The Colonial Office asserted that the British 
principle forbidding any department from retaining fees for its own use should 
be followed strictly. A stamp duty was chosen by the Colonial Office and the 
Governor as a tool to reinforce fiscal control over revenues raised by application 
to Chinese passenger ships in the late nineteenth century. It was, therefore, a 
clear use of the stamp duty to achieve a wider policy outcome. 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the onerous stamp duty was intended to 
affect behaviour or supress the immoral trade of exploiting unskilled Chinese 
labourers. The Hong Kong government might have had this objective in mind, 
but it was not articulated. Even if the intention to supress immoral activities was 
contemplated, the perceived well-meaning gesture did not last long; in 1874, 
the stamp duty was decreased to HK$1 on the application for a certificate and 
another HK$1 on receiving the certificate.1398 No official explanation was given, 
but this might be explained by the Hong Kong government’s intention to avoid 
driving the coolie trade away from Hong Kong to other ports in China.1399  
                                            
1394 Exchequer and Audit Department Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict c 39), s 10. 
1395 Ibid s 14. 
1396 Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 
(Cambridge University Press 2001), 67. 
1397 Letter from Arthur Kennedy to John Wodehouse (17 January 1873), CO129/162, 11. 
1398 An Ordinance to consolidate and amend law relating to Chinese passenger ships, and the 
conveyance of Chinese emigrants, No 3 of 1874, sch E, s 9.  
1399 For an account of the coolie trade and its impacts, see W K Chan, The Making of Hong 
Kong Society (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1991), c 5; Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong, 1862–
1919: Years of Discretion (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 1975), 36. 
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4.4.2 Stamp duty as an internal control device  
Kennedy also imposed a stamp duty on Supreme Court vouchers for sheriffs’ 
services. Historical research reveals that this was an explicit example of the 
stamp duty system being used as a fee-collection mechanism  
 
The duties of sheriffs were to execute writs, summons, and other processes of 
the Hong Kong Supreme Court 1400  collecting fees for various services 
rendered.1401 The introduction of the Hong Kong Sheriff’s Ordinance 1873,1402 
meant that sheriffs were not allowed to collect fees directly; and so stamp duties 
were imposed instead.1403 The law required that Supreme Court vouchers be 
prepared, indicating the services required. These vouchers were to be 
presented to the Stamp Office for stamping. The sheriffs could act only on 
vouchers bearing an appropriate stamp.1404 The Sheriff’s Ordinance stipulated 
that these stamp duties were to be included in the charging schedule of the 
Hong Kong Stamp Duty Amendment Ordinance 1868.1405 
 
The analysis demonstrates that the main objective of the law was a practical 
one, namely to segregate duties to prevent fraud. If the sheriffs were allowed 
the dual roles of performing court duties and collecting fees, the sheriffs would 
have had the opportunity to abuse their powers by not reporting the income. 
The task of collecting fees was delegated to the officers in the Stamp Office as 
a control procedure to prevent fraud. There is no governmental record to specify 
clearly whether the aforementioned stamp duty policy succeeded in achieving 
its internal control objective. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that such a 
measure was bound to be successful provided that a proper control 
environment was maintained to deal with offending sheriffs through stern 
administrative punishments. 
4.4.3 The least powerful motivator for Hong Kong stamp duty advancement 
The discussion above shows that the least important imperative driving the 
development of stamp duty was the use of the stamp duty system to provide 
                                            
1400 Hong Kong Sheriff’s Ordinance, No 1 of 1873, s 5. 
1401 For the list of services provided, see Hong Kong Sheriff’s Ordinance, No 1 of 1873, sch 2. 
1402 Hong Kong Sheriff’s Ordinance, No 1 of 1873. 
1403 Ibid s 11. 
1404 Ibid s 13. 
1405 Ibid s 15. 
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pragmatic solutions for administrative problems encountered by the 
government. Three characteristics stand out.  
 
First, was the very low frequency of occurrence of stamp duty law enacted in 
response to this imperative.  
 
Second, the impact of the rules prescribed was insignificant to the advancement 
of Hong Kong stamp duty system. In fact, there was no detected development 
to the law enacted in response to pragmatic concerns after introduction in the 
nineteenth century. The justification was that as Hong Kong developed with 
more resources, the use of stamp duty legislation to serve as an internal control 
measure was no longer essential. The government was able to set up other 
more effective control systems. 
 
Third, all the related laws had been repealed in the nineteenth century and no 
traces of them could be found in the Hong Kong stamp duty law in use during 
the twentieth century. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It has been found that the secondary imperatives which moulded the Hong 
Kong stamp duty system during British rule, in order of priority, were the pursuit 
of sustainability, political demands and other less obvious pragmatic needs.  
 
A holistic examination of all stamp duty provisions enacted with an aim to 
preserve the stamp duty system concludes that the Hong Kong government 
began to take a proactive interest in introducing legislation for the maintenance 
of sustainability after World War II. The analysis of the sustainability imperative 
shows a continuous evolution in the sub–imperatives: offering convenience, 
increasing the comprehensibility of the charging schedule and provisions, 
clarifying the jurisdiction subject to tax, incorporating noncompliance provisions, 
introducing taxpayer’s protections and safeguards as well as restricting relief 
and exemptions. These enactments were usually effective in meeting the 
demand to maintain sustainability but they were not promulgated in significant 
volume. In analysing the reasons why the system could be preserved without 
the government’s concerted effort to introduce legislation to enhance 
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sustainability, the contextualisation of the stamp duty history shows that the 
Hong Kong system relied heavily on the cardinal rule of stamp duty law derived 
from the British courts in the nineteenth century – to preserve the system. 
Interestingly, the investigation shows that these judge-made rules were 
originally intended to render technical clarifications without considering the 
question of ensuring system sustainability. Furthermore, the investigation 
demonstrates that the granting of near absolute power to the Hong Kong 
Governors pertaining to stamp duty matters, and the introduction of the British 
tenet of taxation only with representation into the colony, had certainly 
supported the maintenance of stamp duty system sustainability under British 
rule. 
 
As regards the examination of the political imperatives shaping the Hong Kong 
stamp duty system, the evidence collected pertaining to the relationship 
between political history and stamp duty history demonstrates that in general, 
for every demand for stamp duty revenue and/or controversial provision to 
maintain sustainability, there is likely to be a political support to deal with the 
demand. Conversely, for every political demand to circumvent opposition on 
stamp duty matters there is likely to be a stamp duty legislative reaction to 
tackle such political demand. 
 
The analysis of the process transformation of stamp duty policy-making in Hong 
Kong from 1867 to 1997 shows how the Hong Kong government managed to 
effect a change in the attitude of the Hong Kong public from opposing 
everything related to stamp duty in the early colonial days to a more co-
operative mind-set in the early twentieth century and beyond. The Hong Kong 
government managed to achieve this outcome by shifting from a pre-occupation 
with secrecy and speed, to open discussions made possible by the creation of 
trust, the explanation of benefit, and frank public consultation. The interpretation 
of the evidence also emphasises that with limited – ‘taxation with 
representation’ in Hong Kong under British rule, the subsequent role of pre-
legislative, frank and open public discussion with various parties on taxation 
matters, was of great importance to the Hong Kong government in formulating 
good stamp duty law. These solutions to political demands also played a key 
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role in preventing harmful elements from gaining a foothold within the Hong 
Kong stamp duty legislative process. 
 
The study reveals the Hong Kong stamp duty system was also used to restore 
fiscal control and accountability within the Hong Kong administration. A related 
observation is that the stamp duty system acted as a fee-collection mechanism 
for the government to prevent fraud when Hong Kong still lacked the resources 
to establish a viable internal control system to secure revenue in the 1870s. The 
evidence affirms the stamp duty system was successful in achieving those 
aims.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion  
 
The aim of this study was threefold: to show how the Hong Kong stamp duty 
achieved its modern form; to identify the imperatives that underlay the 
development of this major tax; and to assess the future path of the tax in the 
light of this hitherto unexplored history. 
 
In order to achieve these aims, this study examined the origins, implementation 
and development of stamp duty in Hong Kong over the 130 year period from its 
introduction in 1866 until the reversion of British sovereignty to the Chinese 
government in 1997. It investigated the historical experience of using the 
system to raise revenue and meet other objectives, and considered possible 
future developments. 
5.1 How the Hong Kong stamp duty achieved its modern form 
At the outset, the evidence shows that the Hong Kong stamp duty system 
realised its modern form as a result of six imperatives driving the colonial 
administration at various periods, operating under the mantle of British ideology 
regarding the governance of a colony, and reflecting the skilful administration of 
some well-chosen appointees to the office of Governor or senior bureaucrat of 
Hong Kong.  
 
The imperatives 
It has been established that Hong Kong stamp duty policies were variously 
structured, either in isolation or combination, in terms of three primary 
imperatives – financial, social, economic – and three secondary imperatives – 
sustainability, political, pragmatic.1406  
 
The first Hong Kong stamp duty statute was predominantly instituted for 
revenue-raising purposes, though Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell (in office 
1866–1872) advocated certain non-financial motives for introducing the tax. The 
stamp duty system was successful in collecting the requisite revenue from the 
outset. It is noteworthy that this innocuous form of taxation was effective in an 
                                            
1406 See section 2.5; section 3.6; section 4.5. 
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economy dependent on entrepôt trade, as well as other commercial activities 
that typified Hong Kong in the late nineteenth century. The success of the 
taxation regime resulted from the abundance of taxable instruments designated 
for stamping. 
 
Two distinct periods have been identified as exemplifying the imperatives that 
principally shaped the development of Hong Kong stamp duty in the 
progression to its modern form. The first period ranged from immediately after 
the 1866 introduction of stamp duty to the beginning of World War II; the 
second period ranged from the end of the World War II to the 1997 reversion of 
Hong Kong’s sovereignty. 
 
During the first period (ie before World War II), the analysis reveals that the 
financial imperative was the most significant factor in driving changes to the 
stamp duty legislation, with numerous regulations introduced to principally meet 
revenue objectives and often to satisfy secondary imperatives.1407 
 
From the 1860s to the 1880s, some Governors declared that certain stamp duty 
measures were instituted to achieve equity restoration, yet the analysis in this 
study supports an argument that the equity-restoring stamp duty legislation 
usually concealed an underlying aim to raise revenue. In short, the articulated 
objectives of some stamp duty legislation did not always match the outcome 
intended or achieved. This was attributed to the government’s need to 
circumvent political resistance in promulgating revenue-driven stamp duty law 
during the system’s infancy. 
 
From the 1880s until World War II, however, the Hong Kong government 
usually argued that the aims of the reforms to the stamp duty were to raise 
revenue. It thus seems pertinent to ask: what was the reason for the changed 
approach? It could be that some of these revenue-driven changes were 
accepted by the public because they had become better conditioned to 
recognise the need for government to raise money in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Nonetheless, the study has shown that the need for stamp 
revenue generally prompted the colonial government to supress political 
                                            
1407 See section 3.3.13. 
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resistance so as to more effectively communicate the revenue aims of the 
stamp duty legislation. 1408  During this period, the government implemented 
specific strategies to neutralise opposition to the stamp duty, including control of 
debate in the legislature by restricting legislative time, the application of 
procedural justice, appropriately constituting financial committees and select 
committees to inform and discuss policy, creating a sense of trust between the 
government and taxpayers, engaging in open and sincere consultation with the 
public, as well as introducing stamp duty legislation that was based on British 
stamp duty law to ensure its political acceptability in Hong Kong. These political 
strategies tended to mollify the near-automatic opposition of the unofficial 
members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and the general public, with 
regard to the stamp duty overall. More cooperative attitudes became apparent 
in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Moreover, it was found that the 
strategies conceived to surmount political resistance also shaped how the 
stamp duty laws were written, the implication being that the content of the 
revenue-seeking stamp duty legislation was a set of permissible outputs 
conditioned by the selected political strategy to obtain its passage through the 
legislature. For example, from a historical perspective, the creation of trust 
would enable a simple increment to stamp duty rates to be approved with the 
government simultaneously lowering its expenditures.1409 The use of procedural 
justice would often allow various equity-restoration provisions to be introduced, 
in concert with the changes to the stamp duty structures, to enhance 
revenue. 1410  The use of cooperative consultation would normally lead to 
sustainable stamp duty law but the process would be time consuming.1411 The 
restriction of legislative time for debate will generally lead to faulty stamp duty 
law, a strategy which cannot be maintained in the long run.1412  
 
The forgoing revenue-raising initiatives could not have been effected if the 
system failed within a short period of implementation. When a tax system is 
new, it is expected that the government will intensify legislative efforts to ensure 
the sustainability of the system. By way of contrast, the study has demonstrated 
that the Hong Kong government acted counter-intuitively, in that stamp duty 
                                            
1408 See section 4.3.10. 
1409 See section 4.3.5. 
1410 See section 4.3.2. 
1411 See section 4.3.7. 
1412 See section 4.3.6. 
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legislation specifically targeted at enhancing sustainability before World War II 
was uncommon, yet the system survived. The study offers perspectives on how 
this was achieved. First, Hong Kong was given a head start by adopting British 
stamp duty legislation that had been tested politically, fiscally and legally for 
some 200 years, in which time undesirable features had been filtered out.1413 
Second, the study has demonstrated that by amending the law to allow appeals 
to the regular courts in 1884, the system sustainability was adequately 
enhanced by adopting the experience embedded in English case law.1414 
 
The study has shown, that before World War II, there was no material 
relationship between stamp duty legislative changes and the provision of social 
welfare. The Hong Kong government had little appetite for the implementation 
of social policies and there was no public demand for such policies.1415 During 
this period, stamp duty law had also been unresponsive to economic 
demands.1416 
 
After World War II until 1997, however, there emerged a need to provide social 
welfare within the colony, and this assumed a conspicuous role in determining 
how Hong Kong stamp duty achieved its modern form. Although revenue-
raising was clearly a leading motivation underlying the imposition of stamp duty 
after World War II, the evidence suggests that it was untenable to claim that 
stamp duty remained simply a tool of the Hong Kong government’s need for 
revenue with no regard to the subject matter of the charge. Careful examination 
of extra-statutory material shows that a succession of stamp duty legislative 
initiatives was promulgated with the principal objective being to abolish 
cumbersome stamp duties as well as encouraging private home ownership for 
lower income groups post-War. Other evidence revealed that stamp duty 
policies were promulgated to tackle the problem of the Hong Kong brain-drain 
that occurred as the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty drew near. This 
related class of stamp duty was not conceived for revenue-raising as it had 
been demonstrated that the Hong Kong government was prepared to forgo the 
revenue loss associated with implementation post-War. It appeared that in 
                                            
1413 See section 2.3. 
1414 See section 2.3.7; section 4.2.5; section 4.2.8. 
1415 See section 2.2.3; section 3.4. 
1416 See section 3.5.1. 
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certain instances, Hong Kong stamp duty legislative changes were intentionally 
and constructively conceived in order to achieve multifaceted social outcomes 
with no apparent ulterior motive.1417 
 
Thus the social imperative played a major role in determining how the Hong 
Kong stamp duty system achieved its modern form during the post-War period, 
contrasting with the pre-War era when the Hong Kong government was inactive 
in using stamp duty to achieve social aims. The reason for the post-War change 
was partially due to similar developments in Britain where providing welfare had 
become a popular ideal. However, it was the case that the Hong Kong 
Governors were never subject to electorate pressure to provide welfare. As 
such, there were other reasons behind the shift in focus. 
 
One Hong Kong historian has emphasised that Governor Sir Murray 
MacLehose (in office 1971–1982) initiated a philosophy of benevolence in Hong 
Kong with personal conviction. 1418  Another scholar stated that MacLehose 
advocated social welfare be implemented in Hong Kong in the belief that ‘if 
Hong Kong was to be handed back (to China) it must not be a colony, but as 
near to an independent state as might conveniently be contrived, and in a 
condition that did credit to its previous owners.’1419 
 
The historians had their various points of view regarding influences on the 
development of stamp duty. Nonetheless, the findings in this study when 
viewed through the prism of stamp duty differ from the perceptions of the 
aforementioned historians, suggest that these stamp duty policies (the abolition 
of cumbersome duties as well as encouraging private home ownership for lower 
income groups) were designed to meet social imperatives, though the historical 
reasons for promoting social development via the stamp duty system might 
have had a different auxiliary objective. It can be argued that the stamp duty 
deletions and the lowering of the stamp duty rate for entry level flats had very 
little to do with benevolence, but everything to do with fine-tuning cost-effective 
administration joined with a cynical approach by the Hong Kong government to 
                                            
1417 See section 3.4.4; section, 3.4.5. 
1418 John M Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 
2007), 161. 
1419 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, Harper Collins 1997), 475–76. 
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be seen in the eyes of the populace as caring, but in effect giving up little on the 
government’s behalf. 1420  This interpretation seems to be in line with the 
rationalisation of the stamp duty regime as part and parcel of a political 
imperative to optimally position Britain for the forthcoming negotiations with 
China for the future of Hong Kong in the 1980s in an effort to retain Hong Kong 
under British control after 1997.1421 
 
Even after it was resolved in the 1980s that Hong Kong would be returned to 
the Chinese government in 1997, the Hong Kong government, instead of 
standing aside, continued to be active in prescribing stamp duty policies to 
solve the social problem of the brain-drain. 1422  The related stamp duty 
measures depleted billions of Hong Kong dollars from the government purse. It 
could be that the Hong Kong government was compelled by the Legislative 
Councillors and the public to tackle the social problem.1423 A better explanation 
would be the parent British government was also eager to curb the brain-drain 
from Hong Kong as many large British corporations with head offices in London 
controlled large business operations as well as property empires in Hong 
Kong.1424 It was politically sound (in Britain) for the British government to ensure 
there were sufficient numbers of skilled professionals in Hong Kong to run those 
Hong Kong establishments. Furthermore, by stabilising the British corporations’ 
income sources in Hong Kong, these companies might be able to maintain their 
contributions to the British revenue as well as Hong Kong income tax. This 
reasoning suggests stamp duty policies that were implemented for 
predominantly social purposes after World War II had auxiliary political and 
revenue considerations during the colonial era.  
 
Following the development to this point, the broader implication is that desirable 
stamp duty policies which promoted social objectives were those that reduced 
the forecasted stamp duty revenue depletion or even improved government 
revenue from another avenue and at the same time appeared to display a 
benevolent consideration.  
 
                                            
1420 See section 3.4.5; section 3.4.6. 
1421 See section 3.4.6. 
1422 See section 3.4.7. 
1423 Ibid. 
1424 Examples are John Swire & Sons Limited and HSBC Holdings plc. 
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It has been seen that the imposition of Hong Kong stamp duty after World War 
II was more responsive to the economic-growth imperative, than was the case 
before the War.1425 Nonetheless, the evidence showed that the Hong Kong 
government since the late nineteenth century generally adhered to a policy of 
not implementing a tax policy that would interfere with the colony’s freedom of 
trade and possibly alienate any particular group of traders.1426 In the 1970s the 
government removed all taxable instruments except those related to property 
and share transactions, which action may be discerned as unfair to traders 
involved in property and share transactions. Nevertheless, the evidence has 
shown that the policy effectively removed trade barriers and enhanced freedom 
of trade for all other sectors to pave the way for economic development.1427  
 
Stamp duty with representation 
In seeking to identify the forces shaping the growth of the Hong Kong stamp 
duty, apart from various imperatives and their implications, the study also 
demonstrated that the Hong Kong stamp duty system was shaped by the 
uprising in North America following the 1765 imposition of stamp duty by the 
British colonists in North America, leading to the American War of 
Independence.1428 This event gave force to the principle that Hong Kong being 
a British colony should give its local residents the right to discuss the imposition 
of taxes. It has been shown that the British government adhered to this tenet for 
stamp duty legislation throughout the British rule of Hong Kong. 1429  The 
evidence has shown beyond doubt that the Hong Kong government initiated all 
stamp duty laws with local discussion before World War II. More significantly, 
following World War II the British government did not even comment on the 
stamp duty law initiated by the Hong Kong government. All Hong Kong stamp 
duty laws were initiated and sanctioned by the Hong Kong Legislative Council 
with no British influence.1430    
 
                                            
1425 See section 3.5.5. 
1426 See section 3.5.1. 
1427 See section 3.5.3. 
1428 See section 2.4.2. 
1429 See section 2.4.2. 
1430 See section 4.3.9. 
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These findings should be contrasted with the conclusion reached by Gavin Ure 
in his examination of Hong Kong policy formation under British rule.1431 Ure 
remarked: ‘It is remarkable how few policies examined originated from the Hong 
Kong government: indeed, nearly all originated from elsewhere’.1432 He shows 
that the policy to regulate mui-tsai1433 was dictated by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies Winston Churchill (in office 1921–1922) to an unwilling Hong Kong 
government. The Colonial Office also instructed the unwilling Governor Sir 
Alexander Grantham (in office 1947–1957) to establish a Hong Kong Housing 
Authority to provide low cost housing.1434  
 
The marked contrast in the differing conclusions between Ure’s research and 
the findings in this study pertaining to promulgation of stamp duty law in Hong 
Kong demonstrates that the British took the lessons learned from the 1765 
American stamp duty revolt seriously and refrained from repeating the same 
mistake again in Hong Kong. It was apparent that the British government 
initiated many policies applicable to Hong Kong directly from London but left the 
colony’s stamp duty policy untouched. 
 
The key concept of involving local participation in discussion definitely shaped 
the Hong Kong stamp duty legislation. As a result, Hong Kong stamp duty law 
was inclined towards the mercantile interest which was strongly represented in 
the colony.1435 This resulted in stamp duty law which retained applicable rates 
and incidences, and an ideology that was not tempered under British rule. 
 
Given the apparent success of the historical model of stamp duty, coupling 
representation with minimum interference imposed by the parent government, 
there seems no rationale for China and Hong Kong to adopt a different path 
during the term of the 1997 reversion agreement. Furthermore, representation 
                                            
1431 Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics, and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918–
58 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2012). 
1432 Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics, and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918–
58 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2012), 218. 
1433 In the nineteenth century, many Chinese girls and women in Hong Kong were mui-tsai who 
had been sold to wealthier families through an intermediary known as a pocket mother. This 
practice helped poor families find better homes for their daughters, while providing domestic 
help for wealthier families. See section 3.4.1. 
1434 Gavin Ure, Governors, Politics, and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918–
58 (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2012), 218. 
1435 See section 2.2.3. 
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and/or mechanisms to ensure the stamp duty legislation is not biased towards 
the interests of any particular community group may be considered a worthwhile 
improvement.    
 
The human factor 
The study has shown that another influence enabling the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system to achieve its modern form is undoubtedly the human factor. Hong 
Kong colonial officials were the backbone of stamp duty innovation and 
implementation.  
 
If only one person could be identified as responsible for the Hong Kong stamp 
duty system achieving its modern form, that person is Governor Sir Richard 
MacDonnell (in office 1866–1872). The evidence shows that he played a key 
role in the introduction of Hong Kong stamp duty legislation and in the first 
stamp duty amendment, which enabled the legislation to survive.1436 Without 
MacDonnell, the introduction of stamp duty in the colony might have been 
delayed indefinitely and the stamp duty system might not have survived the 
initial implementation phase, thus no doubt significantly affecting the evolution, 
if not the very existence, of the stamp duty in Hong Kong. 
 
The evidence has demonstrated 1437  that MacDonnell handled fiscal matters 
efficiently and that he was a skilled and astute debater. In respect of the original 
Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance 1866, 1438  he drafted the law himself, made 
changes himself and personally defended the law, with success, against public 
objection. He was determined to introduce stamp duty into Hong Kong. His 
dispatches to the Colonial Office were to the point and brought out the vital 
issues for London’s attention and approval.1439 The stamp duty regime that he 
introduced proved to be a steady revenue producer and has been sustained 
until the present day. Indubitably, he is the father of Hong Kong stamp duty. 
 
MacDonnell’s experience, gained from over twenty years as Colonial Governor 
for the British Empire, proved invaluable when he needed to ease financial 
                                            
1436 See section 3.3.1. 
1437 See section 2.1.1; section 3.3.1 
1438 No 12 of 1866. 
1439 See section 2.1.1; section 2.1.2. 
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pressure by adding chargeable instruments to the stamp duty legislation only 
six months after its implementation. 1440  He demonstrated his political 
intelligence by developing and executing a plan that enabled the amendments 
to be passed with no resentment from the legislators or the public. 1441  A 
comparison with John Davis, the second Governor of Hong Kong (in office 
1844–1848), is striking. He complained that ‘it was more difficult to govern the 
few hundred English than the many thousand Chinese in Hong Kong’1442 and 
subsequently resigned, partly due the British community’s hostility towards him 
for his imposition of the house rate and his attempts to impose other taxes. 
Through the analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty history, it is apparent that 
MacDonnell’s political intelligence had won him the respect of all sections of the 
community,1443 despite his implementation of a major branch of revenue law in 
Hong Kong. 
 
The evidence reveals that the human factor not only impacted the Hong Kong 
stamp duty introduction and development during its infancy stage but also 
continued to shape the law in the ensuing century. A half century following 
MacDonnell’s introduction of stamp duty into Hong Kong, there emerged 
another key figure responsible for momentous advancements in the stamp duty 
system. Attorney General Joseph Kemp (in office 1915–1930) was responsible 
for the 1921 Hong Kong stamp duty reform.1444 The study of legislative records 
showed that he introduced into Hong Kong many stamp duty laws that were 
ahead of Britain at that time,1445 venturing to create and implement ground-
breaking stamp duty regulations that were opposed by the British Board of 
Inland Revenue.  
 
Kemp’s painstaking efforts enabled the passing of novel stamp duty measures 
that significantly enhanced the permanent revenue of the colony. These stamp 
duty measures successfully counterbalanced the loss of substantial revenue 
from opium resulting from the British government’s suppression of the opium 
                                            
1440 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 3 of 1868. 
1441 See section 3.3.1; section 4.3.1. 
1442 G B Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong (Singapore, Eastern 
Universities Press 1962), 25. 
1443 G B Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, Oxford University Press 1958), 159. 
1444 Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance, No 8 of 1921. 
1445 See section 3.3.7; section 4.2.2; section 4.2.4. 
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trade in 1921. 1446  Most of his state-of-the-art stamp duty methods and 
procedures introduced in 1921 have been retained till the present day.1447 
 
Another half century following Kemp’s reform, the analysis of Hong Kong stamp 
duty legislative development has indicated that Financial Secretary Haddon-
Cave (in office 1971–1981) was another colonial official who personally made a 
significant contribution to the advancement of the system. Instead of adding 
novel heads of charge (consisting of various taxable instruments) to the Hong 
Kong Stamp Ordinance like most of his stamp duty law-making predecessors, 
Haddon-Cave set forth to greatly simplify the Hong Kong stamp legislation by 
drastically reducing the heads of charge in the fiscal year 1978/79 and 
concentrating on the imposition of stamp duties on transactions relating to 
immoveable properties and stocks. The evidence confirmed Haddon-Cave’s 
ability to weight up the situation. He boldly reformed the Hong Kong stamp duty 
legislation and rendered it ahead of Britain’s legislation at that time. Haddon-
Cave’s measures were proven to be a boost to the Hong Kong economy and at 
the same time greatly enhanced stamp duty revenue.1448 
5.2 Lessons and pitfalls from history 
The second set of conclusions drawn from the study relates to the lessons and 
pitfalls learned from the history of the implementation of Hong Kong stamp duty 
during British rule. It is submitted that the understanding of this accumulated 
knowledge is an important contributor to the informed and effective decision-
making by Hong Kong legislators in the future. These lessons are considered in 
terms of the key imperatives that the study has identified as having driven 
stamp duty development in Hong Kong, namely the enhancement of revenue, 
the promotion of social as well as economic policies. 
 
Enhancement of revenue 
The study has consistently shown that revenue-enhancing stamp duty law 
focused solely on the stamp duty structure, such as increasing tax rates or 
widening the tax base, was unlikely to achieve its financial objective. In 
particular, it has been demonstrated that doubling or trebling stamp duty rates 
                                            
1446 See section 3.3.7; Letter from Reginald Stubbs to Winston Churchill (23 June 1921), 
CO129/468, 181. 
1447 See section 3.3.7; section 4.2.2; section 4.2.4. 
1448 See section 3.5.3. 
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would not necessarily yield a similar multiple of duties actually collected, in part 
due to the vagaries of human behaviour. 1449 
 
In order for stamp duty reform to be financially successful, it is a necessary pre-
condition that the stamp duty mechanism needs to be considered while altering 
the stamp duty structure. Whilst it may appear that the modification of the stamp 
duty mechanism has a slight relationship to revenue enhancement, the study 
has nonetheless revealed that every introduction of a novel stamp duty 
mechanism to raise money is a step towards achieving the revenue goal.1450 
Further, the study has shown that simply amending or reinforcing the existing 
stamp duty mechanism without altering the related structure, is also effective in 
improving revenue collection.1451  
 
The theoretical arguments for these conclusions suggest the order of actions to 
pursue when a government is confronted with the raising of extra revenue from 
its stamp duty system. First, consider reinforcing the existing mechanisms. 
Second, consider making legislative changes to the mechanisms. Finally, 
consider altering the legislation for both the stamp duty mechanisms as well as 
the structures. In any event, legislators should avoid the trap of significantly 
raising the stamp duty rates, or increasing the number of chargeable 
instruments, to enhance revenue. The study has shown that some Hong Kong 
Governors or senior bureaucrats fell into this trap in the absence of a clear 
understanding of the past record of stamp duty implementation.1452    
 
Having emphasised the importance of stamp duty mechanisms in raising 
revenue, the historical analysis has exposed one important exception. Offering 
a stamp duty mechanism to improve taxpayer convenience alone would not 
necessarily enhance revenue. In order to enhance revenue, convenience has to 
be offered together with other incentives similar to those used by British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer William Gladstone (in office 1852–1855) in his 
1854 penny tax reform.1453 The Hong Kong experience has shown that novel 
stamp duty mechanisms which offer additional convenience to the taxpayers 
                                            
1449 See section 3.3.6. 
1450 See section 3.3.2; section 3.3.3; section 3.3.4; section 3.3.7. 
1451 See section 3.3.2. 
1452 See section 3.3.1; section 3.3.6; section 3.3.11. 
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with a revenue–enhancement objective have to be coupled with simplification of 
the law and equity restoration.1454 The implication is that the failure of a stamp 
duty mechanism to improve taxpayer convenience is likely to cause revenue 
depletion, yet the passing of legislation to improve convenience alone will not 
enhance revenue. A simple direct relationship cannot be established. 
 
This also suggests that law designed to restore equity may lead to an increase 
in stamp duty revenue. When the relationship between equity restoration and 
revenue collection was examined,1455 it was seen that taxpayers were likely to 
engage in tax evasion if the stamp duty system was perceived as inequitable 
and caused a loss of revenue. However, the analysis of Hong Kong stamp duty 
development in the area of revenue-raising suggests that it would also be 
financially ineffectual to restore equity by the use of complicated legislation that 
taxpayers did not necessarily understand and therefore shunned. Moreover, the 
study found that it is undesirable to introduce any equity restoration stamp duty 
law that might have the effect of encouraging further evasion. 1456  Thus, a 
careful balance needs to be struck between these factors to ensure a 
sustainable stamp duty law to raise revenue. 
 
Promotion of social policies 
The study has repeatedly shown that the use of the stamp duty system as the 
sole means by which to promote social policies, notably to curb Hong Kong 
property prices so as to ease overcrowded living conditions and to curtail 
speculation, has never been effective. This was the case whether the total 
taxes levied on immovable properties were frozen (as in 1866) or increased 
(subsequent to 1866) by the institution of the Hong Kong stamp duty system or 
by making changes to the stamp duty legislation.1457 Investigating this historical 
situation revealed that the phenomenon was attributed to the limited supply of 
land in Hong Kong, rendering immovable properties as asset goods that were 
purchased for their potential to accrue value rather than purchased for 
consumption. It has been learned that in order to curb Hong Kong property 
                                            
1454 See section 3.3.3. 
1455 Ibid. 
1456 Ibid. 
1457 See section 2.1.2; section 4.2.4. 
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prices, other non-fiscal measures had to be implemented.1458 The utilisation of 
stamp duty as a stand-alone regulatory tool, therefore, would be unable to 
dampen the escalation of Hong Kong property prices. 
 
This pattern suggests that stamp duty should not be used as a medium to 
regulate housing prices in Hong Kong. It is thus a moot point why the Hong 
Kong government continued to increase stamp duty rates recently in the 
2010s1459 with an articulated intention to regulate soaring Hong Kong property 
prices. It is possible that the legislators were genuinely not aware of the futility 
of similar policies over the 150 years of Hong Kong stamp duty history. 
Nonetheless, it is more plausible to conclude that the government knew that 
stamp duty increases were ineffectual in curbing property prices but decided to 
take stock of the situation and went ahead with increasing stamp duty rate to 
raise additional revenue. In short, it has not been accepted practice in recent 
decades to institute revenue law changes simply to raise revenue. A strong 
non-financial aim is required to overcome political resistance. Thus, escalating 
property prices serve as a timely reminder for the government to raise stamp 
duty rates on property conveyances so as to achieve undisclosed financial 
goals. 
 
Although the evidence showed that the use of stamp duty was not effective in 
curbing soaring property prices, the stamp duty history after World War II 
showed that stamp duty law was used successfully as a regulatory tool to 
encourage home ownership for the low- and middle-income, groups. This was 
achieved by reducing the stamp duty rates levied on houses suitable for this 
class of Hong Kong residents as well as by offering marginal stamp duty 
relief.1460 
 
Integrating and synthesising the relevant findings, it is clear that in order for 
legislative efforts to be effectual in promoting the socially desirable objective of 
encouraging home ownership, they should be promulgated when properties are 
being traded in a steady market. During a soaring property market, any 
reduction in stamp duty only encourages more property speculation, driving 
                                            
1458 See section 4.2.4. 
1459 Hong Kong Stamp Amendment Ordinance, No 14 of 2014, s 28. 
1460 See section 3.4.5. 
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prices upwards and discouraging home ownership. A soaring property market is 
a signal to the government to exploit the circumstances for budgetary relief. The 
implementation of stamp duty law to promote a social objective related to 
housing issues during a booming property market will be futile. 
 
Promotion of economic policies 
The study has shown that the less-is-more approach articulated by supply-side 
economists – advocating the reduction in tax rates and tax regulation, 
increasing the incentive to save and invest and produce economic benefits that 
trickle down into the overall economy – found favour in Hong Kong stamp duty 
reform during the 1970s.1461 In the 1970s, the government substantially reduced 
the number of chargeable instruments. Ultimately, during the 1980s, the Hong 
Kong government only imposed stamp duty on instruments related to the sale 
and purchase of immovable properties and stocks. It has been shown that 
stamp duty collections soared after the reduction of chargeable instruments. As 
such, using stamp duty as a gauge for economic advancement, the statistics1462 
showed significant economic growth brought about by the less-is-more 
approach. The additional economic wealth generated incidental to the reduction 
of stamp duty rates and their occurrence, was reflected as a rise in trading 
prices as well as transaction volumes in respect of these asset goods (Hong 
Kong immovable properties and stocks). The related transactions were 
subjected to Hong Kong stamp duty and raised stamp duty collections. Thus, 
the evidence demonstrates that the less-is-more approach not only stimulated 
economic growth but also increased stamp duty collection.  
 
Nevertheless, the study of Hong Kong stamp duty history also questioned 
whether it is valid that the application of the less-is-more approach to the stamp 
duty system would always be capable of enhancing stamp revenue. It could be 
that supply-side economics proved effective in enhancing revenue (besides its 
economic enhancement effect) in the Hong Kong stamp duty reform carried out 
in the 1970s, because Hong Kong had identified crucial collection pillars of 
sales and purchases documents for immovable properties as well as stocks that 
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would embrace the economic expansion brought about by the less-is-more 
approach.  
 
It is surmised that before World War II, when the financial and property markets 
were yet to establish themselves as significant economic power-houses in Hong 
Kong, it was doubtful whether the same result would be achieved using the 
same less-is-more approach. For example, in the nineteenth century, it would 
have been financially disastrous if the Hong Kong government had decided to 
raise revenue by cancelling stamp duties on all instruments except 
conveyances and share contract notes. At that time, property and share 
transactions might not have been of sufficient substance to compensate for the 
loss of wealth and economic growth occasioned by the reduction of stamp 
duties.  
5.3 The future of Hong Kong stamp duty 
The third set of conclusions drawn from the study relate to the specifics 
indicating the future path for stamp duty in Hong Kong, whether embellished, 
maintained or abolished, and considered in the light of Hong Kong’s historical 
background, present circumstances and possible future situation.  
 
It has been discussed that the general grievances about taxes which may lead 
to their abolition, are usually categorised in terms of the following four groups: 
excessively complicated; difficult to enforce; unfair; damaging to the 
economy.1463 
 
Stamp duty is complicated 
It has been seen that the Hong Kong Stamp Ordinance was made increasingly 
more complicated from the late nineteenth century.1464 It was not until the 1970s 
that the government began to take resolute steps to greatly simplify the stamp 
duty law thus enabling its sustainability, remaining as an important source of 
revenue till the present day.1465 
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Since the stamp duty law was appropriately simplified in the 1970s as well as in 
the 1980s, and further examination shows that the amendments introduced 
thereafter did not further complicate the law, it is submitted that at the present 
time, when considered in isolation of other factors, it is not rational to abolish 
the Hong Kong stamp duty system based on the rhetoric that it is too 
complicated. 
 
Stamp duty is difficult to enforce 
It has been learned that besides the collection and noncompliance provisions 
adopted from Britain in 1866, the colonial government developed many effective 
methods for enforcing stamp duty.1466 The evaluation of Hong Kong stamp duty 
collection methods, as well as procedural developments in countering 
noncompliance, show that Hong Kong stamp duty law has not been difficult to 
enforce.  
 
The evidence collected shows that apart from the difficulties in enforcing stamp 
duty on trading stocks in the early twentieth century, due to the then prevalent 
practice of using blank transfers in Hong Kong, 1467  there were no other 
conspicuous problems that required specific legislative effort to enforce 
collection. The study has shown that the blank transfer problem was resolved 
completely in 1946 by making changes to the incidence of the tax.1468 The 
evidence gathered leads to the conclusion that it is unacceptable to argue for 
the abolition of Hong Kong stamp duty by claiming that it was too tough to be 
enforced. 
 
Stamp duty is unfair 
It has been discussed that the main argument for stamp duty being regarded as 
unfair was due to whether tax transactions: 
1. generated a profit or loss; 
2. impeded the efficient allocation of capital; 
3. created double taxation.1469  
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The findings in this study enabled a point-to-point discussion from an historical 
perspective and offered suggestions for a possible future path. 
 
Regarding the first criticism, fundamentally, it has been learned that stamp duty 
is a non-inquisitorial tax on transactions that could be levied without the need to 
ascertain income.1470 It has been learned that, in order to instil vertical equity, 
the British government had instituted the concept of ad valorem duty to be 
levied on transaction values stated on the taxable instruments as early as in 
1782. 1471  The evidence demonstrates that stamp duty vertical equity was 
achieved by assessing the quantum of the transaction values stated on the 
taxable written documents in order to gauge the taxpayers’ liability. 
 
In 1866, Hong Kong had adopted the concept and continued to make 
improvements to the ad valorem system in the quest for stamp duty vertical 
equity. 1472  The investigation of stamp duty history has revealed that the 
government had frequently introduced legislative changes to restore stamp duty 
vertical equities by replacing fixed rates with ad valorem rates whenever 
possible, adjusting the ad valorem rates and offering deductions. Furthermore, it 
has been learned that the government also ensured horizontal equity by 
promulgating mechanisms to educate taxpayers as well as punishing defaulters 
to ensure equality of treatment.1473 
 
By close examination of the historical Hong Kong Stamp Ordinances, it 
emerges that it would be illogical and impractical to measure income generated 
in respect of each and every instrument that appeared in the 130 years of Hong 
Kong stamp duty under British rule in order to levy stamp duty.1474 The reason 
is that not every instrument would generate quantifiable income.1475 As revealed 
above, Hong Kong stamp duty system had its own peculiar methods to restore 
fairness; it was not satisfactory to state that the duty was unjust merely because 
it did not assess tax based on the income benchmark. It could be that the 
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critic1476 confused the accepted principle for determining the fair distribution of a 
tax burden based on ability-to-pay,1477 with the ability or potential to generate 
income. It is submitted that income measurement was only one of the many 
yardsticks of a taxpayer’s prosperity under the ability-to-pay approach. The very 
notion of assessing the fairness of the stamp duty system, based solely on the 
concept borrowed from income taxation, is unjustified. 
 
The second opposing view relates to the stamp duty being distortional as it was 
only levied on instruments relating to immovable properties and stock 
transactions. It has been found that stamp duty was initially introduced in Hong 
Kong to widen the narrow Hong Kong tax base in 1866 to instil fairness into the 
Hong Kong tax system.1478 This was achieved by levying duties on a variety of 
instruments. The evidence shows that the Hong Kong stamp duty regime was 
effectual in attaining the pre-set goal of widening the tax base.1479 The system 
continued to impose stamp duties on multifaceted instruments until 1978.1480 In 
1978, Financial Secretary Haddon-Cave (in office 1971–1981) decided to 
narrow the scope of charge facilitating the less-is-more approach in order to 
accomplish an economic objective.1481 
 
It must be concluded that the present stamp duty distortional effect as observed 
by the critic today was shaped in 1978 to expedite economic development.1482 It 
is submitted that, if the need for revenue arises and the public demands a 
diversity of taxes to restore fairness, stamp duty would be an important choice 
to realise these objectives, as has been demonstrated in the past.1483 To be 
more specific, with regard to the critic’s rhetoric about it being unfair that 
purchases such as antiques, jewellery and works of art are not subject to stamp 
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duty,1484 it is submitted that in the past, such transactions were subjected to 
stamp duty imposed on receipts. It is also submitted that documents arising 
from the sales and purchase of antiques, jewellery and works of art such as 
instruments under seal to certify the authenticity of the items, would have been 
subject to Hong Kong stamp duty in the past.1485 As such, the Hong Kong 
government may not want to relinquish the stamp duty system lightly at this 
moment due to the distortional-effect criticism which argued that the stamp duty 
system was unfair.  
 
Relating to the third opposing view that stamp duty caused double taxation, it 
has been shown that the imposition of stamp duty on conveyancing of Hong 
Kong immovable properties as well as shares dealing transactions would 
indeed amount to the collection of capital gains tax or income tax.1486  
 
However, it could not be said that stamp duty imposed on such Hong Kong 
assets created unfairness in taxing the same capital gains, as Hong Kong did 
not levy any form of capital gains tax under British rule (except for the two years 
after World War II).1487 In this respect, inequitable double taxation caused by the 
overlapping of stamp duty and capital gains tax was not detected.  
 
As Hong Kong began to levy income tax in the 1940s,1488 inequitable double 
taxation caused by the overlapping of stamp duty and income tax was detected. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that only the sellers would be subject to such 
inequities when they were liable to settle both the ad valorem stamp duty and 
income tax in respect of the documents pertaining to the sale of the same 
immovable properties (or shares).1489 
 
In light of the findings, it is submitted that if necessary, the law can be 
embellished by granting a tax credit on stamp duty paid on the income tax 
assessment in respect of the same assets to solve the problem in the future. 
                                            
1484 See section 1.6. 
1485 See Appendices I to V. 
1486 See section 3.3.9. 
1487 See section 3.3.9. 
1488 See section 1.7; Michael Littlewood, Taxation without Representation: The History of Hong 
Kong's Troublingly Successful Tax System (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press 2010), 39. 
1489 See section 3.3.9. 
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Stamp duty is bad for the economy 
From the historical point of view, it has been convincingly shown that the 
imposition of stamp duties on immovable properties in Hong Kong would not 
diminish the capital values of the houses in the short run or indeed in the long 
run.1490 Essentially, there was also no evidence to suggest that increased stamp 
duty rates would dampen or curtail Hong Kong residents from undertaking self-
improvement and asset accretion, especially in housing.1491 This viewpoint is 
exacerbated by the observation that immovable properties are scarce asset 
goods in Hong Kong.1492  
 
Nicolas Gibb and John Wakeham advocated that a stamp duty system 
concentrated on imposing duties on instruments related to immovable 
properties ought to be abolished.1493 This is contrasted with the actual results 
derived from the investigation of the Hong Kong stamp duty history, yielding a 
conclusion that their arguments were not applicable to Hong Kong in respect of 
the imposition of stamp duty on documents related to immovable properties. On 
this account, stamp duty should not be abolished.  
 
The historical analysis revealed that the Hong Kong government realised the 
negative economic impact of imposing heavy stamp duties on stock 
transactions, reducing Hong Kong’s competitive edge as a financial centre in 
the 1980s.1494 It has been noted that in order to maintain competitiveness, the 
colonial government took continuous steps to decrease stamp duty rates as well 
as to exempt duties (for certain specific transactions) imposed on stock 
transactions from the 1980s until the 1997 reversion of sovereignty.1495 So far, 
the historical evidence shows that the collective measures taken by the 
government were successful in assisting Hong Kong to maintain its status as a 
prominent financial centre.1496  
 
                                            
1490 See section 2.1.2. 
1491 See section 4.2.4. 
1492 See section 2.1.2. 
1493 See section 1.6. 
1494 See section 3.5.4. 
1495 Ibid. 
1496 Ibid. 
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The historical findings suggested that to maintain the competitiveness of its 
stock market, it may be better, at this moment, for Hong Kong to adhere to its 
historically successful formula of assessing the situation and prescribing stamp 
duty inducements for a particular class of stock transactions or else adjust the 
stamp duty rates across the board, as necessary. This is the case, as the Hong 
Kong government must also consider the wisdom of relinquishing its tax options 
on stock transactions, when the Hong Kong residents, as well as the world-at-
large, are permitted to derive monetary benefits from the Hong Kong financial 
market. 
 
In light of the analysis of the possible factors in favour of the removal of the 
stamp duty system in Hong Kong, the only contentious issue signifying the 
potential of a repeal of Hong Kong stamp duty was the possibility of double 
taxation of stamp duty and income tax on gains derived from trading (not long-
term investment) of immovable properties and stocks by taxpayers. In this 
regard, a possible future remedy has been suggested above. As such, at 
present, it is not justified to abolish the entire Hong Kong stamp duty system 
based on this ground alone. It is submitted that without any material changes in 
the contextual circumstances confronting Hong Kong, such as the state of its 
economy and the balance between stamp duty and other forms of taxation as 
compared to 1997, the Hong Kong stamp duty system should be maintained in 
the near future. 
 
The study analysed the history of Hong Kong stamp duty to ascertain how the 
system fulfilled various pre-determined objectives and satisfied the context to 
survive during different stages of Hong Kong’s development from relatively less 
developed circumstances to the present time. It identified and analysed the 
nexus between the changing statutory expression of the stamp duty and the 
financial, social, economic and political forces that were identified as shaping 
the law. This material interaction between the legal provisions of the stamp duty 
and wider imperatives is so powerful that it must be considered in formulating 
the future role of the Hong Kong stamp duty system. With apparent outstanding 
success, the Hong Kong system is increasingly looked upon by other 
jurisdictions as a model, Mainland China constituting the main example. The 
study has provided not only Hong Kong itself, but also these other jurisdictions 
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with an historical analysis of the evolution of the stamp duty which can be used 
to assess whether the historical cause of the problems encountered by those 
other jurisdictions are the same as they were in Hong Kong, and whether the 
solutions adopted by Hong Kong to resolve similar issues can be implemented 
effectively in their countries. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: The summary of changes to Hong Kong stamp duty heads of charge from 1866 to 1900 
Head of 
charge 
1866 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1866 
category  
1868 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance  
1868 
category 
1873 
Governor’s 
Order 
1884 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1884 
category 
1886 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1886 
category 
1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1894 
category 
Adjudication 
fees 
Adjudication 
fees 
Specified 
within the 
Stamp 
Ordinance 
and not 
classified as 
head of 
charge under 
the schedule 
annexed to 
the Ordinance 
Adjudication 
fees 
Specified 
within the 
Stamp Duty 
Ordinance 
and not 
classified as 
head of 
charge under 
the schedule 
annexed to 
the Ordinance 
 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 
            
Affidavits Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Affidavits No 
category 
            
Agreements Agreements Head 1 Agreementsa Head 1  Agreementsb Head 2 Agreements Head 2 Agreements Head 2 
            
Arbitration 
awards 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Arbitration 
awardsc 
Head 3 Arbitration 
awards 
Head 3 Arbitration 
awards 
Head 3 
            
Articles of 
clerkship 
Not enacted Not enacted Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 23  Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 4 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 4 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 4 
            
Attested copies Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Attested copies Head 5 Attested 
copies 
Head 5 Attested 
copies 
Head 5 
            
Bank cheques 
 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Bank chequesd Head 6 Bank cheques Head 6 Bank cheques Head 6 
            
Bank notes Bank notes Head 2 Bank notes Head 2  Bank notes Head 7 Bank notes Head 7 Bank notes Head 7 
            
Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 3 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notese 
Head 3  Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notesf 
Head 8 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 8 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 8 
            
Bills of lading Bills of lading Head 4 Bills of lading Head 4  Bills of lading Head 9 Bills of lading Head 9 Bills of lading Head 9 
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Head of 
charge 
1866 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1866 
category  
1868 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance  
1868 
category 
1873 
Governor’s 
Order 
1884 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1884 
category 
1886 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1886 
category 
1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1894 
category 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 5 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 5  Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomryg 
Head 10 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 10 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 10 
            
Broker’s notes 
 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Broker’s notesh Head 11 Broker’s notes Head 11 Broker’s 
notes 
Head 11 
            
Charter parties Charter 
parties 
Head 6 Charter 
parties 
Head 6  Charter parties Head 12 Charter parties Head 12 Charter 
parties 
Head 12 
            
Copy charter 
 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Copy charteri Head 13 Copy charter 
 
Head 13 Copy charter 
 
Head 13 
            
Cognovit and 
arbitration 
awards 
Not enacted Not enacted Cognovit and 
arbitration 
awards 
Head 26  Repealedj Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
            
Conveyances Conveyances Head 13 Conveyances Head 13  Conveyances Head 14 Conveyances Head 14 Conveyances Head 14 
            
Co-partnership 
deeds 
Not enacted Not enacted Co-
partnership 
deeds 
Head 25  Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 15 Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 15 Co-
partnership 
deeds 
Head 15 
            
Declarations of 
trust 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Declarations of 
trust 
Head 16 Declarations 
of trust 
Head 16 Declarations 
of trust 
Head 16 
            
Deeds of gift Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Deeds of giftk Head 17 Deeds of gift Head 17 Deeds of gift Head 17 
            
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 17 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 17  Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 
            
Emigration 
fees 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Emigration 
fees 
Emigration fees 
 
Head 19 Emigration 
fees 
Head 19 Emigration 
fees 
Head 19 
            
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 20 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 20 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 20 
            
Instruments 
under seal  
Instruments 
under seal  
Head 21 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 21  Instruments 
under seal 
Head 21 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 21 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 21 
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Head of 
charge 
1866 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1866 
category  
1868 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance  
1868 
category 
1873 
Governor’s 
Order 
1884 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1884 
category 
1886 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1886 
category 
1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1894 
category 
Leases at a 
premium 
Leases at a 
premium 
Head 18 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 18  Leases at a 
premium 
Head 22 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 22 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 22 
            
Lease 
duplicates 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Lease 
duplicates 
Head 23 Lease 
duplicates 
Head 23 Lease 
duplicates 
Head 23 
            
Leases at a 
premium and a 
rent 
Leases at a 
premium and 
a rent 
Head 20 Leases at a 
premium and 
a rent 
Head 20  Repealedl Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
            
Leases at a 
rent 
Leases at a 
rent 
Head 19 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 19  Leases at a 
rent 
Head 24 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 24 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 24 
            
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 16 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 16  Letters of 
hypothecationm 
Head 25 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 25 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 25 
            
Mortgages Mortgages Head 14 Mortgages Head 14  Mortgages Head 26 Mortgages Head 26 Mortgages Head 26 
            
Notarial acts Notarial acts Head 10 Notarial acts Head 10  Notarial acts Head 27 Notarial acts Head 27 Notarial acts Head 27 
            
Notes of 
protest 
Notes of 
protest 
Head 9 Notes of 
protest 
Head 9  Notes of 
protestn 
Head 28 Notes of 
protest 
Head 28 Notes of 
protest 
Head 28 
            
Policies of 
insurance  
 
Not enacted Not enacted Policies of 
insurance 
Head 22  Policies of 
insuranceo  
Head 29 Policies of 
insurance  
 
Head 29 Policies of 
insurance 
Head 29 
Powers of 
Attorney 
Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 8 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 8  Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 30 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 30 Powers of 
Attorneyp 
Head 30 
            
Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 12 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 12  Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 31 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 31 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 31 
            
Re-
assignments of 
mortgaged 
property 
Re-
assignments 
of mortgaged 
property 
Head 15 Re-
assignments 
of mortgaged 
property 
Head 15  Repealedq 
 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
            
Receipts  Receipts  Head 11 Receipts Head 11  Receipts Head 32 Receipts Head 32 Receipts Head 32 
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Head of 
charge 
1866 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1866 
category  
1868 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance  
1868 
category 
1873 
Governor’s 
Order 
1884 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1884 
category 
1886 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1886 
category 
1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1894 
category 
Servant 
security bonds 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Servant 
security bonds 
Head 33 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 33 Servant 
security 
bonds 
Head 33 
Settlements Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Settlements Head 34 Settlements Head 34 Settlements Head 34 
            
Surrenders of a 
lease 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted  Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Surrenders of 
a lease 
No 
category 
            
Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
company 
Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
company 
Head 7 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
company 
Head 7  Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Head 35 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
company 
Head 35 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
company 
Head 35 
            
Warrants of 
attorney 
Not enacted Not enacted Warrants of 
attorney 
Head 24  Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  
Note: Each head of charge might contain one or more taxable instrument(s). Only those Ordinances that effected changes to the heads of charge were presented. 
aExpanded to include brokers’ notes as new taxable instruments. 
bBrokers’ notes were reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
cPreviously categorised under cognovit and arbitration awards reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
dPreviously categorised under bills of exchange reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
eExpanded to include bank cheques as new taxable instruments. 
fBank cheques were reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
gExpanded to include average statements as new taxable instruments. 
hPreviously categorised under agreements reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
iPreviously categorised under chartered parties reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
jRenamed as arbitration awards. 
kPreviously categorised under conveyance reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
lThe duty remained as the total of those due under leases at a premium and leases at a rent. The rule appeared as a note in the charging schedule annexed to the Stamp Ordinance. 
mExpanded to include general letters of hypothecation as new taxable instruments. 
nExpanded to include notes of protest for bill of exchange as new taxable instruments. 
oExpanded to include fire and life insurance policies as new taxable instruments. 
pExpanded to include proxies as new taxable instruments. 
qReclassified as taxable instruments under the head of charge of mortgages.
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Appendix II: The summary of changes to Hong Kong stamp duty heads of charge from 1901 to 1920 
Head of charge 1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
I) 
1894 
category 
1901 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1901 
category 
1902 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1902 
category 
1909 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1909 
category 
1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1911 
category 
Adjudication fees Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 
           
Affidavits Affidavits No category Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 
           
Affirmations Not enacted Not enacted Affirmationsa Head 3 Affirmations Head 3 Affirmations Head 3 Affirmations Head 3 
           
Agreements Agreements Head 2 Agreements Head 4 Agreements Head 4 Agreements 
 
 
Head 4 Agreements Head 4 
           
Arbitration 
awards 
Arbitration 
awards 
Head 3 Arbitration 
awards 
Head 5 Arbitration 
awards 
Head 5 Arbitration 
awards 
Head 5 Arbitration 
awards 
Head 5 
           
Articles of 
clerkship 
Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 4 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 
           
Assignments Not enacted Not enacted Assignmentsb Head 7 Assignments Head 7 Assignments Head 7 Assignments Head 7 
           
Attested copies Attested copies Head 5 Attested copies Head 8 Attested copies Head 8 Attested copies Head 8 Attested copies Head 8 
           
Attorney – 
Letters or 
Powers of 
Not enacted Not enacted Attorney – 
Letters or 
Powers ofc 
Head 9 Attorney – 
Letters or 
Powers of 
Head 9 Attorney – 
Letters or 
Powers of 
Head 9 Attorney – 
Letters or 
Powers of 
Head 9 
           
Average 
statements 
Not enacted Not enacted Average 
statementsd 
Head 10 Average 
statements 
Head 10 Average 
statements 
Head 10 Average 
statements 
Head 10 
           
Bank cheques Bank cheques Head 6 Bank cheques Head 11 Bank cheques Head 11 Bank cheques Head 11 Bank cheques Head 11 
           
Bank notes Bank notes Head 7 Bank notes Head 12 Bank notes Head 12 Bank notes Head 12 Bank notes Head 12 
           
Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 8 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 13 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 13 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 13 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 13 
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Head of charge 1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
I) 
1894 
category 
1901 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1901 
category 
1902 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1902 
category 
1909 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1909 
category 
1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1911 
category 
Bills of lading Bills of lading Head 9 Bills of lading Head 14 Bills of lading Head 14 Bills of lading 
 
Head 14 Bills of ladinge Head 14 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 10 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 15 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 15 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 15 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 15 
           
Broker’s notes  Broker’s notes Head 11 Broker’s notes Head 16 Broker’s notes Head 16 Broker’s notes Head 16 Broker’s notes Head 16 
           
Charter parties Charter parties Head 12 Charter parties Head 17 Charter parties Head 17 Charter parties Head 17 Charter parties Head 17 
           
Copy Charter Copy Charter Head 13 Copy Charter Head 18 Copy Charter Head 18 Copy Charter 
 
Head 18 Copy Charter Head 18 
           
Collateral 
securities 
Not enacted Not enacted Collateral 
securitiesf 
Head 19 Collateral 
securities 
Head 19 Collateral 
securities 
Head 19 Collateral 
securities 
Head 19 
           
Contract Not enacted Not enacted Contractsg Head 20 Contracts Head 20 Contracts Head 20 Contracts Head 20 
           
Conveyances Conveyances Head 14 Conveyances Head 21 Conveyances Head 21 Conveyances Head 21 Conveyances Head 21 
           
Co-partnership 
deeds 
Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 15 Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 22 Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 22 Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 22 Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 22 
           
Declarations Not enacted Not enacted Declarationsh Head 23 Declarations Head 23 Declarations Head 23 Declarations Head 23 
           
Declarations of 
trust 
Declarations of 
trust 
Head 16 Declarations of 
trust 
Head 24 Declarations of 
trust 
Head 24 Declarations of 
trust 
Head 24 Declarations of 
trust 
Head 24 
           
Deeds of gift Deeds of gift Head 17 Deeds of gift Head 25 Deeds of gift Head 25 Deeds of gift Head 25 Deeds of gift Head 25 
           
Deposits of title 
deed 
Not enacted Not enacted Deposits of title 
deedi 
Head 26 Deposits of title 
deed 
Head 26 Deposits of title 
deed 
Head 26 Deposits of title 
deed 
Head 26 
           
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 27 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 27 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 27 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 27 
           
Emigration fees Emigration fees Head 19 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
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Head of charge 1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
I) 
1894 
category 
1901 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1901 
category 
1902 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1902 
category 
1909 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1909 
category 
1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1911 
category 
Equitable 
charges 
Not enacted Not enacted Equitable 
chargesj 
Head 28 Equitable 
charges 
Head 28 Equitable 
charges 
Head 28 Equitable 
charges 
Head 28 
           
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 20 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 
           
Guarantee Not enacted Not enacted Guaranteesk Head 30 Guarantees Head 30 Guarantees Head 30 Guarantees Head 30 
           
Instruments 
under seal  
Instruments 
under seal 
Head 21 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 31 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 31 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 31 Instruments 
under seal 
Head 31 
           
Leases at a 
premium 
Leases at a 
premium 
Head 22 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 32 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 32 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 32 Leases at a 
premium 
Head 32 
           
Lease duplicates Lease 
duplicates 
Head 23 Lease 
duplicates 
Head 33 Lease 
duplicates 
Head 33 Lease 
duplicates 
 
Head 33 Lease 
duplicates 
Head 33 
           
Leases at a rent Leases at a 
rent 
Head 24 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 34 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 34 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 34 Leases at a 
rent 
Head 34 
           
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 25 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 35 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 35 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 35 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 35 
           
Letters for 
appointing 
proxies 
Not enacted Not enacted Letters for 
appointing 
proxiesl 
Head 36 Letters for 
appointing 
proxies 
Head 36 Letters for 
appointing 
proxies 
Head 36 Letters for 
appointing 
proxies 
Head 36 
           
Letters of 
guarantee 
Not enacted Not enacted Letters of 
guaranteem 
Head 37 Letters of 
guarantee 
Head 37 Letters of 
guarantee 
Head 37 Letters of 
guarantee 
Head 37 
           
Mortgages Mortgages Head 26 Mortgages Head 38 Mortgages Head 38 Mortgages Head 38 Mortgages Head 38 
           
Notarial acts Notarial acts Head 27 Notarial acts Head 39 Notarial acts Head 39 Notarial acts Head 39 Notarial acts Head 39 
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Head of charge 1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
I) 
1894 
category 
1901 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1901 
category 
1902 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1902 
category 
1909 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1909 
category 
1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1911 
category 
Policies of 
insurance  
Policies of 
insurance  
Head 29 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 41 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 41 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 41 Policies of 
insurancen  
Head 41 
           
Powers of 
Attorney 
Powers of 
Attorneyo 
Head 30 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 42 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 42 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 42 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 42 
           
Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 31 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 43 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 43 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 43 Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 43 
           
Re-assignments 
of mortgaged 
property 
Repealed Repealed Re-
assignments of 
mortgaged 
propertyp 
Head 44 Re-
assignments of 
mortgaged 
property 
Head 44 Re-
assignments of 
mortgaged 
property 
Head 44 Re-
assignments of 
mortgaged 
property 
Head 44 
           
Receipts  Receipts Head 32 Receipts Head 45 Receipts Head 45 Receipts Head 45 Receipts Head 45 
           
Servant security 
bonds 
Servant 
security bonds 
Head 33 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 46 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 46 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 46 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 46 
           
Settlements Settlements Head 34 Settlements Head 47 Settlements Head 47 Settlements Head 47 Settlements Head 47 
           
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Not enacted Not enacted Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 48 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 48 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 48 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 48 
           
Statutory 
declarations 
Not enacted Not enacted Statutory 
declarationsq 
Head 49 Statutory 
declarations  
Head 49 Statutory 
declarations  
Head 49 Statutory 
declarations  
Head 49 
           
Surrenders of a 
lease 
Surrenders of a 
lease 
No category  Surrenders of a 
lease 
Head 50 Surrenders of a 
lease 
Head 50 Surrenders of a 
lease 
Head 50 Surrenders of a 
lease 
Head 50 
           
Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Head 35 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Head 51 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Head 51 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Head 51 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public company 
Head 51 
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Head of charge 1894 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
I) 
1894 
category 
1901 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1901 
category 
1902 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1902 
category 
1909 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1909 
category 
1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1911 
category 
           
Share warrants 
to bearer 
Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Not enacted Share warrants 
to bearer 
Head 52 
Note: Each head of charge might contain one or more taxable instrument(s). Only those Ordinances that effected changes to the heads of charge were presented. 
aThey have similar meaning as affidavits. 
bPreviously categorised under mortgages reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
cThey have the same meaning as powers of attorney. 
dPreviously categorised under bonds reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
eExpanded to include accountable receipts as new taxable instruments. 
fAdded in to highlight instruments that were already taxable under mortgages. 
gThey have the same meaning as agreements. 
hThey have the same meaning as affidavits. 
iPreviously categorised under mortgages reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
jPreviously categorised under mortgages reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
kPreviously categorised under agreements reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
lPreviously categorised under powers of attorney reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
mPreviously categorised under agreements reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
nExpanded to include proxies as new chargeable instruments. 
oExpanded to include floating insurance policies as new chargeable instruments. 
pPreviously categorised under mortgages reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
qThey have similar meaning as affidavits. 
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Appendix III: The summary of changes to Hong Kong stamp duty heads of charge from 1920 to 1945 
Head of charge 1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from 
Appendix II) 
1911 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1922 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1922 
category 
1929 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1929 
category 
1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1935 
category 
Adjudication fees Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 
             
Affidavits Affidavits Head 2 Affidavitsa Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 
             
Affirmations Affirmations Head 3 Repealedb Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Agreements Agreements Head 4 Agreementsc Head 3 Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 
             
Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 4 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate 
body 
Head 4 Agreements 
of service with 
a corporate 
body 
Head 4 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 4 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 4 
             
Appointments of a 
new trustee 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Appointments 
of a new 
trustee 
Head 5 Appointments 
of a new 
trustee 
Head 5 Appointments 
of a new 
trustee 
Head 5 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 5 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 5 
             
Apprentice- 
ships 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Apprentice- 
ships 
Head 5A Apprentice- 
ships 
Head 5A 
             
Arbitration awards Arbitration 
awards 
Head 5 Repealedd Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Articles of clerkship Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 
             
Assignments Assignments Head 7 Assignmentse Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Attested copies Attested 
copies 
Head 8 Attested 
copies 
Head 7 Attested 
copies 
Head 7 Attested 
copies 
Head 7 Attested copies Head 7 Attested copies Head 7 
             
Awards Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Awardsf Head 8 Awards Head 8 Awards Head 8 Awards Head 8 Awards Head 8 
             
Attorney – Letter or 
Powers of 
Attorney – 
Letter or 
Powers of 
Head 9 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Average 
statements 
Average 
statements 
Head 10 Repealed 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Bank cheques Bank cheques Head 11 Repealedg Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed 
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Head of charge 1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from 
Appendix II) 
1911 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1922 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1922 
category 
1929 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1929 
category 
1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1935 
category 
Bank notes Bank notes Head 12 Bank notes Head 9 Bank notes Head 9 Bank notes Head 9 Bank notes Head 9 Bank notes Head 9 
             
Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 13 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notesh 
Head 10 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 10 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 10 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 10 Bills of 
exchange and 
promissory 
notes 
Head 10 
             
Bills of lading Bills of ladingi Head 14 Bills of lading Head 11 Bills of lading Head 11 Bills of lading Head 11 Bills of lading Head 11 Bills of lading Head 11 
             
Bonds concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 15 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 12 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 12 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 12 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 12 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 12 
             
Bonds  Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Bonds  Head 
12A 
Bonds  Head 12A Bonds  Head 12A Bonds  Head 12A 
             
Broker’s notes Broker’s notes Head 16 Repealedj Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Certificates to 
practise 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 
             
Charter parties Charter parties Head 17 Charter parties Head 14 Charter 
parties 
Head 14 Charter 
parties 
Head 14 Charter parties Head 14 Charter parties Head 14 
             
Copy Charter Copy Charter Head 18 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Collateral securities Collateral 
securities 
Head 19 Repealedk 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Compradore orders Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Compradore 
orders 
Head 
14A 
Compradore 
orders 
Head 14A Compradore 
orders 
Head 14A Compradore 
orders 
Head 14A 
             
Cashier orders Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Cashier orders Head 14B 
             
Contracts Contracts Head 20 Repealedl Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Conveyances Conveyances Head 21 Conveyances Head 15 Conveyances Head 15 Conveyances Head 15 Conveyances Head 15 Conveyances Head 15 
             
Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially described 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Conveyances 
of any kind 
not specially 
described 
Head 15A Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 15A Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 15A 
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Head of charge 1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from 
Appendix II) 
1911 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1922 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1922 
category 
1929 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1929 
category 
1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1935 
category 
            
Co-partnership 
deeds 
Co-partnership 
deeds 
Head 22 Repealedm Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Declaration Declaration Head 23 Repealedn Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Declarations of 
trust 
Declarations of 
trust 
Head 24 Repealedo Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Declarations or 
revocations of trust 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 16 Declarations 
or revocations 
of trust 
Head 16 Declarations 
or revocations 
of trust 
Head 16 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 16 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 16 
Deeds Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Deeds Head 17 Deeds Head 17 Deeds Head 17 Deeds Head 17 Deeds Head 17 
             
Deeds of gift Deeds of gift Head 25 Deeds of giftp Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Deposits of title 
deed 
Deposits of 
title deed 
Head 26 Repealedq 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Dividend warrants Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Dividend 
warrants 
Head 17A Dividend 
warrants 
Head 
17A 
Dividend 
warrants 
Head 17A Dividend 
warrants 
Head 17A Dividend 
warrants 
Head 17A 
             
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 27 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 
             
Equitable charges Equitable 
charges 
Head 28 Repealedr 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Exchanges Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Exchanges Head 19 Exchanges Head 19 Exchanges Head 19 Exchanges Head 19 Exchanges Head 19 
             
Exchange contract 
cancellation notes 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 
             
Foreclosure orders Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 
             
Foreign attachment 
bonds 
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 
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Head of charge 1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from 
Appendix II) 
1911 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1922 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1922 
category 
1929 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1929 
category 
1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1935 
category 
Godown warrants Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Godown 
warrants 
Head 23 Godown 
warrants 
Head 23 Godown 
warrants 
Head 23 Godown 
warrants 
Head 23 Godown 
warrants 
Head 23 
             
Guarantees Guarantees Head 30 Repealeds Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Instruments under 
seal  
Instruments 
under seal 
Head 31 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
 
             
Leases Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Leasest Head 24 Leases Head 24 Leases Head 24 Leases Head 24 Leases Head 24 
Leases at a 
premium 
Leases at a 
premium 
Head 32 Repealedu 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Lease duplicates Lease 
duplicates 
Head 33 Repealedv Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Leases at a rent Leases at a 
rent 
Head 34 Repealedx 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Letters of allotment Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 
             
Letters for 
appointing proxies 
Letters for 
appointing 
proxies 
Head 36 Repealedy 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 35 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 
             
Letters patent Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Letters patentz Head 27 Letters patent Head 27 Letters patent Head 27 Letters patent Head 27 Letters patent Head 27 
             
Letters of 
guarantee 
Letters of 
guarantee 
Head 37 Repealedaa 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Marketable 
securities issued in 
the colony 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Marketable 
securities 
issued in the 
colony 
Head 28 Marketable 
securities 
issued in the 
colony 
Head 28 Marketable 
securities 
issued in the 
colony 
Head 28 Marketable 
securities 
issued in the 
colony 
Head 28 Marketable 
securities 
issued in the 
colony 
Head 28 
             
Mortgages Mortgages Head 38 Mortgages Head 29 Mortgages Head 29 Mortgages Head 29 Mortgages Head 29 Mortgages Head 29 
             
Notarial acts Notarial acts Head 39 Notarial acts Head 30 Notarial acts Head 30 Notarial acts Head 30 Notarial acts Head 30 Notarial acts Head 30 
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Head of charge 1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from 
Appendix II) 
1911 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1922 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1922 
category 
1929 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1929 
category 
1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1935 
category 
Notes of protest Notes of 
protest 
Head 40 Repealedbb 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Notes of protest of 
a bill of exchange 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Notes of 
protest of a bill 
of exchangecc 
 
Head 31 Notes of 
protest of a bill 
of exchange 
Head 31 Notes of 
protest of a 
bill of 
exchange 
Head 31 Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 31 Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 31 
             
Partnership 
instruments 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 
             
Policies of 
insurance  
 
Policies of 
insurance  
Head 41 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 
             
Powers of Attorney Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 42 Powers of 
Attorneydd 
Head 34 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 34 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 34 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 34 Powers of 
Attorney 
Head 34 
             
Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Probates and 
letters of 
administration 
Head 43 Repealed 
 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Re-assignments of 
mortgaged property 
Re-
assignments of 
mortgaged 
property 
Head 44 Repealedee 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Protests by a 
master of a vessel 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Protests by a 
master of a 
vesselff 
Head 35 Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 35 Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 35 Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 35 Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 35 
             
Receipts  Receipts 
 
Head 45 Receipts Head 36 Receipts Head 36 Receipts Head 36 Receipts Head 36 Receipts Head 36 
             
Servant security 
bonds 
Servant 
security bonds 
Head 46 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 37 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 37 Servant 
security bonds 
Head 37 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 37 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 37 
             
Settlements Settlements Head 47 Settlements Head 38 Settlements Head 38 Settlements Head 38 Settlements Head 38 Settlements Head 38 
             
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a duly 
stamped 
agreement 
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 48 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 39 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of 
a duly 
stamped 
agreement 
Head 39 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of 
a duly 
stamped 
agreement 
Head 39 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 39 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 39 
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Head of charge 1911 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from 
Appendix II) 
1911 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1921 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1921 
category 
1922 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1922 
category 
1929 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1929 
category 
1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1935 
category 
Shares Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Sharesgg Head 40 Shares Head 40 Shares Head 40 Shares Head 40 Shares Head 40 
             
Shippers book Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Shippers 
bookhh  
Head 41 Shippers book Head 41 Shippers book Head 41 Shippers book Head 41 Shippers book  Head 41 
             
Statutory 
declaration 
Statutory 
declaration 
Head 49 Statutory 
declarationii 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Surrenders of a 
lease 
Surrenders of 
a lease 
Head 50 Surrenders of 
a leasejj 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Transfers of shares 
in any public 
company 
Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
company 
Head 51 Transfers of 
shares in any 
public 
companykk 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Share warrants to 
bearer 
Share 
warrants to 
bearer 
Head 52 Share 
warrants to 
bearerll 
Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
             
Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Telegraphic 
transfer 
advices 
Head 42 Telegraphic 
transfer 
advices 
Head 42 Telegraphic 
transfer 
advices 
Head 42 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 42 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 42 
             
Trademarks Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Trademarksmm Head 43 Trademarks Head 43 Trademarks Head 43 Trademarks Head 43 Trademarks Head 43 
             
Vesting orders Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Vesting 
orders 
Head 43A Vesting orders Head 43A Vesting orders Head 43A 
             
Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Voluntary 
dispositions 
inter vivos of 
propertynn 
Head 44 Voluntary 
dispositions 
inter vivos of 
property 
Head 44 Voluntary 
dispositions 
inter vivos of 
property 
Head 44 Voluntary 
dispositions 
inter vivos of 
property 
Head 44 Voluntary 
dispositions 
inter vivos of 
property 
Head 44 
Note: Each head of charge might contain one or more taxable instrument(s). Only those Ordinances that effected changes to the heads of charge were presented. 
aExpanded to include the previous heads of charge of affirmations and declarations. 
bReclassified under the head of charge of affidavits. 
cExpanded to include the previous heads of charge of guarantees and letters of guarantee. 
dRenamed as awards. 
eReclassified under the heads of charge of conveyances, letters patent, mortgages and trademarks. 
fArbitration awards renamed as awards. 
gReclassified under the heads of charge of bills of exchange and promissory notes. 
hExpanded to include the previous head of charge of bank cheques. Also expanded to include traveller’s cheques, circular notes, letters of credit. 
iExpanded to include accountable receipts as new chargeable instruments. 
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kReclassified under the head of charge of mortgages. 
lReclassified under the head of charge of agreements. 
mReclassified under the head of charge of partnership instruments. 
nReclassified under the head of charge of affidavits. 
oRenamed as declarations or revocations of trust. 
pRenamed as deeds. 
qReclassified under the head of charge of mortgages. 
rReclassified under the head of charge of mortgages. 
sReclassified under the head of charge of  agreements. 
tExpanded to include to previous heads of charge of leases at a premium, leases at a rent and leases at a premium and rent as well as lease duplicates. 
uReclassified under the head of charge of leases. 
vReclassified under the head of charge of leases. 
xReclassified under the head of charge of leases. 
yReclassified under the head of charge of powers of attorney. 
zPreviously categorised under assignments reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
aaReclassified under the head of charge of agreements. 
bbSeparated into the heads of charges of notes of protest of a bill of exchange and protests by a master of a vessel. 
cc Previously categorised under notes of protest reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
ddExpanded to include the previous head of charge of letters for appointing proxies. 
eeReclassified under the head of charge of mortgages. 
ffPreviously categorised under notes of protest reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
ggIncluded therein was the new chargeable instrument of share contract notes. 
hhChinese version of bills of lading. 
iiReclassified under the head of charge of affidavits. 
jjReclassified under the head of charge of lease. 
kkReclassified under the head of charge of shares. 
llReclassified under the head of charge of shares. 
mm Previously categorised under assignments reclassified as a separate head of charge. 
nnPreviously categorised under conveyances reclassified as a separate head of charge.
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Appendix IV: The summary of changes to Hong Kong stamp duty heads of charge from 1946 to 1970 
Head of charge 1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
III) 
1935 
category 
1949 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1949 
category 
1950 Law 
Revision 
Ordinances 
1950 
category 
1961 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1961 
category 
1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1968 
category 
Adjudication fees Adjudication fees Head 1 Adjudication fees Head 1 Adjudication fees Head 1 Adjudication fees Head 1 Adjudication fees Head 1 
           
Affidavits Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 Affidavits Head 2 
           
Agreements Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 Agreements Head 3 
           
Agreements for 
hire purchase  
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Agreements for 
hire purchase 
Head 4 Agreements for 
hire purchase 
Head 4 
           
Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable interest 
in any property 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable interest 
in ant property 
Head 4 Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable interest 
in ant property 
Head 5 Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable interest 
in ant property 
Head 5 
           
Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Head 5 Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Head 6 Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Head 6 
           
Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 4 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 4 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 6 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 7 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 7 
           
Appointments of a 
new trustee 
Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 5 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 5 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 7 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 8 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 8 
           
Apprenticeships Apprenticeships Head 5A Apprenticeships Head 5A Apprenticeships Head 8 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Articles of 
clerkship 
Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 6 Articles of 
clerkship 
Head 9 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Attested copies Attested copies Head 7 Attested copies Head 7 Attested copies Head 10 Attested copies Head 9 Attested copies Head 9 
           
Awards Awards Head 8 Awards Head 8 Awards Head 11 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Bank notes Bank notes Head 9 Bank notes Head 9 Bank notes Head 12 Bank notes Head 10 Bank notes Head 10 
           
Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Head 10 Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Head 10 Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Head 13 Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Head 11 Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Head 11 
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Head of charge 1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
III) 
1935 
category 
1949 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1949 
category 
1950 Law 
Revision 
Ordinances 
1950 
category 
1961 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1961 
category 
1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1968 
category 
Bills of lading Bills of lading Head 11 Bills of lading Head 11 Bills of lading Head 14 Bills of lading Head 12 Bills of lading Head 12 
           
Bonds concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Head 12 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Head 12 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Head 15 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Head 13 Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Head 13 
           
Bonds  Bonds  Head 12A Bonds  Head 12A Bonds  Head 16 Bonds  Head 14 Bonds  Head 14 
           
Certificates to 
practise 
Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 13 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 17 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 15 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 15 
           
Charter parties Charter parties Head 14 Charter parties Head 14 Charter parties Head 18 Charter parties Head 16 Charter parties Head 16 
           
Compradore 
orders 
Compradore 
orders 
Head 14A Compradore 
orders 
Head 14A Compradore 
orders 
Head 19 Compradore 
orders 
Head 17 Compradore 
orders 
Head 17 
           
Cashier orders Cashier orders Head 14B Cashier orders Head 14B Cashier orders Head 20 Cashier orders Head 18 Cashier orders Head 18 
           
Contract notes Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Contract notes Head 18A 
           
Conveyances Conveyances Head 15 Conveyances Head 15 Conveyances Head 21 Conveyances Head 19 Conveyances Head 19 
           
Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Head 22 Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Head 20 Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Head 20 
           
Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially described 
Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 15A Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 15A Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 23 Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 21 Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 21 
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Head of charge 1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
III) 
1935 
category 
1949 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1949 
category 
1950 Law 
Revision 
Ordinances 
1950 
category 
1961 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1961 
category 
1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1968 
category 
            
Declarations or 
revocations of trust 
Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 16 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 16 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 24 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 22 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 22 
           
Deeds Deeds Head 17 Deeds Head 17 Deeds Head 25 Deeds Head 23 Deeds Head 23 
           
Dividend warrants Dividend 
warrants 
Head 17A Dividend 
warrants 
Head 17A Dividend 
warrants 
Head 26 Dividend 
warrants 
Head 24 Dividend 
warrants 
Head 24 
           
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 18 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 27 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 25 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 25 
           
Exchanges Exchanges Head 19 Exchanges Head 19 Exchanges Head 28 Exchanges Head 26 Exchanges Head 26 
           
Exchange contract 
cancellation notes 
Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 20 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 29 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 27 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 27 
           
Foreclosure orders Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 21 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 30 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 28 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 28 
           
Foreign 
attachment bonds 
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 22 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 31 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 
           
Godown warrants Godown warrants Head 23 Godown warrants Head 23 Godown warrants Head 32 Godown warrants Head 30 Godown warrants Head 30 
           
Import or export 
declarations 
Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Import or Export 
Declarations 
Head 33 Import or Export 
Declarations 
Head 31 Import or Export 
Declarations 
Head 31 
           
Leases Leases Head 24 Leases Head 24 Leases Head 34 Leases Head 32 Leases Head 32 
           
Letters of allotment Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 25 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 35 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 33 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 33 
           
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 26 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 36 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 34 Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 34 
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Head of charge 1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
III) 
1935 
category 
1949 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1949 
category 
1950 Law 
Revision 
Ordinances 
1950 
category 
1961 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1961 
category 
1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1968 
category 
Letters patent Letters patent Head 27 Letters patent Head 27 Letters patent Head 37 Letters patent Head 35 Letters patent Head 35 
           
Marketable 
securities issued in 
the colony 
Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 28 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 28 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 38 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 36 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 36 
           
Mortgages Mortgages Head 29 Mortgages Head 29 Mortgages Head 39 Mortgages Head 37 Mortgages Head 37 
           
Notarial acts Notarial acts Head 30 Notarial acts Head 30 Notarial acts Head 40 Notarial acts Head 38 Notarial acts Head 38 
           
Notes of protest of 
a bill of exchange 
Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 31 Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 31 Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 41 Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 39 Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 39 
           
Partition deeds Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Partition deeds Head 42 Partition deeds Head 40 Partition deeds Head 40 
           
Partnership 
instruments 
Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 Partnership 
instruments 
Head 32 Partnership 
instruments 
Head 43 Partnership 
instruments  
Head 41 Partnership 
instruments  
Head 41 
           
Policies of 
insurance  
Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 33 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 44 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 42 Policies of 
insurance  
Head 42 
           
Powers of attorney Powers of 
attorney 
Head 34 Powers of 
attorney 
Head 34 Repealeda Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Powers of attorney 
for appointing 
proxies 
Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Powers of 
attorney for 
appointing 
proxies 
Head 45 Repealedb 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Powers of attorney 
for any other 
purposes 
Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Powers of 
attorney for any 
other purposes 
Head 46 Repealedc 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Powers of attorney 
for any purpose 
Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted  Not 
enacted 
Powers of 
attorney for any 
purpose 
Head 43 Powers of 
attorney for any 
purpose 
Head 43 
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Head of charge 1935 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
III) 
1935 
category 
1949 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1949 
category 
1950 Law 
Revision 
Ordinances 
1950 
category 
1961 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1961 
category 
1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1968 
category 
Protests by a 
master of a vessel 
Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 35 Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 35 Protests by a 
master of a 
vessel 
Head 47 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Receipts  Receipts Head 36 Receipts Head 36 Receipts Head 48 Receipts Head 44 Receipts Head 44 
           
Servant security 
bonds 
Servant security 
bonds 
Head 37 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 37 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 49 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 45 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 45 
           
Settlements Settlements Head 38 Settlements Head 38 Settlements Head 50 Settlements Head 46 Settlements Head 46 
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 39 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
 
Head 39 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 51 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 47 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 47 
           
Shares Shares Head 40 Shares Head 40 Shares Head 52 Shares Head 48 Shares Head 48 
           
Shipper books Shipper books Head 41 Shipper books Head 41 Shipper books Head 53 Shipper books Head 49 Shipper books  Head 49 
           
Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 42 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 42 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 54 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 50 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 50 
           
Trademarks Trademarks Head 43 Trademarks Head 43 Trademarks Head 55 Trademarks Head 51 Trademarks Head 51 
           
Vesting orders Vesting orders Head 43A Vesting orders Head 43A Vesting orders Head 56 Vesting orders Head 52 Vesting orders Head 52 
           
Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 44 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 44 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 57 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 53 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 53 
           
Import declaration Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Import 
declaration 
Head 45 Repealedd Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Export declaration Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Export 
declaration 
Head 46 Repealede Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
Note: Each head of charge might contain one or more taxable instrument(s). Only those Ordinances that effected changes to the heads of charge were presented. 
a Reclassified under the head of charge of powers of attorney for any other purpose. 
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bReclassified under the head of charge of powers of attorney for any purpose. 
cReclassified under the head of charge of powers of attorney for any purpose. 
dReclassified under the head of charge of import or export declarations. 
eReclassified under the head of charge of import or export declarations. 
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Appendix V: The summary of changes to Hong Kong stamp duty heads of charge from 1971 to 1997 
Head of charge 1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
IV) 
1968 
category 
1973 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1973 
category 
1977 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1977 
category 
1978 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1978 
category 
1981 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1981 category 
Adjudication fees Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication fees Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Head 1 Adjudication 
fees 
Specified within 
the 1981 Stamp 
Ordinance and 
not classified as 
head of charge 
under the 
schedule 
annexed to the 
Ordinance 
           
Affidavits Affidavits Head 2 Repealed Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed 
           
Agreements Agreements Head 3 Repealed Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed 
           
Agreements for 
hire purchase  
Agreements for 
hire purchase 
Head 4 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable interest 
in any property 
Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable 
interest in any 
property 
Head 5 Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable interest 
in any property 
Head 5 Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable 
interest in any 
property 
Head 5 Agreements for 
sale of any 
equitable 
interest in any 
property 
Head 5 Repealed Repealed 
           
Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Head 6 Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Head 6 Agreements for 
sale of interest in 
any property 
Head 6 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 7 Agreements of 
service with a 
corporate body 
Head 7 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Appointments of a 
new trustee 
Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 8 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 8 Appointments of 
a new trustee 
Head 8 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Attested copies Attested copies Head 9 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Bank notes Bank notes Head 10 Bank notes Head 10 Bank notes Head 10 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
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Head of charge 1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
IV) 
1968 
category 
1973 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1973 
category 
1977 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1977 
category 
1978 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1978 
category 
1981 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1981 category 
Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
 
Head 11 Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
 
Head 11 Bills of exchange 
and promissory 
notes 
 
Head 11 Repealed  
 
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed 
Bills of lading Bills of lading Head 12 Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Bonds concerning 
respondentia and 
bottomry 
Bonds 
concerning 
respondentia 
and bottomry 
Head 13 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Bonds  Bonds  Head 14 Bonds  Head 14 Bonds  Head 14 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Certificates to 
practise 
Certificates to 
practise 
Head 15 Certificates to 
practise 
Head 15 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Charter parties Charter parties Head 16 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Compradore 
orders 
Compradore 
orders 
Head 17 Compradore 
orders 
Head 17 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Cashier orders Cashier orders Head 18 Cashier orders Head 18 Cashier orders Head 18 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Contract notes Contract notes Head 18A Contract notes Head 18A Contract notes Head 18A Contract notes Head 18A Repealed Repealed 
           
Conveyances Conveyances Head 19 Conveyances Head 19 Conveyances Head 19 Conveyances Head 19 Repealed Repealed 
           
Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Head 20 Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Head 20 Conveyances 
made for the 
purpose of 
effectuating the 
appointment of a 
new trustee 
Head 20 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 21 Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 21 Conveyances of 
any kind not 
specially 
described 
Head 21 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
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Head of charge 1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
IV) 
1968 
category 
1973 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1973 
category 
1977 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1977 
category 
1978 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1978 
category 
1981 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1981 category 
Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 22 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 22 Declarations or 
revocations of 
trust 
Head 22 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Deeds Deeds Head 23 Deeds Head 23 Deeds Head 23 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Dividend warrants Dividend 
warrants 
Head 24 Dividend 
warrants 
Head 24 Dividend 
warrants 
Head 24 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 25 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 25 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 25 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 25 Duplicates or 
counterparts 
Head 4 
           
Exchanges Exchanges Head 26 Exchanges Head 26 Exchanges Head 26 Exchanges Head 26 Repealed Repealed 
           
Exchange 
contract 
cancellation notes 
Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 27 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 27 Exchange 
contract 
cancellation 
notes 
Head 27 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Foreclosure 
orders 
Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 28 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 28 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 28 Foreclosure 
orders 
Head 28 Repealed Repealed 
           
Foreign 
attachment bonds 
Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Foreign 
attachment 
bonds 
Head 29 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Godown warrants Godown 
warrants 
Head 30 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Hong Kong bearer 
instruments 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Hong Kong 
bearer 
instruments 
Head 3 
           
Hong Kong stock Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Hong Kong 
stock 
Head 2 
           
Immovable 
property situated 
in Hong Kong  
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Not enacted Not 
enacted 
Immovable 
property situated 
in Hong Kong 
Head 1 
  Appendix V 
 
  Appendix V 376 
           Appendix V Cont’d 3 
           
Head of charge 1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
IV) 
1968 
category 
1973 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1973 
category 
1977 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1977 
category 
1978 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1978 
category 
1981 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1981 category 
Import or export 
declarations 
Import or Export 
Declarations 
Head 31 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Leases Leases Head 32 Leases Head 32 Leases Head 32 Leases Head 32 Repealed Repealed 
           
Letters of 
allotment 
Letters of 
allotment 
Head 33 Letters of 
allotment 
Head 33 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Letters of 
hypothecation 
Head 34 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Letters patent Letters patent Head 35 Letters patent Head 35 Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 36 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 36 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 36 Marketable 
securities issued 
in the colony 
Head 36 Repealed Repealed 
           
Mortgages Mortgages Head 37 Mortgages Head 37 Mortgages Head 37 Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Notarial acts Notarial acts Head 38 Repealed Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Notes of protest of 
a bill of exchange 
Notes of protest 
of a bill of 
exchange 
Head 39 Repealed Repealed Repealed  
 
Repealed Repealed  
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Partition deeds Partition deeds Head 40 Partition deeds Head 40 Partition deeds Head 40 Partition deeds Head 40 Repealed Repealed 
           
Partnership 
instruments 
Partnership 
instruments  
Head 41 Partnership 
instruments  
Head 41 Partnership 
instruments  
Head 41 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Policies of 
insurance 
Policies of 
insurance  
Head 42 Repealed  
 
Repealed Repealed  
 
Repealed Repealed  
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Powers of 
attorney for any 
purpose 
Powers of 
attorney for any 
purpose 
Head 43 Powers of 
attorney for any 
purpose 
Head 43 Powers of 
attorney for any 
purpose 
Head 43 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Servant security 
bonds 
Servant security 
bonds 
Head 45 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 45 Servant security 
bonds 
Head 45 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
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Head of charge 1968 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
(Final column 
from Appendix 
IV) 
1968 
category 
1973 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1973 
category 
1977 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1977 
category 
1978 Stamp 
Amendment 
Ordinance 
1978 
category 
1981 Stamp 
Ordinance 
1981 category 
Settlements Settlements Head 46 Settlements Head 46 Settlements Head 46 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 47 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 47 Settlements 
executed in 
pursuance of a 
duly stamped 
agreement 
Head 47 Repealed  
 
Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Shares Shares Head 48 Shares Head 48 Shares Head 48 Shares Head 48 Repealed Repealed 
           
Shippers book Shippers book  Head 49 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 50 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 50 Telegraphic 
transfer advices 
Head 50 Repealed Repealed Repealed Repealed 
           
Trademarks Trademarks Head 51 Trademarks Head 51 Repealed  Repealed Repealed  Repealed Repealed Repealed 
Vesting orders Vesting orders Head 52 Vesting orders Head 52 Vesting orders Head 52 Vesting orders Head 52 Repealed Repealed 
           
Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 53 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 53 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 53 Voluntary 
dispositions inter 
vivos of property 
Head 53 Repealed Repealed 
Note: Each head of charge might contain one or more taxable instrument(s). Only those Ordinances that effected changes to the heads of charge were presented. 
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